AEROFLOT: HOW RUSSIA USES ITS CIVIL AIRLINE FOR COVERT ACTIVITIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00210R000300050004-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 74
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 7, 2007
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: May 1, 1981
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

pved For Release 2007/05107_.: CIA.-~ZDP83M00210R0003q
DATE
TRANSMITTAL SLIP 26 May 1981
Per our telephone conversation,
attached is the magazine that should
be filed in the 30 ril 81 briefing
file (SSCI mark u~ , f the FY 82
Intelligence Auth i ation Bill,
DDCI was the witn ss).
FROM: Judy
ROOM NO. BUILDING
EXTENSION
~~d FdF~fi~l~a~~ 20('~1~~~~`:'~1A-RDP83 n~t~~~nRnnn~znn
 Approved For Release-2007/05107 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300050004-5
?
~sugge5ted you
~~ AEROFLOT SSCI this mo~nin
:,::.?
STAT
ILLEGIB
?
Approved For Release 2007/05107 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300050004-5
 d For Release 2007/05107 : ,~IA~RpP83M00210R000300050004-5
 Approved For Release 2007/05107 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300050004-5
publisher
LuAnne K. Levens
7t
editor
Benjamin F. Schemmer
managing editor
Deborah G. Meyer
congressional editor
Deborah M. Kyle
contributing editors
Landow Anthrax
Hassan eI Badri
Brid
et Gail
~,,_
ARMED FORCES ~` ~~~-e~ May 1981 $1.75 ~
INTERNATIONAL Founded in 1863 as
The Army and Navy Journal
g
Justin Galen
SITUATION REPORTS
Abdul Kasim Mansur
Alexander Scott
Silver Flash II
Congress/Administration
R. James Woolsey
Senate Approves $2.8-Billion in FY81 Defense Add-Ons;
proofreader
HASC Recommends Similar Adds ................................. 8
Paul G. Gabelia
House Increases Reagan FY82 Budget Targets,
circulation manager
Senate Expected To Do Same .................................... 10
Nancy J. Biglin
Pentagon/Services
[phone]
GAO Backs DLA Action on Second Source
circulation assistant
Chemical Protective Glove Production ............................. 17
Debra N. Houze
Army Chopper Bids Weigh More
accounting
Than It Does .................................................. 17
Judy L. Jaicks
Weapons/Research
west coast manager
GD Refutes Navy Allegations
Barbara L. Currie
of Mismanaged Sub Programs .................................... 18
[phone]
DoD Proceeds With Austere ELF ................................... 18
* yt ~k
A Sea-Going M-X ICBM? ......................................... 24
advertising
Army Kills "High Priority" IMAAWS ............................... 26
european managing director
Paul Singer-Lawrence, All-Ameri-
can Media, 54 Burton Court,
FEATURES
Franklins Row, London SW3, En-
gland, Tele: 01-730-3592
european representatives
The $150-Billion Misunderstanding .................................... 11
France
DoD Mobility Study Asks $18-$31 -Billjon to
George Beaumont, Montsam, S.A.
Beef Up Airlift, Preposition More Forces ......................
28
14 rue de Birague, Paris 75004,
.......
MAC'S One-Man Airlift to Save
Tele: 277-7427
Sweden
a Life in Russia 30
.................................................
O. Michael Nager, Sveadress PO
US Sealift: Dwindling Resources vs.
Box 4085, S1-2704, Skarholmen
Rising Need? .................................................... 35
4, Sweden, Tele: 08-710-3700
Aeroflot .......................................................... 38
* ,k, ~.
Presidential Courage-and the April 1980
ARMED FORCES JOURNAL
Iranian Rescue Mission ........................................... 60
1414 22nd St., NW, Suite 603
Washington, D.C. 20037
Te?ex )No. 892763
STANDING FEATURES
Answer back is Sherwood ASH.
Classified Advertising ........... 69 Defense Forum .............. 4, 6
('opyright 19R0 by Army and tiary Journal, Inc. All
Consolidated Mess ............. 70 Index to Advertisers ............ 22
rignts reserved.
Darts & Laurels ............... 68 People ....................... 67
do part of this periodical may be reproduced or trans-
Star Statn$ ................ 68, 69
muted in any form or by any means, electronic or
mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by
an information storage and retrieval system, without
prior written consent.
THIS MONTH'S COVER illustrates one of the most critical
controversial and
Issues from 1863 and article reprints available on mi-
crofilmfrom l'niversity Microfilm, Ann Arbor, Michigan
,
timely facets of national security planning today: America's ability to "lift" its
aRlccoe.
forces to trouble spots around the globe. In this issue, AFJ takes a detailed look
Subscription rate: $18.00 one year l'SA; $35.00 one
at how ready the nation's airlift and Sealift forces, both military and civilian,
year ForeignlAir Maill. second Class postage paid at
are to meet those needs. And, at what's on the horizon, including the Air Force's
Washington, D.C. and other mailing offices. Armed
proposed new C-X airlifter.
Forces Journal nss:v o19~-3s9~i
Elsewhere, an unprecedented look at Russia's Aeroflot "civil" airline and its
Armed Forces Journal, Vol. 118, No.
use in military contingencies, intelligence gathering, and revolutionary ferment.
9, Whole No. 5676, May, 1981. Pub-
As Memorial Day approaches and this issue comes off the press on the anniversary
fished by Army & Navy JOURNAL
of last April's rescue mission to free our former hostages from Iran, at a time
Inc., in each calendar month. Publica-
when we all remember the courage of the eight men who lost their lives at
tion office: 1414 22nd St., NW, Wash-
Desert One, AFJ looks back to the events surrounding that oft-maligned rescue
ington, DC 20037.
mission-and the hardest decision Jimmy Carter ever had the courage to make. ^ xY ^
Approved For Release 2007/05107 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300050004-5
 Approved For Release 2007/05107 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300050004-5
Defense Forum
Decision Supporter-
or Decision Maker?
^I I have read with interest your com-
peting articles on the AV-8B. I believe
that Mr. Murray makes a mistake common
to many in his profession-he has mistaken
the role of the systems analyst with that
of the manager. It is his job to provide
information which supports decisions, not
makes them.
There are many factors other than the
quantified results of systems analysis that
rr~ake up defense complexities of combat
when he attempts to dismiss the subjective
judgment of a commander as a miscon-
ception in the heat of battle. While he
is correct that a tank killed 45 mintues
Iz~te is still denied to the enemy for to-
rriorrow's battle, so too are our ground
troops killed by that same tank during
that 45 minutes denied to us. Let's rely
a little more on the judgment of a proven
a~mbat leader and not rush headlong after
numerical justification of every decision.
Better Alternatives
to A~'J's Strategic Initiatives
^ The article in your March issue by Mr.
Schemmer, "Strategic Initiatives to Bridge
a Budget Chasm Too Big for Dollars Alone
to Cure," was an interesting and certainly
creative attempt to solve many paradoxes
inherent in our present defense posture.
1 believe, however, that many of his so-
lutions fail to adequately address military
and political realities.
The proposal to withdraw the United
States Army's 2nd Infantry Division and
the 3rd Marine Division from the Western
Pacific, and to replace them with a Jap-
anese Corps ignores several diplomatic
problems. Many Koreans still have un-
pleasant memories of occupation by Jap-
ar,~ese troops, and are concerned over the
possible emergence of a militaristic Japan.
Further, Japanese public opinion itself is
a fragile thing which has to be prodded
slowly to the right through [he process
of consensus.
When Mr. Schemmer discusses the
"United States Marine CorpslNorway
Mismatch," he also ignores a major fallacy
in his hypothesis by assuming that Marines
are unsuited to fight in that area of the
world. Not only are all three Marine di-
visions training their battalions for winter
warfare on a regular basis, but Marines
presently participate in Norwegian exer-
cises annually. Perhaps the most important
argument for a continued Marine contin-
gency role in the area is the need to main-
tain aforcible entry capability of amphibi-
ous assault to counter any Soviet thrust
at ?Europe's northern flank. Throughout
history, Marines have proven that they
can not only fight anywhere in the world,
but that they can win.
As he discusses his "Gulf Fuel Option,"
the author correctly highlights the prob-
lems of transporting enough refined fuel
to conduct mechanized operations in that
part of the world. His solution, relying
on Kuwait or Saudi Arabia to provide
refined petroleum products to United
States forces committed to the area, ig-
nores the tremendous instability in their
presently conservative governments. This
may appear to be a less expensive alter-
native than building a sufficient airlift ca-
pability, but could easily lead to no fuel
at all if the political situation changes
abruptly. An obvious alternative passed
over by Mr. Schemmer is to utilize tankers
prepositioned with NTPS shipping to aug-
ment airlift requirements.
Maj. C. M. Lohman, USMC
Dumfries, VA
USAF's Rapier Buy
^ Much has happened over the last three
years; I am sure you are aware that the
United States Air Force is in the process
of acquiring Rapier for the defense of its
NATO bases in the UK, whilst Rapier
continues to defend our own Army and
Air Force bases in Germany. You will
not therefore be surprised that the system
is being considered as a most suitable con-
tender to provide low-level air defense for
the newly constituted Rapid Deployment
Force.
I am anxious not to arouse old and un-
necessary controversy, but am equally con-
cerned that the United States officers with
the responsibility of planning the intro-
duction of the RDF have accurate facts.
Many of these officers read and sometimes
contribute to the Journal and hence my
concern and this letter to you.
If I may refer to the March issue of
the Journal, on page 50 you say, "Carter
and Brown have asked Congress to buy
a non-NATO standard Rapier air defense
system...." 1 underline the words non-
NATO, as this is not true: Rapier has
for some years now formally been declared
operational by SACEUR, the only weapon
of its type to be so recognized. The Rapier
system now being introduced to the United
States Air Force is every bit as standard
as that employed by the Royal Air Force
and the British Army in the operational
defense of their NATO bases in Germany.
You go on to say, "The Rapier buy
is an important political program given
England's decision last year to buy Trident
submarine-launched ballistic missiles and
the need to offset some of the cost through
a two-way street US purchase of British
hardware." The implication that must be
drawn from this statement is that if it
had not been for the Trident program in
the UK, Rapier would not have been ac-
quired by the US Air Force. This is simply
not true. Rapier was selected by the USAF
only after the most painstaking review of
the whole problem of air defense for vital
bases, and Rapier emerged as the only
viable system that could be acquired with
a substantiated performance, cost, and de-
livery profile. 1 understand that after the
decisions were made some very minor ar-
rangements on manpower offsets were
agreed, but this had nothing to do with
the selection of the right equipment to
meet the operational requirement.
