CUBAN AND NICARAGUAN INVOLVEMENT IN EL SALVADOR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00914R000700020040-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 20, 2006
• Sequence Number: 40
• Publication Date: March 6, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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ER NO.
82-502/2
DCI N DDI DATE
C/LA/Div/D0 6 Mar 82
CLASS.
L-2048 8B-227 S pr
_
UB: Memo: Subject: Cuban and Nicaraguan Involvement in
31 Salvador: The demand for proof of Cuban and
icaraguan involvement in El Salvador is bring met
partially by martialling current evidence. I am
attaching' a current Heritage Foundation publication
t-: as stated above
Mar 82 0rig w/atts &'l cy w/atts to ES f/distribution
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8 Mar 82 Orig w/atts to DDI f/action fpdmW fm D/ES:
1 cy w/atts to C/L.A/DDO: 1 cy w/atts DCI: cys w/o/att
to DDCI: EXDIR: DDO: D/OEA: SA/IA: ES: ER Watts to -
files:.Ext. Susp NOON 10 March.
b C
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MEMORANDUM FOR: deputy Director for Intelligence
Chief, Latin America Division, DO
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Cuban and Nicaraguan Involvement in El Salvador
1. The demand for proof of Cuban and Nicaraguan involvement in
El Salvador is being met partially by martialling current evidence.
We knew this as a fact well over a year ago and have been constantly
getting one or another reaffirmation over that period.
2. I think a compilation of this history should be made and pulled
together for use at the present time, hopefully for the testimony requested
by the Senate Committee for Thursday of next week. Included in this should
be a public statement of credible witnesses such as those made by Archbishop
Obando y Bravo on November 16, 1981, who stated that the Nicaraguan govern-
ment is governed by Cubans and not by the junta. We make a mistake in con-
fining the evidence to Nicaragua when proof of Cuban and Soviet involvement
is just as good and strengthens the case. There is no harm in repeating
some of the White Paper material. The public has forgotten the details of
that and stronger elements should be incorporated in this statement. The
implications are the same when the Salvadorans and Guatemalan leaders are
called to Havana or Mexico City for instruction under Cuban and Nicaraguan
leadership as it is for them to be called to Managua.
3. I am attaching a current Heritage Foundation publication which
captures some of the public evidence.
Ja 7
I2 X1
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SECRET
 February 24, 1982
THE NICARAGUAN CONNECTION.-,
A THREAT TO CENTRAL AMERICA
INTRODUCTION
Nicaragua and the United States enjoyed close ties for over
half a century. This relationship ended as the Carter Administra-
tion. provided tacit support for the Sandinista revolutionaries
who ousted the Somoza government in July 1979. The Sandinista
National Liberation Front (FSLN) came to power then, and the
Carter Administration provided Nicaragua with massive financial
assistance in efforts to win their friendship. The U.S. continued
its attempts to improve bilateral relations and by the end of
1980, the U.S. had become Nicaragua's single largest financial
supporter.
But, in spite of this U.S. aid, the Sandinistas remained
hostile to the United States and suppressed democratic-movements
and dissent in Nicaragua.. Most alarming, the Sandinistas have
forged a Nicaraguan connection which actively arms and trains
Marxist-Leninist guerrillas in El Salvador and Guatemala. The
Sandinistas have identified their government as a Marxist-Leninist
regime and adopted a foreign policy aligned with the Soviet
Union. The government has repressed freedom of the press, harassed
the Catholic Church and increased human rights violations. The
Sandinistas have created the largest military force in Central
America, and now poses amilitary threat to its neighbors.
Following the inauguration of the Reagan Administration, the
U.S. suspended bilateral financial assistance to Nicaragua in an
effort to stem Sandinista aggression within Central America.
This effort, however, has failed to pressure the Sandinistas to
cease supplying military and logistical support to the guerrillas.
in El Salvador and Guatemala. In order for the U.S. to halt
Nicaragua's military assistance to the leftist guerrillas in
Central America, the Reagan Administration will have to reassess
its current policy and develop a solid strategy aimed at ending
the threats to the region posed by the Sandinista regime.
Note: Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an
attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress.
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THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE SANDINISTA GOVERNMENT
Although the opposition to President Anastasio Somoza Debayle
was broadly based, the armed struggle to oust him: was directed by
the Sandinistas (FSLN). This group, formed in 1961 by several
communist activists, is named after a Nicaraguan revoulutionary
nationalist hero, Augusto Cesar Sandino. The group was composed
of three factions: the Marxist-Leninist Prolonged Popular Struggle
(GPP), the Trotskyite Proletarian (TP), and the Castroite Terceris-
tas. These three Sandinista splinter groups, which initially
were plagued by internal disputes, united in response to Fidel
Castro's promise of assistance to a unified Sandinista movement.
This led to the formation of the Sandinista National Directorate,
incorporating the nine leading commanders of the three FSLN
factions, all of whom are self-proclaimed Marxist-Leninists.
In spite of the Sandinistas' radical orientation, the vast
majority of Nicaragua's democratic sectors joined efforts with
the Sandinistas to depose the Somoza government. This was primar-
ily due to a pact (Punta Arenas) spelled out in a political
platform devised by the Sandinista government in exile. This
platform affirmed the Sandinistas' commitment to restore a consti-
tutional government through "universal suffrage" for all Nicara-
guans; until these elections were held, the government would be
composed of individuals with various political ideologies. The
platform also promised that the government would adopt an indepen-
dent foreign policy and give the private sector a major role in
the economic activities of the country. (See Appendix I.)
However, following the July 1979 collapse of the transitional
Nicaraguan government headed by President Urcuyo, the nine comman-
ders within the Sandinista Directorate occupied key ministerial
posts and maintained complete authority over the army and security
forces.' Furthermore, these Directorate commanders appointed a
majority of FSLN-affiliated members*to all branches within Nicara-
gua's new "revolutionary" government. They also requested and
received numerous advisers from Socialist bloc nations. These
advisers, primarily from Cuba and the German Democratic Republic,
have assumed prominent roles within Nicaragua's army and security
forces, education, health,-:communication and information services.
In spite of_the-ideological unity within the Directorate,
the complex inter-relations of its members, all of whom rule
The nine commanders, the factions and positions in the government are as
follows: The GPP (spanish initials) Directorate, consisting of: Tomas
Borge (Minister of the Interior), Henry Ruiz (Minister of Planning), and
Bayardo Arce (Propaganda Chief); Proletarian: Luis Carrion (Vice-Minister
of Defense), Jaime Wheelock (Minister of Agriculture), and Carlos Nunez
(President of the State Council); and Terceristas: Daniel Ortega (Junta
Coordinator), Humberto Ortega (Minister of Defense), and Victor Tirado
(Minister without portfolio and Economic Supervisor).
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independently as "President," has brought confusion and a constant
struggle for power. Directorate member and Interior Minister
Tomas Borge initially emerged as the principal leader of the
Nicaraguan government. Borge has since lost considerable power
to the Ortega brothers, who also are members of the Directorate:
Humberto, who is Defense Minister, and Daniel, who is the Junta
leader. Nevertheless, all the Directorate members continue to
play a central role.. in the decision-making process within the
Sandinista government.
