NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL (NSC) MEETING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00914R000700010003-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 17, 2012
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: January 20, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83M00914R000700010003-5
ACTION
DATE
INITIAL
1
DCI . :.._..
2
DDC
3
D/ICS
4
DD/NFA
5
DD/A
6
DD/0
7
DD/S&T
8
Chrn/NIC
9
GC
10
IG
11
Compt a
s .
12
D/EEO
13
D/Pers,.
14
D/OPP
15
C/EAS/OPP
16
C/IAS/OPP
17
A0/DCI
18
jD
Al
19
20
-A
21
22
SUSPENSE
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83M00914R000700010003-5
 a mil t i
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83M00914R000700010003-5
SYSTEM II
90015 addon
January 20, 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
COUNSELLOR TO THE PRESIDENT
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUD ET
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE
UNITED NATIONS
UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIV_
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR POLICY DEVEL'OP1iENT
CHAIRMAN, COUNCIL ON ECONOMIC ADVISERS
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
SUBJECT: National Security Council (NSC) Meeting
The President will chair an NSC meeting on Thursday,
January 21, 1982, from 3:30 to 5:00 p.m. in the Cabinet
Room. There will be two agenda items:
(1) Law of the Sea
(2) Libya
Attached is the paper for agenda item (1). Papers for
agenda item (2) will be issued under separate cover. Only
those provided papers on Libya shall remain for that section
of the meeting; all others are requested to leave when agenda
item (1) is completed.
FOR THE PRESIDENT:
William P P. Clar
Attachment
Law of the Sea Review
SECRET
RDS 1/21/01
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83M00914R000700010003-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83M00914R000700010003-5
SECRET
Summary
The issue is whether the United States should seek to
negotiate changes consistent with US Law of the Sea (LOS)
objectives at the UN Conference on Law of the Sea or with-
draw from the negotiations.
The conference has been negotiating a treaty since 1973
which would establish a legal regime covering military and
commercial navigation and overflight, deep seabed mineral
resource development, coastal state jurisdiction, fisheries,
marine scientific research, ocean pollution, continental shelf
rights, and peaceful settlement of disputes. The conference
was expected to conclude negotiations and open a treaty for
signature in 1981. However, serious questions in the US,
particularly about the deep seabed mining provisions, pre-
vented that. A Senior Interdepartmental Group has now
completed its review of the draft LOS convention.
The main conclusions of the review are:
The navigation and overflight provisions are acceptable.
Any deterioration, however, would render this portion of
the treaty unacceptable. A favorable treaty text would
serve US interests in discouraging the expansion of coastal
state claims adverse to US navigation interests.
Major elements of the deep seabed mining provisions are
contrary to US interests and objectives. The current
text renders the treaty unratifiable. Significant, al-
though perhaps not fully satisfactory, improvements can
be negotiated with little risk to other important elements
of the treaty.
-- Other provisions are, with certain limited exceptions,
generally consistent with US interests.
The review presents two options for consideration: (1)
withdraw from the conference prior to the next session, or
(2) continue participation in the negotiations to secure the
objectives of a regime that:
1. will not deter the development of any deep seabed
mineral resources to meet national and world demand;
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83M00914R000700010003-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83M00914R000700010003-5
SECRET
-2-
2. will assure national access to deep seabed mineral
resources by current and future qualified entities to
enhance US security of supply, to avoid monopolization
of the resources by the operating arm of the Interna-
tional Authority, the Enterprise, and to promote the
economic development of the resources;
3. will reserve for the US a decision-making role in
the deep seabed institution that fairly reflects the
relative weight of US political and economic interests
and financial contributions, and effectively protects them;
4. will not allow for amendments to enter into force
without US approval, including the advice and consent of
the Senate, and will not set other undesirable precedents
for international organizations; and
5. will be likely to receive the advice and consent of
the Senate if the President decides to support ratifica-
tion. (To this end, it would not contain provisions that
create serious political or commercial difficulties, in-
cluding provisions for the mandatory transfer of private
technology and participation by and funding for national
liberation movements.)
(Satisfying these objectives would also minimize the
impact of New International Economic order principles
that could create adverse precedents for other areas.)
Agency Views. The Departments of Commerce, Defense,
Energy, Labor, State, Transportation, and Treasury, the
Environmental Protection Agency, and the National Science
Foundation recommend continued participation in the nego-
tiations to fulfill these objectives. They recognize that,
while there is an opportunity to obtain substantial improve-
ments, it will be extremely difficult to satisfy all of the
objectives. Fulfillment of these objectives would be con-
sidered mandatory by the US delegation in negotiations.
The Department of the Interior does not support the
above approach as set forth in the interdepartmental review.
If the decision is to continue negotiations, the agencies
agree that the guidelines listed below should be the basis for
the US negotiating effort. Since all the guidelines cannot be
satisfied to the fullest extent, the agencies have established
priorities. If the priority guidelines were substantially
satisfied and progress made in the other areas listed, the
convention could meet the five objectives set forth above.
The following six guidelines indicate the highest priority
kind of improvements:
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83M00914R000700010003-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83M00914R000700010003-5
SECRET
-3-
The procedures and decision-making system of the Authority
should enable the US, in concert with a few allies, (1) to
ensure that qualified deep seabed miners of nodules and
other deep seabed minerals, current and future, receive
contracts and are allowed to mine; (2) to achieve accept-
able rules and regulations applicable to development of
all deep seabed minerals; (3) to insulate deep seabed
miners from politically motivated interference from the
Authority; and (4) to block adverse decision on important
financial/budgetary questions concerning the Authority and
the Enterprise. Attaining this objective would not only
repair many of the defects in the convention but could
also facilitate attainment of most of the other guidelines.
The production policies of the Authority should be amended
by eliminating or relaxing those production limitations
that discourage production of deep seabed mineral re-
sources by private enterprise and that could artificially
stimulate competition among potential deep seabed miners.
The technology transfer provisions should be revised to
eliminate the mandatory nature of the transfer-of private
technology.
The provisions on the review conference should be revised
so-that any amendment to the deep seabed provisions must
have the consent of the US before coming into force.
National liberation movements should not be parties to the
treaty or. share in any revenues controlled by the Authority.
New International Economic Order precedents should be
minimized.
Beyond the above guidelines, the agencies attach considerable
importance to (1) minimizing the possibility that the Assembly
can interfere with the Council's exercise of power; (2)
minimizing the possibility that the Authority may expand or
abuse its powers; (3) substantially reducing or eliminating
discriminatory privileges of the international mining entity,
the Enterprise; and (4) reducing financial burdens on the US
Government and private operators.