For the record, and as someone who
has been involved in the disciplines of air
defense over many years, may I make the
following observations on the requirement
for air defense for the Rapid Deployment
Force:
? Air defense at high-, medium- and low-
level altitudes is essential;
? By the nature of the logistical limitations
imposed, the RDF will be unable to lift
and deploy much of the existing air defense
equipment, particularly the medium al-
titude air defense missile systems.
Examination will show that both high
and medium altitude cover can only be
achieved in this case with aircraft.
Further examination (as in the case of
the USAF selection of Rapier) will show
that Rapier is the only proven system of
both capability and logistical profile suit-
able for the RDF which is available and
can provide adequate low-level antiaircraft
defense in an acceptable time-scale and
cost.
Gordon Banner
British Aerospace
Hertfordshire, England
Bring Back the
Battleship!
^ So far, the only objections I have heard
to resurrecting the Iowa-class battleships
are manpower and vulnerability. The
former problem must be solved for the
entire Navy. The latter "problem" does
not exist.
Torpedoes, once the bane of battleships,
are less of a problem now, as modern ASW
is forcing submarines to adopt standoff
weapons such as cruise missiles. Indeed,
the new monster Russian submarine is re-
portedly designed for cruise missile at-
tacks. But cruise missiles are slow and
carry a relatively small payload. Large
caliber naval shells travel exceedingly fast
and carry a large payload. It was precisely
to meet this latter threat that the lowa-
class was built with 19-inch thick steel
armed forces JOURNAL international/May 1981
 Approved For Release 2007/05107 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300050004-5
..~
.~~ ,/tee i ii
The off-road king.
~hrYsler's High MohilitY Multipurpose
Wheeled Vehicle.
The Chrysler Expanded Mobility Truck offers lions and keeps all wheels in contact with the
a: proven base for the US Army High Mobility driving surface. The Chrysler HMMWV also comes
Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle Program withadependableandprovendieselorgasoline
(HMMWV). The Chrysler HMMWV sets new high engine...3-speed automatic transmission and 2-
sl:andardsfor its class in rugged off-road mobility. speed transfer case... independent front suspen-
EXPERIENCE sion...oversized power brakes...and much more!
Eased on over 100,000 miles of proven perform- APPLICATION(S)
cmce and reliability testing, the Chrysler HMMWV
is unsurpassed on rough surfaces, slopes, mud, The Chrysler HMMWV adapts easily for more
sand, and snow. specialized applications. Available are Weapon
_ REASON and others. v
The reasons are full-time four-wheel-drive. , .large, When nature's most severe terrain must becon-
low-pressure tires and deep, soft suspension, This quered, the versatile Chrysler HMMWV is the ulti-
suspension system absorbs bumps and depres- mate off-road king.
l~~dovfng defense into the future. Forty years a proven leader. ?' C H RYS LER
,-,DEFENSE, INC.
 Approved For Release 2007/05107 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300050004-5
Deficiencies in Air
Worse Than on Ground?
^ AFJ is by far the best all-around pro-
fessional reading magazine available for
military officers, and I recommend it to
all officer students and staff at the Marine
Corps Education Center in Quantico.
Not to say that Mr. Woolsey's article
"Who Will Shoulder The Burden" in the
Feb. '81 issue was up to par, however.
(t is naive to believe that the "deficiencies
of air are more quickly corrected" than
for a division or for logistics, that it is
easier to keep aviation ready. The lead
times for procurement of aircraft and parts
and the lead times for training/integrating
aircrews/maintenance crews far exceeds
any similar problems that I am aware of
on the ground side.
Perhaps Mr. Woolsey could expand his
point if I have missed it.
Stick By Your Guns!
^ Regarding the March, 1981 edition of
AFJ, specifically the Defense Forum letter
"On Character Assassination:"
Stick by your guns! The likes of An-
derson and Turner deserve it. It is they
who do not have the wisdom to extensively
correct the record-if indeed the record
need be corrected.
I continue to enjoy the outstanding work
you and your staff are doing.
James C. Broadus
Controller
Alabama Dry Dock
& Shipbuilding Co.
Paper Armies Are Nice,
BUt .. .
^ I have been in two of our war mo-
bilizations, and one does not make good
forces from rosters ar warm bodies. At
present, the Army can no longer call out
17 divisions of the "inept, ill-trained, and
unready" National Guard. In the course
of their paper-chasing and force building,
bureaucrats have managed to hash a num-
ber of [hose and sank them neatly. Each
Army division needs a trained division base
with its staff and technical units, its
DivArty, and time to work as a team.
You do not build such a team overnight,
as one millionaire learned many years ago
on the baseball held.
We had a similar experience with our
skeleton forces in 1950, and it cost a lot
of good troops until we got some field
skills re-learned under fire. Paper armies
are nice, but real live ones are the only
ones with relevance.
armed forces JOURNAL international/May 1981
belts. Clearly, vulnerability is not a prob-
lem for the Iowas.
Further, battleships can be loaded down
with a large number of antiaircraft weap-
onry. It seems to me that they would add
to the fleet's capability without adding
to its vulnerability, as well as impressing
the hell out of anyone who saw them.
~Nashington, DC
20/20 Foresight
for a Change?
11 R. James Woolsey's article, "US Navy
I3udget: Ingenuity, Audacity and aTail-
Iiooker Spirit" (April AFJ,), challenges the
Navy to face up to some "nasty questions"
in planning the Reagan Administration's
naval expansion. Mr. Woolsey advances
some interesting and innovative concepts
(the use of space, emphasis on EW, in-
creased NBC warfare capabilities, distri-
bution of offensive power across more plat-
form types, V/STOL, innovation in the
application of technology).
Subsequent to the preparation of his
article, Mr. Woolsey had the opportunity
to meet with me and review some of the
current work of the Navy's Long-Range
Planning Group (established in January,
1980). He found that the types of concepts
he supports have been addressed by our
group and many are receiving active con-
siideration by the Navy leadership. As a
case in point, a number of his proposed
initiatives were published as long-range pri-
orities in the planning and programming
guidance issued by the Chief of Naval
C-perations earlier this year.
Needless to say, Mr. Woolsey was very
supportive of the work of the Long-Range
Planning Group and would, I believe, agree
that we are not suffering from myopia,
".as most naval planners are during salad
years."
R.Adm. C. R. Larson, USN
More On the
Bloodiest Battle
^ Re: "The Battle Over the Bloodiest Bat-
tle," the battle of the Somme must rank
at the top among the great tragedies of
modern warfare.
John Keegan in his excellent book, The
Face of Battle, determined that whereas
the German losses on July 1, 1916 totaled
6,000 killed or wounded, the fourteen Brit-
ish divisions committed to the assault "had
lost about 60,000, of whom 21,000 had
been killed, most in the first hour of the
attack, perhaps the first minutes." These
figures do not include losses suffered by
the French who committed 20 divisions
to the battle.
These statistics are interesting, but pale
when compared to the potential for killing
in. the hands of today's armies! Only a
strong America can prevent the setting
of new casualty scores.
Brig. Gen. Eugene
Bandera, TX
Maier, USAR-Ret.
Setting the Record
Straight, Again!
^ You reported in February that on De-
cember 19, at Frank Carlucci's request,
I called Cap Weinberger about Bill Van
Cleave. You stated that I believe in stra-
tegic disarmament. You suggested that I
was under consideration for a position at
DoD. All three statements are false.
1 have never spoken or written to Sec-
retary Weinberger about Bill Van Cleave;
neither on December 19 nor on any other
date. 1 have never spoken nor written in
favor of strategic disarmament and do not
believe in it. Finally, 1 made crystal clear
to those involved in the transition that
I was no[ interested in any position any-
where in government, a decisia,~ which
remains firm.
To set the record straight, I left Wall
Street and came to Washington to serve
as special civilian assistant to Paul Nitze
in 1966 when he was SecNav. Later I
served as Deputy Legal Advisor at the
Department of State and as legal advisor
to the SALT I delegation. I believed then,
and do now, that arms control in general
and SALT in particular must be consid-
ered in the context of our national security
policy, the essence of which is secure de-
terrence.
Finally, in my 15 years in Washington
and 10 years in government, including ser-
vice as Under Secretary of HUD, I have
never seen an Under Secretary as effective
as Frank Carlucci, whom I worked with
daily when General Counsel of HEW. I
believe Frank will prove to be the ablest
DepSecDef seen at DoD in years.
Editors' Note: We hate to repeat ourselves,
but as we noted in March's Defense Fo-
rum, on this one we goofed!
Concerning the article referred to in
Mr. Rhinelander's letter, "Top Level In-
fighting for Key Defense Posts," it was
never the Journal's intent to endorse the
allegations in a memo we quoted and ref-
erenced throughout the article, only to
highlight the level of tactics sometimes
employed in jockeying for high level ap-
pointive positions. We appreciate that Mr.
Rhinelander set the record straight, and
hope he'll accept our apologies.
AFJ reserves the right to edit all De-
fence Forum letters for clarity and to
conform with space constraints. ^ ~r ^
If You Don't Subscribe-
You Should!
 Approved For Release 2007/05107 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000
'I~iis is probably
the last place
y~ud look to cut
~
~~ro costs. -
Somehow a wiring system never seems to get all the
att~=ntion that's paid to other major subsystems in today's
aircraft, missiles, surface vehicles, and weapons systems.
In fact, many wiring systems look like after-thoughts,
thrown together with a lot of different connectors and wire
termination methods.
There had to be a simpler, more cost-effective way. And
Deutsch found it.
Introducing the Common Termination System (CTS).
A izew concept that uses one method of wire termination to
support modern, light-weight, high-performance electrical
sy~;tems.
The simplicity of the CTS concept provides a wiring solution
that reduces tooling, inventory, documentation, and training
co:~ts. With increased reliability and shortened turn-around time.
The Deutsch Common Termination System. If your engineers
areri t specifying CTS on your programs, you may find you're not
competitive. And, of course, the system meets or exceeds the
requirements of AFLC 8027520.
Deutsch Electronic Components Division, Municipal Airport,
Banning, California 92220 ? [phone] ? TWX 910-332-1361.
~ The best way to make ends meet. ~iyong-
y,ing, besides some intermediate sups in
neighboring countries where the Soviets
maintain an active political interest
It is only in the western hemi phere
where the Aeroflot network could b~ con-
sidered "underdeveloped." Though it is in
their strategic interests to expand in the
Caribbean and South America, they are
restricted to Havana, Mexico City', and
Lima. Likely short-term targets f~r ex-
pansion are Managua, Panama City Gra-
nada, and other politically opportune Ca-
ribbean countries.