The Directorate's subordinate five-member Junta initially
contained two moderates, Violeta Chamorro and Alfonso Robelo,
both appointed by the Directorate. Both resigned in April 1980,
Chamorro allegedly for health reasons and Robelo in protest at
the radical Sandinista policies; the Directorate replaced them
with two independent Sandinista supporters, Arturo Cruz and
Rafael Cordoba Rivas. The Junta was reorganized in March 1981.
The new three-man Junta, composed of Sandinistas Daniel Ortega
and Sergio Ramirez and "moderate" Rafael Cordoba Rivas, has
maintained its dominant Marxist-Leninist composition and continues
to take its orders form the Sandinista National Directorate.
Nicaragua's legislative body, the State Council, which
"serves as an advisory group to the Junta and the Directorate,"
is guided and controlled.by the Directorate. This chamber has
always ha.d.a clear majority of Sandinista sympathizers. Nonethe-
less, the Sandinistas attempted to increase their ratio within
the assembly by adding new members and thereby precipitated the
November 1980 walk-out of its moderate members. This has given
the Sandinistas nearly absolute control over the State Council.
To gain further control over Nicaragua, the Directorate
formed the Sandinista Defense Committees and the Sandinista
Workers' Federation. Both these base organizations, under Party
control, have been used as political tools to deter opposition
groups. The Sandinista Defense Committees, modeled after the
Cuban Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, were organized
throughout Nicaragua as a spy network and used for mass mobiliza-
tions. However, these neighborhood committees have not received
substantial popular support, even though Nicaraguans must go
through them to acquire food subsidies and to obtain drivers'
licenses. The-Sandinista Workers' Federation, formed to incorpor-
ate the Nicaraguan working class into a central labor movement
affiliated with the FSLN, has about 60,000 members. Nevertheless,
Nicaragua's two independent labor movements, with memberships
approaching 40,000, have rejected any affiliation with the Sandi-
nista Party, thus creating friction between these independent
unions and the Sandinistas.
In a recent Wall Street Journal article, businessmen from
the town of Estel were quoted as saying, "We were all duped,"
describing how they are discriminated against by Sandinista
leaders in obtaining credit and foreign currency from the national-
ized banking system. "If I though for one minute that the Sandini-
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stas would turn the country into another Cuba, I never would have
given them my house to use as a base during the war," said a
local grocery store owner.2
Friction has developed between the Sandinista government and
the democratic opposition circles which now includes the Nicara-
guan Democratic Movement, the Social Christian Party, the Social
Democratic Party and the Democratic Conservative Party. In
particular, tensions have grown in anticipation of the electoral
process scheduled for 1985. This process, the Sandinistas claim,
will take place only to affirm their role as the leaders of the
revolution because the FSLN has already been chosen as the "van-
guard" of the Nicaraguan people. In the Wall Street Journal
article, a foreign diplomat saw the future of the electoral
process in this manner: "the nine (the nine-man directorate of
the Sandinista Liberation Front that controls the country) aren't
about to share power with anybody for a long, long time." These
comments, along with the Sandinistas' "fraternal" relations with
the Soviet bloc, have placed Nicaragua's planned elections in
doubt.
Esteli's experience perhaps best illustrates the reason for
the widespread disaffection with the new government. Some 70
percent of Nicaraguans want free elections -- which have been
.postponed by the government -- and 64 percent feel that their
lives have not improved since 1979. These poll results were
published in October 1981, by Nicaragua's only independent news-
paper La'Prensa. The paper was harassed by the Sandinista govern-
ment, which has prohibited publication of such polls without
prior government approval.
SANDINISTA FOREIGN POLICY
Since July 1979, the Sandinistas have developed particularly
close ties with Fidel Castro, who has provided Nicaragua with at
least 5,000 and possibly as many as 10,000 Cuban advisors. The
close working relations between the Nicaraguan and Cuban govern-
ments have been highlighted by frequent top-level consultations.3
In addition, the Sandinistas have assumed a Cuban-style "non-
aligned" stance within the Third World, supporting the Soviet
occupation of Afghanistan, while condemning the U.S. military
presence in South Korea as "imperialism." _
By October 1979, Nicaragua had already established diplomatic
relations with Cuba, the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslova-
kia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Vietnam, Mongolia, North Korea,
2 Lynda Schuster, "Fading Dreams," Wall Street Journal, January 15, 1982.
3 Italy's daily newspaper Il Tempo, on June 27, 1981, reported that Fidel
Castro had made some forty secret trips to Iianagua since the July 1979
Sandinista victory.
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Kampuchea (Heng Samrin), and other communist states. Yet despite
the presence of Soviet advisors in Nicaragua, it was not until
mid-October 1979 that the Soviet Union sent a delegation headed
by Yurii I. Volskii, Soviet Ambassador to Mexico, to establish
Soviet-Nicaraguan diplomatic relations. While in Managua, Ambas-
sador Volskii transmitted Leonid Brezhnev's desire "that ambassa-
dorial relations between our countries be restored following the
Leninist principles of peaceful coexistence and support for the
national liberation movements of all peoples."4
Five months after establishing relations with Moscow, the
Sandinistas sent.'a high-level mission to the Soviet Union led by
Directorate commanders Humberto Ortega, Tomas Borge,. and Henry
Ruiz. While in the USSR, the Sandinista delegation issued a
"joint communique" with their Soviet hosts denouncing the Israeli
occupation of all Arab territories and calling for the "legitimate
national rights of the Arab people of Palestine." Not surprising-
ly, the Sandinistas, whose ties to the PLO date back to the
1960s, opened an office for the PLO in Managua with the status of
embassy. This feeling of camaraderie between the PLO and the
Sandinistas was expressed by the PLO Ambassador to Nicaragua,
Marwan Tahbub, in an interview on January 5, 1982, when he said,
"ties between the PLO and Nicaragua are based on revolutionary
principles and the facttthat the two peoples have struggled for
their independence and against imperialism.115
The Soviet-Nicaraguan joint communique went on to condemn
"the campaign... launched by the imperialist and reactionary
forces... aimed at subverting the inalienable right of the people
of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan." Nicaragua, character-
istically, abstained from the overwhelming United Nations vote
condemning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. However, the most
intriguing development during the Sandinistas' USSR visit was the
signing of a party-to-party agreement in the form of a "Joint
Communique" on March 22, 1980 between the Soviet Communist Party
and the FSLN. Such an action usually only takes place between
formal communist parties.
In June 1980, only two months after the Soviet tour, Directo-
rate member Tomas Borge led a delegation to North Korea. During
this tour, Borge declared to his North Korean hosts that:
The Nicaraguan revolutionaries will not be content
until the imperialists have been overthrown in all
parts of the world. The imperialist United States
should not believe that they are able to rule South
Korea permanently... .We stand with the forces of peace
and progress, which are the socialist countries. Our
Domestic Service 0400 GMT, October 19, 1979.
rLV ices wiLu r+icaragua,, narricaaa in -)panish, January 5, 1982, p. 8.
