REPORT OF SPACE POLICY ALTERNATIVES ON INTEGRATED REMOTE SENSING(Sanitized)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 13, 1979
• Content Type: MF

~~~ee TT I
? Approved For Release 003/0fT3a~-RDP83M00171F!!b02300100001-1
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505 _.
DCI/RM 79-2373
Resource Management Staff 13 September 1979
NSC REVIEW
COMPLETED
MEMORANDUM FOR: DCI Space Policy Working Group
SUBJECT: Report of Space Policy Alternatives on Integrated
Remote Sensing (U)
Attached provided for your information. PRC meeting is scheduled
for 25 September. (U)
25X1A
25X1A
Attachment:
Space Policy Alternatives on Integrated
Remote Sensing for Policy Review
Committee (Space)
U . y00ir ir.L wnnly Lf.1t. 1J 4J Ui- ii v r% V----.
FROM ATTACI~.'KENT SECRET ^ O;_ Wtt3REVW ON 13 Sep 1965
C ' ?.; C , FROM,! Multiple
Approved For Release 2003/04723 P8IN-RDP83M00171R002300100001-1
 Approved For Release 2003/04/25 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100001-1
i
SUBJECT: Report of Space Policy Alternatives on Integrated Remote
Sensing (U)
Distribution: (DCI/RM 79-2373)
1 - SAFSS (Maj Rothrock)
25X1 A 1 - NSA/W
1 - 5tate/INR r. timberline)
25X1 A 1 - DIA/DC
25X1 Al - CIA/DDA
25X1 Al - CIA/DDS&T
1 - CIA/NFAC
25X1 A 1 - D/DCI/CT/TA0
25X1A 1 - D/DCI/CT/COMIREX
r
25X1A1 - D/DCI/RM/PBO
1 - D/DCI/RM/ PB
1 - D/DCI/RM/CLLO
25X1A 1 D/DCI/RM/PAOt
1~ PAO Chrono
1 - PAO/Typist
1 - CT Registry
1 - RM Registry
25X1 A DCI/RM/PAC
I:bd/1215 (13 Sep 79)
Approved For Release 2003/04/25 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100001-1
 Approved For Release 2003/04/25 : CIA-RDP83M00171 R002300100
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
UNCLASSIFIED WITH
August 31, 1979
SECRET ATTACHMENT
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE
THE
THE
THE
THE
THE
SECRETARY
SECRETARY
SECRETARY
SECRETARY
SECRETARY
SECRETARY
OF
OF
OF
OF
OF
OF
STATE
DEFENSE
INTERIOR
AGRICULTURE
COMMERCE
ENERGY
THE
THE
DIRECTOR,
ASSISTANT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
TO THE PRESIDENT FOR DOMESTIC
AFFAIRS AND POLICY
THE ADMINISTRATOR, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT
THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT
AGENCY
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND
SPACE ADMINISTRATION
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
POLICY
THE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION
SUBJECT: Report of,Space Policy Alternatives on
Integrated Remote Sensing (U)
Attached is a report-of-space policy alternatives on possible
integration of US remote sensing systems and programs in
response to PD/NSC-42. It was prepared by an interagency task
force chaired by NASA and will serve as the basis for a Policy
Review Committee (Space) meeting to be scheduled in the future.
The polar meteorological satellite issue will also be discussed
briefly. (U)
Christine Dodson
Staff Secretary
UNCLASSIFIED WITH
SECRET ATTACHMENT
Approved For Release 2003/04/25 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100001-1
 Approved For Release 2003/04/25 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100001-1
SECRET/NO FOREIGN`-'
SPACE POLICY ALTERNATIVES ON
INTEGRATED REMOTE SENSING
FOR
POLICY REVIEW COMMITTEE (SPACE)
AUGUST 28, 1979
SECRET/NO FOREIGN
ORIGINAL CL BY Z. Brzezinski
DECL (3 REEVW-ON August 30. 1985
EXT BYND 6 YEARS BY
RZASON pprpyed Fee R_le___ `003/04/25 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100001-1
 Approved For Release 200116 CIA-RDP83M00171 R002300100001-1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
I.
Observations and Conclusions ........................
1
II.
Polar Meteorological Satellite Program Options ......
