THE MILITARY SITUATION IN EL SALVADOR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00914R001800010001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 11, 2007
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 24, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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?ANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Attached is the memorandum requested by Judge
Clark concerning the current military situation
in El Salvador. Completing the memo before the
elections posed some problems, as we view insurgent
capabilities to disrupt the elections as a key test
of the existing military balance. In as much as
Judge Clark does not want the memorandum until 30 March,
we propose to update it just after the elections and
thus firm up our conclusions.
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The graphics shop will provide us with
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Date 24 March 1982
FORM i n' USE PREVIOUS GPO : 1981 0 - 345-783
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Director
African and Latin American Analysis
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 DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
24 March 1982
MEMORANDUM
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Central Intelligence Agency
THE MILITARY SITUATION IN EL SALVADOR
Summary
strategic setback to the guerrilla cause.
On balance, we believe the armed forces will provide sufficient security
in most cases to permit a relatively high voter turnout. The military will
A military stalemate has existed in El Salvador for much of the past
year, although each side has attempted to seize the tactical initiative at
various times. In general the armed forces appear to have made the most
progress in improving their capabilities, and as a result, their offensive
operations have gradually increased in scale and effectiveness. The
insurgents nevertheless remain a potent force and they have improved their
combat readiness appreciably in recent months through acquisition of more and
heavier weapons and the return of foreign-trained manpower.
The insurgents had planned to make a substantial show of force prior to
28 March in hopes of postponing the elections and forcing negotiations. The
armed forces have been able to neutralize most insurgent attacks, however, and
they still hold the current military initiative.
This has placed the insurgents in a position where they must now make a
concerted effort during the final week before the election to disrupt the
balloting and reduce voter turnout. If they fail, it will represent a major
This memorandum was requested by the Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs. It was prepared by of the Central 25X1
America Working Group, Middle America/Caribbean Division, Office of African
and Latin American Analysis and coordinated with the Clandestine Service, the 25X1
Department of State, and the Defense Intelligence Agency. Information
available as of 23 March 1982 was used in its preparation. Questions and
comments are welcome and should be directed to Chief, Middle America/Caribbean
Division, ALA, 25X1
ALA-M-82-10044C
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likely'be sorely tested in eastern El Salvador, however, where the insurgents
now appear to be planning to make a major effort to seize some key cities.
if the elections are successful, the insurgent problem will not disappear
by any means. The insurgents will retain considerable disruptive potential,
and the military balance will not swing quickly or decisively in the
government's favor. But leftist hopes for negotiating with the new government
from a position of strength will be greatly reduced, and new strains are
likely to-appear in the already fragile insurgent alliance.
? More than a year after the failure of the insurgents' "final
offensive" in January 1981, the military conflict in El Salvador
remains a stalemate. The military initiative has changed hands
several times over the past year, but never long or decisively
enough to represent a trend. Repeated armed forces' offensives
against major insurgent concentrations generally have failed to
encircle or inflict heavy losses on the guerrillas. On the other
hand, while the insurgents have been able to keep up their hit-
and-run raids and. economic sabotage, they have not been able to
gain enough momentum to turn the military balance in their
favor .
Despite the continued stalemate, both sides have improved
their capabilities over the past year. On balance, the armed
forces appear to have made the most progress, although this
cannot yet be projected as a long-term trend. Significant
weaknesses remain on each side. The ability of the insurgents to
disrupt the scheduled 28 March election will provide the best
test to date of the existing military balance and prospects for
the future.
Military Improvements
One of the greatest weaknesses of the armed forces has been
a lack of sufficient strength to conduct offensive operations
while still defending major population centers and economic
targets from insurgent attack. Since the January 1981 offensive,
the military has made a significant effort to expand, aided by
increased US material assistance. As a result, the armed forces
have nearly doubled in the past year, and now number about 18,000
(see Table 1).
To improve command and control of this larger force, two
additional brigade headquarters have been formed, bringing the
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current total to six (see Map 1). The activation of a quick-
reaction battalion has provided a central reserve force. While
regular units have often been tied down in a static defensive
posture, this elite battalion has been free to operate where
needed.
The army currently has two additional quick-reaction
battalions in,trainingi, one in the US at Ft. Bragg and another
in-country. The General Staff hopes to activate two other such
units by early 1983, bringing the total to five. Regular
infantry battalions throughout the country also are being
strengthened and reequipped with US M-16 rifles, M-60
machineguns, 81 mm mortars and 90 mm recoilless rifles.