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strategic goal is clear, our principles are clear,
too.6
The.Sandinistas's anti-U.S. stance was reiterated by Daniel
Ortega during his address commemorating the first anniversary of
the Sandinista revolutionary victory in Managua on July 19, 1980.
During this ceremony, attended by Cuba's Fidel Castro and Grenada's
Maurice Bishop, Ortega outlined his government's position on
foreign policy issues. This stance included condemning "imperial-
ism" and calling for an end to "the blockade of the heroic Cuban
people and the unconditional [U.S.] withdrawal from the Guantanamo
Naval Base." Ortega affirmed Nicaragua's solidarity with the
"liberation movements" in El Salvador and Namibia, and also
praised the Libyan-backed Polisario Front. He expressed his
country's support for "the reunification of Korea" and for the
"right" of Puerto Rico to "self-determination." He concluded his
address by making reference to the upcoming U.S. elections and
denouncing "Mr. Reagan, who with his Grand Old Party has become a
great witch-hunter."7
On August 25, 1981, Directorate Member Humberto Ortega
delivered a speech in which he announced that Nicaragua was a
part of the "Marxist camp." Ortega claimed that:
without Sandinism one cannot be Marxist-Leninist, and.
Sandinism without Marxism-Leninism cannot be revolution-
ary. Because of this they are indisolubly united, and
therefore our moral force is Sandinism, our political
force is Sandinism and our doctrine is Marxism-Leninism.8
Following the Sandinista rise to power President Carter
immediately released aid that had been approved for the Somoza
government but suspended by his Administration. Bilateral aid
flowed generously in the next eighteen months, rising to $170
million by the end of 1980. In addition to bilateral aid, the-
U.S. voted for all loans to Nicaragua within multilateral institu-
tions, of which the U.S. government is the single largest share-
holder. Just five months after the Sandinistas took power, the
World Bank and the International Development Association lent $30
million to'Nicaragua. This was followed by another $30 million
as a World Bank loan in June of 1981. On January 14, 1982, the
World Bank approved an additional $22.8 million to the Sandinista
regime. Overall the Sandinistas received more international
financial institution support in nineteen months than the Somoza
government received in nineteen years.
UPI wire story, Tokyo, June 9, 1980.
"Junta Member Ortega's Address," Managua Domestic Service 1750 GMT, July
19, 1980, FBIS.
"Nicaragua Admits: It Is Really Marxist," 0 Estado De S. Paulo, October
10, 1981.
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Despite this aid, Fidel Castro, during the Sandinistas first
anniversary celebrations in'Managua, criticized the U.S. for not
providing sufficient funds to Nicaragua. Only after the Reagan
Administration came into office and the State Department provided
evidence demonstrating the Sandinista government's involvement in
assisting the Marxist-Leninist guerrillas in El Salvador, was
U.S. bilateral aid to Nicaragua curtailed.
The U.S. policy of authorizing no new aid projects to Nicara-
gua and curtailing the ongoing aid programs -- which the Sandini-
stas have termed as "interventionism, blackmail and Yankee economic
aggression" -- has had little effect. The suspension of aid has
been undermined by the multilateral lending institutions and
Mexico, Libya and the USSR have offered Nicaragua increased
financial assistance at favorable terms. This recent expansion
of financial aid to Nicaragua has included a $100 million loan
from Libya, over $70 million in loans from the multilateral
lending institutions and a $50 million loan from the Soviet
Union. The USSR has also given Nicaragua a $16 million grant to
purchase agricultural machinery and delivered 20,000 tons of
wheat. Czechoslovakia has expressed its solidarity with Nicaragua
through an agreement of a $30 million loan for 1982; $20 million,
financed under generous conditions, will go for the building of
three textile factories and the other $10 million will be for the
purchase of machinery and equipment for the mining industry and
the installation of machine shops. Such actions have undoubtedly
hindered U.S. efforts to pressure the. Sandinistas to stop their
military assistance to the guerrilla forces in Central America
and to halt their attempts to militarize Nicaragua.
NICARAGUA'S MILITARY BUILD-UP
The Sandinista government, with the assistance and supervision
of at least 5,000 Cuban advisors (of which 1,800 to 2,000 are
military advisors), and several hundred East German advisors, has
built up the Nicaraguan armed forces. The militarization effort
announced by the Sandinista leadership in the summer of 1980 will
increase the size of the army until it reaches 50,000 members.
To date, the Sandinista army has expanded up to an estimated
25,000 active soldiers, and 20,000 well-trained reserves, who can
be called up at any time. This is well over 400 percent larger
than the former Somoza National Guard, which ranged from 8,000 to
10,000 active and reserve members. This is more than twice the
size of Guatemala's 17,000-man army, which traditionally has been
the largest army in Central America. In addition to its army,
the Sandinista government has organized a "People's Militia"
currently numbering 50,000, and designed to eventually incorporate
200,000 persons. This has already made Nicaragua's security
apparatus much larger than the security forces of the four remain-
ing Central American countries combined. The size of the army is
even more remarkable when one considers that Nicaragua has only
2.6 million inhabitants, or 13 percent of the 19.6 million people
of Central America.
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To enhance Nicaragua's military capabilities still further,
the Sandinista government has acquired sophisticated arms from
several Communist bloc nations and France. Sandinista officials,
including Directorate member Jaime Wheelock, have recently acknow-
ledged the acquisition of new armaments, including approximately
one hundred model T-54 and T-55 Soviet-made tanks and surface-to-
air missiles. U.S. State Department officials disclosed that
additional military equipment reaching Nicaragua included large
quantities of automatic weapons, some of which are being supplied
to the guerrillas in El Salvador and Guatemala.
Military assistance from the West has been initiated through
a secret agreement between France and Nicaragua, which. was signed
in December and revealed on January 7, 1982. The $15.8 million
sale, labeled as "purely-defensive equipment" by the French
Foreign Ministry's office, consisted of two Alouette 3 helicop-
ters, a pair of coastal patrol boats and a dozen military trucks.
Not disclosed in the original report was the inclusion of shoulder-
fired rocket launchers. The rocket launcher, a bazooka-like
weapon, has become a favorite of guerrillas around the world
because it can knock out armored vehicles or reinforced buildings
from a distance. These are similar to the ones used by Salvadorean
guerrillas in a recent attack on the Ilopango Air Base, which
destroyed six U.S. UH1H, or Huey, helicopters on loan to El
.Salvador and six French-built fighter jets.
Claude Cheysson, the French foreign minister, defended his
government's sale by asserting that Nicaragua will avoid communist
allies only if they find help in the West. U.S. officials de-
.scribed the French position as "naive." Though complaints were
voiced by Secretaries Weinberger and Haig, and an official com-
plaint was registered by U.S. Ambassador Evan Galbraith in Paris,
French officials, nevertheless, said the U.S. reaction was not as
strong as they had expected.9
There are reports indicating that the Sandinista government
has lengthened its airfields on the Atlantic coast at Bluefields
and Puerto Cabezas to handle fighter jets. In April, the Nicara-
guan coast-to-coast highway will be finished, connecting two
existing highways to the Pacific coast. This project of 426 kms,
has some 200 Cuban and 100 Nicaraguans working on it, using heavy
equipment which has been brought from Cuba.