6
III. Ocean Observation Satellite Management Options ......
7
IV.
Civil Terrestrial Observation Satellite Management
Options .............................................
16
V.
References ...........................................
32
Approved For Release Z 125 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100001-1
NOJFD=
 Approved For Release 20U31U25 CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100001-1
SPACE. POLICY ALTERNATIVES ON INTEGRArTTED`REMOTE SENSING
FOR POLICY.REVIEW COI SITTEE (SPACE)
AUGUST 28, 1979
1. OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
This overview reports the deliberations of the Phase II Interagency Task
Force study considering possible integration of U.S. remote sensing
systems and programs from the management, institutional, and policy
perspective. It responds to the direction of PD/NSC-42 and further
guidance from the Director of the OMB. A Phase I report, covering
technical and cost aspects of remote sensing integration has been
completed and forwarded. The Phase II Task Force has followed, in large
part, the Phase I categorization of technical integration approaches. In
addition, the Phase II Task Force relied upon the general conclusions of
the separate study that examined potentials for private sector involve-
ment. (U)
This Section outlines observations and conclusions that are important to
the consideration of national remote sensing activities, whether viewed
separately or as a single entity.. Separate. discussion of the management
options for meteorological, oceanic, and terrestrial remote sensing pro-
grams are included in Sections II, III and IV. Section V lists relevant
references for the Phase II study. (U)
B. SEPARATION OF GOVERNMENT SECTORS
In principle, a single agency could manage a single remote sensing
program serving all U.S. needs (whether civil, military, or intelligence,
whether domestic or international) in the acquisition and distribution
of global observational data. Upon analysis, the various programs,
institutions, and policies in being today do not lend themselves easily
to any dramatic coalescence that would both improve services and reduce
costs. This is because of the difference in the levels of technical
maturity among the various programs, in the different data requirements
of the user constituencies, and in the different content-specific data
and management policies. If, however, the existing disparities among
civil sector program requirements, capabilities, and policies could be
accommodated within a single civil management structure, this Administration
could put forward a significant remote sensing initiative. (C)
Approved For Release 20(30Q ..CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100001-1
SECRET
 -2-1'iO aFJ .
Approved For Release 2003/04/25: CIA-RDP83M00171R0023.a001fSC
C. SATELLITE REMOTE SENSING MANAGEMENT CONSIDERATIONS
Polar Orbiting Meteorological Satellites. The majority of the Phase II
Task Force concluded that the integration of civil and military systems
makes programmatic and economic sense when the requirements to be. met
are virtually identical, when the security issues do not impede civil 25X1
activities, and when the civil data management policies do not create
military security, operational, or survivability problems. A review of NSC
Oceanographic Satellites. An examination of space oceanography possi-
bilities reveals a present congruity of civil and military data requirements,
with few problems of data management or security other than those of
foreign participation. In this case, joint civil-military activity
seems a logical and economic next step beyond R&D, leading perhaps to an
operational capability. Separate options covering this area are discussed
in Section III. (U)
Converged Oceanographic and Meteorological Systems. The Phase I study
concluded that both the meteorological and oceanographic observational
low-earth-orbit systems could be combined. The majority of the Phase II
Task Force has concluded that the technical risks would be high in
combining both civil and military operational meteorology with develop-
mental oceanography in a single system. This program was not documented
as a management issue at this time but it remains available for future
consideration. (U)
Approved For Release f 81 5 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100001-1
NOFOR2'IA
 Approved For Release 2003/04/25 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100001-1
Terrestrial Observation Satellites. Civil operational terrestrial
remote sensing-decoupled from classified activities--presents one major
management question: What civil Federal organization should take the
lead in developing and managing an operational program that builds upon
the technologies demonstrated both in classified and civil activities?
