THE DOZIER KIDNAPPING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00914R000300020026-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Sequence Number: 26
• Content Type: REPORT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
National Foreign Assessment Center
The Dozier Kidnapping
The Red Brigades is responsible for the kidnapping of
General James Dozier on 17 December. The Brigades, who
reportedly have expanded their target list to include senior US
military officers, have never before kidnapped an American
citizen. Based on previous Brigades' kidnappings of senior
Italian officials, the Brigades can be expected to trv to exploit
General Dozier's knowledge of NATO operations in Italy, and to
issue demands call.inq for Italy to quit NAr"O or restrict its role
in the Alliance. The kidnappinq probably will he protracted.
Some recent Brigades kidnappings have been resoivea through
negotiations, although not in all cases have the Red Brigades
released their prisoners after milking the incidents for all
possible propaganda value. Therefore, the possibility exists
that after exploitinq General Dozier, the Brigades will have him
killed. If past Brigades activities are indicators, another
spectacular incident may take place soon. We have no evidence
either way concerning Libyan involvement in the incident.
This memorandum was prepared for the Office for Combatting
Terrorism, State Department by of the
International Terrorism Center, O ice o o al Issues. it
contains information received by 1200, 18 December 1981.
Questions and comments should be directed to the Chief,
International Terrorism Center
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characteristic tactic of the Brigades.
Details of the attack suggest classic Red Brigade tactics:
The Kidnapping
The kidnappers, dressed as plumbers, talked their way into
Dozier's apartment in Verona on the evening of 17 December. Some
press accounts state Dozier resisted and was wounded during the
attack. Reportedly, the apartment was ransacked before Dozier
was placed in the trunk of the getaway vehicle. In a call to the
Italian news service ANSA in Milan, an anonymous caller claimed
credit for the incident in the name of ~he Rea Brigades. a
Some previous Brigades' kidnappings have involved the
use of disguises.
Al.though breaking into a residence to effect a
kidnapping is an unusual tactic for the Brigades, many
of their kidnappings have been carried out near the
residence of the intended victim.
The Brigades like to obtain documentary evidence of the
"misdeeds" of their victims. The ransacking of General
Doziers's residence was almost certainly done in the
hopes of finding NATO documents that could be used to
embarrass the Alliance in Red Brigades propaganda
communiques.
The Dozier kidnapping almost certainly resulted from a
careful surveillence of the General's daily pattern since the
Brigades do not normally engage in spontaneous acts of
terrorism. Most terrorist groups eschew forceful entry into
private residences because they are uncertain regardinq
availability of weapons to the intended victim, presence of a
fortified "safe room", and other security measures. The group
Approv
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may have had prior knowledge of the interior of the Dozier
residence in this case.
The Red Brigades: A Brief Primer
Originally formed in Milan in the late 19FO's by radicals
trying to polarize the local labor scene, the Brigades initially
engaged in leftist political activity but soon adopted terrorism
as a primary weapon against the Italian government and the
capitalist system. Since then, Brigades' tarqettinq has been
expanded to include a wide range of individuals representing
institutions and classes that have thwarted the formation of a
"peoples' democracy."I
The Brigades have sought to undermine Italian institutions
by conducting a relatively low-intensity terrorist campaign
designed to provoke repressive government actions that would
prompt armed popular responses. Brigade motives, if not methods,
have struck a responsive chord in some elements of Italian
society disenchanted with the government's unfulfilled
promises.1
The Brigades operate out of six major cities, but probably
have bases and/or supporters in other urban areas. Each of the
major cities-Rome, Milan, Venice, Turin, Naples, and Genoa--has
its own column, as Brigades formations are known. The columns
consist of a number of small cells that function autonomously but
under the loose direction of the "colonel" of each column. This
decentralized arrangement makes it difficult to disrupt
completely the activities of the column.
At the top of the Brigades pyramid is the Strategic
Directorate, which is the highest operational. authority in the
Brigades structure. Activities of the various columns are
coordinated at this level, although each column appears to have
considerable leeway in the conduct of its day-to-day opera-
tions.
