SOVIET GAS PIPELINE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00914R001000060038-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 20, 2007
• Sequence Number: 38
• Publication Date: July 2, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
Routing Slip
ACTION
INF
DATE
I NITIA
1
DCI
1
JUL 198
2
DDCI
3
EXDIR
4
D/ICS
5
6
DDA
7
DDO
8
DDS&T
9
Chm/NIC
10
GC
11
IG
12
Compt
13
D/EEO
14
D/Pers
15
D/OEA
16
C/PAD/OEA
17
SIVIA
18
A0/DCI
19
C/IPD/01S
20
21
22
A01 roved For. Release 2007/02/20: CIA-R?P83M00914R00100006
 International
Communication
Agency
' United States of America
JUL 2 1982
Washington, D. C. 20547
riE110RAI1DUM FOR: 4
illiam J- ------y
Director
Central Intelligence Aged cy
FROM: Charles Z. Odic
Director
SUBJECT: Soviet Gas Pipeline
I would like to recall to your attention findings on the
our recent surveys in
Yamal natural gas pipeline from
Western Europe. On the eve of the Versailles Summit, USICA
opinion polls found that:
o Most French (57%), Germans (50%), and Italians (64%)
eline with the USSR.
i
p
favored building the gas p
to two-thirds n
a
o But nearly one-half (Germany) o ed the pipeline
f
d o p
France) changed their minds an
they thought that Soviet hard-currency earnings would be
ilitary strength.
used to beef-up Soviet m
Europeans were of several minus on ????`
supplies would: make them more vulnerable; moderate Soviet
The ar response was
most popul
actions; or have no effect.
"vulnerable" (32%-37%) -- an increase of 12-14 percent over
last year (except in Italy).
not see their eheoip~
did
e-
On trade generally, Europeans
dependent on Soviet trade and, at the same time, their pf
de should continue reg
t
ra
vailing view was that
lsewhere.
d
e
Soviet actions in Poland an
While having little desire for trade osatitions or halting
is:
S
p
U
.
.
detente, they agreed with key
o The prevailing view (except in Italy) was to restrict
The Italians
USSR
h
.
e
"high technology" sales to t
osed
were split, but a year ago the prevailing view opposed
e in France).
t
ru
restrictions (as was also
o Though desiring trade, they did not want to subsidize
16-00- in Italy to 84% in
the Soviet economy. Most
Britain) opposed granting special trade concessions to
t loans and credit.
Moscow -- such as low interes
d coordinating their Soviet
o And, Europeans preferre
trade policy with the U.S. -- even if it means less
their own "best deals."
i
ng
trade -- rather than mak
C its