This question is discussed in Section IV. The necessary transition
steps; the necessary interagency priority and requirements mechanisms;
and the need for responsiveness to Federal, state and local government,
private sector, and international users are also outlined. (C)
The majority of the Phase II Task Force concluded that a selection
should be made as soon as possible. The selection should take into
account experience in space operations, data management and distribution,
terrestrial applications, and international participation. The Department
of Agriculture, Commerce, and Interior are each willing to accept this
operational role. The diversity of terrestrial remote sensing data .
users and uses dictates that an authoritative interagency mechanism be
established to oversee and guide the conduct of such an operational
program. (C)
Supporting Research and Development. In all three civil space remote
sensing cases--atmospheric, oceanic, and terrestrial-the majority of
the Phase II Task Force concluded that responsive and continuing research,
development, and demonstration activities are necessary adjuncts to
sound operational programs. Separation of research and operations
avoids conflict of priorities. within a single organization. Continuity
and responsiveness permit smooth introduction of new or improved capabilities
after an adequate experience has been established. (U)
D. COMMON POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Remote sensing involves the acquisition and preprocessing of data for
purpose of analysis and. eventual transformation into usable information.
While remote sensing is often characterized by the regime being observed
(atmosphere, ocean, land), most informational products require combining
data sets from both space and conventional sources. Agricultural crop
production forecasts, for example, require data on weather, crop distri-
bution, soil types, and local conditions gathered from a wide range of
sources. The informational uses to which space remote sensing data are
applied differ significantly. Some information functions, like intelli-
gence, domestic and foreign crop forecasting, or law enforcement, are
primarily for internal use by Federal agencies. Some applications, like
mapmaking, disaster warning, or weather forecasting., are provided as
public services. Other information functions, like mineral exploration,
support developments by the private sector. (C)
P. P1 V9
Approved For Release 200345 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100001-1
iN OFORN
 ?. 1 -4- jjGjr0=
X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/25 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100001-1
This complex matrix of regimes, requirements`, and products has led the
majority of the Phase II Task Force to identify a number of related
cross-cutting policy questions which pervade remote sensing programmatic
discussions. These deal with national security, data treatment, inter-
national involvement, private sector involvement, and future integration
possibilities. These are set forth below as a backdrop for the program
and management decisions under consideration. (U) 25X1 NSC
Data Treatment. Most federally acquired civil unclassified remote
sensing data, by tradition, policy, and law, have been supplied to date
as public services-i.e., available to anyone at the cost of reproduction
and freely disseminated domestically and internationally. As operational
civil systems become more sophisticated, the political and economic
values of these data will increase significantly. No policy framework
relates the value of data for a particular beneficiary to the cost of
its acquisition, processing, or dissemination. If data are to be treated
as "property" or as a commodity, changes in law and policy would be
necessary. (U)
If data are to continue to be supplied as public services, regulator
mechanisms will be required to protect civil data from misuse or exploi-
tation inimical to overall U.S interests. (U)
International Involvement. Remote sensing from space is inherently
global and therefore has international implications. U.S. civil remote
sensing programs--both R&D and operational--have generally benefited
from international participation and interest. Open U.S. civil space
programs have gained international support for a variety of U.S. positions
in different arenas. Countries that share in U.S. data have supported
the U.S. in international forums where freedom of action for U.S. space
programs is at stake. Foreign contributions of instruments to U.S.
spacecraft have provided dollar benefits to U.S. programs. (U)
Approved For Release 200 SET IA-RDP83M001 71 R0023001 00001 -1
W
 -)- Ho to
Approved For Release 2003/04/25 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100001-1
These benefits have been achieved at a certain cost. Foreign countries
have capitalized on U.S. space segment investments at a small-fraction
of the U.S. costs. Some have developed selective competitive positions
in both space and ground technologies, threatening U.S. leadership and
potential markets. An issue such as "open dissemination" versus "prior
consent" allows nations to exercise leverage on U.S. civil programs
through their ability to forward or retard U.S. interests in international
forums. The balance between U.S. national and international interests
in remote sensing will always remain dynamic. U.S. policies must
accommodate evolving national program objectives and shifting international
priorities; an example would be the U.S. support of internationalized
remote sensing. (C)
Private Sector Involvement. The Private Sector Involvement Study--based
on a survey of private firms and individuals outside the Federal Govern-
ment--concluded that the present market risks are such that private
industry will not assume a significant role in civil remote sensing
operations without guarantees against loss. These guarantees include
combinations of financial subsidy, monopoly,. data ownership, and product
selectivity. Administration policy supports a larger and more independent
private sector role in remote sensing. While security, data management,
and international questions must be addressed on a continuing basis, the
private sector is being encouraged to invest in, and share the risks and
profits of, civil remote sensing operations. Given current industry
proposals under development, an expanded role that includes provision of
specialized services to particular markets appears the most feasible in
the near future. (U)
Future Integration Possibilities. One approach to integration focused
on combining military and civil instrumentation on a minimum number of
spacecraft. This has difficult management and policy implications.