The only regions of the world enied
tc~ Aeroflot are the larger portions f the
western hemisphere, Australia and ~ New
Zealand? and the great Pacific Ocei~n ba-
sin. Most conservative and politically an-
tagonistic regimes of the western hemi-
sphere, including the United State$ and
Canada, have denied or severely restricted
Aeroflot service on the basis of mi~trust,
political leverage, and pure financial
infeasibility. Australia and New Zealand
have denied Aeroflot service simply be-
ca~use they have judged that there w~vould
tic; insufficient passenger traffilc on
Aeroflot, and that Qantas and Air. New
Zealand have no financial gain to >je re-
alized in service to Moscow.
[t is acknowledged that various (types
of intelligence and political activities are
conducted by other nations' flag cairriers
for their respective governments to (some
degree (including the United States), but
hardly at the degree and intensity of ~ero-
flot and its surrogate airlines in ~oviet
client states. Furthermore, even though
such activities are pursued by other foreign
1964
{continued}
Congo
(Brazzaville)
fessed nonaligned policy by government
1964-Premier Chou En-tai pays three-
day visit to gain support in border d%s-
pute with India; Soviets counter with
anti-Chinese rhetoric
19b3-196$-Pro-Marxist civilian gov- P(2)
ernment in power; Cuban serve as cadre
for training Presidential Guard and Peo-
plc's Militia-ibis situation produced
conflict with the Army until it seized
power in 1968
After 1963, Congo has been a base for C/F
Communist and radical subversion in (6)
Zaire and southern Africa-arms very
likely brought in on Aeroflot aircraft
1965 Senegal Soviet interest mainly in acquiring stra- F(1)
tegcally located base at Dakar for
shorter route to Latin America
1965-1970-PRC heavily involved in F(1)
economic assistance and development of
railroad to Zambian copper mines
Soviets, during'60s, concerned about
PRC influence in Tanzania and East Af-
rica. Aeroflot base at Dar es Salaam im-
portantfor political, intelligence, and
strategic purposes
1965-Intense anti-American and anti- P(2)
West German disorders due to FRG rec-
ognition of Israel
Late'SOs-Beginning of Soviet arms F(6)
shipments to PLO, much of which was
used against Jordan, Israel, and Chris-
tians in civic war
Although no political/military copse- F('1)
quences, Aeroflot. presence ii Tokyo a
matter of high prestige and visibility
Soviets hope entre to Japan. would pre-
sent them with market for IL-62 aircraft
Canada. Soviets hope that route to Montreal. F(1)
would extend across Canada to give
them access to Trans-Pacific route
United Aeroflot access to US highly prest- F(1)
States gious; symbol of "detente"; hopeful of
extending to West Coast and Trans-Pa-
cific route.
North.
Yemen
grimed forces JOURNAL international/May 1981
1957-Intense anti-American feelings, C(2)
riots over US opposition to Turkish oc-
cupation of portion of Cyprus-possible
Soviet attempt to exploit anti:-Ameri-
canism
Late 1966 resumption of civil war with P(2}
Egypt (and Soviets) supporting rebels F(4)
and. Saudi Arabia supporting govern-
ment/royalists
Soviet economic aid to North Yemen n-
chiding development of strategic port of
Nudaydeh
Cameroon Mid'S0s to 1970-Communist backed P/C(2)
Union of Cameroon People's (UCP) in-
surgency
{eontenned next page
 Approved For Release 2007/05107 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300050004-5
m an
h d t 'fic t
si
1':967
(continued}
1969
South
Yemen
July; 1967 tomid-1969-Nigerian civil
war; Soviets supply Nigerian govern
went with aircraft. and other arms
against secessionist Biafra (Eastern Re-
gion)
Soviet Union and PRC in intense compe-
tition dnring'60sfar influence
June,1969-Extreme 1Vlarxist wing of
NaNanal Liberation Front seizes power
in coup; internal' conflict between pro-
Moscow and pro-Peking factions, with
pro-Moscow faction victorious
1975-South Yemen becomes Commu-
nist-dominated Yemen E'eople's Demo-
cratic Republic
1970-:Soviet influence increases; mill-
taty aid and support. of confrontation
with North Yemen and Oman over
Dhofar region
1'9b81970-Increasing power of So-
viet-supported PLO against monarchy
creates "state within.. a state"
September 1970-"Black Septem-
ber"-Soviet and Syrian backed PLO
:attempt coup against monarchy
.September 1969-Col. Qaddafi leads.
radical coup against monarchy
June 1970-US evacuates W heelus Air-
base; British evacuate bases in eastern
regionat request of Qaddafi
Mid'-1970-First order for Soviet tanks
negotiated
March1972-Libya. signs "technical"
.and economical aid agreement with So-
viet Union; this agreement probably dis-
guises ecret arms deal
1969/70-Intensive North Vietnamese
and Communist guerrilla activities in
north (Plain. of Jars) results in loss of re-
gion to government
February,1970-Souvanna calls for re-
convening of 1462 Geneva signatories to
halt Communist offensive-rejected by
Soviet Union.
Late 1970-Beginning of Communist
offensive which marks final effort to de-
feat. royalist and .Neutralist forces
1'970-Height. of communist terrorism
in northeast and great concern over
North Vietnamese/communist conquest
of Laos. and' Cambodia
.Soviets support Bangladesh indepen-
dence movement in early'70s
December, 1971-14-day war of inde-
pendence; Soviet Union supports India in
war against Pakistan; Soviet support
critical to India's alliance with Bangla-
desk independence movement
Soviet support of Bangladesh (and'. India)
has virtually eliminated PRC influence
insub-continent
C(2)
F(3)
(4)
F(3)
f4)
P/C(2)
(3)
(6}
P/C
{2)
CiF(1}
g
carriers, t ey ono pose a
threat to the security interests of the
United States or its allies. Aeroflot does
pose such a threat.
The Aeroflot Threat Potential:
Aeroflot as an Adjunct to VTA
The greatest and most obvious threat
posed by Aeroflot is its personnel and
materiel transport capabilities as an ad-
junct to the VTA. The seven Aeroflot air-
craft types designated as the VTA reserve
fleet (AN-12; AN-24; IL-14; IL-62; Tu-
124; IL-76; and AN-22), when combined
with VTA assets for both personnel and
materiel transport make a significant con-
tribution. Tables Five and Six show the
Aeroflot contribution, by military trans-
port aircraft type, to the potential total
lift capabilities for personnel and materiel.
In personnel transport, Aeroflot's most sig-
nificant contribution is in the long-range
aircraft (Tu-124, IL-62, AN-22, and IL-
76). Aeroflot can lift almost as many per-
sonnel as VTA over long ranges and about
70% as many over shorter ranges, as shown
in Table Eight.
In the matter of materiel lift augmen-
tation to VTA, except for a significant
contribution of the long-range IL-62's
limited payload capacity, a more modest
contribution is made by the older, long-
range AN-22. The most significant
materiel transport augmentation is made
by the short-range AN-24. These aircraft
would be used as "work horses" in combat
logistics environments such as Central Eu-
rope, Afghanistan, Iran, and the Middle
East. The percentage augmentation for
short- and long-range materiel transport
is also shown in Table Eight. Aeroflot aug-
mentation for long-range materiel trans-
port (39%) is also significant. These long
ranges (up to 4,000 miles) would apply
most to African and western hemisphere
missions.
Addition of the 100 IL-76s mentioned
earlier would increase the long-range per-
sonnel transport capability by 45% and
cargo capacity by over 50% by mid-1982.
The AN-22, in service since 1965, has
been the mainstay of the VTA because
of its versatility in long-range personnel
and materiel transport. For example, it
is capable of carrying equipment ranging
from large amounts of munitions to main
battle tanks, missile launchers, and self-
propelled artillery. Though it lacks the
range and payload capacity of the Ameri-
can C-5, the AN-22's rear loading lets
it handle large bulk cargo and most Soviet
fighting vehicles.
In addition to the technical and func-
tional capabilities of Aeroflot's reserve
fleet, their value is enhanced by immediate
to short-term availability of both aircraft
and crew/maintenance personnel. Since
most crew and key maintenance personnel
are members of the Soviet Air Force Re-
serve, it would be a relatively simple mat-
ter to transfer them to active Air Force
status with their aircraft. Moreover, a sig-
nificant portion of Aeroflot's personnel and
50 armed forces JOURNAL international/May 1981
Approved Far Release 2007105/07 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300050004-5 _
 Approved For Release 2007/05107: CIA-RDP83M00210R000300050004-5
SCIE11lCE0SCOPE
U.S. Army forward observer teams operating from armored vehicles will be able to
pinpoint targets for laser-homing weapons or conventional weapons by using a
modified Ground/Vehicular Laser Locator Designator. The device was developed by
Hughes to be mounted on the M113 Fire Support Team (FIST) armored vehicles. It
determines the distance to a target based on the length of time for a burst of
laser light to reach the target and bounce back. The laser beam also can
illuminate the target to provide a bull's-eye for laser-homing weapons.
For the first time a weapon delivery system will let pilots of single-seat air-
craft find, track, and destroy surface targets day or night while flying at high
speed and low altitudes. The system is called LANTIRN (Low Altitude Navigation
Targeting Infrared for Night). It would be mounted in a pod outside U.S. Air
Force F-16 and A-10 aircraft. LANTIRN includes a forward-looking infrared sen-
sor and a terrain-following navigation subsystem for low-level day and night
operations. It automatically can recognize targets, "hand off" a target to an
infrared-guided Maverick missile, and designate a target with a laser beam for a
laser-guided bomb to home on. Hughes, teamed with Martin Marietta, is responsi-
ble for the target recognizes and boresight correlator for Maverick hand-off.
The LANTIRN program is directed by Aeronautical Systems Division, deputy for
reconnaissance/electronics warfare systems at Wright-Patterson AFB.
Eight more U.S. Navy guided-missile frigates of the FFG-7 class will carry
advanced consoles for displaying data from ship radars and acoustic, TV, and
electronic warfare sensors. The Hughes AN/UYA-4 consoles will be part of the
Naval Tactical Data System, which links ship sensors, computers, and weapons
while detecting, tracking, and evaluating enemy threats. The consoles have more
display capability for tactical symbols, operate at higher data rates than ear-
lier systems, and are more reliable. The displays are installed on or planned
for more than 100 ship and shore installations of the U.S. and its allies.
Technicians in the field will be able to make quick fixes on the F/A-18 Hornet
strike fighter's radar with the aid of an automatic radar test system. The
AN/USM-469 system, which is suitable for U.S. Navy ships and U.S. Marine Corps
vans, consists of five and a half bays of test equipment and a single-bay liquid
cooler system. It uses production test software to ensure common standards
between the factory and the field. One operator position tests the AN/APG-65
radar's transmitter, antenna, and receiver-exciter. A second tests the radar
signal processor and radar data processor. A video display shows test results,
fault types, locations, and other pertinent data. The test system, like the
radar, is built by Hughes under contract to McDonnell Douglas Corporation.