Brigade Tactics
Brigade tactics have consisted mainly of kidnappings,
assassinations and efforts to maim police and security officers,
prison guards, members such as university professors and labor
leaders. Most of these activities are designed to "punish" those
members of the system who have somehow obstructed the formation
of the "peoples' democracy." Generally speaking, the Brigades
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have avoided protected installations, preferring the safe tactic
of ambush assassinations. The group such operations
as airliner hijackings.
The Aldo Moro case attracted all the media attention the
Brigades could wish for, but it also brought a massive increase
in the security effort against the Brigades. While the Brigades
may have considered the Moro operation a propaganda victory, the
group probably decided that the police reaction to such incidents
endangered the group's survival. The pattern of incidents after
the Moro case suggests the Brigades have tried to undermine
public confidence in the state by demonstrating that it is
incapable of protecting its citizens. Recent kidnapping
exercises represemt a further development in the terrorists'
strategic thinking aimed in part at gathering intelligence on
certain government and industrial activities for the purposes of
publicly exploiting those "misdeeds" and broadening the Red
Brigades' popular appeal. The kidnapping of Neapolitan political
figure Ciro Cirillo, who was involved in the inept earthquake
relief, was a clear attempt to capture public sympathy been
carried out to find out which companies and which members of
government involved in the disaster relief embezzled money for
the operation. Other operations such as the kidnap and murder of
the brother of a repentent terrorist, were designed to weaken the
government's anti-terrorist campaign by warning ca tured
terrorists against cooperation with the police.
Prognosis
The Brigades have normally interrogated their prisoners over
a lengthy period of time and then, after obtaining maximum
publicity, have released them. There are exceptions to this
pattern--the murder of Aldo Moro being the most famous example.
The goal of a Brigades' kidnapping generally is to emharass the
government, cause bickering among the various elements in the
Italian parliament, enhance the Brigades image as a group capable
of stri e, and achieve the maximum publicity.
The Dozier kidnapping represents a new stage in Red Brigade
strategy: they are trying to broaden their support beyond their
traditional backers--the economically deprived and politically,
indifferent sectors of society--by tapping into anti-military
sentiment they perceive to be behind popular support for the
peace movement in Italy. Consequently, the Brigades will attempt
to exploit Dozier's knowledge of NATO to embarrass the US and
Italy. They will probably issue a series of communiques
detailing the NATO's "exploitation of Italy" and dangers of
US forces being stationed in Italy.
If Dozier cooperates even minimally with his captors, his
chances for a safe release will increase but not be guaranteed.
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SF.C'RFT
In the past, especially in the case of kidnapped magistrate
Giovanni D Urso, the Brigades attempted to make the point that
D'Urso's cooperation with his captors had led to his safe
release. The implicit messaqe in that incident was that the
Brigades would spare those who told the Brigades what they wanted
to hear. However, in other cases, the Brigades have murdered
their prisoners, even after apparent compliance with their
demands. An additional factor of uncertainty in the Dozier case
is the probability that the Milan column is a factor in the
kidnapping. In the past, the so-called Strategic Directorate of
the Brigades has accused the Milan inq tri
and overly prone to violence. gger-happy
This is a new kind of operation for the Brigades. While
they have extensive experience in the kidnapping of Italian
prominent personalities and the ensuing manipulation of
propaganda to sow discontent among political factions, the
kidnapping of a senior US military officer is a new experience
for them. It is certainly a more risky operation than the
kidnapping of a judge or businessman; the pursuit of the
perpetrators is likely to be much more vigorous, as vigorous as
the pursuit of the Moro kidnappers. Additionally, the Brigades
probably are not certain as to how the Dozier kidnapping will
impact on the Italian political scence, and how they can best
exploit the NATO issue. The initial communiques and demands are
likely to be tentative until the Brigades see which way the
political blowing and how the public is responding.
I
The Libya Issue
We have no evidence that the Dozier kidnapping is anything
other than a Red Brigades operation. There were several reports
earlier this fall of an anticipated Red Briqades fall. offensive
that would include US military tar ets.
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At this juncture we have no clear evidence either way
concerning the issue of other terrorist group or patron state
involvement in the operation. There have been conflicting
reports about Libyan attempts to recruit the Brigades to carry
out operations against US interests in Italy. The Brigades have
prided themselves on their self-sufficiency
Ap
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