Another approach would be an institutional integration of all civil
operational remote sensing within a single Federal service agency (which
could also be the civil component in joint or coordinated programs with
the military). Given sufficient visibility, stature, and budgetary
recognition, such an organization could manage the operational data
acquisition, preprocessing, and initial distribution functions for all
regimes and users. Because no one agency today is responsible for all
space remote sensing data and information, the selected agency would
have to respond to the priority and policy direction of the authoritative
executive program Board suggested in each of the options papers. The
consolidation of all civil remote sensing within a single civil Cabinet
Department could lead to improved coordination among the involved sectors
and to the further integration of requirements and systems. Multiple
responsibilities for individual civil operational systems, on the other
hand, would preserve separation and might hamper integration. (U)
*The Interior Task Force Representative believes that meteorological and
oceanographic satellite activities could be managed by a combination
military and civil agencies but that terrestrial observations should be
conducted solely by a civil agency.
Approved For Release
125 : CIA-RDP83M00171 R002300100001-1
 Approved For Release 2003/04/25 : CIA-Rl
II. POLAR METEOROLOGICAL SATELLITE PROGRAM OPTIONS
(See polar meteorological satellite options paper prepared by the
Interagency Task Force on Integrated Remote Sensing Systems, dated July
13, 1979 and distributed by the National Security Staff Secretary on
July 27, 1979.) (U)
Approved For Release 2003/04/25: CIA-RDSE P1R002300100001-1
1`070=
 NOFOBR
Approved For Release 2003/04/25 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100001-1
III. OCEAN OBSERVATION SATELLITE MANAG IENT OPTIONS
A. ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
How should the United States proceed with the development and management
of space oceanography? (U)
B. BACKGROUND
Task. PD/NSC-42 directed, in relation to a proposed National Oceanic
Satellite System (NOSS), that "the Policy Review Committee (Space) will
assess the policy implications of combining civil and military programs
as part of this process." In relation to study of an integrated remote
sensing system, PD/NSC-42 directed NASA to "chair an interagency task
force to examine options for integrating current and future potential
systems into an integrated national system. This review will cover
technical, programmatic,. . . ., and institutional arrangements." (U)
Current Program. NOAA, NASA, and DOD have been flying ocean observing
instruments on experimental and operational satellites for years, e.g.,
on the TIROS, NIMBUS, GEOS, NOAA and DMSP series. The infrared radiometers
on NOAA series provide information on the sea surface temperatures in
cloud-free areas which has been used by NOAA to prepare maps of oceanic
fronts and major circulation patterns in the Great Lakes and the ocean.
DOD has developed techniques for direct preparation of sea surface
temperature maps from the IR data obtained from the DMSP. The altimeter
on GEOS-3 has provided a definite datum on sea surface height; and the
color scanner and scanning radiometer on NIMBUS have had practical
application. DOD is pursuing design work on a four-channel passive
microwave imager to be flown for experiemental purposes on a DMSP
satellite. (U)
Instruments of most of these types and a synthetic aperture radar were
combined on the NASA experimental Seasat oceanographic satellite to
confirm their utility for making systematic oceanographic observations.