U.S. intelligence reports that Vietnam has agreed to supply
Marxist Nicaragua with approximately 1,000 aircraft that would
"turn the country into a major Soviet-proxy air force bastion."lo
U.S.-made M-16 rifles and M-79 grenade launchers captured from
Leftist rebels in El Salvador, have.U.S. serial numbers indicating
9 "France Reportedly to Sell Rockets to Nicaragua," The Washington Post,
December 28, 1982.
10 Intelligence Digest, Weekly Review, November 25, 1981.
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they were captured by the North Vietnamese forces when South
Vietnam was conquered in 1975. Nicaraguan pilots are.beinj
trained in Bulgaria, Cuba and other Communist bloc nations,
These facts, along with already documented evidence of Sov.et-mar,
MIG-23 aircraft in Nicaragua, raise serious-security probl',ms f
the Hemisphere. Should the full quantity of 1,000 aircraft ever
reach Nicaragua from Vietnam, Nicaragua will have the capaility
of militarily dominating Central America.
The Directorate Defense Minister, Humberto Ortega, pointed
out during a June 4, 1981 press conference that, "We [Sandinistas;
are strengthening our defense, and we are prepared to.operate
tanks, to operate planes, cannon and different kinds of we pons_'r..
While the Sandinistas claim that their military build-up is
intended for defense only, observers maintain that the closest
nation capable of posing a direct military threat to Nicaragua
Mexico, a country supportive of the Sandinista revolution.
The most serious concern to Nicaragua's Central American
neighbors is not military inferiority, but rather the assistance
.the Sandinistas have been providing to the insurgency movements
in El Salvador and Guatemala. This assistance, which has. been
documented by the U.S. Department of State and reaffirmed by
'Sandinista defectors, has included training guerrillas and supply-
ing them with logistical support, personnel, weapons andarimuni-
tion.12 In addition, Nicaragua has become a strategic transfer
location for Cuban troops entering El Salvador to assist that
.country's Marxist-Leninist guerrillas.13 Thus
Central aeri
an
,
c
nations fear that Nicaragua has become Cuba's center for subversion
in Central America.
Guatemala is planning to triple its armed forces this year
to 60,000 men "to combat communist subversion more effec tvely,"
.according to General Manuel Benedicto Lucas Garcia, Army Chief of
Staff, who pointed to the apparent threat posed by Nicaragua's
goal of a 200,000-man militia and 60,000-man army. In order to
achieve this goal, a strict military draft and recruiting campaign
has been planned in Guatemala.
NICARAGUA'S'FALTERING ECONOMY
During the Sandinistas' two years in office, the Nicaragu.lul
government bureaucracy has expanded at a rate that threatens to
11 Alma Guillermoprieto, "Nicaraguan Tells of Arms Efforts," The k_shingttolN
Post, June 5, 1981.
12 "Communist Interference in El Salvador, Documents Demonstrating Communtkt
Support of the Salvadoran Insurgency," U.S. Department of State, Febru:ity'
23, 1981.
13 Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "Bridge Over the River Lempa," The Wash%%)k,
ton Post, October 19, 1981.
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bankrupt the country's economy. The growth of the Sandinista
government is highlighted by eight ministries formed in the
aftermath of the revolution and a rapidly expanding security and
military apparatus. Consequently, the government's budget in-
creased by over 250 percent in 1980. To meet the financial
requirements for the enlarged budget, the Sandinistas have re-
scheduled payments of the country's foreign debt, increased the
monetary supply, restructured the tax system and have become
increasingly dependent on foreign financial assistance.
Early in 1980, the Sandinista government renegotiated payment
of their inherited foreign debt held by the international private
financial community in order to halt the outflow of foreign
exchange. The terms of this negotiation stipulated that the
Sandinista government would resume payments of its foreign debts
in 1986. Similarly, the Sandinistas were granted a five-year
period of grace on interest payments of this debt. A financial
observer predicts that this debt will have to be renegotiated in
1986 to avoid default.
The Sandinista policy of increasing the country's money
supply has created an abundance of currency which increased
inflation and caused a scarcity of consumer products. This
policy has had a severe impact among Nicaragua's poor; the cost
of food products has more than doubled since the Sandinistas
assumed power. The 30 percent wage increase decreed by the
Sandinistas for Nicaragua's rural poor population was offset by a
rural inflation estimated at over- 60 percent.14 In July 1981,
Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega conceded that inflation had
consumed the wage increases and concluded that to attain the
anticipated minimum wage for the poor, "we must first increase
productivity. "IS Although recognizing the need to increase
productivity, the Sandinista policies have restrained economic
growth.
In 1980, the Sandinistas restructured Nicaragua's tax law in
order to acquire a larger number of contributors and increase
progression of the tax system. The Sandinistas also imposed a
tax to set up an unemployment fund by directly taking the yearly
employee salary referred to as "Christmas bonus" from all Nicara-
guans earning over 1,500 cordobas per month (U.S. $150 at the
official exchange rate).
Besides these policies devised to increase the government's
financial resources, external funding sources have made available
over $1.3 billion to the Sandinistas since July 1979. In spite
of this foreign assistance, the Sandinista government's deficits
Christopher Wenner, "Nicaragua's Fortunes Have Begun to Pinch," The San
Diego Union, May 3, 1981.
"Daniel Ortega Address," Managua Radio Sandino 1652 GMT, July 4, 1981,
FBIS.
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have been increasing as a result of a combination of government
expansion costs and a reduction in productivity.
In September 1981, Daniel Ortega, upon returning to Nicaragua
from a fundraising tour to Libya and the USSR, imposed a "state
of national economic and social emergency" to alleviate the
government's financial crisis. This decree outlawed strikes and
prohibited unauthorized price increases by imposing a one to
three year prison sentence for those individuals violating these
measures. Under the law, someone can be "arrested on suspicion"
of "economic sabotage," which includes the publishing of economic
data affecting "state security." The decree also ordered the
government to cut its budget by 10 percent, reduce its food and
transportation subsidies by 10 percent, impose a 30 to 100 percent
tax on all imports classified as luxury items and freeze all of
its hiring.ls
Despite this decree, the Sandinista government bureaucracy
has already drained a large portion of Nicaragua's work force,
incorporating them into the army or other government-affiliated
organizations. This has been particularly troublesome for Nicara-
gua's agricultural productivity, where a labor shortage became
critical after the Central American migrating farmers refused to
work in Nicaragua during harvest season. This cutoff of a tradi-
tional source of agricultural labor in Nicaragua was sparked by
the declining value of the cordoba, currently worth less than 40
percent of its official rate. The labor shortages coupled with
the Sandinistas' mismanagement of expropriated private sector
operations have reduced Nicaragua's output.
In fact, the country's vital agricultural harvest has de-
creased by approximately 50 percent since the Sandinistas assumed
power. The cultivated area of Nicaragua's two most important
export earning crops, cotton and coffee, has shrunk drastically.
Furthermore, both of these crops, representing 50 percent of
Nicaragua's export income, have been affected by declining market
prices. Output within the country's third largest export source,
the cattle industry, has also diminished due to the massive
slaughter and export of livestock during the revolution. Other
agricultural products primarily for domestic use. Sugar, rice,
beans and corn, which Nicaragua had previously exported or at
least attained self-sufficiency, are now in such short supply
they have been imported.