Background
The Third UN Conference on Law-of the Sea was convened in
1973, after six years of preparatory work, for the purpose of
establishing a widely accepted and comprehensive legal regime
for the oceans. The US has been a major participant in these
efforts. A key US objective has been to protect US military
interests, specifically to halt extension of coastal state _
control over ocean areas, and to preserve and strengthen
SECRET -
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83M00914R000700010003-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83M00914R000700010003-5
SECRET
-4-
the rights of passage and other uses of the oceans. At the
same time, the US sought to create an international legal and
economic regime for seabed mineral exploitation that would
give US companies secure tenure and assured rights to conduct
deep seabed mining activities.
In ten negotiating sessions that have taken place to date,
more than 150 states have achieved negotiated compromises on
most issues. Until last March, the conference was also close
to agreement on questions relating to the control and manage-
ment.of deep seabed mineral resources. There was consensus
that a final treaty should be adopted in 1981. This was
prevented when the US announced in March 1981 that it would
undertake a thorough review of.the draft convention. Two
conference. sessions followed without negotiations on deep
seabed issues. The last session, however, included sub-
stantial discussion of problems in the text that have been
identified in the US review.
The decision for a review reflected serious questions in
the US about the draft convention, particularly the deep seabed
resource provisions. The Republican Platform stated: "Multi-
lateral negotiations have thus far insufficiently focused at-
tention on US long-term security requirements. A pertinent
example of this phenomenon is the Law of the Sea Conference,
where negotiations have served to inhibit US exploitation of
the seabed for its abundant mineral resources. Too much
concern has been lavished on nations unable to carry out seabed
mining, with insufficient attention paid to gaining early
American access to it. A Republican Administration will
conduct multilateral negotiations in a manner that reflects
America's abilities and long-term interest in access to raw
material and energy resources."
The next session of the conference begins in early March.
The conference expects to complete work on the draft text and
to adopt a convention at that session. A treaty is very likely
to be open for signature by the end of this year, with or
without US agreement, although this timetable could slip
under certain circumstances. Most conference participants
-- including virtually all our allies, the developing coun-
tries, and the Soviet Bloc -- are prepared to accept the
draft convention with relatively little change.
Assured US access to deep seabed minerals has been a con-
sistent but elusive goal in the negotiations. These resources
offer a potentially important alternative source of strategic
minerals, cobalt and manganese, in addition to nickel and
copper. Other minerals of potentially greater value are only
now being identified in the deep seabed. Current world demand
and metals markets do not justify commercial-scale development
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83M00914R000700010003-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83M00914R000700010003-5
SECRET
-5-
at this time. Nevertheless, multinational consortia have in-
vested substantial amounts to develop technology and to
prospect. When economic factors become favorable, deep seabed
mining is likely to be an important source of minerals. Con-
sequently, the US has sought to protect its future interests
by seeking a legal regime that will allow mineral exploration
and exploitation under reasonable terms and conditions. So
far it has failed.
Unfortunately, since 1967 doubts have increased concerning
the legal rights to mine deep seabed ore bodies outside a uni-
versally accepted treaty. While the US, some European states
and Japan continue to assert the right to mine the deep seabed
as a high seas freedom subject to reasonable regard for the
rights of others, this legal claim is regarded by many coun-
tries as contrary to international law. This controversy
does not extend to the issue of exclusivity of mine sites. All
sides agree that exclusivity can be legally achieved only
through international agreement.
US firms have been leading partners in the multinational
consortia engaged in deep seabed mining development. In re-
cent years, however, they have reduced their proportionate
participation. It appears that firms would need government
subsidies and incentives to operate under the draft convention,
although a rise in metals prices could alter that view. In
the absence of US subsidies, US companies could well partici-
pate in foreign entities operating under an LOS treaty.
The interdepartmental review has considered US interests
and objectives in the Law of the Sea, the alternatives of
not having or not joining any treaty, and the negotiability
of improvements to the deep seabed regime. The basic con-
clusions of the review are:
(1) The navigation and overflight provisions of the
draft convention are acceptable; any deterioration in the
language of these provisions, however, would render this
portion of the treaty unacceptable. These provisions, while
not ideal from the US point of view, would be beneficial as
they would provide a foundation for the exercise of important
naval and air mobility interests in a non-confrontational
manner. This assessment is, in part, predicated on the fact
that the draft convention provides for navigation and over-
flight freedoms, including transit on, over, and under
international straits overlapped by.territorial seas and
archipelagic waters. Without these provisions, the assertion
of the freedoms guranteed thereby would require a direct chal-
lenge to existing territorial sea claims of 107 states,
including many of our allies. Unless international limita-
tions are established, the proliferation of excessive maritime
claims almost certainly will continue, thereby requiring
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83M00914R000700010003-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83M00914R000700010003-5
r7Crl.R r1
costly levels of confrontation and certain political-military
risks to conduct routine peacetime military operations. Am-
biguities in the text regarding navigation and overflight
rights can be protected with interpretive statements and
appropriate exercise of our rights as we view them.
The navigation provisions of the Draft Convention take
on particular importance for US commercial navigation interests.
A widely accepted treaty embodying the provisions of the
current Draft Convention would provide a more stable, predictable
regime of maritime jurisdiction and navigation rights that
are essential to the smooth flow of maritime commerce.
(2) The provisions of the treaty concerning marine
scientific research, the continental shelf, ocean energy
production, and marine environmental protection are generally
consistent with US interests and objectives. With respect
to fisheries, the Department of State believes that US interests
would not be significantly affected one way or another by a.
treaty, except for salmon and tuna where the effect would be
adverse. The Department of Commerce believes that, despite
the treaty provisions on tuna and salmon which in the short
term provide less protection for the US than our current
legal positions, US fisheries interests would, in the long
run, be better served under a treaty.
(3) 1ajor elements of the Draft Convention deep seabed
mining regime are clearly contrary to US interests and objectives.
(4) An effort to renegotiate the deep seabeds provisions
of the Draft Convention presents the only realistic possibility
of achieving a law of the sea treaty acceptable to the US.
Returning to the Conference is the only strategy or approach
that has been identified which could prevent deterioration of
the navigational provisions while offering an opportunity to
achieve an acceptable deep seabed mining regime under the treaty.