The security forces have also been expanded since January
1981, and currently number about 10,500 men. This has improved
urban security and allowed the National Guard to strengthen
detachments in smaller towns, particularly in isolated areas. In
most of these, the National Guard is the primary defensive force,
generally supplemented only by civilian irregulars.
Another significant manpower, weakness also shows signs of
improvement. This is the critical shortage of junior officers--
platoon leaders number only some 55 percent of the authorized
total. About 500 officer candidates are currently undergoing
training at Ft. Benning, however, and they should be available to
El Salvador by June 1982. Nevertheless, the officers will
require combat seasoning before they become fully effective.
A major air force improvement over the last year has been
the acquisition of 14 UH-1H helicopters. These have greatly
improved army mobility, allowing small units to be airlifted and
wounded personnel to be evacuated quickly. Although a number of
these aircraft were destroyed in the late January 1982 raid on
Ilopango Air Base, they were rapidly replaced by the US. The
current inventory is being expanded to 20 UH-lHs, and Taiwanese
mechanics will be available to assist in maintenance
requirements.
Despite these improvements, significant weaknesses remain:
-- Basic infantry training is poor. There is no national
training center, and each major unit is responsible for
training its own recruits. Given the distractions of
regular combat operations, this has often proved
difficult.
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Logistical support capabilities are inadequate. The
recent acquisition of some 180 military trucks has eased
a critical shortage, but the entire supply system is
poorly managed and controlled. Operations are often
curtailed, for example, because of inadequate rations of
food and ammunition.
Command and control is still weak. Major sweeps are
conducted by different companies drawn from throughout
the country, and these forces have not been trained to
operate as la unit. In addition, communications often are
Interdiction of guerrilla supply deliveries is poor.
Although interdiction of overland insurgent supply lines
has improved somewhat,. defenses -are still porous. Naval
interdiction also needs to be greatly improved,
particularly in deep water. Moreover, there is almost no
capability for air interdiction.
Finally, despite force expansion efforts, the manpower
ratio of the army and security forces to the insurgents
is still only about 5 to 1; far less than the 10 to 1
force advantage generally considered necessary to defeat
an insurgency.
The Insurgent Situation
The Salvadoran guerrillas also have made considerable
improvements over the past year, including increasing their
forces by about 25 percent to the 4,500 to 5,000 range. In
addition to these regular insurgent forces, there probably are
another 5,000 to 10,000 local militia personnel to aid in the
defense of base areas.
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The insurgent units are generally concentrated in about
eight major base areas, primarily in rugged terrain. The most
secure are along the Honduran border. Within these
concentrations, we have been able ~o identify about 40 guerrilla
camps. There could easily be twice this number which we have not
been able to confirm.
Most insurgent training apparently takes place at camps
within the base areas. Insurgent leaders, communication
personnel, and other technicians and specialists, however,
probably get much of their training in Cuba, Nicaragua, the
Soviet Bloc, or the Middle East. Several hundred may be abroad
at any one time, and the cumulative total could be over a
thousand. As a result, the guerrillas have become noticeably
more skilled at handling their newer weaponry and adept at
launching ambushes and conducting sabotage operations.
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The routes used to deliver weapons have been diversified
considerably in the past year. Nicaragua reportedly reduced
aerial deliveries after the failure of the "final offensive," and
most of the supplies began to move overland through Honduras. As
a result of increasingly effective Honduran interdiction efforts
during 1981, however, delivery by sea gradually gained more
prominence. Shipments primarily arrive cuff the southeastern
coast of El Salvador, which is wjthin easy reach of Nicaragua by
small fishing craft. Air deliveries also have picked up again,
usually by parachute drop. Airfields outside of Nicaragua,
including some in Costa Rica and Panama, have increasingly been
used as points of departure.
Despite the insurgent improvements during the past year,
significant weaknesses have continued to hinder their efforts: 25X1
-- The various factions have been riven by serious
differences over political and military strategy. The
largest faction--the Farabundo Marti Popular Liberation
Force (FPL)--is opposed to negotiation and believes a
protracted guerrilla war is necessary to achieve an
ultimate victory. Other factions apparently still hope
for a victory through a popular insurrection, and barring
that, a negotiated settlement giving them access to 25X1
power.