Canada and the European Space Agency operated direct reception stations
under MOU's resulting from their proposals to NASA. ALthough the
satellite failed a few months after launch, data analysis has confirmed
the utility of the instrument complement. (U)
In the fall of 1977, the interagency Program Review Board convened a
tri-agency (NASA-DOD-DOC) group to evaluate what steps should follow
Seasat. Fundamental to the task is the agreed list of deficiencies in 25X
our national capability:
Approved For Release 2003/04CJRDP83M00171R002300100001-1
NOFOf
 Horwa
Approved For Release 2003/04/25 : CIA-RDP83M00l71 R002300100001-1
To address these needs, the group defined a tri-agency limited operational
demonstration program, National Oceanic Satellite System (NOSS), which all
three agencies proposed for start in FY 1980, and will propose again. The
Office of Management and Budget deferred the program and subsequently
requested reviews of reduced cost configurations and alternative cost-sharing
arrangements, which were conducted by the tri-agency management team and
provided to the integrated remote sensing task force. For the purpose of
discussion of issues the NOSS proposed in FY 1980 will be used. It is
outlined as follows:
25X1
NSC
The ground segment task to design, develop, and demonstrate a
centralized operational primary data processing and distribution
capability that meets the user requirements. (U)
The proposed schedule has a five-year development and installation
period, followed by five years of service demonstration; the
decision to commit to service continuity beyond the demonstration
period would be made after three years of experience in meeting
practical user needs. (U)
A tri-agency joint project management structure is implementing
the development and acquisition activities, for which NASA will
serve as system integrator. Once on-orbit operations begin, it
is planned for the responsibility to shift to a joint DOC-DOD
(NOAA-USN) spacecraft operations, data processing and distribution
management team. (U)
Each participating agency would budget for NOSS according to an
agreed 10-year plan that allocates responsibility for specific
elements during the five years of development and five of operation.
(U)
Approved For Release 2003/ R ,-RDP83M00171R002300100001-1
E; T
PIM
 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/25 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100001-1
Approved For Release 2003/04/25 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100001-1
 NOZOB
Approved For Release 2003/04/25 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100001-1
C. KEY CONSIDERATIONS
Implementation Goals. Requirements have been identified for precise and
timely data on ocean properties. In the long term at least portions of
these data will probably require classification for national security
reasons. The initial steps represented by the demonstration phase-like
the planned NOSS-must be taken so that any transition to an operational
system is economical and effective. (C)
Policy Framework. There is no ongoing operational space oceanography
program. A program-specific policy framework has not developed to the
same extent it has in the meteorological area, although the same basic
policy structure (Presidential Directives, legislation, and treaties) is
broadly applicable.
1. "The United States will maintain current responsibility and
management relationships among the sectors focused on civil,
defense, and national intelligence objectives." PD/NSC-37 (C)
2. "The United States will pursue space. activities to increase
scientific knowledge, develop useful civil applications of
space technology, and maintain United States leadership in
space. PD/NSC-37 (U)
3. "The United States will conduct international cooperative
space-related activities that are beneficial to the United States
scientifically, politically, economically, and/or militarily."
PD/NSC-37 (U)
3. "Close coordination, cooperation, and information exchange
will be maintained among the space sectors to avoid unnecessary
duplication and to allow maximum cross-utilization, in compliance
with security and policy guidance, of all capabilities."
PD/NSC-37 (U)
25X1
NSC
6. "Data and results from the civil space programs will be provided
the widest practical dissemination, except where specific exceptions
defined by legislation, Executive Order, or directive apply."
PD/NSC-37 (C)
7. "The United States will conduct those activities in space which
25X1
NSC
are necessary to national defense.
Approved For Release 2003/04/25 : C M00171R002300100001-1
25X1
NOFORN
 Noyp
Approved For Release 2003/04/25 : CIA-RDP8 00171R002300100001-1
8. "....activities peculiar to or primarily-associated with the
development of weapon systems, military operations, or defense of
the United States.... shall be the responsibility of and directed
by the Department of Defense...."; NASA shall conduct civil space
R&D. Space Act (U)
9.
25X1
NSC
Congressional Interests. Success in multi-agency budgeting requires an
Administration commitment to a long-term effort, and full Congressional
understanding and acceptance of joint program principles. Reaction to
date in the Congress has been favorable. (U)
User Interests. Lacking specific declarations to the contrary, both
the domestic and international communities would expect any follow-on
activities to conform to the R&D pattern of open data, essentially free
data services, and international participation. The manner in which these
expectations should be treated in the space oceanography program is a
significant policy issue which must be faced in the implementation of a
program like NOSS. (U)
A unique characteristic of spacecraft oceanography today is the absence
of differences in the data and operational demonstration requirements of
the user communities--both civil and military. This unanimity of purpose
should lead to perceptions. of the programs quite different from those that
are obtained in the meteorological and terrestrial areas. (U) 25X1 NSC
Approved For Release 2003/04/25: CIA-RDP83 ELI .