(5) The Conference is likely to open the Draft Convention
for signature in 1982, even if the US objects, unless the
Conference believes that by extending the deadline the US is
likely to sign and ratify the treaty. Most Conference
participants, including virtually all of our allies, are
prepared to complete the Draft Convention with relatively little
change. Sixty countries are required to bring the treaty into
force and there are more than one hundred and twenty developing
countries, many of whom have strong interests in bringing the
treaty into force. In the event the treaty enters into force,
it is impossible to assess with any de"cjree of confidence exactly
who the parties to it might be and, therefore, what effect
entry into force would have on overall US interests if the
US were not a party.
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83M00914R000700010003-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83M00914R000700010003-5
SECRET
(6) At one extreme, if a comprehensive treaty enters
into force and the US is the only major nation that is not
a party to it, commercial-scale deep seabed mining under US
licenses almost certainly would not occur on an unsubsidized
basis because of serious international legal and political
risks. At the other extreme, in the unlikely event that
a treaty did not enter into force for many of the nations
interested in deep seabed mining (the US, UK, France, West
Germany, Belgium, Japan, the Netherlands, and Italy), the
USSR, certain major developing countries and other indus-
trialized countries, and if the US could induce them to
join an alternative regime, investment in commercial-scale
deep seabed mining under US and foreign licenses might oc-
cur under such regime.- A variety of cases lie between these
two extremes. The agencies cannot predict with a reasonable
degree of confidence whether commercial-scale investment
would occur under any such case. The various industrial
consortia hold differing views on the matter.
Additional conclusions of the agencies concerning
negotiability of changes are:
(1) It would be extremely difficult to satisfy all
US objectives (listed in the summary) with respect to the
deep seabed mining regime. Nevertheless, there is an
opportunity to seek and obtain substantial improvements
to the regime now contained in the draft convention.. Such
improvements could increase US and western allied influence
in the decision-making process. At the same time, they
could neutralize the one-nation/one-vote Assembly and
eliminate, reduce, or mitigate the practical impacts of
provisions that would otherwise result in the implementa-
tion of principles of the New International Economic Order
(NIEO). Such improvements could also provide an investment
climate for US industrial development without subsidization.
However, the improvements are -:.unlikely to alter the fact
that the treaty would still be replete with NIEO rhetoric
which could be employed by developing countries to promote
their aims in other negotiations.
(2) Negotiations to improve the deep seabed provisions
can be conducted with little risk of retaliation against
non-seabed provisions important to the US.
Further review of the various parts of the draft con-
vention and US interests, as well as an evaluation of the
seabed regime provisions as they relate to US objectives,
are provided in Annex a.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83M00914R000700010003-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83M00914R000700010003-5
SECRET
-8-
Options
Two options are proposed for consideration:
1. Withdraw from the Law of the Sea Conference
prior to the next session.
2. Continue participation in the Conference to
to secure the objectives set forth in the
summary through negotiations.
It is likely that, with or without US participation, the
conference will conclude its work and open a treaty for signa-
ture sometime in 1982 and that treaty will have an impact on
international law and practice. If Option 2 is chosen, however,
and serious renegotiation efforts appear likely to succeed,, it
is possible that the conference will delay its work somewhat.
In presenting these options, the agencies considered
whether either or both approaches realistically could result
in achievement of US objectives with respect to deep seabed
minerals. In this regard, the success of Option 1*would
depend on our ability to establish a viable alternative
regime. As noted, the agencies cannot predict with any'
reasonable degree of certainty whether it would be possible
to establish such a regime.
With respect to Option 2, the agencies reached no conclu-
sion as to the negotiability of specific changes to the draft
convention. However, the agencies have concluded that it
would be very difficult, although not impossible, to achieve
all US objectives. This general assessment is based in large
part on the results of the last session of the conference. If
renegotiation failed to meet US objectives, the US could still
decide not to sign the treaty.
Option 1 would represent a determination that the draft
convention cannot be renegotiated in a manner that would
satisfy US objectives.
Arguments favoring withdrawal from the conference are
that it:
would demonstrate an American resolve not to participate
in multilateral negotiations in which the terms of the
draft agreement do not fairly reflect US political and
economic interests and financial contributions or
contain New International Economic Order principles
that we find unacceptable and that developing countries
could employto promote their aims in other negotiations;
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83M00914R000700010003-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83M00914R000700010003-5
SECRET
-9-
might cause other countries, including US allies, to
rethink their commitment to the treaty and eventually
decide not to ratify it;
would avoid the risk that US interests in deep seabed
mining might be compromised further through continued
negotiation and might increase the effectiveness of US
denunciation of objectionable features of the treaty;
and
would appeal to Americans who feel that US interests
should not be subjected to majority votes by develop-
ing countries in international organizations.
Arguments against withdrawal from the conference are
that it:
would eliminate any realistic possibility of improving
the draft convention and would not capitalize on our
currently strong bargaining position;
could lead to the unravelling of important navigational
provisions to the detriment of US security interests and,
therefore, could reduce US ability effectively to assert
its minority view of navigation rights in the face of
adverse coastal state claims;
would isolate the US from most other countries on this
issue and provoke substantial international controversy,
including severe criticism from US allies and others for
walking away from the negotiating table;
would be viewed as a major departure from the traditional
US practice of cooperating in efforts to reach multi-
lateral solutions to foreign policy issues, thereby
reducing US credibility as a reliable participant in
multilateral negotiations and possibly affecting other
US foreign policy goals adversely;
would virtually eliminate any possibility of a US
domestic deep seabed mining industry, unless the US
could convince its allies and other key countries not
to ratify the treaty and to join an alternative regime
(otherwise,, investors would likely operate under a
foreign flag pursuant to the treaty unless fully in-
demnified by the government against risk);
could result in US allies being unable to pursue and
implement a reciprocating states agreement with the US
since they would stay in the LOS negotiations and the
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83M00914R000700010003-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83M00914R000700010003-5
SECRET
-10-
US would be seeking a permanent, alternative regime
rather than a transitional regime consistent with an
LOS treaty;
would offer the Soviets an opportunity to criticize
the US in international fora for "high-handed" tactics;
and
would be opposed by Americans who do not believe the US
should walk out of negotiations and who favor multi-
lateral solutions to major world problems and an inter-
national rule of law.