A new communications system delivered to the U.S. Navy saves weight and space
over previous systems. The Hughes tactical information exchange system (TIES)
uses a single set of hardware to accommodate many different digital and voice
communications processing. This was made possible by a new frequency translator
unit and a programmable signal processor. Previous systems used separate pieces
of equipment for amplitude modulation or frequency modulation of voice and data.
Creating a new world with electronics
r------------------~
i
HUGHES
I I
L__________________J
HUGHES AIRCRAFT COMPANY
GULVER GITY,CALIFORNIA 90230
 -Approved For Release 2007/05107:.CIA-RDP83~1100210R000300050004-5
' From the prime contractor to the prime. beneficiary:
Congratulate
?-
?0o?vv00
 Approved For Release 2007/05107 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300050004-5
'axis, America.
Cnce again, America is
leading the world into space.
Rockwell International is
prime contractor for the Shuttle
orbiter. Also, our Rocketdyne
Di~~ision built the main engines. And
we assist NASA in the integration of
thE~ Space Transportation System.
O~,r achievements in space and
aircraft development demonstrate
the high technology which
characterizes all the businesses of
Rockwel! International.
We join America in saluting
NASA, the Columbia crew -
John W. Young and Robert L. Crippen
-and the 50,000 people in many
companies who worked with us to
build America's Space Shuttle.
Congratulations, America.
Through the Shuttle, designed for
repeated flights into space, you have
built a technology bridge to the
benefits of this vast new frontier.
It is a uniquely American
achievement.
Good old American
"know-how" is alive and well.
Automotive /Aerospace
Electronics/Generallndustries
 Approved For Release 2007/05107 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300050004-5
147~~ ~.-?(:bile
(eorttenued) ,.
Benin
{formerly
Dahomey)
September, l9fitl-m-Allende's Mara~ist=
backed Popuhtr IInity Cctaliti~ wins
36 % of vote and is confu~med as Presi=
dent
1911--Municipal eMctions returnel!
Sfl % of vote favoring Allende..
August 1972-Anti-governmen# riots;
Army tapes control'
Uetober' 1972-Riots over inflation atu
economic conditions; Army extendscon
trot to include most of country
1973-Allende increases leftist po6ti-
Cal/eCOMimIC pOllCleS
August, 1973-Continuing labor un-
restf severe government crisLs
September 12,1473-Military coup,..
Allende overthrown, Aeroflot service to
Chile suspended
January1972-Strong leftist guerrilla
attack on town of San Pablo-Army be-
ginscounter-terror campaign..
't'hroughout 19?2 contintted sporadic
guerrilla activities in remote and rural
~i~'
There is no known direct orindirect So-
viet support for the. insurgents though
Soviet materiel may be passed through
Cuban contacts
August, 1972-President Mareiaspro-
claimed "president for hfe"-estab-
fishes close contacts with Eastern.En-
rope, receives some economic and!
military aid
197U-Following earthquake, Soviets
give substantial aid utilizing Aeroflot-
since then, Soviets have persisted in es-
tablisbi~ route to Lima via Havana
August, 1973-President'Velasco over-
thrown in coup
November, 1976-Peres signs purchase
agreement with Soviets for 22 aircraft,
200 T-62 tanks and other military
equipment
April,1978-Moscow reschedules 8?%
of payment due in 1980 to extend
through 1988
1978-Six AN-26 transport aircraft
purchased from Soviet Union..
19$0-Additional 16 Su-22 fighter air
craft purchased from Sorie# Union
October1972-Military Revohttionary
government under Cal. Kereku seizes
power-increased radicalization
November,1974-Kereku proclaims
-that aMarxist-Leninist course would be
followed'.
November,1974-People's Republic of
Benin proclaimed:
Guinea- September, 1974-Independence from
Bissau. Portugal-immediately afterwards,
close ties established with.. Communist
Bloc-small economic aid program
from Bloc established
C jF(3)
(4} ''
aircraft are frequently used for troop transport
during Russia's routine, semiannual troop ro-
tation in Eastern Europe (April 1981 AF.n.
This participation by Aeroflot provides crews
and maintenance personnel with highly rel-
evant practice and training in tactical troop
movement procedures.
The use of Aeroflot assets in the semi-
annual troop rotation program provides yet
another potential threat, particularly to un-
suspecting neighboring countries. During the
troop rotation periods the troop-laden aircraft
could easily be directed to seize or occupy
a political/military objective from an unwary
victim. The efficiency of utilizing Aeroflot
assets for such purposes during the rotation
period was made evident during the August,
1968 Soviet seizure of Prague's international
Aeroflot's Intel!
THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT uses
the assets and designated routes of Aeroflot
for general information and specific intelli-
gence gathering is certain, Defense Depart-
ment officials say. Periodically, members of
Aeroflot's foreign airport ticket agencies and
maintenance staffs have been arrested for
illegal activities including espionage and at-
tempts to gain access to security information
through use of local nationals.
During 1980, for example, Aeroflot em-
ployees in Brussels and Madrid were expelled
for undefined "illegal activities" and customs
violations. Closer to home, three Cuban airline
pilots were arrested last September as sus-
pected espionage agents. An FBI agent, Ar-
thur F. Nehrbass, of the Miami office, stated
that the Cubans were arrested on "informa-
tion we developed as an outgrowth of in-
vestigations into Cuban intelligence matters."
In February of ~ this year, Ricardo Escartin,
who was First Secretary of the Cuban Interest
Section and who functioned also as Cubana's
representative in Washington, was expelled
for "enticing illegal trade." The FBI also iden-
tified him as an intelligence agent.
Another interesting fact emerges from
Cubana's operations in the United States.
There are currently three Cuban "security
agents" permanently residing in Miami os-
tensibly assigned to protect Cubana's single
weekly chartered flight. DoD authorities who
monitor Cubana's activities report these
agents "are never to be found, even when
the Cubana aircraft is at Miami." This was
borne out several weeks ago when an anti-
Castro agent attempted to drive a vehicle
into a Cubana plane at Miami and none of
the Cuban "security agents" were present
to protect the aircraft.
Aeroflot's extensive network through West-
ern Europe permits it to observe all aspects
of commercial and, indeed, some important
military installations lying along or adjacent
to its flight paths. It is not unusual for Aeroflot
(or its counterpart surrogates), to veer "ac-
cidentally" off its prescribed flight path to
overfly troop movements and maneuvers in
Western Europe and NATO naval exercises.
armed forces JOURNAL international/May 1981
Approved Far Release 2007105!07:CIA-RDP83M00210R000300050004-5
 Approved For Release 2007/05107 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300050004-5
airpc rt and other key centers during its take-
over of that country.
T} e use of Aeroflot aircraft and crews in
the ~oviet occupation of Afghanistan, and
its utcliz~ction in logistical support for Soviet
and surrogate forces in Angola, Ethiopia, and
South Yc;men are other examples of the value
of Aeroflot as an adjunct to the VTA.
Aide from the transport aircraft, Aero-
flot ,~lso maintains and operates a large fleet
of sl ecially designed aircraft used for crop
dust~ng and other chemical spraying func-
tion.. These aircraft could easily be utilized
fort ctic;al employment of chemical and bio-
logi~al agents if the Soviets should consider
thes., aircraft expendable, since few would
likely survive the hazards of a combat
environment. ^~^
i e~nce Activities
g
This practice, however, is not limited to Eu-
rope~; the;re are numerous incidents over the
past I S years of Aeroflot, Cubana, and other
surr gate carriers straying off designated
route s tc observe events and places of interest
in tl~~e United States.
The matter of Communist bloc illegal
overflights over restricted areas in the United
States caused the US Air Force last summer
to is ue the following standing note of concern
in a memorandum to all its designated critical
inst. Nations:
I here are indications that Communist air-
lihes have SIGINT [signal intelligence] col-
lellction missions in Western Europe-there
is~ no evidence to date that Aeroflot uses
such collection capabilities in the United
States' air space. However, the CONUS
overflight capabilities of Aeroflot along
vJith their unevaluated collection capabili-
ti~s does present a threat of unknown di-
rr ensions. All recipients of this message
a e advised to take appropriate actions to
s; feguard sensitive communications and on-
g~ing operations."
According to some Air Force authorities,
theif e is reason to believe that Aeroflot has
already engaged in some form of electronic
intelligence, such as monitoring VHF and
UHF at certain locales along their flight paths
in the lJnited States.
A,cr Force liaison officers at FAA assigned
to r~onicor Communist airline flights over the
i
United 'States stated that the various air con-
trolEers covering the northeastern US reported
rec wing requests at a rate of as much as
fou per month from Cubana, Lot, and CSA
airl nes to overfly the restricted regions of
the Hudson Valley and Connecticut on their
flig is to and from Montreal. They requested
these routes in order to "avoid the heavy
traffic" of their authorized flight routes.
F~erhaps the Watervliet Arsenal near Al-
bary, the Knowles Atomic Power Labora-
tories, or the many electronic and naval fa-
cili ies of the Hudson Valley and Connecticut
are specially designated high priority targets
for the Soviet intelligence data collection ef-
fort. (continued on p. 56)
Angola January,1975-Portugal attempts to F{2)
estabi'rsh independent Angola with alf {3)
parties represented in transitional gov- {4)
ernment-MPLA (Supported by Soviet {
Union] attempts military seizure of
power but is opposed by FNLA (sup-
ported by PRC and Zaire, and tacitly,
the US) -
July,1975?-MPLA requests and re-
ceives Cuban troops. and arms, US be-
gins supplying arms to FNLA and
UNITA in August,1975
4ctober,1975-Aeroflot utilized in C/~'
transporting much of 15,000 Cuban
troops #a Angola
By early 1976-Cuban forces defeat
FNLA/UNITA in convention combat;
FNLA/UNITA begin guerrilla oper=
ations
Throuthaut 1976-Soviets rearm Cu-
ban and MPLA forces; process still con=
timing
Mozambique June, 1975-Independence-Establish-
ment of Marxist People's Republic.
Apri1,1977-US intelligence reports
heavy influx ofSoviet/East European
arms-mast likely destined for Rhode-
Sian and South African black liberation
forces-Aeroflot utilized for arms ship-
meet
Mexico September, 1977-President Portilla F{1)
announces political reforms which per-
met Communists to farm legal party and.
participate in elections.
