NSC EMBARGO FOLLOW-ON REQUEST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00914R000500060017-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 20, 2007
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: January 11, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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JAN iZo2
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy. Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Deputy Director for Intelligence
SUBJECT: NSC Embargo Follow-on Request
1-. This is our analysis. supporting the NSC's request for a
list of items to be considered in any expansion of US government
measures to embava- technology and end-products to the Soviet 25X1
Union.
2. If the President's embargo is expanded, it probably
should include the items listed in Table 1. We must note, ho, X1
ever, that unilateral USG actions on these items likely will a
only marginal effects on the Soviet Union in general.
3.. The President may wish to consider an even greater expan-
sion of the embargo, encompassing other USG actions to curtail
Soviet-American interactions. Some suggested action-areas are
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Table 1: The"Effect of Further Trade Restrictions
on Selected Technologies and End-Products
Agricultural
Machinery
? combines
0 tractors
? po].ysilicon
? printed circuit
boards
test equipment
Even if replaced by foreign suppliers,
the US action probably would raise Soviet
costs and strain Soviet hard currency
reserves. Given poor Soviet and world
harvests, unilateral USG action could
exacerbate Soviet food shortages.
Allied action could cut Soviet grain
imports by 70%.
US action would inhibit long-term Soviet
drive for.self-sufficiency.
Allied action would further inhibit this
drive.
Legal acquisitions, coupled with illegal
ones, have given the Soviets an entire
industry.
Allied action would substantially retard
Soviet advances. .
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US and/or Allied action would affect
Soviet agricultural productivity.
Oil and gas equipment/
technology
Allied action would reduce expected
Soviet oil and gas recovery by 2 or 3
submersibles
off-shore rigs
drill bits and pipe
million barrels per day by late 1980s.
pipeline equipment,
including compressors
recovery chemicals
Construction equipment/materials
Non-US equipment is widely available.
?
large-diameter pipe
Allied action would cause severe dis-
?
rolled steel
ruptions in machine building and gas
?
bulldozers/excavators,/
transmission.
dumpsters
Allied action would inhibit advanced
Soviet work.
?
ceramics
?
composites/powders
special steel alloys
Subst
antial
US action would be reduced by foreign
availability.
?
software
large-frame
?
minis
?
peripherals
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NC/CNC/robotics
CAD/CAM
mills/foundries/fabrication
precision machinery
? floating drydocks
? heavy-lift cranes
* NC: numerically controlled
CNC: computer numerically controlled
CAD: computer-aided design
CAM: computer-aided manufacture
Substantial Non-US suppliers are numerous.
Allied action would seriously hamper
Soviet efforts to boost quality/quantity
in production. ..
I
Allied action would curtail Soviet
naval construction and repair capabilities.
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Technology/action
1. Total cut-off of export credits,
including retroactive action on
outstanding credit
2. Terminate maritime agreement
3. Terminate fishing agreement
4. Reduce Soviet commercial
presence
Impact Foreign availability
Forces Soviets to pay scarce Europeans and Japanese already
hard currency and/or compete offer "below prime" rates but
for market rates increased Soviet demand may
increase cost of borrowing
Shipping and cross-trading Allies have stronger flag-
with and by Soviets would shipping requirements and the
increase their costs and Soviet fleet would not encroach
reduce hard currency earnings on their markets
Deprives Soviets access to World fisheries are already
fertile grounds and would strained; may cause friction
cut Soviet protein consump- with allied competitors
Lion
Reduces Soviet presence and
would limit intelligence
service (IS) uses
5. Eliminate all S&T* agreements Cuts off direct Soviet
(including Article 4 exchanges access to US academies and
of technical data with US firms) business
not up for renewal in short-run,
including "unofficial" exchanges
(e.g., direct university-Academy
exchanges, Fulbright Scholars,
etc.)
Soviets would probably shift
commercial activities to
allies
Allies have such agreements
and Soviets are strengthening
them
Commentary
Now suspended
by US only
Now suspended
by US only
Now suspended
by US only
An easy, low-cost
action--if we trade
less, they don't need.
commercial offices
These generally are of
one-way benefit to Soviets
and are very difficult
to monitor--no loss to
USG
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6. Reduce or eliminate US
participation in trade
shows attended by Soviets,
and restrict sales presenta-
tions, and industry tours
7. Reduce or eliminate US
presence in international
organizations (e.g., IIASA,
UNDP) with large Soviet
presence
8. Eliminate Soviet access
to USG open source
documents (NTIS, Library
of Congress)
9. Regulated activities of
Soviet-owned, US-chartered
companies
10. Restrict imports of Soviet-
origin goods
Cuts Soviets off from Allies could and probably
personnel relations with would pick up slack
US firms and state-of-the-
art technology and reduces
IS involvement
Cuts Soviets off from Allies may pick up tab, but
close contacts with US not likely
experts and reduces IS
involvement
Would restrict Soviet Some agreements with Allies
access to USG-sponsored (e.g., British library) must
research be altered
Would weaken Soviet NA
commercial presence,
and use of same for IS
related activities
Damages Soviet prestige NA
and may crimp somewhat
Soviet hard-currency
earnings
Reduces the risk of
theft, inadvertent
losses of know-how and
design processes, and
IS recruitment/assessment
threat
A rather simple way of
restricting US "subsidies"
to Soviets, but may cause
problems in multilateral
contexts (e.g., UN)
Would probably require
legal action, but well
worthwhile in any event
Mostly symbolic, as we
don't import a great deal
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Appendix: US-USSR BILATERAL TECHNICAL AGREEMENTS
Name
Science & Technology
Agriculture
Artificial Heart
Research & Development
Atomic Energy
Energy
Environmental Pro-
tection
Housing and Con-
struction
Medical Science and
Public Health
Exploration and Use
of Outer Space for
Peaceful Purposes
Transportation
Studies of the
World Ocean
Date for Renewal
July 8,
1982
June 19,
1983
June 28,
1987
June 21,
1983
June 28,
1982
May 23,
1987
June 28,
1984
May 23,
1937
May 24,
1982
June 19,
1983
Dec. 15,
1986
Notification'
By Dec. 1982
30 day advance
By Dec. 1983
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SUBJECT:
NSC Embargo Follow-on Request
Original -
Addressee
1 -
DDI
1 -
AD/DI
1 -
AS/DI
1 -
DI/Registry
1 -
Executive Registry
1 -
D/OSWR
C/TTAC
OSWR/TTAC4
](7 Jan. 82)
STAT
.STAT
STAT
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