Option 2 -- continued participation in the negotiations --
would commit the US to make a full effort to achieve improve-
ments in the deep seabed provisions of the draft convention
sufficient to produce a treaty that could be signed and
ultimately ratified by the US. Detailed instructions for
achieving these objectives, including US positions on and
proposed amendments to specific treaty provisions, will be
developed by the Senior Interdepartmental Group which in-
cludes all relevant agencies. Any agency differences will be
forwarded no later than February 1 for decision by the President.
To implement this option, it would be essential that the
US state its commitment to the multilateral treaty process.
The US would have to indicate that, if the renegotiated text
meets its objectives, the US Executive Branch would promote
ratification. This commitment would not prejudge the decision
on whether to sign and ratify the final treaty text, as that
would depend on a later decision on whether it meets US
objectives.
If this option is selected, the US negotiating strategy
would be designed to minimize the risk that retaliatory
measures would be taken involving attempts to amend provisions
of the treaty which are favorable to US national security
needs, while at the same time pursuing strategies and tacti-
cal decisions which could result in success under this option.
Improvements consistent with US objectives in other areas
also may besought if opportunities arise and if they could
be achieved without risking the unravelling of military
navigation and other important interests.
This approach carries no assurance that further nego-
tiations will satisfy US objectives. In the event that the
US was successful and decided to ratify the treaty, this
would entail an appropriation by the US upon entry into
force of at least $300 million for financing the Enterprise
and an annual appropriation by the US of $5-10 million for
the Administrative expenses of the Authority until it became
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83M00914R000700010003-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83M00914R000700010003-5
5--
self-financing. Whether ratified or note, costs which are
not now quantifiable, would be incurred.
Arguments for continued participation in the nego-
tiations are that it:
presents the only realistic possibility of achieving
a law of the sea treaty that would be acceptable to
the US or capable of obtaining the Senate's advice and
consent. (returning to the conference is the only
strategy or approach that has been identified which
could reduce the risk of deterioration of the naviga-
tion provisions while offering an opportunity to achieve
an acceptable deep seabed mining regime);
would take maximum advantage of the negotiating lever-
age now available to the US because of the review, would
establish an optimum posture for achieving an acceptable
treaty, and could attract allied support;
would be less likely than Option 1 to result in an
unravelling of the navigation provisions;
would give the US greater credibility in any attempt to
persuade its allies not to participate in a treaty, if
the.. final text is unacceptable;
would avoid the controversy and potentially adverse
effects on other foreign policy areas which would be
associated with withdrawal from the conference;
would mean that, if after further negotiations in
which the US participates, the US decides not to sign
or ratify the treaty and the treaty enters into force,
the treaty is still likely to be improved and would
benefit American companies which may decide to operate
under the flag of a treaty party; and
offers an opportunity to repair the very risky invest-
ment climate.
Arguments against continued participation in the nego-
tiations are that it:
may still result in a treaty which the US could not
sign or ratify;
involves returning to the negotiations and perhaps
gaining concessions, though inadequate, which likely
would increase the political pressure (both foreign
and domestic) upon the US to sign the treaty and, if
the US acceded, to accept similar regimes in the future;
and
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83M00914R000700010003-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83M00914R000700010003-5
SECRET
-12-
would require US acquiescence in a negotiation involv-
ing (1) the supervision and regulation by an international
organization of the development of deep seabed minerals;
and (2) the creation of an international entity (the
Enterprise) to mine deep seabed resources in competi-
tion with private or state entities.
If Option 2 is selected, the US negotiating positions would
be designed to fulfill the objectives and be based on the
guidelines specified in the summary.
Implementation. The review has also considered imple-
mentation of each option and concludes that the following
would be required to implement Option 1 effectively:
1. A public relations effort should be carried out which
could include a White House announcement of the decision.
It should be designed both to obtain domestic political
advantages and to minimize domestic and international
disadvantages such as the adverse editorial comments that
followed announcement in March 1981 of the US review
of LOS policy.
2. Contingency plans should be executed to protect US
non-seabeds interests outside ?a LOS treaty. These plans
are being prepared.
3. If the US wishes to attempt to persuade its allies not
to ratify the treaty, a high-level, and potentially
politically costly, effort should be made.
4. The US would have to develop a strategy for establishing
an alternative regime for commercial investment in deep
seabed mining.
The prospects for establishing such an alternative regime
would be affected by decisions made by US allies. The agencies
believe that the current prospects are virtually nil for in-
ducing the allies to withdraw from the negotiations with the
US. The US would then have to seek to induce the allies not
to ratify the treaty.
If the US should succeed in convincing its allies not to
ratify the treaty, an effort would have to be undertaken to
establish an alternative regime for commercial-scale invest-
ment in deep seabed mining. If such a regime were to be
established in the face of a law of the sea treaty that comes
into force, or is likely to come into force, companies may
require financial protections from their governments. If the
US fails to convince its allies not to participate in the
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83M00914R000700010003-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83M00914R000700010003-5
SECRET
-13-
treaty and decides to establish a unilateral regime under
which its nationals would invest in commercial-scale deep
seabed mining, the US would have to provide additional
financial protections for its miners, becaue of serious
international legal and political risks. As noted, the
agencies cannot predict with a reasonable degree of confi-
dence whether commercial-scale investment would occur under
any case between the extremes of a comprehensive treaty in
which the US is the only major nation outside it or a treaty
that did not enter into force for many key nations and where
the US induced them into an alternative regime.
With respect to Option 2, the review concludes that the
following would be required to implement it effectively:
1.
A public announcement should be made, committing
the
US to the treaty negotiation process and
US objectives in further negotiations.
setting
Such an
forth
announce-
ment could communicate to the conference participants
that the US has serious concerns with the draft conven-
tion but that, if US objectives are fully satisfied, the
U$ would sign and seek ratification of the resulting
treaty.
2. The US must develop, in accordance with the objectives,
an-opening position that would not be confrontational*
but that at the same time would leave enough room to
back away and adopt acceptable fall-back positions. US
positions on specific provisions and changes and nego-
tiating instructions are being prepared. The extent to
which US concerns would be accommodated at the confer-
ence would depend upon a number of factors, the most
important of which probably would be the developing
countries' perception of the US position. They would
weigh the extent and nature of the US proposed changes
against their desire to have US participation in the
treaty.
3. The allies should be consulted as soon possible since
it would be essential to have their support. A number
of the allies are sympathetic to US concerns and would
welcome changes. But their judgment appears to be that,
on balance, their interests are better served by pre-
serving the non-seabed provisions of the treaty in their
present form.even at the price of accepting the deep
seabed mining provisions.