I Nor
 t l
Approved For Release 2003/04/25: CIA-RDP83MO~b~'11R002300100001-1
International Considerations. Foreign participation could involve:
direct reception of data from the satellites; transmission of data
through a relay from the U.S.; and/or provision-of foreign components on
U.S. spacecraft. Foreign participation may be valuable for technical as
well as for foreign policy purposes. (U)
The mixing of civil and military programs as in other areas of remote
sensing can be expected to give rise to some international reaction.
That reaction should be manageable to the extent that there are opportunities
for obtaining the unclassified data and for international participation. (C)
Pricing Considerations. Unclassified data could be made available on a
non-discriminatory basis worldwide. Price of the data should be determined
by the appropriate reviewing board. (U)
D. ALTERNATIVES
There are two major decision areas affecting the eventual establishment
of an operational oceanographic remote sensing system: the configuration
of the space segment, and the management of the satellite oceanography
program. (U)
Configuration of the Space Segment. Two options appear viable and were
discussed in the Phase I report. The first option is based on a separate,
dedicated spacecraft for the operational demonstration; the second is the
integration of the oceanic system with the operational polar meteorological
satellites. (U)
Option 1. Dedicated Spacecraft
This is the option outlined as NOSS above. Briefly, a near-polar orbiting,
shuttle launched spacecraft would carry an array of sensors in an orbit
chosen to maximize the utility of the data for the purposes listed in
Table 1. The program would take maximum advantage of instrument and
spacecraft technology already developed for programs such as Seasat,
Nimbus, and others. (U)
Advantages
Provides operational independence from other programs,
thus affording the greatest flexibility for pursuing the
demonstration objectives. (U)
Permits th'e selection of the orbit which provides the best
coverage of the ocean and the greatest accuracy of observations
for meeting the oceanic objectives. (U)
Has least program technical risk and cost uncertainty, since
it is not as complex a spacecraft development as would be
necessary for the integrated approach. (U)
Does not impact the reliability and continuity of the operational
METSAT program due to introduction of new technology on a demon-
stration basis. (U)
SECRET
Approved For Release 2003/04/25: CIA-RDREMMMM 1 R002300100001-1
 Approved For Release 2003A 25 : CIA-
Dis9advantages
Correlation of the oceanic data with related data from the
separate meteorological satellites would be more difficult
because of the different orbits and data coverage times. (U)
May have increased costs. (U)
Option 2. Integration with the Polar-Orbiting Meteorological Satellite
The Phase I study concluded that the principal extant requirements for
both atmospheric and oceanic observations could be met with a judicious
selection of instruments aboard a constellation of three satellites
designed for a fully converged METSAT system, plus a new, free-flying,
microwave radiometer satellite. This total system would cost some $900
million for the space segment in the period from FY 1981 to FY 1992,
implying a saving of. an additional $86 million over what could be
realized by converging only the meteorological instruments. (U)
Advantages
There may be some cost saving; the amount is uncertain. (U)
Synergism in the use of data from the oceanic and meteorological
sensors would be increased for some applications. (U)
- Technical integration forces management and system integration. (U)
Disadvantages
The technical risks would be higher. (U)
-- Integration of the oceanic demonstration program with the
operational meteorological program could have negative conse
quences for both. (The meteorological program, requires the
prescribed, reliable delivery of services to users; these
services could be disrupted by the demonstration program using
the postulated new technology. (U)
-- A merger of the oceanic satellite with the meteorological
satellites could destroy some flexibility required to complete
the development of an oceanic satellite capability. (U)
-- The orbit selected would be a compromise between the oceanic
and meteorological requirements. Assuming that the orbit would
have the same inclination as the present meteorological satellites,
then both the measurement of ocean currents and the mapping of
polar ice would suffer. (U)
-- Mandates the immediate development of all new spacecraft within
tight deadlines. (U)
Management Options. If the decision is made to integrate the oceanic
and meteorological satellites as detailed above, the management arrange-
ment should be determined in consonance with the decision regarding
management of the polar orbiting meteorological satellites. If the
decision is for dedicated spacecraft for the future oceanic operational
demonstration phase, then the management options are as follows:
Approved For Release 2003/04/25 : CIA 00171R002300100001-1- ,
 -13- No1OI
Approved For Release 2003/04/25 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100001-1
Option 1. Joint DOD-DOC-NASA Management
Under this approach, a joint DOD-DOC-NASA management organization would
be established to design, develop, procure, operate, and task the ocean
satellite space and ground segments. Supporting research and space develop-
ment and procurement would be tasked from the joint office to NASA,
either with or without reimbursement. The management organization would
take the form of a joint office staffed by all three agencies. To
assure adequate policy review, there should be a Policy Committee
composed of a senior official from each of the involved agencies (e.g.,
State, Defense, Commerce, DCI, and NASA) chaired by the member from one
of the principal funding agencies. The Committee would forward unresolved
issues to the PRC(S) for policy consideration. Its operations would not