1.977 Ethiopia September, 1974-Radical military P{2)
junta overthrows monarchy of Haile Se-
lassie
January, 1975/76-Civil war between.
government forces and Eritrean seces-
sonists
February, 1977-Col. Mengistu seizes
power from Provisional Military Gov-
ernment-cuts ties with U and West
March,1977-Castro visits Ethiopia
Apri1,1977-200 Cuban military adv-
sors airlifted to Ethiopia utilizing
Aeroflot aircraft; US facilities closed
and military advisors expelled
May,1977-Mengistu visits Moscow- C/F{3}
series of military and economic agree-
merits negotiated'
July, 1977-Heavy fighting breaks out
between Ethiopia and Somati "Leber-
anon" forces
September, 1977-$SOO,million arms
agreement signed with Soviet Union {48
M1C aircraft; 200 T-54/55; SAM and
ATK missiles}
November,1977-Soviets begin large
scale arms and personnel airlift-Hera-
tint aircraft plays significant role hair-
lift; by January,197f3, estimated 2,400
Soviet and. surrogate advisers arrive
May,1978-Ethiopia receives 224
Mies-launches counteroffensive
{continuer! next page)
 Approved For Release 2007/05107 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300050004-5
against Somali forces
November,l9?B-USSR-Ethiopia sign.
long term Treaty of Frientlship
Zambia. Mid-'?()s-Zambia accepts Soviet j
East European military equipment for
Rhodesian black liberation forces
Soviet Aeroflot aircraft: most likely ut-
tized to transport arms to Zambia
19?8 Jamaica.. December, l9?6-Leftist Premier Min-
later Manley assumes power with. large
. majority
ApriI,19?9-Manley flies to Moscow
to establish closer trade and economic
ties..
50,000-~
a 40,000
a
0
20,000
10,000
Table Five
Soviet Transport
One Time Lift Potential for Contiguous Power Projection
(PERSONNEL)
Medium
Range
AIRCRAFT
ALLOCATION
Long
Range
Short
Range
Short
Range
F(1)
Aeroflot
VTA
~ ~ Additional
~ _ ~ 100 IL-76's
Long
Range
Long
Rannge
l
IL-14 AN-12 AN-24 TU-124 IL-62 AN-22 IL-76
Aircraft Type
Aeroflot and surrogate airlines have
requested .transcontinental "charter"
flights which have coincided with mis-
sile firings, troop maneuvers, and prac-
tice Strategic Air Command alerts. The
continual desire of Aeroflot and sur-
rogate carriers to establish scheduled
or non-scheduled "courier" and "spe-
cial" flights to southern California and
CSA*s April IO-,12 "Special
Flights" and the Space
Shuttle Launch
ON APRIL. $, two days before the
Space Shuttle was to make its first
launch from Cape Canaveral, FL, the
US received an extraordinary request
through unusual diplomatic channels
from GSA (Czecholsavakian Air Lines)
fora "special flight"' through US air-
space on April 10 which, it quickly,
became clear to US officials, would
overfly the Cape (or very near it) during
the launch. CSA had never requested
any uch special flights in recent years.::
This one was requested at the last
minute, through unusual channels, and ';
in a way that. raised eyebrows through- j
out government agencies concerned.'
with such matters.:
The flight was to leave Prague early
April. 9, fly to Montreal, then go on
to Havana, and return early on April
14, the morning of the launch, flying
near tale Cape, enroute to Gander, New-
foundland to refuel before returning to
Prague. A number of US officials
wanted to deny the overflight rights,
but the channels and ;mechanisms fur
doing so are often complex and time-
consuming, and as of late evening, April.
9, the Havana-Newfour~diand flight was:
still an. When new Federal.. Aviation
Administrator J. Lynn Helms learned
of the problem through other channels `
late that evening, he ;took quick and
decisive action. to deny CSA's overflight ''
rights during a critical four-hour time
window the next morning. As soon as
the Shuttle launch was postponed, CSA
began filing.. alternate; schedules that
might,. it appeared, coincide with the
final .April 12 Shuttle' launch. Helms
subsequently denied two more such.
CSA flights out of Havana which were
to fly through FAA's Miami. oceanic
area. Thus, it is clear that FAA's Helms
is keenly interested in the overflight.
issue and personally following devel-
opmenis, far more so "than some FAA
officials have. in recent years.
(What the CSA flights were carrying
was Holm known at Journal press time.
The two events may be totally unre-
lated, but AFJ has also learned that
about the time of the Shuttle launch,
two Soviet reconnaissance aircraft flew '
close enough off the Florida coast to
"garble up" the Shuttle's UHF' com-
munications channels. 'with their own
traffic-and persisted. in doing so until.
the North American :Air defense Com-
mand directed them onanather course.)
The Editors'
denial of west coast landing rights has
effectively denied the Soviets the routes
which they desire across the
Pacific.
the Seattle area, which would pass
through some of the most sensitive de-
fense-related facilities, is of great con-
cern to Defense Department authori-
ties. To date they have been successful
in convincing the CAB and the State
Department that it would be inimical
to the security interests of the United
States to authorize such flights. The
 Approved For Release 2007/05107 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300050004-5
Covert Operations
The use of legitimate Aeroflot oper-
atiions for the insertion of undercover
agents and clandestine forces into the des-
ignated target is a tactic repeatedly em-
ployed by the Soviets. It is highly likely
that Aeroflot is the primary means of in-
troducing Soviet intelligence agents and
other covert operatives throughout the
world, but especially in Africa and other
less developed regions.
During the 1968 Czech crisis, an un-
us~ually large number of Soviet "govern-
ment officials" were observed debarking
Aeroflot planes at Prague; in fact, several
accounts reported that Soviet "civilians"
debarking at the Prague airport imme-
diately seized the airport while being led
by the former Director of Aeroflot op-
erations there. At Kabul, Soviet comman-
dos, ferried in an Aeroflot aircraft in a
routine flight, reportedly seized that air-
port prior to the advance of the airborne
forces. There is good reason to believe
th:~t most of the Soviet combat brigade
elements recently introduced into Cuba
were surreptitiously brought there by
Aeroflot over an extended period of time
so as not to arouse suspicion and alarm
the United States.
"Showing the Flag" and Explicit
Power Projection
'The use of military and technological
assets of one country to impress, or indeed,
to intimidate another country in the guise
of "showing the flag," or "gunboat di-
plomacy" is an ancient and accepted prac-
tice brought to its peak by the British
in the 19th century. .
'Though a late arriver in the competition
for global influence and power, the Soviets
have, since World War II, more than made
up for their tardiness. In particular, since
the expansion of Aeroflot into the world's
lesser developed regions in the '60s, that
carrier has been effectively utilized by the
Soviet government as an instrument of po-
liti.cal influence and power projection.
Throughout parts of Africa, Aeroflot is
thf; only means for international travel.
For example, Burundi and Rwanda have
re
1272 1
95!
.
.
..
Soviet Union {Aeroflot}
344
172
62
6
406
178
Ptlland (1.ot)
562
488
126
150
688
638
Romania (Tatum)
192
288
$
4
200
292
Czechalslovakia (CSA)
536
544
Q
4
526
548
East Germany (Interflug}
0
0
6
12
6
12
Bulgaria (Balkan}
Culaa {Cabana)
~
288*
0
* 284**
$
488
0
.186
8
776.
4
470
? Cabana's routes from Havana/Montreal
into JFK, New York should be confined
to only over-water routes beyond the US
air defense zone.
? No "charter flights" should be permitted
until quid pro quo charter authorization
(now denied US carriers to the Soviet
Union) is granted.
? If charter flights are granted under quid
pro quo conditions, a minimum of I S days
notification should be mandatory.
? Perform rigorous and continual inspec-
* Flight-a single transit, %e., one-way trip.
** Authorized Overflights, Havana-Montreal'. f
tion of all communist Bloc aircraft in con-
fortuity with US Government regulations
and agreements and international conven-
tions with the foreign carriers. Interna-
tional agreements provide for frequent and
thorough inspections, some on a "no no-
tice" basis. The Soviets used to conduct
such inspections zealously when Pan Am
was operating into Russia; the US has
not conducted any such inspections of
Aeroflot planes operating in the US during
recent years. ^ ~ ^
Tabjt
Communist Bioc civil Aviation Informatio
n
Communist
Albania Bulgaria flemoeratic China Cuba Czech. E. Germ. Hungary N. Korea
Outer
Pataml
Romania
USSR
Vietnam
Bloc State
Kamuchea tPRCi (GDR}
MongoHs
If'AO 2-LTR Cksiguafor'
LZ (Cambad~? CA Ctt OR IF' MA JS
LO
RO
StJ
VN
State Airline
Balkan CAAC Cubans GSA Intern Maler CAA of DPRIC
Lot
Tarom
Aeropat
Air Vietnam
ICAO Member
No
B Jd Yes 15 Feb f0 Jun 4 .Apr No 30 Oct 15 Sep
No
4 Apr
30 May
t4 Nor
12 Apr
6'1 74 49 47 d9 7?
4'7
65
7Q
SU
ltl.$TA Memtier....
Na
_21 Sep 15 Feb..... No 20 Jun 18 Apr No:.. i5 Jan No...
No.
b Apr
No
No
No
?0 5b 47 45 73
45
Dipkunatic
Relations with tTS
No
Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes No
No
Yes
Yes
Ves
No
t?3 CAB:.
4C~2 Permit
No
No No -Yes Yes Yes No No Nn
Na
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Bi-Lateral Air
Transport Agreement
.
No
No Nu Yes Yes Yes Na Yes No
_
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
.,
FrtA Ap Dyed AIPs
No
Yes No No No Y~ No Yes No
Na
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Piar Permission
7 Wurk. 10 413 Hrs ?Yes **Yes 2 Work-
7 Days 3 flays
3 Work
R,Nuired for Entry
ng Days Days (1/F fQ ing trays
(?/F 14
30 Days
[lays (3
Days
Days
Ser[es
weeks
LNDG
LNDC
suggested
Diplomatic Clearance
Yes Yes.
Yes
Yes
R.yuired for Entry
Paltry Permit valid
48 Hrs.
Changes must tie
24 Hrs
submitted
void if AJG does
18 Hrs
ne~f ester
_.
Et+cart Grew Required
Yes
Yes..
Flight Plan Required
4li Hrs 3d Mirrs.