Thus far, the Sandinista expropriations of private sector
operations have given the Nicaraguan government control of over
50 percent of the country's economic activity. Although continu-
ing to nationalize private sector operations, the Sandinistas
have in certain instances returned run-down farms to the private
16 "Nicaragua Junta Declares State of Emergency," The Wall Street Journal,
September 11, 1981.
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sector after the deterioration of some of these businesses under
government control. However, the government has not issued new
land titles to anyone. The Sandinistas have kept banking, insur-
ance, and mining operations under government control.
GROWING SANDINISTA OPPOSITION
Nicaragua's economic crisis, coupled with the government's
radical policies, have generated mass dissatisfaction with the
Sandinista regime. This opposition has emanated from several
groups: the Catholic Church, the independent media, the private
sector, democratic circles and the vast majority of the Atlantic
coast population. These groups previously assisted in deposing
the Somoza government, but now see their country drifting toward
a totalitarian state under the control of "Soviet imperialism."
Nicaragua's powerful Catholic Church, under the leadership
of the Archbishop of Managua, Miguel Obando y Bravo, has vehement-
ly criticized the leftist trend of the Sandinista government. At
a Latin American Episcopal Congress (CELAM) meeting in Bogota,
Colombia, on November 16, 1981, Archbisop Obando y Bravo stated
the Nicaraguan government is governed by Cubans and not by the
junta. He.charged that key positions in the Nicaraguan government
were occupied by men close to Fidel Castro and that the regime is
totalitarian and Marxist-Leninist. His remarks were not reported
in the American media, but were picked up by several international
wire services including Agence France Press. In January of this
year, during a press conference in New York, the Archbishop
stated that the "Nicaraguans no longer believe in the Sandinista
Leaders," and added "there is no doubt .that the governments of
Nicaragua has good relations with the governments of the Soviet
Union and Cuba. 1117
Responding to a decree by Pope John Paul II, the Archbishop
requested members of the clergy, such as Father Miguel D'Escoto
to resign from their posts in the revolutionary junta and return
to their apostolic ministry. Father D'Escoto (Nicaragua's Foreign
Minister). together with other churchmen who hold government
positions answered the Archbishop's request with a joint statement
affirming their "unbreakable commitment to the popular Sandinista
revolution in loyalty to our people, which is the same as saying,
in loyalty to the will of God. We will continue in whatever
place our presence might be necessary."18
Shortly afterwards, during his June 1981 visit to Italy, the
Archbishop of Managua declared "that after two years of hope, our
revolution is drifting toward Marxism according to the Cuban
17 El Diario de Hoy, December 1981, San Salvador.
18 James Nelson Goodsell, "Nicaraguan Priests Told 'Quit Politics, The
Christian Science Monitor, June 22, 1981.
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13
model." Archbishop Obando y Bravo also criticized the Cuban
advisors, in Nicaragua, whom he claims "are among.us with an
arrogant attitude" in spite of the country's "economic difficul-
ties.1119 For his criticism of the Sandinistas, the Archbishop's
Sunday mass, aired on television for many years, was suspended.
Furthermore, Archbishop Obando y Bravo was labeled as "the princi-
pal force of the counterrevolution" by Father D'Escoto in an
interview published in the Mexican publication El Periodico.
Father D'Escoto's interview, which was republished in Nicara-
gua's most widely circulated and only independent newspaper, La
Prensa, led to the paper's closure for forty-eight hours in July
1981 ? La Prensa has been closed down by the Sandinista govern-
ment many times since for publishing "counterrevolutionary"
material. D'Escoto (he is no longer addressed as Father) visited
the Soviet Union in December 1981 in an official capacity on
behalf of the Nicaraguan government. He began his visit in
Leningrad and stated:
I am arriving on an official visit with the objectives
that through this visit the friendly and fraternal ties
with this noble government and between the people of
Nicaragua and the Soviet Union be strengthened more and
more.
I believe that especially for Nicaraguans, and also for
any knowledgeable person, being in Leningrad is a kind
of pilgrimage. One feels that one has come to a holy
land, where the people have heroically defended their
gains. I am talking about the 900-day siege and also
of the fact that this city is the birthplace of the
Soviet revolution- Thus, one is moved, as I was moved.
It is a beautiful way to start a visit to this great
nation, through Leningrad.
Finally,. he charged that:
No one but the United States interferes in the internal
affairs of the Central American state, where a people's
revolution is going on.
North American imperialism, once used our territory for
the invasion.of Guatemala and Cuba. It has been ended
.now. The United States can no longer use us against
fraternal Latin American countries. Nicaragua.does not
want to be a puppet.21
"Archbishop Says Revolution Moving Toward Marxism," San Jose, Radio Reloj
1730 GMT, June 20, 1981.
Alma Guillermoprieto, "Struggle between Sandinistas and Press Heats Up,"
The Guardian, August 24, 1981.
Nicaraguan Foreign Minister Concludes Visit, Moscow in Spanish to Latin
America, 2300 GMT, December 14, 1981; and Moscow TASS in English, 1835
GMT, December 15, 1981.
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In spite of its major role in the downfall of Somoza, this
newspaper has come under severe harassment and censorship by the
Sandinistas, who currently are considering closing down La Prensa
indefinitely. La Prensa is the only independent, non-government
newspaper in Managua,- i-ts circulation of 75,000 is twice the
combined total of the government-run newspapers. All three
papers are administered by the Chamorro family, making La Prensa,
the only one within their control. Recently, Pedro Joaquin
Chamorro Barrios, son of the newspaper's assassinated editor,
charged that the Sandinistas are trying to do what the late
dictator Anastasio Somoza tried to do, shut La Prensa down.
"Isn't it ironic that both Somoza and the Sandinistas are trying
to do the same thing?," said Pedro Joaquin.
A number of radio news programs charged by the Sandinista
government with having "broadcast news harmful to the Armed
Forces," have been shut down in Nicaragua recently. The latest
victim was Radio Mundial's progam "Hoy," or Today. This was the
fifth news program ordered off the air by the Sandinista regime
since it took power in 1979. A coalition of four anti-government
parties, the Democratic Coordination, protested the government's
action calling it a violation of the "Nicaraguan people's right
to be informed."
The Sandinistas have also harassed and intimidated other
opposition groups such as the Nicaraguan Democratic Movement.
This movement, incorporating a large sector of non-Marxists who
helped overthrow Somoza, has become increasingly critical of
Sandinista policies leading toward Soviet domination of Nicaragua.
This group, which had been unable to receive government permission
to hold a party mobilization since mid-1980, was finally granted
Sandinista approval to hold a rally on March 15, 1981. However,
this rally was cancelled on March 14 by the movement's leader,
former Junta member Alfonso Robelo, after a Sandinista youth
group ransacked the Nicaraguan Democratic Movement's headquarters,
stoned homes belonging to members affiliated to it, attacked
people distributing leaflets for the rally and then threatened
the rally with more violence. Directorate member Tomas Borge,
who granted permission for this party event, laid the blame of
the violence on the Nicaraguan Democratic..Movement for "provoking"
the people with counterrevolutionary views.22 In October 1981,
Sandinista authorities detained Robelo and confiscated his passport
as he attempted to flee Nicaragua.