affect the established informational, resource management, or regulatory
responsibilities of the user community and agencies. Budgeting would be
divided among DOD, DOC, and NASA. (U)
Advantages
Reduces the pressure to establish duplicative oceanic systems
to serve civil and military requirements. (U)
Provides a broader interagency consumer/user forum for data
service requirements. (U)
Preserves the option for future further integration of remote
sensing functions under joint management in the future. (U)
Builds on the momentum established in the NOSS planning. (U)
Serves as a useful test of interagency remote sensing program
management, as encouraged in PD/NSC-42. (U)
If present internation cooperation and data policies applicable
to terrestrial and atmospheric observations were applied here,
this would not cause unmanageable foreign reactions. (U)
Disadvantages
-- Requires a new and complex interagency management and budget
structure for both the civil and military communities. (U)
-- Might reduce responsiveness of the overall system to its user. (U)
Funding priority decisions in any year by any one agency or
its respective Congressional authorization or appropriation
Committees could put the entire program in jeapardy. (U)
Approved For Release 2003/04/2.5 J D
P83M00171R002300100001-1
E
NOFOXt'd
 Approved For Release 2003/04/25 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100001-1
Option 2. Single. Agency Management
Under this approach, there are two sub-options: either DOC or DOD would
be selected to fund, develop; procure, and demonstrate a single oceanic
satellite system for the U.S., responsive to all national interests.
The selected operating agency (DOD or DOC) would establish an inter-
agency advisory board (representing State, DOC, DOD, DCI, NASA) to
assure that external requirements are understood and that the system is
responsive to other than the operator's requirements. Trade-offs and
operational constraints that affect an agency's requirements would be
appealed by the concerned agency head to the PRC(S) for resolution. (U)
Advantages
-- Streamlines budgetary, development, procurement, and management
activities through centralization in a single agency. (U)
-- If present international cooperation and data policies applicable
to meteorological and terrestrial observations were applied here,
this alternative should not cause unmanageable foreign reaction.
(U)
Disadvantages
Requires a potentially adversary interagency coordination
structure to assure lead agency understanding of external
requirements and encourages conflict between the lead agency
and the others (excessive claims for service from agencies
not required to pay for them, and valid complaints of non-
responsiveness). (U)
Places either DOD or DOC in the role of developing and
operating systems for another sector, which might require
changes in policy and law. (U)
Either the DOD or DOC managed configuration would forego
the opportunity to demonstrate successful merging of civil
and military interests in oceanography. (U)
D. OTHER ISSUES
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/04/20mfP83M00171R002300100001-1
V070= I
 Nor=
Approved For Release 2003/04/25 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100001-1
T ~TT
Approved For Release 2003/04/2583M00171R002300100001-1
Iv'OFOF
25X1
 .4%J? t^..ii 4
Approved For Release 2003/04/25 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100001-1
IV. CIVIL TERRESTRIAL OBSERVATION SATELLITE MANAGEMENT OPTIONS
A. ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
How should the Administration implement its commitments to continuity of
terrestrial remote sensing data through the 1980's and to moving toward
an eventual operational civil earth resources system? (U)
B. BACKGROUND
Administration Commitment. PD/NSC-42, policy statements and testimony
by Presidential spokesmen, and the President's message to Congress on
science and technology document this Administration's commitment to
continuity of data and to an eventual, as yet undefined, operational
system. This commitment builds on statements made by each President for
the past fifteen years underlining that U.S. civil earth observing
systems are for the benefit of all the people of the world. (U)
Study Results. The technical and cost study of potential remote sensing
system integration (Phase I) examined the feasibility of incorporating
sensing functions into platforms supporting atmospheric, environmental,
terrestrial, and oceanic functions within a relatively specific set of
orbital constraints and technical configuration assumptions. The high
technical risks led to the conclusion that this level of technical
integration should not be pursued. The Phase I study concluded that
system management assignments and institutional issues have to be
resolved before integration at any level could be successful. Terrestrial
remote sensing for civil purposes, therefore, will be treated as a
separate program function with emphasis on operational systems management
and the transition from R&D. (U)
The study of selective declassification of photoreconnaisance imagery in
order to serve civil user data needs has shown that a number of civil
requirements could benefit significantly from easy access to repetitive
and non-repetitive high resolution terrestrial photography. If this
photography were unclassified, the number of beneficial uses would
increase greatly. However, the security programs are overtaxed by their
existing requirements. Declassification of reconnaissance imagery
alone--without providing for additional civil tasking of classified
space systems--would only be marginally useful since the major emphasis
of the photoreconnaissance programs is on the collection of intelligence,
in contrast to the civil community's emphasis on U.S. and global repetitive
coverage. This review underlines the potential civil values of high
quality, high resolution imagery collected in response to civil needs.
