IG ON DANGERS TO PAKISTAN FROM SOVIET ACTIVITY IN AFGHANISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00914R000500100037-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 25, 2006
• Sequence Number: 37
• Publication Date: February 1, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2006/09/25: CIA-RDP83M00914R000500100037-0
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Council
DDI 812-82
1 February 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Chairman, National Intelligence Council
National Intelligence Officer for NESA
SUBJECT: IG on Dangers to Pakistan from Soviet Activity in
Afghanistan
1. Recent enhancements in Soviet military strength in Afghanistan
prompted State Pol/Mil in conjunction with State/NEA to call this IG.
The basic question posed was whether recent Soviet force enhancements in
Afghanistan portended a more aggressive military policy toward Pakistan.
CIA was asked comment the recent SNI14
The JCS was asked to comment
on RDJTF contingency planning as regards Pakistan. The undersigned and
A/NIO/USSR, represented CIA.
2. No representative took exception with CIA's description of the
situation, which included the following essential points:
a. Certain force improvements to Soviet forces have
occurred, including enhanced IFF, MIG-23 presence
in country, SA-8 deployment, security troop
de to ments,
While these can be
explained y- of er reasons, they do in total add
up to an increased Soviet capability for limited
intervention in Pakistan.
b. We have no evidence of a Soviet intent to utilize
this enhanced capability for such an intervention,
and long-standing political restraints still apply.
This Memo is classified
SECRET in its entirety.
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c. Should the Soviets decide to intervene on the
ground, it would probably consist of a relatively
limited in-and-out strike against Mujahidin
training camps or supply points. Contact with
Pakistani forces would be avoided, if possible.
3. The JCS representative pointed out that lines of command regarding
Pakistan are in flux, that current RDJTF responsibilities do not include it,
and that CINCPAC is the current command element responsible. Additionally,
no clear policy requirement had been levied on the JCS to prepare responses
for Pakistan contingencies, and hence none existed. He requested policy
guidance be provided.
4. During ensuing discussion, an informal consensus emerged that no
likely current contingency, including Soviet intervention as described above,
would require a direct US military response. Some form of conspicuous
military support for Pakistan might be necessar
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5. It was decided to convene a working group to update contingency
n1annina and threat assessment documents on Pakistan. A 1981 document
will be utilized as a basis for this updating.
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Approved For Release 2006/09/25: CIA-RDP83M00914R000500100037-0