The Nicaraguan Permanent Human Rights Commission headed by
Jose Esteban Gonzalez has become a target of frequent acts of
intimidation by the Sandinista government. This group, used
extensively by the Sandinistas during the revolution when it
recorded human rights violations committed by the Somoza govern-
Al Kamen, "Sandinista Mob Action Thwarts Rally by Opposition," The Wash-
ington Post, March 16, 1981.
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15'
ment has, since July 1979, become an increasingly unacceptable
annoyance to.the Sandinista government. Since the Sandinistas
assumed power, the Commission has revealed that summary executions,
torture, harassment of the press and of opposition political
groups, confiscation of private property and deportation are
common human rights violations perpetuated by the current Nicara-
guan government. During his European tour, Jose Esteban Gonzalez
reported that Nicaraguan jails still hold eight thousand "prisoners
of conscience." For his remarks in Europe, Gonzalez was arrested
upon his return to Nicaragua early in 1981 and released only
after the Venezuelan government exerted economic pressure on the
Sandinista government. He is now in exile in Venezuela.
Nicaragua's private sector, organized under an umbrella
organization known as the Superior Council for Private Enterprise
(COSEP), has constantly complained about the radical policies
pursued by the Sandinistas creating a lack of confidence in the
country's political and economic future, elements vital for
private investment. For such criticism, members of the Nicaraguan
business community, who played an essential role in overthrowing
Somoza's government through its "crippling strikes," have been
branded as "counterrevolutionaries" exploiting the masses for
which they have been persecuted by the Sandinista security forces.
This persecution includes the assassination of the vice president
of COSEP, Jorge Salazar, who was shot to death by government
security-forces minutes after Salazar had presided over a COSEP
meeting. The government justified the murder by calling him a
"counterrevolutionary." Since this incident, some 20,000 business-
men, technicians, and professionals have fled from Nicaragua.
Understandably businesses have suffered dramatic decreases in
productivity.
On October*20, 1981, COSEP published an open letter criticiz-
ing Humberto Ortega's statement that the Sandinista government
could "In a matter of hours," take over everything that "the
bourgeoisie still possesses." The letter accused the government
of egregious economic mismanagement, and the Sandinistas' "doctrine
of Marxism-Leninism," for the country's deepening economic crisis.
The Sandinista government quickly reacted to this letter; by
midnight of the same day, state security forces arrested four
COSEP leaders in their homes for "violation of the economic and
social emergency law." Three of those arrested were sentenced to-'
seven months in jail on October 30. They were Enrique Dreyfus,
President of Higher Council for Private Enterprise, Benjamin
Lanzas, President of the Chamber of Construction, and Gilberto
Cuadra, President-of the Federation of Nicaraguan Professionals.
Similar sentences were handed down to three other businessmen who
fled into exile in Venezuela and the U.S. This left the private
sector of Nicaragua leaderless, and with few anti-Sandinista
individuals willing to assume such a risky role. Under continued
international pressure, the Sandinistas finally released the
COSEP leaders on February 14. Daniel Ortega called together 250
business executives to announce that the sentences had been
commuted.
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EAST COAST DISSENSION
Nicaragua's Atlantic region inhabitants, in the true spirit
of Augusto Cesar Sandino who was ideologically opposed to Marxism-
Leninism and any type of foreign military presence in his country,
have rejected the Cubans and through them the Sandinista government.
Although the Atlantic region of Nicaragua covers one-third of the
country's territory, its population of three indigenous communi-
ties -- the Miskitos, the Sumos and the Ramas -- barely reach
200,000. Shortly after the Sandinistas came to power, they
opened an office in Managua incorporating leading members of
these three communities under the name of Misurasata.
Tension began building between the Atlantic region's inhabi
tants and the Sandinistas over the arrival of Cuban teachers,
doctors and military advisors early in 1980. The local people
started to voice concern and disapproval over the growing military
presence in the region, the lessons taught by the Cuban teachers
and the incompetence of the Cuban doctors. In February 1981, the
Sandinistas arrested Miskito leader Stedman Fagoth along with
thirty-two other leaders of Nicaragua's Atlantic community. This
led to violent incidents inflicting casualties among the region's
local, Sandinista and Cuban populace.23 Since this episode, as
many as 20,000 Miskitos, Ramas and Sumo Indians including Fagoth,
have fled across the Nicaraguan border into Honduras. The Miski-
tos' dissatisfaction with the Sandinistas were heard in Washington
during mid-1981, when Fagoth arrived in the United States to
plead for-assistance against the communists in his country.
Fagoth's requests were not answered by the Administration. In
February 1982, he returned to the U.S. and presented new charges
against the militia of the Sandinistas, alleging human rights
violations. (See Appendix II.)
In early January of this year, reports that Nicaraguan
troops had crossed the border into Honduras and had murdered up
to 200 Miskito Indians of the 20,000 who have fled into Honduras,
prompted a formal complaint from Honduras' foreign relations
secretary Colonel Cesar Elvir Sierra. He cited eyewitness reports
that the Nicaraguan troops killed at least 200 Miskito Indians
around New Year's Eve,'and that in the days prior to and following
the incident Nicaraguan patrol vessels had seized several Honduran
fishing vessels. in Honduran territorial waters. Nicaragua's
Foreign Affairs Minister Miguel d'Escoto denied the incident and
charged that rightists who'were followers of the late President
Anastasio Somoza had attacked Nicaraguan border patrols and
killed 150 Nicaraguan soldiers.. Both reports are still under
investigation. 24
23
Shirley Christian, "Discontent Grows on Nicaragua's East Coast," The
Washington Post, August 26, 1981.
24
"Elvir
Spanish
January
Story.
Sierra Lodges Complaint Against Nicaragua," Buenos Aires LATIN in
1855 GMT, January 8, 1982; (Reuters) Wire Story from Tegucigalpa,
4, 1982; Managua, Nicaragua, January 16, 1982; and (Reuters) Wire
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17
Repression against the clergy in the Atlantic region has
also been reported. On January 13, 1982, three sisters of the
order of St. Agnes, who worked in Puerto Cabezas, and two Capuchin
brothers working in Waspan, were taken to Managua and were expelled
by the Sandinistas. On January 16, Interior Minister Tomas Borge
admitted the incident had been inappropriately handled and stated
that the clergy could return to Nicaragua. The Bishops Conference
released a statement concerning the incident on January 25,
hoping that similar incidents would not occur to the remainder of
the missionaries and "God's people on the Atlantic coast."
Unconfirmed reports of five Moravian ministers jailed in the
region by the Sandinista militia and accusations of orders to
capture and kill remaining Moravian ministers are under investiga-
tion. An incident of assault on a Catholic bishop last October,
which was not reported by the press, is also under investigation.25
MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST THE SANDINISTAS
The Sandinistas have encountered their strongest opposition
from two militant organizations, the Nicaraguan Democratic Front
and the National Liberation Army. Both groups have formed major
.guerrilla networks to carry out military operations against the
Sandinista government and their communist advisors. The Nicaraguan
Democratic Front claims to have over 2,000 armed individuals
organized-into cells throughout Nicaragua. This group is made up
primarily of civilians who opposed and fought Somoza and have now
grown disillusioned with the Sandinista regime. The National
Liberation Army is an anti-communist guerrilla network composed
primarily of former lower rank guardsmen, who along with their
collaborators within Nicaragua, have carried out raids against
Sandinista posts.