*
Interior wants it understood that the negotiator should have
the flexibility to be confrontational should that be neces-
sary to achieve US objectives.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83M00914R000700010003-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83M00914R000700010003-5
4. A prior arrangement should be made with leading develop-
ing countries on the outlines and parameters of the
negotiations and a commitment sought from them to support
the negotiating process.
5. The President of the conference should be asked to
support US efforts.
6. The US should develop an approach for dealing with the
Soviet Union. The Soviet Union and its allies also are
prepared to accept the present draft convention. The
Soviets consider the non-seabed parts of the treaty as
the most significant and are determined to protect them.
To succeed in negotiating improvements on most of the
troublesome deep seabed provisions, we do not need active
support from the Soviets, but the. US would need at least
some degree of. neutrality on their part. To the extent
they perceive that the US is moving toward acceptance
of the treaty, they might be more likely to adopt a
neutral attitude since they clearly prefer US partici-
pation in a treaty. However, in light of Soviet concerns
that the changes the US wants to make may threaten the
non-seabed portions, it is not realistic to expect Soviet
support for most US proposals and they are likely to
pressure the US to moderate its requirements. The
Soviets are further concerned that the US will try to
do'away with the three Soviet seats on the Council.
Further discussion of the range of substantive problems
and possible solutions that would be addressed in the nego-
tiations implementing option 2 are set forth in Annex A.
Reciprocating States Agreement. The US is engaged in
intense negotiations with other countries interested in deep
seabed mining intended to conclude a reciprocal agreement
early in 1982 concerning recognition of deep seabed mining
licenses. These negotiations are authorized by the Deep
Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act and, in accordance with its
provisions, must be regarded as transitional to an acceptable
LOS treaty. Under the act, the US will be required to begin
accepting US deep seabed mining applications and according
priorities of right to US deep seabed miners, with or without
a reciprocating state agreement, within a "reasonable" time
after the September 1981 publication of US deep seabed mining
regulations. Thus, even in the absence of an agreement, the
US will have to make a decision early in 1982 concerning the
unilateral receipt and processing of, deep seabed mining
applications.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83M00914R000700010003-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83M00914R000700010003-5
IMPLEMENTATION OF OPTION 2
The IG has been considering alternative approaches for
meeting U.S. objectives set out in option _2- in the Memorandum
to the President. This memorandum identifies the major
problems and summarizes several possible solutions that would
solve practical problems for U.S. seabed mining and mitigate
adverse NIEO precedents. The problems in the seabed mining
portion of the Draft Convention are significantly interrelated
and many cannot be resolved in isolation. In a number of
instances, a specific problem could be resolved by obtaining
only one of the range of solutions listed. In other instances,
it would be necessary to combine two or more of the alternative
"fixes" to achieve satisfactory results.
The range of problems and solutions set forth below is
not intended to be exhaustive. Equally effective alternative
solutions may emerge during the development of instructions
and consultations with U.S. allies and others. Through.this
process, the details of the solutions will be defined, and
t-he most attractive combination or combinations of acceptable
solutions will be identified.
I. DECISION-MAKING SYSTEM OF THE INTERNATIONAL SEABED AUTHORITY
Problem 1
The Draft Convention establishes a 36 member executive
Council which would exercise most powers of the Authority.
It is fundamentally important that the U.S. and at least two
or three of its principal allies be members. The U.S. is
not guaranteed a seat and would be required to compete with
its allies for Council membership, while the Eastern European
Bloc is guaranteed three seats.
Solutions
(1) Name the U.S. as a permanent member;
(2) Reserve seats for the largest investors in seabed
mining, the largest consumers of these minerals or the largest
contributors to the Authority and Enterprise;
(3) Reserve seats for the states with the largest GNPs,
or those with the largest GNPs who are also large investors;
(4) Increase U.S. influence over caucuses which select consumer,
and investor representatives.
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83M00914R000700010003-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83M00914R000700010003-5
SECRET
- 2 -
Problem 2
The voting system in the Council does not give the
U.S. and its major allies influence commensurate with
their interests. The adoption of rules and regulations
requires consensus, which gives not only the U.S. but other
states a veto. The two-thirds and three-fourths majority
voting for other issues gives the U.S. and its allies little
blocking power and no affirmative voting power.
Solutions
Ensure that the U.S. can block decisions in concert
with two or three of its major allies and can exercise,
in concert with a few states of like view, affirmative
voting power in rule-making and other key areas through:
(1) Weighted voting (based on production and consumption,
financial contributions or similar criteria);
(2) Chambered voting (with veto power in the investor
and consumer chambers);
(3) An "inner Council", composed mostly of the U.S. and
those states which we believe will most likely vote with
us, empowered to decide important questions;
(4) Some combination of the above voting approaches,
varying as to the issue involved, but assuring the U.S. and its
allies the power to control important decisions.
Problem 3
The all-inclusive, one-nation, one-vote Assembly has
broad policy-making powers, is characterized as the "supreme
organ" to which other organs are accountable, and is empowered
to exercise residual powers of the Authority. Thus, the
Assembly could circumvent Council control of the Authority.
Solutions
(1) Subject specific Assembly decisions to weighted or
chambered voting that enables the U.S. and its allies to
block decisions;
(2) Require Council concurrence with specific Assembly
decisions, such as the establishment of-policies;
(3) Convert the Assembly into a recommendatory body
that meets every two or three years;
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83M00914R000700010003-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83M00914R000700010003-5
SECRET
- 3 -
(4) Eliminate the Assembly's supremacy and the Council's
accountability to it, while simultaneously expanding the
Council's powers;
(5) Restrict the scope of the Assembly's policy-making
powers and specify that such policies have no binding force;
(6) Specify that the Council and Seabed Disputes Chamber
are independent of the Assembly.
II. REVIEW CONFERENCE
Problem
A Review Conference convened 15 years after seabed
mining begins would have a broad mandate to amend the Convention.
Amendments could be adopted by a two-thirds vote and would
enter into force for the U.S. upon ratification or accession
by the same majority. If the U.S. opposed the amendments,
its only choice would be to denounce the entire Convention.
Solutions
(1) Condition the entry into force of amendments upon
their ratification by all States Parties, all states which
have sponsored existing contracts, or all of the major consuming
states; (The latter two approaches would be adequate
provided that the U.S. was a member of those categories.)