Flight Notification
24 Hrs
MSG Required
"Czechoslovakia Requires:
72 Hrs Adranee Notice for Non-Gouunerciat Flights with. 6 or less people
Source: FAA/AtA
24 Hrs Advance Notice for Non-Commercial Flights with. more than b people
Ig' Worki~ bays Notice for NonSeheduled Commercial Flights
"`E. Cermm~y (GDR) Requires:
48 Hrs Advance Notice
i5 bays Advance Native for A jG remahdng in GDR far extended period of time
72 Hrs Adraace Notice for series of 3 or more Flights
 Approved For Release 2007/05107 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300050004-5
Presidential Courage and the April 1980
'Iranian Rescue Mission
AS WE REMEMBER AND HONOR this
Memorial Day the eight men who gave
their lives at Desert One last April 25th,
the men from that rescue mission would
tell ~ you there is one casualty for whom
there will never be a medal, although they
believe he deserves it most-former Presi-
dent Jimmy Carter.
The men of Joint Task Force 1-79 speak
of Jimmy Carter with a respect that bor-
ders on awe, a reverence almost, that one
seldom hears from military men-because
they expect courage of leaders who order
hazardous missions, just as they believe
those leaders should be able to expect cour-
age of them.
There is an unwritten axiom of special
military operations: the world hears about
them only when they fail, never when they
succeed. A basic premise of such work
is that it be deniable; thus the guts of
even the most successful missions aren't
advertised. Secrecy strictures are so tight
and enduring that the truth behind them
rarely surfaces; when it does (if ever), it
is invariably long after the mission. A re-
grettable but frequent by-product of that
secrecy is that the people who risk such
missions seldom obtain proper credit-
publicly or professionally-even for acts
of the most compelling courage.
Presidential courage takes many forms.
The nation has just seen one kind-in the
graceful, reassuring calm and infectuous
humor with which Ronald Reagan reacted
to his attempted assassination on March
30th after taking a bullet through the lung.
But the nation has not even heard of
Jimmy Carter's courage a year ago. With
the mission's first anniversary here, the
men he asked to rescue our former hos-
tages want Jimmy Carter_to be given credit
for a form of courage which they say far
transcended theirs.
At this time last year, the nation was
clamoring for some kind of Presidential
action to resolve the hostage crisis. Some
civilians in government, despairing of ever
recovering the hostages, had even proposed
u B-52 raid to level the holy city of Qom.
Their patience, like others', was exhausted,
hopes having been dashed once too often
from the on-again, off-again diplomatic
channels through which the Administra-
tion hoped to recover the hostages.
Carter had ordered the Joint Chiefs of
Staff to ready a rescue mission eight days
after the hostages had been seized, and the
first plan was ready on December 20th (al-
beit, its planners had cautioned, with ele-
ments of risk that concerned them greatly).
The mission, the President and its plan-
ners had emphasized, was to be a rescue,
not a punitive or retaliatory raid. For five
months before last April 16th, when Carter
finally approved launching it, the President
had made it clear that the nation would
pursue one goal-"To protect our national
honor and interests, and bring the hostages
home alive." Throughout the task force's
planning, the "operative" word was
"alive." And, Carter had emphasized qui-
etly to the few people really privy to his
thinking, he felt the Presidency bound to
resolve the crisis along Constitutional
lines-diplomacy first; military options
would be used only if diplomacy failed.
Late last March, Carter's hopes were
high that release of the hostages was im-
minent. Through a complex, prearranged
scenario, Carter was to get a set of signals
from Iran that were supposed to trigger
a positive public statement from him; given
it. Iranian officials had agreed, the hos-
tages would then be transferred to gov-
ernment control, the first and crucial step
leading to their freedom. As Jody Powell
recounts those trying days, the signals from
Iran came three days late-through a co-
incidence, shortly after midnight on April
1st, the 150th day of captivity- and the
morning of the Wisconsin primary. At
seven a.m., Carter made his positive state-
ment, announcing at the White House that
the crisis was abating and that the hostages
would soon be home. But it soon became
apparent, once again, that the Iranians
were unable or unwilling to follow through.
Carter was later criticized brutally for
his awkwardly timed statement: political
pundits charged that he had politicized
the hostage issue to win a primary.
But there is one powerful indication that
the President had read the diplomatic sig-
nal in good faith: it was given enough
credence within the Pentagon that a senior
officer relied on it to disapprove the
planned early deployment of some of the
rescue team members to the Persian Gulf.
Within days of that hopeful news, however,
the crisis and apparent danger of losing
the hostages reached new heights: Iranian
spokesmen announced (previously they
h~td only "warned") that some hostages
would be tried as spies. Under Iranian
justice, spies are shot: those convicted be-
fore noon are executed by sundown; those
convicted after noon are executed by noon
the next day. Carter's advisors were well
aware that some 460 Iranians had already
been executed after such quick "trials."
All promising diplomatic avenues had run
their course with no favorable outcome.
Carter did not need to be reminded that
it is proper for a President to use military
force when diplomacy fails or stalls.
Yet Jimmy Carter was profoundly
aware, when he approved the Iranian hos-
President Carter attending services for the
eight men who died at Desert One.
(Washington Post photo.)
tape rescue mission a year ago Thursday,
April 16th, that the mission might not
succeed. He had asked in a final White
House review before the entire National
Security Council that evening (according
to a former White House official present
at the three-hour meeting), "'What are
the chances of success'?"
Recollections of that meeting vary
slightly, but six people who were present
agree that the President was told some-
thing very close to this:
"The mission has high prospects for suc-
cess. But if something goes wrong, the
odds become somewhere between zero and
100 percent, and those two numbers could
be vert? close together. We won't know
how close, or how far apart, until we get
into Iran..Any number of unforeseen fac-
tors, none of which we can precisely predict
or control, could cause the whole thing
to go to hell in a handbasket." Factors
such as desert weather, Iranian forces turn-
ing up in the wrong place, a last minute
move of the hostages, and equipment fail-
ures were cited. One of the four Carter
was specifically warned about-equipment
failure would later cause the mission to
fail; another factor he was warned about,
weather, contributed to the abort at Desert
One.
Based on the factors they could control,
the briefer told the President, he and his
men were confident they could free the
hostages and bring them home alive. (To-
day, intelligence sources say, debriefings
60 armed forces JOURNAL international/May 1981
Approved Far Release 2007105/07 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300050004-5
 Approved For Release 2007/05107 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300050004-5
"Also I heard the voice of the Lord, saying, Whom shag I send, and who will go for us? Then said I, Here am
1C; send me: ' _ Isaiah 6:8
Captain Richard L. Bakke
United States Air Force
of the former hostages confirm that the
rescue force knew the precise location,
down to their very rooms, of 95% of the
51 men and two women they tried to res-
cue-and would quickly have located the
others based on information gleaned during
the mission.) But the briefer was equally
clear in telling the President that there
could be casualties on both sides if some-
thing went awry, according to one White
House official present in the Situation
Room that evening. In that case, the Presi-
dent was told, "Perhaps one aircraft crew
could be lost somewhere along the way;
three to eight hostages killed or wounded;
three to eight rescue team members killed
or wounded; and an indeterminate number
of Iranians, depending on how they elect
to respond."
Thus, James Earl Carter knew last April
that the mission he was ordering was not
without substantial risk, that it might fail,
and that there could be casualties, even
among the hostages he had sworn to bring
home alive. '
It was not the kind of prognosis that
made a Presidential decision to execute
the mission easy. Jimmy Carter still had
the courage to try.
Carter demonstrated that evening last
April 16th another kind of Presidential
courage-unique, perhaps unprecedented,
in recent American military history. At
one point in the briefing, national security
advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski asked, "How
can we talk to the commander if we need
to?" Carter cut the question off abruptly:
he told Brzezinski, "We won't!" He turned
and said, "I know you'll be busy. Your
mission comes first. If you have time to
tell us what's happening, that would be
nice. But don't feel you have to give us
play by play status reports. I will not sec-
ond guess or interfere." Carter also em-
phasized that he would follow the chain
of command: the President to the Sec-
retary of Defense to the Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staff, to the Joint Task Force
Commander. The Task Force Commander,
he said, should not concern himself with
an.y other counsel.
Other senior military officers who were
present confirm that dialogue. And add,
they have never heard of a President in
recent times giving or following such clear
guidance to a commander. Carter said,
"[ won't interfere"-and he didn't.
(That vignette is a striking contrast to
the memories of other commanders on
other recent but far less sensitive oper-
ations. [During the 1976 crisis in Lebanon,
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld not
only monitored operations closely from the
Pentagon's National Military Command
Center, but-his aides bragged later to
the Pentagon press corps-Rumsfeld him-
self was in "direct radio-telephone com-
munication" with the boatswain's mate
driving one of the landing craft standing
by offshore to evacuate American person-
nel from Beirut.] Carter's vow not to "in-
terfere" was also a striking contrast to
his image as a President obsessed with
detail-wont, it was said, to micromanage
national security issues in particular.)
The men of JTF 1-79 understood the
risks too. They knew what the President
had been told of their odds.
The night before they flew into Desert
One, in a few moments set aside for quiet
meditation, one of the men was asked to
serve as chaplain. He ended the brief "ser-
vice" by leading his comrades in singing
"The Battle Hymn of the Republic."
Some of the men found a few moments
to lie on their backs on the desert floor
and rest as they talked about the mission.
As he looked up at the stars over Southwest
Asia just a few hours before he was
killed-a young aircrew member turned
to one of his comrades and said quietly,
"1 don't mind sacrificing for the things
1 believe in."
Had the mission gone forward from Des-
ert One, the rescue team would have re-
ceived amessage from their commander
at their loge head the next night: the quote
from /saiah, "Whom shall I send, and
who will go for us? ... Here am I; send
me."
(In mid-February, Major General James
B. Vaught, the Commander of JTF 1-79,
Staff 'Sergeant Dewey L. Johnson
united States Marine Corps
was invited to Hermitage, PA with some
of the former hostages to unveil a monu-
ment dedicated to the eight men who died
the day after that brief worship service
at their Mideast staging field. The towns-
people of Hermitage did not know of that
service: but at the very moment Vaught
unveiled the monument, a 200-person choir
began singing "The Battle Hymn of the
Republic.")
Three days after the tragic events of
Desert One, President Carter flew to a
secret location to meet with most members
of the rescue force immediately upon their
return to the US. Carter says today that
for him, it was the most emotional moment
of the whole rescue operation. As Carter
stepped off the helicopter, Colonel Charles
Beckwith-a "big, burly sort of guy" who
grew up in Ellaville, Georgia, 15 miles
north of Plains, and who commanded the
rescue team that would have gone on from
Desert One to Tehran-saluted the Presi-
dent. At first there was silence; then Carter
embraced him. Beckwith apologized for
"failing." Carter said he could not accept
the apology.