These guerrilla organizations propose to destabilize and
depose the Marxist-Leninist Sandinista government and, if success-
ful, install a true democracy in Nicaragua. Although both groups
have harassed the Sandinista regime, their forces are much smaller
and weaker than the huge, well-equipped army of the government.
Also it should be noted that this military opposition only arose
in response to repressive Sandinista actions.
U.S. POLICY TOWARD NICARAGUA
During the Carter years, American policy attempted to build
friendship with the Sandinistas. To this end, the Carter Admini-
stration, which had assisted in deposing-the Somoza and Urcuyo
governments, offered financial and diplomatic support to the
25
"Borge Says Deported Priest, Nuns, Can Return," Paris AFP in Spanish 0315
GMT, January 22, 1982; Bishop's Communique, Managua Radio Sandino in
Spanish, 1200 GMT, January 25, 1982.
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Sandinistas. By the end of President Carter's term in office,
the U.S. had delivered to the Sandinistas $170 million in bilateral
aid, and, according to Arturo Cruz, had become Nicaragua's "main
source" of financial assistance. In addition to bilateral aid,
the U.S. voted for all loans to Nicaragua within the multilateral
lending institutions. Yet this aid failed to prompt favorable
comments about the United States from the Sandinistas.. In fact,
Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega revealed his rationale for demand-
ing U.S. financial assistance in May 1980 by claiming:
What Nicaragua knows is that when we were fighting
against Somoza, the USSR was supporting the Nicaraguan
people.....And now we have relations with the Soviets
and they are.seeking ways to help us.... They are seeking
ways to have the United States pay us for the. great
harm they have done us..*..One must note that this is a
historic debt that the U.S. Government owes to the
Nicaraguan people.26
Only after the Reagan Administration came into office and
provided evidence collected by the Carter Administration demon-
strating the Sandinista government's involvement in assisting the
Marxist-Leninist guerrillas in El Salvador, was U.S. bilateral
aid to Nicaragua terminated. The U.S. policy to stop authorizing
new aid projects to Nicaragua and curtailing the on-going aid
programs,-which the Sandinistas have termed as "interventionism,
blackmail and Yankee economic aggression," has been ineffective.
In yet another attempt initiated in August 1981, Thomas
Enders, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs,
went to Managua and offered to resume U.S. bilateral aid to
Nicaragua if the Sandinistas would cease furnishing the Salvadorean
guerrillas with military supplies. The Sandinistas ignored the
Enders proposal, and continue to offer military support to the.
guerrillas in Central America. In order to meet the. Sandinista
challenge, the United States will have to devise a ougher policy.
U.S. POLICY INITIATIVES
The overall U.S. policy toward Nicaragua should attempt to
halt the Sandinistas' military. assistance to the guerrilla forces
in the Central American region, slow down Nicaragua's militariza-
tion efforts and ultimately change the fundamental character of
this Marxist-Leninist regime into a genuine democracy emerging
out of a free, pluralistic society. This can best be achieved by
a four-pronged policy:
1). Economic pressures: The United States should exert
economic pressure against the Sandinista regime by withholding
26 "Daniel Ortega Saevedra,Direct Line," Managua Radio Sandino 0200 GMT,
May 30, 1980.
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U.S. support within the multilateral lending institutions for all
loans to Nicaragua. This would make it difficult for Nicaragua
to receive "soft loans" from the Inter-American Development Bank,
in which the U.S. has a tacit veto power. Similarly, this policy
would make it tough for Nicaragua to attain loans from other
multilateral institutions such as the World Bank. In addition,.
the Reagan Administration should totally terminate all U.S.
bilateral aid programs to the Nicaraguan government and encourage
Western European and Latin American nations, particularly Mexico,
to do likewise.
2) Arms interdiction: To diminish the arms movements out
of Nicaragua, the United States should provide El Salvador with
effective detection equipment. This would include radar tracking
equipment requested by President Duarte in October 1981 to spot
night flight operations between Nicaragua and El Salvador. It
should train and provide the Salvadorean Navy with gun ships to
control the arms and guerrilla smuggling through the Gulf of
Fonseca. In addition, it should provide equipment and training
to set up a Central American surveillance task force with rapid
reaction capability to seize the smuggled military' supplies going
to El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala on both the Atlantic and
Pacific coasts. This surveillance team would also ensure that
.stockpiles of weapons in Costa Rica are destroyed or removed from
.that country since it has no army. If the arms flow cannot be
curtailed by these means, then serious consideration should be
given to a naval blockade on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts.
This naval blockade should be in-cooperation with naval forces
from Honduras, Panama, Venezuela, and Mexico, together with other
Latin American navies willing to participate in stemming the tide
of weapons.
3) Promoting democratic groups: The United States should
also exploit the Nicaraguan population's growing disenchantment
with the Sandinista government by supporting all of the Nicaraguan
opposition groups with a democratic orientation. Pressure should
not be lifted until the Sandinistas open up the political system
to allow the participation of all parties. If a constitutional
government is not established in Managua, as promised by the
Sandinistas in their initial political platform, the U.S., in
coordination with its Latin American allies, should offer clandes-
tine support to Nicaragua's anti-Sandinista militant forces.
Only by supplying them with weapons and other provisions for
guerrilla warfare can the opposition effectively challenge the
Sandinista regime if its repressive policies continue.
4) Human rights violations: An investigation should be
carried out concerning human rights violations by the Sandinista
regime towards all factions which oppose it. An investigative
task force consisting of members of the Organization of American
States should be sent to Nicaragua to report on human rights
violations. Hearings should be scheduled as soon as possible in
the U.S. Congress concerning allegations of brutality and human
rights abuses perpetrated by the Sandinista militia, particularly
against the Miskito population in the Atlantic coast region.
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The Nicaraguan connection, through which the Sandinista
government supplies and supports subversive activities in Central
America, makes Nicaragua's problems regional. A concentrated
effort of the United States in cooperation with the OAS could
mobilize the necessary forces to sever the connection and end the
political and military threat which Nicaragua now poses toward
its neighbors. This joint effort should be backed by Western
European countries, Japan, and all other nations which profess a
commitment to democracy. The Sandinistas have brought on them-
selves regional and domestic crises through their policies. By
adopting a Marxist-Leninist ideology, they have betrayed the
ideals of the revolution, which were for a pluralistic government
democratically elected by the people. By becoming a land base
exporting guerrilla warfare, the Sandinistas are threatening the
sovereignty of their neighbors.