(2) Require Council approval of amendments by consensus
(together with a guaranteed U.S. seat);
(3) Require the Review Conference to adopt amendments
only on the basis of consensus, concurrence of all sponsoring
states, or concurrence of all major consuming states;
(4) Delete the Review Conference provision entirely.
III. SYSTEM FOR ACQUIRING AND MAINTAINING ACCESS
Problem 1
The Draft Convention does not assure that qualified U.S.
applicants will obtain contracts to mine the deep seabed. A
Legal and Technical Commission, that will probably be dominated
by developing countries, has the power to grant or deny
access on the basis of highly discretionary judgments.
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83M00914R000700010003-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83M00914R000700010003-5
SECRET
- 4 -
Solutions
(1) Assure the U.S. and its allies adequate influence
in the composition and decision-making procedures of the
Commission;
(2) Include objective qualification standards that
eliminate the Commission's discretion to disapprove qualified
applicants, impose time-limits on its review of applications,
and provide rejected applicants prompt access to commercial
arbitration; alternatively, the treaty could set out all of
the detailed regulations governing access, together with
these procedural protections; .
(3) Require the Authority to issue contracts to all
applicants and replace the present qualification standards
with objective diligence standards to be applied during
exploration and development.
Problem 2
The Authority's powers to regulate seabed mining are
inadequately circumscribed. The high risk of politically
motivated interference will deter private investment.
Solutions
(1) Make extensive, technical amendments to remove
ambiguity and establish objective criteria for Authority
actions;
(2) Rely on U.S. influence in an improved Council and
Legal and Technical Commission;
(3) Transfer supervision and enforcement functions from
the Authority to states which sponsor contractors;
(4) Specify that the Authority may only impose requirements
on contractors which are authorized in rules and regulations,
assuming adequate U.S. influence in rule-making;
(5) Specify that the Authority may impose no new require-
ments on contractors after a contract is issued;
(6) Make all disputes between a contractor and the
Authority subject to commercial arbitration.
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83M00914R000700010003-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83M00914R000700010003-5
SECRET
Problem 3
By requiring that all seabed mineral development be
carried out pursuant to Authority regulations, the Draft
Convention enables other states to block the adoption of
regulations and, thus, deter the development of minerals
other than nodules.
Solutions
(1) Confine the deep seabed portion of the convention
to nodules;
(2) Grant States Parties the right to develop other
minerals in the absence of Authority regulations and provide
grandfather rights for such investments after regulations
are adopted;
(3) Obtain adequate affirmative voting strength for the
U.S. and its allies in rule-making.
IV. RULES, REGULATIONS AND PROCEDURES
Problem
The details of the program for regulating seabed mining
will be spelled out in the rules, regulations and procedures
of the Authority. While these regulations could be prepared
by a Preparatory Commission prior to a decision with respect
to U.S. signature or ratification, important issues should
be resolved in the treaty itself. Further, the procedure
for adopting and amending regulations must adequately protect
U.S. interests.
Solutions
(1) Improve the decision-making system of the Council
as indicated above;
(2) Negotiate establishment of a Preparatory Commission
to be made up of states which have signed the final act of
the Conference, including a decision-making system patterned
after approaches discussed above for the Council, in order
to ensure that the rules, regulations and procedures will be
available for review before a decision is taken on ratification
of the Convention.
(3) Include in the Convention itself the Authority's
initial set of rules, regulations and procedures.
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83M00914R000700010003-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83M00914R000700010003-5
SECRET
V. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
Problem
During an interim period, the Enterprise (the mining
arm of the Authority) is empowered to compel seabed mining
contractors to sell their technology to it, if the Enterprise
finds that it is unable to acquire such technology on the
open market on fair and reasonable terms. This right is
extended to developing countries under certain circumstances.
Morever, the mandatory transfer obligation is extended indirectly
to third party suppliers of such technology. These provisions
could have serious precedential consequences. Further, it will
be necessary to withhold some technology for national security
reasons.
Solution
(1) Delete mandatory technology transfer entirely;
(2) Eliminate mandatory technology transfer for private
miners or their suppliers, but empower a Conference or Commission
of States Parties to facilitate the transfer of technology to the
Enterprise;
(3) Eliminate mandatory technology transfer, but require
State Parties to prevent their companies from colluding to
deny the Enterprise access to technology; or allow the
Enterprise, upon a showing of such collusion, to obtain
technology as part of a commercial arbitration award;
(4) Eliminate sanctions for invoking national security
as grounds for not transferring technology.
VI. PRODUCTION LIMITATIONS AND RELATED POLICIES
Problem 1
The production policies contained in the Draft Convention
are inconsistent with a free market economic philosophy.
These policies include limiting seabed production in order
to protect landbased producers against competition from the
seabed.
Solutions
(1) Recast the production policies to eliminate offending
concepts and specify that any Authority role in protecting
landbased producers is limited to explicitly identified
mechanisms;
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83M00914R000700010003-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83M00914R000700010003-5
SECRET
- 7 -
(2) Add new policy goals emphasizing that seabed develop-
ment should be governed by free market forces;
(3) Add new policy goals which require the Authority at
all times to exercise its powers so as permit rather than
deter seabed development;
(4) Eliminate the risk that these policies will deter
seabed development by other amendments which strengthen the
U.S. role in decision-making and reduce the Authority's
regulatory discretion.
Problem 2
The ceiling imposed on seabed production levels could
impede seabed minerals development, if the level of production
reaches the limit allowed, and in that case may not accommodate
the existing consortia interested in seabed mining. Moreover,
the procedure for administering this limit enables the Authority
to discriminate against bona fide U.S. miners.
Solutions
(1) Delete the production ceiling entirely;
(2) Delete the ceiling and substitute a prohibition on
the subsidization of exports of seabed minerals (or all
exports of these minerals, whether produced on land or from
the seabed);
(3) Delete the ceiling and substitute a residual
power in the Council, pursuant to a highly qualified majority
vote, to impose controls upon a finding that developing
country landbased producers have been injured by seabed
production;
(4) Delete the ceiling and substitute a right on the
part of seriously injured developing country landbased producers
to exercise a first call on the Authority's funds after Admin-
istrative expenses;
(5) Increase the ceiling to ensure that it would have no
practical effect.
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83M00914R000700010003-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83M00914R000700010003-5
SECRET
- 8 -
.,VII. DISCRIMINATION IN FAVOR OF TIIE ENTERPRISE
Problem 1
The Draft Convention requires industrialized states to
finance the major share of the first mining project of the
Enterprise, but grants them little or no control over the
terms and conditions of such financing, or over Enterprise
operations.