-- Another basic weakness has been the failure to build a
substantial base of popular support. Although the
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insurgents have been largely able to gain the favor of
rural peasants in the base areas, they have failed to
rebuild their urban front organizations.
Insurgent Efforts to Disrupt the Elections
By the end of 1981, insurgent recognition that the scheduled
28 March constituent assembly glection could deal them a major
strategic setback, particularly if there were a high voter
turnout, led them to put aside many of their political and
military differences.
This insurgent mobilization effort to disrupt the elections
will have residual benefits--better arms, more trained cadre,
specialized units--in the months to come. Nevertheless, the
primary motive of the anti-election campaign is essentially
defensive--to prevent a political defeat. The insurgent leaders
are aware that successful elections will boost the new
government's image at hom and abroad and deal a psychological
blow to guerrilla morale.
Initially the insurgents hoped that increased raids on major
towns and cities, more attacks and ambushes of small military
garrisons, and stepped up sabotage operations would demonstrate
the continued military strength of the left and force the
government into negotiations. Some of the more optimistic
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factions even hoped that an "insurrectionary" climate would be
created, leaving the government no choice but to cancel the
elections.
The failure of their campaign to prevent the elections has
forced the insurgents into a position where they must now attempt
Current Situation
an all-out effort to disrupt the actual balloting.
The insurgents hope they can still intimidate voters,
disrupt transportation to the polls, reduce voter turnout, and
generally undermine the credibility of the elections. They may
even attempt to place bombs in polling places to prevent
voting. These efforts also are aimed at producing enough
distructive violence to attract considerable world attention.F
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Prospects
On balance, we believe the armed forces will provide
sufficient security in most cases to permit a relatively high
voter turnout. Insurgent attempts to paralyze public
transportation in rural areas could hold down balloting there
somewhat, but most reports indicate considerable voter
determination to get. to the polls.
Nevertheless, the army may be sorely tested in eastern El
Salvador, where its resources are stretched thin and
reinforcement must come across the two remaining--and
vulnerable--bridges across the Lempa River. But even in the
east, guerrilla victories are likely to be temporary.
Should the elections come off well and the insurgents
achieve only temporary military successes, they will suffer in
several ways:
-- Considerable manpower and material likely will be
expended, drawing down insurgent resources.
-- The psychological blow to the morale of insurgent rank-
and-file may be considerable.
-- Insurgent unity is likely to fall apart after 28 March,
particularly as their current alliance is based primarily
on the common goal of disrupting the elections, and
failure to do so is likely to result in considerable
recrimination.
The military balance will not swing quickly and decisively
in the government's favor, however, as the insurgents will retain
strong residual capabilities:
-- The insurgent offensive effort in eastern El Salvador,
although failing to take and hold major cities, may help
them expand and consolidate control of rural areas.
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-- The Cuban and Nicaraguan arms pipeline will likely remain
open, and the military's interdiction capabilities will
still be minimal. Nevertheless, less priority may be
given to sending arms to El Salvador as opposed to other
areas, especially Guatemala.
-- Despite the negative impact that attempts to disrupt the i
actual balloting may have an world opinion, the
insurgents will continue to enjoy considerable
international public support in both political fora and
the media.
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Table 1
Salvadoran Military Strength
February 1981 March 1982
Army 9,170 17,015
Navy 285 440
Air Force 180 510
9,635 17,96
National Guard 3,460 3,540
National Police 2,835 4,940
Treasury Police 1,320 2,040
7,615 10,520
GRAND TOTAL 17,250
28,485
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SUBJECT: The Military Situation in El Salvador
Distribution:
Orig. Cy #1 - William P. Clark
2 - DCI
3 - DDCI
4 - ED/DCI
5 - EXEC REGISTRY
6 - CHAIRMAN, NIC
7 - DDO
8 - DDI
9 - ADDI
10 - AS/DDI
11 - SA/IA
12 - C/DDI/PES
13 - DDI REGISTRY
14 - NIO/LA
15 - D/ALA
16-17 - ALA/PROD. STAFF
18-21 - OCO/IMD/CB
22 -'C/MCD/ALA
23 - DC/MCD/ALA
24 - C/CAWG/ALA
25 - ES-DESK
26-27 - FILE
DDI/ALA/MCD/CA 24Mar82)
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Moe*1
Salvadoran Military Organization
Brigade boundary
Military garrison
4
Kilometers
asp
tepequ
La Unidn
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Chalatenango t
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