Beckwith led him inside a building
where his men were waiting. They were
still in combat fatigues; bruises and minor
burns were evident on some, and others
still wore hasty first aid bandages and
dressings over their injuries. Carter told
the men Beckwith had tried to apologize,
and that he had refused to accept it. He
told the men he considered them heroes;
they were all part of the same team, Carter
said, and their efforts had shown the world
that America believes in freedom and will
fight for it.
One of the men recalls that Carter then
asked them, "What can I do for you?"
A young Army or Marine Corps noncom-
missioned officer spoke up: "Mr. President,
give us another chance. Don't write us
off because we didn't hit a home run for
you the first time." Carter was deeply
moved by that charge from men whose
comrades had died trying to carry out
his orders. Later, Carter was equally
moved when several Iranians in [his coun-
armed forces JOURNAL international/May 1981 61
~ Aooroved For Release 2007/05107 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300050004-5
 Approved For Release 2007/05107 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300050004-5
"Also I' heard...the voice of ,the I.c-rd, saying, whom shall I send, and. who will go for us? Then said I, Here am
I; .send :me." ,.. Isaiah b:8
try asked him to let them go on the next
mission to rescue the hostages: they were
ashamed of their countrymen holding
Americans like common criminals, they
told the President, and they wanted to
.prove that his agony, and the hostages',
was not what Islam and Iran stood for.
Jimmy Carter's courage last April took
other forms. Surely the hardest decision
for any commander to make, be he a mili-
tary man or a President, is to abort a
mission once launched. (It is more than
the issue of built-in momentum or wishful
thinking and "can-do" daring: extricating
a force once committed is always a haz-
ardous operation, and fraught with far
more risk than usual in a clandestine op-
eration.) When Beckwith had to recom-
mend aborting the operation because his
men at Desert One were one helicopter
too short of the number preagreed upon
for the operation's next phase, Vaught re-
layed that recommendation-and en-
dorsed it-to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs
of Staff. He was asked, "How long do
you have before you need a final decision?"
Vaught told General David C. Jones, "No
more than ]0 to 15 minutes." Jones asked
Vaught to stand by while he checked with
Defense Secretary Harold Brown and the
President: eight minutes later, Jones con-
firmed the President's endorsement of
Vaught's gut-wrenching decision. (Carter
went on TV early last April 25th and said,
"It was my decision to cancel ...") But
as another member of Vaught's rescue
team observed, "If you think it was a
`gut-wrenching' decision for Vaught, think
what it must have been for Jimmy Carter
9,000 miles away!
"Sure, we could have improvised. Yes,
we had the courage to go on and try.
But we might have gone on and left a
wreckage of heroic, but unproductive valor
all the way from Desert One to Tehran.
"We were there to recover the hostages
alive, not litter the desert with brave dead.
Vaught didn't second guess us; Jones didn't
second guess us; the President didn't sec-
ond guess us. Jesus Christ, man, do you
have any idea what kind of guts that
Captain Lyn D. Mclutosh
united States .4ir Force
takes?"
Finally, the men who "failed" Jimmy
Carter last April ask that America re-
member: "We failed; he took the heat.
He took full responsibility. That's courage.
It may have cost him his Presidency."
(Actually, the men didn't fail; their
eyurpment did. As Vaught understated it
at the February 14th ceremony in Her-
mitage: "One of the things we learned,
or reaffirmed, was that machines like he-
licopters don't have souls; they aren't very
patriotic; and they really don't care if
they're going to Tehran or Timbuktu when
they decide to quit on you.")
(When 1 watched General Vaught unveil
the monument to his eight men two months
ago, he summarized their sacrifice in a
way 1 wish their families and President
Carter could hear this Memorial Day:
"The mission was not a `foolish under-
taking' or a `fiasco,' as some have said.
It was a very best effort by a small group
of courageous and brave Americans. Never
did a small group of Americans try harder
to do what they thought was right than
those who went forth into that desert last
April. There is no failure in failing: there
is only failure in failing to try-and those
who gave their lives knew that, even as
they died-and 1 thank God for them.")
But 53 live Americans did come home
safely. Did last. April's rescue attempt
-Author's Nate: Throughout Jimmy far= !,
ter's Presidency, I doubt there has been =;
any more vocal critic of his national
security policies (or former Defense '.
Secretary Flarold Brown's execution of
them) Iha~ me personally or than
Armed`Forces ,laurnad editorially, even
though neither has any particular po-
litcal persuasian Had I known last No-
i ~vet~ber all of what I know today abaut
Jimmy Carter's courage last April, I'
~ still would have voted against him last
November 4th. But this nation produces
good Presidents, and iris special courage
last. April ranks Jimmy Carter atrtong
the bravest:.. ~^
Captain Charles T. McMillan, II
United States Air Foree
help? The overwhelming majority of the
former hostages with whom I've talked
since their return believe it did help, and
that it would have been successful. It prod-
ded diplomats to try again; it gave di-
plomacy another chance. And, as one per-
son told me, "At that time, we were able
to confront our captors on a one-to-one
basis-and win. A trained US force com-
ing over the wall (or however) would have
met pathetic resistance from that disor-
ganized, confused, ragtag band of second
string revolutionaries.
"They were brave when they had half
a million Iranians with raised fists shouting
behind them, but they would not martyr
themselves to silence. Carter ended up be-
ing a martyr in silence: he didn't have
half a million fists behind him in the Sit-
uation Room.
"And that's the difference." ^~r^
THIS CDMMENTA'RY ALSt~ AP-
PE,4RED in the Washington Star's ed'-
tortal secrion; "Comment," on Easter
~S'undtty, A~~if 19t1t, `$ '- `~ ~ ,
Editors' Note: The men who tried to
rescue our former hostages last April
have established a college scholarship
fund for the 17 children of the men
killed or incapacitated at Desert One.
The scholarship fund is named in honor
of the late Colonel Arthur D. "Bull"
Simons, who risked his life repeatedly
trying to rescue fellow Americans from
incarceration during World War II,
Vietnam, and from Iran. Every Ameri-
can wanted to go to Iran last year to
free our hostages; not all of us could
go. But all of us can thank the men
who did go by contributing, whatever
our means, to the Bull Simons Schol-
arship Fund for their children. Send
your tax exempt contribution to:
Colonel Arthur D. Simons
Scholarship Fund
P.O. Box "Eight"
Dallas, TX 75221. ^ ~z ^
62 armed forces JOURNAL international/May 9981
Approved For Release 2007/05107 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300050004-5
 Approved For Release 2007/05107 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300050004-5
'rhe Colonel
Arthur D. Simons
:scholarship Fund
Thee Iranian rescue team members are establishing a college
s~~holarship fund for the 17 children of their comrades who were
killed or incapacitated attempting to free 53 fellow Americans April
2~4 and 25.
Thiis scholarship fund is named in memory of the late Army
Colonel Arthur D. Simons, a legendary soldier who risked his life
repeatedly to rescue his fellow Americans. Many of the American
sarrvic:emen who planned, and some of those who attempted the
rrrlsslon to rescue 53 American embassy hostages from Iran, served
~~ith Colonel Simons during his career.
Thiis scholarship fund has no overhead. Every penny you
c. ntribute will apply directly to the scholarships.
Tax-exempt status has been approved under Section 501(cX3) of
tll~e Internal Revenue Code. However, the issue is not a tax
dleduction. Rather, it is to ensure that these youngsters will have an
opportunity to go to college without further burden on their
fzimili:es.
Col. Arthur D. Simons Scholarship Fund
Box "8?
Dallas, TX 75221
I Enclosed is my contribution for scholarships for the children of the I
I American Servicemen who gave their lives in Apri1,1980, trying to rescue I
I their fellow Americans from Iran. I
I ^ $1 ^ $5 ^ $10 ^ $20 ^ $50 ^ $100 -other I
~ I
I Name I
~ Address ~
I - I
I I
I - I
I Tax Exempt Identification Number: 750 96 4565 I
I I
L---------------------------------J
EDITORS: You have permission to reprint this advertisement or portions of it, without further approval. Color separations
a~~ailalble gratis upon request. Call 202-296-0450.
~~ Aar~roved Far Release 2007105/07 :CIA-RDP$3M00210R000300050004-5
 Approved For Release 2007/05107 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300050004-5
Eluding the world's largest navy, von Luckner prowled
30,000 miles-and terrorized Allied sea lanes.
He concocted an elaborate Norwegian disguise
for his armed windjammer and crew. And bluffed
his way through the British blockade. Then from
January to July 1917, German Count Felix von
Luckner hunted prey from North Atlantic to
South Pacific, sinking 14 Allied and neutral
merchant ships while dodging British warships.
His disarming technique: sidle up to the target
on some innocent pretext...then suddenly haul
down the Norwegian flag, hoist German colors,
reveal weapons, seize the vessel, take aboard all
personnel, and sink her. No one was ever hurt or
killed. His multinational "prisoners" ate well and
thoroughly enjoyed themselves. Still, the raids
.4:.1!;1 March. Biggest'v~ctim, English freighter
. Horrrgartl, sunk after being; ~elieved;of .'
champagne cargp our banner day'
";Luckner 1'ater~recalls ~.~_ a.M~~~;~.~,.LL'
had a disruptive effect on Allied war logistics that
extended beyond the sinkings themselves. Fear of
the "Sea Devil" upset sailing schedules and
delayed some badly needed war cargoes.
What about today? With all the technological
advances in offensive systems, could a potential
adversary slip through defense perimeters unde-
tected and unidentified? To counter such a threat,
the IBM Advanced Signal Processor brings to de-
tection, identification and location systems some
remarkable capabilities.
Because of this processor, which is now air-
borne, land-based and aboard ship, detection sys-
tems are able to process target data from a variety
2 r9~.1QJanuary191,7.,Seeadlersnks2'Erglish
`'"~, freighters,near;Aiores, , ~~ _ ?,
3. 21,lattuary-5 March. Cruising equatdriat "'
~tiantic, Seead/er-sinks 4 French. bar`ks,' ~ ~~~.
Canadian schooner and bark, English bark,
Italian sailing ship. Luckner has offered r`noney"~~!
d charnpaghe to anyone rivho sights a target.
esutt is f1oGk,gf eager taokouts in rigging: ~ Y'
 Approved For Release 2007/05107 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300050004-5
o:f sensors...identifying and pinpointing threats in
real time with far greater accuracy. Both in offense
and defense.
The Advanced Signal Processor
also means that America's antisub-
marine forces for the 1980's can
quickly adapt to changing threats,
through the flexibility to handle new
techniques and new sensors.
The same capability extends to sys-
tems that analyze signals from remote
battlefield transmitters. And transmis-
siions from satellites.