Solutions
(1) Specify these terms and conditions in the treaty;
(2) Assuming adequate U.S. influence in the development
of regulations, specify that terms and conditions will be
established in such regulations;
(3) Empower the Council to decide these questions, if
the U. S. has adequate influence in the Council;
(4) Grant major contributors direct control of the.
Enterprise through guaranteed seats and weighted voting on
its Governing Board;
(5) Require specific Enterprise actions to be approved
by the Council, together with adequate U. S. influence on
the Council;
(6) Establish the Enterprise as an autonomous commercial
entity, independent of the Authority, and specify a procedure
whereby major contributors would run the Enterprise in case
of default.
Problem 2
The Enterprise would enjoy significant discriminatory
advantages over other seabed miners and might gain monopoly
control over the most attractive seabed deposits after the
existing consortia obtain contracts.
Solutions
(1) Limit the Authority's right to reserve deposits
discovered by private seabed miners for use by the Enterprise;
(2) Limit the Enterprise's power to compel the sale of
seabed mining technology;
(3) Specify that the Enterprise must comply with the
same rules, regulations and procedures as other operators;
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83M00914R000700010003-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83M00914R000700010003-5
SECRET
9 -
(4) Limit other discriminatory advantages, such as its
exemption from penalties, a temporary tax-holiday, and special
privileges and. immunities.
VIII. LIBERATION MOVEMENTS
Problem
The Draft Convention provides that "peoples who have
not attained full independence or other self-governing status"
may share in the economic and financial benefits and exercise
rights under the treaty. Furthermore, the final clauses of
the treaty have not yet been negotiated to determine what
entities other than states may be party to the convention.
Solutions
(1) Properly define "people who have not attained full
independence or other self-governing status" so as not to
include national liberation movements;
(2) Ensure that only states, qualifying regional economic
integration organizations, and associated States, may become
parties and share in the financial and economic benefits.
IX. GRANDFATHER RIGHTS
Problem
U. S. seabed mining companies have already spent millions
of dollars in preparation of seabed mining, but the Draft
Convention does not presently protect the prior investment
and equitable interests developed by these companies.
Solution
Negotiate a preparatory investment system which will be
binding on the Authority and will adequately protect the
U.S. seabed mining interest. The details of this solution
will depend upon the final provisions of the deep seabed
regime.
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83M00914R000700010003-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83M00914R000700010003-5
FURTHER INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUP (IG) COMMENTS
ON THE DRAFT CONVENTION AND US INTERESTS/OBJECTIVES
Military Navigation and Overflight
The navigation and overflight provisions of the Draft
Convention are acceptable; any deterioration in the language
of these provisions would, however, render this portion of
the draft treaty unacceptable to the Department of Defense.
These provisions, while not ideal from the United States
point of view, would be beneficial as they would provide a
foundation for the exercise of important naval and air mobility
interests in a non-confrontational manner. This assessment
is, in part, predicated on the fact that the Draft Convention
provides for navigation and. overflight freedoms, including
transit on, over, and under international straits overlapped
by territorial seas and archipelagic waters. Without these
provisions, the assertion of the freedoms guaranteed thereby
would require a direct challenge to existing territorial sea
claims of 107 states, including many of our.. allies. Unless
international limitations are established, the proliferation
of excessive maritime claims almost certainly will continue,
thereby requiring costly levels of confrontation and certain
political-military risks to conduct routine peacetime military
operations. Ambiguities in the text regarding navigation and
overflight rights can be protected with interpretive statements
and appropriate exercise of our rights as we view them.
In view of the negotiating environment, any effort to
reopen non-seabed portions of the text to achieve improvements
likely will result in changes that would be adverse to our
military security interests. As it is probable that there
will be a widely accepted convention, with or without US
participation or support, it is important that our strategy
be directed to avoiding this result.
Commercial Navigation
The interests of commercial navigation are well served
by the Draft Convention, which provides a significantly better
measure of predictability and stability than does existing
international law. A stable, predictable regime of maritime
jurisdiction, navigation rights and regulation of marine
pollution is essential to the smooth flow of maritime commerce
which is vital to the economy of the United States.
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83M00914R000700010003-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83M00914R000700010003-5
SECRET
A treaty that incorporates the existing provisions of
the Draft Convention relating to commercial navigation, but
to which the US is not a party, would also be beneficial to
commercial navigation, but would result in less stability and
predictability for commercial navigation than would a treaty
to which the US is a party. Also, the provisions of the
Draft Convention would provide a better climate for investment
in marine transportation, particularly transportation of oil,
than would alternate arrangements.
Commercial Aviation
The interests of commercial aviation are well served by
the Draft Convention. Because jurisdiction over airspace is
predicated on the jurisdictional status of the waters below,
the clarification of,maritime jurisdiction, particularly in
limiting the territorial sea to twelve miles and in ensuring
the right to overflight of straits and archipelagoes, is
important to US international commercial aviation.* A treaty
that incorporates the existing provisions affecting commercial
aviation, but to which the US is not a party, would also be
beneficial to commercial aviation.
Fisheries
US interests in coastal and continental shelf fisheries
and protection of the fisheries environment are generally
well served by the Draft Convention, and US fisheries research
interests would be marginally better off with the Draft
Convention.
However, the Draft Convention would reduce our present
authority under US domestic law over our valuable salmon
resources beyond the 200-mile limit, would erode our position
favoring international. management of highly migratory tuna
There is question regarding the jurisdiction for airspace
over the 200-mile exclusive economic zone for civil aviation
purposes. The Chicago Convention provides for coastal state
jurisdiction in airspace over the territorial sea and
applicability of international rules in airspace over the
high seas. While the Draft Convention provides for freedom
of overflight over the economic zone, it does not explicitly
provide that the Chicago Convention "Rules of the Air" apply.
Since the negotiating history does not indicate an intent to
change the jurisdiction for regulation of civil aircraft
overflying the economic zone from that for the high seas, the
applicability of the "Rules of the Air" to airspace over the
economic zone should be made explicit through an interpretive
statement at the appropriate time.