The Nicaraguan people no longer openly support the Sandinista
regime. This would be proved if the Sandinistas were to allow a
free political choice through open democratic elections. The
freedom of choice by the Nicaraguan people should be exercised on
the basis of the system initially outlined by the Sandinistas
when they took power. Just as international public opinion calls
for the people of Poland to decide their own future, so must the
international 'community support the people of Nicaragua. Every
other country in Central America is holding elections this year,
often under difficult circumstances. The Sandinistas should do
the same. Should the threat from Nicaragua remain unchecked, the
United States soon will confront its most serious Central American
security problem of the past century. The Soviet Union refuses
to allow liberty to expand in Eastern Europe; the United States
should at least as steadfastly oppose the growth of totalitarian
regimes aligned to the Soviet Union in the Western Hemisphere.
Richard Araujo*
Policy Analyst
"Much of the initial research on this paper was completed-by Alexander
Kruger who preceded Mr. Araujo as Latin American Affairs analyst at the Heritage
Foundation.
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The'Sandinista political platform as reissued on July 12,
1979, by the provisional Sandinista government in exile:
1. A political area whose main aspects include the commitment on
the part of the government junta to:
1.1 Install a regime of democracy, justice and social progress
in which there is full guarantee for the right of all Nicaraguans
to political participation and universal suffrage. It is based
on a state organization that will be comprised of an executive
branch, a legislative branch through a council of state comprised
of 33 members from the nation's broadest political and military
sectors an a judiciary branch;
1.2 Guarantee the full exercise of human rights and fundamental
freedoms;
1.3 Organize a new army comprised of the combatants of the FSLN,
the soldiers and officers who served honestly and patriotically
in the face of the plans of the dictatorship and those who joined
the struggle to overthrow the Somozist regime; and
1.4 Observe an independent foreign policy that relates our
country with all nations that respect self-determination and just-
and mutually profitable economic relations.
2. An economic area whose basic objectives, in addition to
attending to the needs of the nation's emergency and reconstruc-
tion, will pursue the following fundamental aspects:
2.1 External transformation in key-sectors of the economy, such
as the financial system, agrarian reform, organization of domestic
and foreign commerce and the necessary changes in the-rural and
urban areas;
2.2 Organization of a mixed economy in which a state area with
social property of precise extent and clearly delimited character-
istics, a private area and a third area characterized by joint
investment and coordinated by the public and private sectors will
coexist;
2.3 Creation of an office dealing with state and social property
and action.
2.4 Compliance with foreign debt commitments and, at the same
time, reorganizing and renegotiating its terms;
2.5 Accepting international donations not subject to conditions
or limitations that harm national dignity or sovereignty, the use'
and destination of which will be subject to the strictest control;
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2.6 Substantial adjustment in the organization and operation of
the private financial system with the depth and proceedings that
are necessary;
2.7 Promotion of foreign investment orientated toward playing a
complementary role with domestic efforts. For this, clear lines
will be established regarding its treatment, acquiring of [word
indistinct], industrial property and so forth; and
2.8 Guarantees and full respect for properties and activities of
the private sector that are not directly affected by the measures
set forth in this program.
3. A social area whose main objective will be that of opening to
all Nicaraguans the true possibility of improving living standards
through the establishment of a policy that will tend to eradicate
unemployment and that will guarantee the right to housing, health,
social security, efficient public transportation, education,
culture, sports and [word indistinct]. it will be a regime of
economic austerity in view of the state of destruction in which
the Somozist regime has left the nation. But it is sought to
implement specific action in the following social areas:
3.1 Jobs and family income;
3.2 Nutrition, which contemplates the creation of a single
national health system;
3.3 Education, where measures will be implemented to reform the
objectives and contents of national education; and
3.4 Housing, where a true urban reform will be undertaken as
emergency programs are implemented for the reconstruction of
homes in the zones affected by the genocidal bombardments of the
Somozist dictatorship; and
4.. Finally, an area of institutional reorganization whose funda-
mental objective will be the rationalization of the functions of
the public administration, preventing an excessive bureaucracy
while establishing an economic and social system that will assure
the execution of the programs and projects of the Government of
National Reconstruction. .
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REPORT OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AGAINST THE MISKITO POPULATION
IN THE ATLANTIC REGION OF NICARAGUA, AS REPORTED BY MISKITO
LEADER STEDMAN FAGOTH, ON JANUARY 18, 1982. THIS ACCOUNT IS OF
INCIDENTS RECORDED FROM DECEMBER 1981 TO JANUARY 18, 1982.
1. December 23, 1981 the community of San Carlos, Rio Coco was.
bombed. Sixty Miskitos died and 100 were injured.
2. December 26, in the city of Bluefields the Sandinistas
incarcerated 30 persons. They killed a.young man who spoke
English for the mere fact that he would not join the militia.
The majority of the youth have fled into the mountains refusing
to join the militia.
3. December 26, in the community of Assang, the government
built a military air base. They captured and jailed all of the
82 Masmoras of the community.
4. The village of San Carlos is being occupied by 150 militia
of which 75 are Cubans. They are forcing the population to dig
trenches. If they do not, they will be denied food. The communi-
ty is living. as in a prison as the military does not permit them
to go out of'the village.
5. In the community of Leymus the government captured 80 persons;
in the community of Assang they captured another 35 persons; in
the community of Krasa they captured 24 persons. And in the
community of Waspuc they captured 12. These were all shot to
death except for four in the community of Leymus who were buried
alive.
6. Sandy Bay is occupied by 300 militia who captured 40 persons,
taking them to the concentration camp in Puerto Cabezas.
7. Bilwaskarma is also a militarized zone. The hospital was
closed and turned into a military fort. An unknown number of
persons were sent to Puerto Cabezas. Among the people captured
was Barbara Diaz, daughter of the Reverend Silvio Diaz, a Moravo
Minister.
8. In the community of Raity there are 200 militia, in Aniwas
there are 300 and in Walakitan there are another 300.
9. When the communists of the FSLN discover that a Miskito
Indian instead of following orders to execute other Miskitos,
fires bullets into the air -- they bind his feet and his hands
and will throw him into the River Coco.
10. From the community of Siksayary to the community of Cum the
area has been deserted. All fled to Honduras: about 20 thousand
Miskito Indians, among them women, children and elderly.
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The following communities have been.abandoned by the Miskito
Indians: Siksayary, Andres Tara, Santa Isabel, Krasa, Santa
Esquipulas, Sang Sang, Kitasqui, Krin Krin, Pilpilia, Namasca,
Wiwinak, Esperanza, Santa Fe, Wirapajni, Pransa, San Jeronimo,
Bulsirpi, Wiswis, Ipritigni, Laguantara, Kisalaya, Bilwaskarma,
Uhry, Tanisca, Kaurotigni and Klisnac.
11. Orders have been given by the Sandinistas to capture all
Moravo ministers and to shoot them.
12. The militia will transport the people they find along the
highways or in small huts, to concentration camps in Tasbayara.
13. The following communities were burnt to the ground by the
FSLN: Esperanza, Ipritigni, San Geronimo, Pransa, Wirapajni,
Bulsirpi and el Carmen.
14. The Voice of Nicaragua, which is the communist radio, is
launching a propaganda campaign of confusion, saying that former
National Guards are the ones killing the Miskitos and stealing
their cattle. They are urging the Indians to return to their
communities so that they will be captured and sent to concentration
camps.
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