Multipurpose systems like these
Seeadler is boarded and searchetl by~Britsh
result from IBM's special skill: our ability to marshal
many specialized systems to a common purpose.
-~ ~ ~ ~.~-
~ ?~ ~
-?? ~? ?.
? ?~. ~
We've also done it in command and
control. In communications, naviga-
tion, electronic countermeasures and a
wide range of other fields.
In fact, the more complex the task
and systems are, the more IBM can help.
0
Federal Systems Division
Bethesda, Maryland 20034
 Approved For Release 2007/05107 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300050004-5
Approved Far Release 2007105!07:CIA-RDP83M00210R000300050004-5
 Approved For Release 2007/05107 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300050004-5
People
Memorial Day,
1981
THIS POEM was writ-
ten by then PFC Sam
Hall on Armistice Day,
1944, while in class be-
ing trained for intelli-
gence duty. At 10:45
a.m., the students were
commanded to stop work
and sit at attention while
the bugle sounds heard
during a soldier's day
were played over the pub-
lic address system. End-
ing in taps, the moment
spurred Hall to write this
poem for the dead sol-
diers who could no longer
hear them. ^ xr ^
General of the Army
Omar N. Bradley
The Soher's Soldier
In whale memory, like
that of the eight men who
died last April at Desert
One and all of the sol-
diers, airmen, sailors,
Marines and Coast
Guardsmen he served so
well as Veterans Admn-
istratorafter World War
II, we commemorate this
issue. ^ ~ ^
armed forces JOURNAL international/May 1981
Dead Heroes
by Sam Hall'
Dead Heroes hear one bugle call;
Not Lights Qut, Call to Quarters,
Taps; Sound no Retreat for them,
'Twill fall. unheard. The lowered
Flag that flaps protesting'gainst
The pole finds no salute in answer
To the sound of To the Colors,
And the glow of setting sun upon
Their mound but glorifies their
Silent sleep. They'll hear no
Bugled call but one yet for that
One they all must keep aware;
Before the last note's done, some
New and haloed-sun. will see their
Souls leap up at Reveille. ^~^
~~ flnnrn~~arl Fnr Rclaaca ?nn7lntiln7 ~ C;IA-R?P8'~ non 108000300050004-5 I
 Approved For Release 2007/05107 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300050004-5
I
Darts & Laurels
To the Commander, Carib-
bean Contingency Joint
Task Force-whose first
1981 press release we've just read, wrap-
ping up the new command's first year of
~ operations-for not recommending that his
70-man headquarters be disestablished.
We need its people elsewhere: the com-
I mand is redundant, a political waste an-
I pounced to defuse President Jimmy Car-
, ter's embarrassment over the self-imposed
1979 fiasco over the Soviet combat brigade
in Cuba. Having read all of what CCJTF
accomplished in 1980, we feel all the more
strongly about what we said in our March
issue: the Pentagon needs more forces, not
more headquarters.
To the Journal reader who
keeps bugging us [o ask
Harold Brown the follow-
ing questions:
? `Mr. Secretary, where did it all go
wrong?"
? "Sir, having spent almost a trillion dol-
Lars in the past four years, how did we
end up second best?"
? "Secretary Brown, are we stronger now,
~ in a relative sense, or are we weaker than
we were four years ago?"
' "What, Sir, would you recommend to
your successors to compensate for your
stewardship?"
? "Harold, had you had a freer hand, what
would you really have done?"
To the Journal subscriber
who recently joined the
White House Presidential
scheduling staff under Michael
Deaver-for candor. When we asked how
she liked her job, she told us, "If you
have to go back to work, it's a great place
to start."
?.~
_i1~.y and former C'iA Director
advertently) admitting why he is no longer
Director of Central Intelligence. In a New
York Times Magazine article of March
29th, "Why We Shouldn't Build the
M-X," Turner wrote, "To construct a base
for it will require, according to some es-
timates, 40% of the country's total cement
production for three years." He must have
gotten the numbers from the same sources
he got his optimistic mid-1978 intelligence
on Iran, and checked them about as care-
lessly: He's only off by a factor of forty.
USAF tells us that the total M-X cement
need will be about 1'/z-million tons over
an eight-year period,. or about '/z of one
percent of US production. Admiral Turner
is said to be lecturing, consulting, and writ-
- ing a book about military strategy. That's
hilarious! ^ ~r ^
Star Status
AIR FORCE
From
To
BABCOCK, Leon W., Jr.
Comdr, 601 Tac Control
Asst CofS, Oper, Allied
Brigadier General
Wg, USAF in Eur, APO
Forces Central Eur, APO
NY
NY
BISHOP, Charles E.
Comdr, 23rd Air Div, N
VComdr, 9th AF, TAC Air
Brigadier General
American Air Def Reg,
Comd, Shaw AFB, SC
Duluth Intn'1 Airport, MN
DREYER, Christian F., Jr.
Comdt, Sq Officer Schl,
Comdr, 601 Tac Control
Brigadier General
Air Trning Comd, Maxwell
Wg, USAF in Eur, APO
AFB, AL
NY
DYER, Pintard M., I I I
CofS, 15th AF, SAC,
Comdr, 12 Air Div, SAC,
Brigadier General
March AFB, CA
Dyess AFB, TX
FAURER, Lincoln D.
Dep Chairman of NATO
Dir, Natl Sec Agency &
Lieutenant General
Milt Comd, Brussels,
Chf, Central Sec Ser
Belgium
GERAN, Daniel B.
Dep CofS/Comps, USAF
Dep Dir of Budget, AF
Colonel
in Eur, APO NY
Compt, Wash, DC
IRIONS, Charles C.
Dep Dir for Log (Strat
Retired
Major General
Mob), J-4 Office of Jt
CofS, Wash, DC
LINDEMAN, William E.
Dep CofS/Plans, Pol, Prog
Retired
Brigadier General
& Requirements, J-5,
Aerospace Def Comd,
Peterson AFB, CO
ROBERTSON, Edin W., I I
Chf, Milt Asst Advisory
Retired
Major General
Gp, Spain, APO NY
SULLIVAN, Dennis B.
Comdr, 12 Air Div, SAC,
Comd Dir, North Amer
Brigadier General
Dyess AFB, TX
Air Def Comd, Combat
Oper Ctr, J-3, North Amer
Air Def Comd/Aerospace
Def Comd, Cheyenne
Mountain Complex, CO
SYLVESTER, George H.
VComdr, AF Sys Comd
Retired
Lieutenant General
ARMY
ADAMS, Robert B.
Dir of Resources & Mgmt,
Dep CG; USA Finance Bc
Brigadier General
Dep CofS for Log, Dept of
Acctng Ctr, Ft Benjamin
Army, Wash, DC
Harrison, IN
DELANDRO, Donald J.
CofS, USA Recruiting
Dep, The Adjutant Gen for
Colonel (P)
Comd, Ft Sheridan, IL
Admin Sys/Exec Dir, Milt
Postal Ser, Wash, DC
GARD, Robert G., Jr.
Pres, Natl Def Univ, Ft
Retired
Lieutenant General
Lesley J. McNair, Wash,
DC
GOODPASTER, Andrew J.
Super, USMA, West Point,
Retired
Lieutenant General
NY
LEWI, Kenneth E.
Dep CG, 21st Support
CG, 3rd Support Comd,
Brigadier General
Comd, USA Eur, APO NY
USA Eur, APO NY
ODOM, William E.
Natl Sec Council Stf,
Asst Dep CofS Intel, Dep
Brigadier General
White House, Wash, DC
of Army, Wash, DC
POINTER, Robert W., Jr.
Proj Mgr, Cannon Art
Asst CofS, G4, 8th USA/
Colonel (P)
Weapons Sys, Picatinny
Asst CofS, J-4, UN Comd/
Arsenal, NJ
US Forces Korea/Asst
CofS, C-4, Comb Forces
Comd Korea, APO San
Francisco
68 armed forces JOURNAL international/May 1981
Approved For Release 2007!05107 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300050004-5
 Approved For Release 2007/05107 :CIA-RDP83M00210R000300050004-5
Star Status
A11; lri)' (continued)
BARBER, William R., Jr.
Asst CofS, G4, 8th USA/
Asst DCofS for Log for
Brigadier General
Asst CofS, J-4, UN Comd/
Sec Asst/Chf, Log-Read
US Forces Korea/Asst
Ofc, USA, Wash, DC
CofS, C-4, Combined
Forces Comd Korea, APO
San Francisco
SCOTT, Willard W., Jr.
CG, V Corps, USA Eur,
Super, USMA, West
Lieutenant General
APO, NY
Point, NY
S~TUBBLEBINE, Albert N., I I I CG, USA Elect R&D
CG, USA Intell & Sec
Major General
Comd, Adelphi, MD
Comd, Arlington Hall, VA
MARINE CORPS
JOHNSON, Mannon A., Jr.
Dir, Matl Div, Instal & Log
Exec Dir, Supply Oper,
Erigadier General
Dept, HQMC
Def Log Agcy, Alex, VA
NAVY
CONNER, Donald L.
Comdr, Construction
Dep Comdr for Plning
Fear Admiral
Battalions, Atlantic
NAVFACENGCOM
HERBEQ2GER, Albert J.
Exec Asst to Asst Sec of
Asst Comdr for Persnl
Ftear Admiral
Navy (MRA&L)
Distribution, NMPC
IIOWE, Jonathan T.
Dir, Pol Milt Policy &
Milt Asst to Dep Sec of
Ftear Admiral
Current Plans Div, OP-61
Def
JOHNSTON, Fred W.
Special Asst to Dir, Plans
Comdr, Sea Based ASW
Ftear Admiral
& Policy, J-5, JCS
Wings, Atlantic
LONG, L. J.
Comdr in Chf, Pac US
Extension of tenure
Admiral
Navy
~/IARRYOTT, Ronald F.
Comding Ofcr, Naval Air
Comdr, Iceland Def Force
Rear Admiral
Station, Moffett Field
D/IETCALF, Joseph, I I I
Comdr, Cruiser Dest GP
Dir, Plning & Prog Div
Rear Admiral
EIGHT
PvI00NEY, John B.
Dir, Total Force Plning
Dir, Oceanography Div,
Ftear Admiral
Div, OP-11
OP-952/Oceanographer of
Navy
1~1'ILLIAMS, James D.
Comdr, Sub Div
Comdr, Naval Base Seattle
Ftear Admiral
SIXTEEN
^ ~r ^
MEMOS
FIRST DQ:LIVERY of the Tactical Digital
Facsimile (TDF) units has been made to
thf: Naval Electronic Systems Command
by Datalog Division of Litton Industries.
This communications system is capable
of transmitting and receiving words and
pi