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83M00914R000700010003-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83M00914R000700010003-5
SECRET
-3-
throughout their range, and would negatively affect our
ability to preserve--our large and efficient distant water
tuna fleet. The Draft Convention also lacks adequate
mechanisms to deal with the failure to reach agreement on
"straddling stocks" existing both within 200 miles and
beyond and "transboundary stocks" which migrate between
the 200 mile zones of two or more countries. This could
lead to future conflict or even "creeping jurisdiction."
The Department of State believes that US interests
would not be significantly affected one way or another by
a treaty except for salmon and tuna where the effect would
be adverse. The Department of Commerce believes that,
despite the treaty provisions on tuna and salmon which
in the short term provide less protection for the US than
our current legal positions, US fisheries interests would,
in the long run, be better served under a treaty.
Continental. Shelf Resources
US interests in development of continental shelf
hydrocarbon resources will be well served whether there is a
treaty or whether the US is a party to the treaty. If the US
is not a party, no obligation will exist to share revenues
from production on the shelf beyond 200 miles. However, the
greater degree'of clarity provided under the treaty as to the
outer limits of the shelf beyond 200 miles is desirable to US
firms operating on the outer shelf of the US or of other
states despite the obligation to share revenues at a modest
rate.
Marine Scientific Research
US,interests in freedom of marine scientific research
are-poorly served by existing international practice which is
steadily worsening. US interests would also be poorly served
by the Draft Convention, but, since the Draft Convention
basically codifies existing practice, it would have the
advantage of deterring further erosion. In addition, the
Draft Convention would provide some standardization for the
conduct of marine scientific research that could reduce the
potential for arbitrary or capricious behavior by coastal
states. 'US participation would aid our scientists.
Marine Environment Protection
US environmental interests are well served by the Draft
Convention. Over the past decade, international standards for
the protection of the marine environment have been developed with
the full participation of, and often at the behest of, the US.
These standards would be implemented on a world-wide basis
by reference in the Convention, and would generally promote
a sound balance of environmental and maritime interests.
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83M00914R000700010003-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83M00914R000700010003-5
SECRET
-4-
Also, both the uniform enforcement regime and the system of
safeguards provided for in the Draft Convention are very
important to operators of commercial vessels, particularly
tankers, and to maritime labor unions.
A treaty that incorporates the existing provisions
related to protection of the marine environment, but to which
the US is not a party, would also generally enhance the level
of global protection of the marine environment. However,
some effective enforcement rights and some safeguards for
commercial navigation not presently recognized under customary
international law, but provided for in the Draft Convention,
would not-be available to the US and its commercial vessel
operators unless either the US becomes a party or these
provisions evolve into customary law. Also, if the US does
not participate, US leadership in marine environmental
protection will be less effective, particularly in fora such
as the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization.
Political/International
US interests in global stability would be better served
by US participation in the negotiations and accession to the
treaty. If widely ratified, the treaty would establish a
generally-shared legal framework relating to activities in
the oceans which would provide for stability and predictability
in international relations, assist in narrowing the scope of
bilateral disputes, and ensure that coordination with allies
in crisis situations is not hampered by different views
concerning sovereignty and jurisdiction. Failure to participate
would be viewed negatively by our allies and the developing
countries.
The US interest in maintaining a position of leadership
in multinational negotiations may be jeopardized if the US
withdraws from negotiations in which it has played a major
role for more than a decade. In addition, failure to
participate in negotiations could have an adverse effect on
other unrelated foreign policy areas.
On the other hand, certain aspects of the Draft Convention
i.e., the establishment of the Authority as now structured
and other elements of the deep seabed regime, are undesirable
precedents which will create difficulty for us in other
multinational negotiations.
Dispute Settlement
she general US interest in promoting international
dispute settlement mechanisms for the resolution of international
disputes is furthered by the Draft Convention. However, one
may question whether the establishment of a'Law of the.Sea
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83M00914R000700010003-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83M00914R000700010003-5
SECRET
-5-
Tribunal, dominated by developing countries, is in the interest
of the US. It is clear that the Draft Convention would not
require certain issues of importance to the US, such as those
relating to military activities, to be submitted to binding
dispute settlement. However, because of ambiguities in the
text, it is difficult to determine with precision all other
issues which would be subject to binding dispute settlement
should the US become a party.
Deep Seabed Mining
Objectives for Evaluation of the Deep Seabed
Regime Provisions
The US objectives in a deep seabed mining regime are a
regime which:
First, will not deter the development of deep seabed
mineral resources to meet national and world demand.
Second, will allow national access to deep seabed mineral
resources by current and future qualified entities so-as to
enhance US security of supply, so as to avoid monopolization
of deep seabed mineral resources by the operating arm of the
International Authority, the Enterprise, and so as to promote
economic development of the resources.
Third, will reserve for the US a decision-making
role in the deep seabed institution which fairly reflects
the relative weight of US political and economic interests
and financial contributions, and effectively protects them.
Fourth, will. not allow for amendments to enter into
force without the approval of the US, including advice and
consent of the US Senate, and will not set other undesirable
precedents for international organizations.
Fifth, will be such as to make it likely to receive the
advice and consent of the Senate if the President decides to
support ratification. (To this end, the treaty would not
contain provisions that would create serious political and
commercial difficulties, including provisions for the mandatory
tranfer of private technology and participation by and
funding for national liberation movements.
Evaluation of the Seabed Regime Provisions of
the Draft Convention
The IG has revieweu the Draft Convention and does not
believe that it meets- hese objectives. For example, the
Draft Convention:
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83M00914R000700010003-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83M00914R000700010003-5
SECRET
(1) artificially limits deep seabed mineral-production
and provides for discretion and discrimination
if there is competition for limited production
allocations;
(2) discourages private investment in deep seabed
mineral production because of: lack of certainty
in the granting of mining contracts, mandatory
technology transfer requirements, and burdensome
financial requirements: . .__
(3) creates a privileged supranational competitor --
the Enterprise -- whose advantages could make it
extremely difficult, if not impossible, for private
ventures -- absent national subsidies -- to compete.
A supranational monopoly over deep seabed mineral
production could thus result;
(4) fails to provide grandfather rights for existing
investment. in deep seabed mineral development;
(5) establishes a decision-making system so structured
that US and other potential deep seabed mineral
producers and consumers will be unable effectively
to influence important policy and operational
decisions;
(6) provides for a review conference which, after five
years of negotiation, may adopt amendments to the deep
seabed mining regime that would automatically
enter into force for the US upon approval by two-
thirds of the States Parties.
(7) allows participation by and funding for liberation
groups.
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP83M00914R000700010003-5