(SINE)
Approved For Release 2003/04/25: WQW3MOO1 71 R0023001 00001-1
JOPOB
 Approved For Release 2003/04/25 : CIA-tBP
The study has been completed of possible approaches to increasing private
sector involvement and investment in the ownership and operation of civil
terrestrial remote sensing systems. It leads to the conclusions that the
private commercial sector is not yet ready or willing to take the capital
investment and market risks inherent in a remote sensing system without
significant and possibly continuing economic protections--government
subsidy, market guarantee, or controlled monopoly. It also concluded
that the more integrated the civil terrestrial data services become
with other civil and military remote sensing systems, the less probability
there is of eventual independent private sector systems. The importance
of holding open the possibility of private sector involvement was noted
by avoiding the premature establishment of stringent criteria for such
participation. The designation of a lead Federal agency responsible for
exploring means for further private sector participation was recommended.
(U)
Current NASA R&D Programs. Since 1972, experimental polar-orbiting
Landsats have been providing routine repetitive (18-day) synoptic
(185 km swath width) multispectral data coverage of the globe at an
Instantaneous Field of View (IFOV) of 80 meters from the multispectral
scanner (MSS) and, now, 40 meters from the panchromatic return beam
vidicon. Data can be both stored onboard for later readout to U.S.
ground stations and read out directly in real time to cooperating
foreign-owned ground stations around the world. Data collected by
U.S. stations are available in digital tape or processed image form
from Interior's EROS Data Center at essentially the cost of reproduction.
Data acquired by foreign stations are publicly available under similar
pricing policies. Currently, foreign participants pay $200,000 per
year for direct reception of Landsat data within the receiving range
of each ground station; seven such stations in six countries are
currently operation, with nine. more expected to be added by 1985.
In 1982, a new Landsat-D experimental satellite will carry, in addition
to the MSS, a seven channel Thematic Mapper (TM) with an IFOV of 30
meters. All Landsat-D data will be collected in the U.S. via the
commercial Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS). There
will also be provision for local direct readout from the MSS and TM
instruments to cooperating foreign ground stations which can receive
either or both. Current plans are to develop a higher resolution
pointable multispectral experimental instrument capable of providing
sample areas of repetitive stereo data for merging with MSS and TM
data for 1985 test flights on the Shuttle or on a satellite. (U)
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/04 ?51 RDP83MOO171R002300100001-1
 Approved For Release 2003/04/25 : CWQ 3M00171R002300100001-1
Remotely acquired data serve a large and diverse population of experi-
mental and operational users. Experimental space data are currently
being used operationally for global agricultural assessments,
land use classification, geological reconnaissance, and pollution
assessments by both the Government and private industry. The most
significant differences between the experimental program and an opera-
tional effort lie in rapid, timely, economical delivery to the user of
usable data products. Current experimental program capabilities do
not provide rapid operational service and reliability or protection
against single point breakdown. (U)
The existing approved and funded civil experimental program does
not provide for assured data continuity through the 1980's. The
presently operating Landsat 2 and 3 spacecraft are expected to cease
operations by 1981. Since Landsat-D will not be launched until early
1982, a data continuity gap can be expected. Landsat-D is expected to
operate until 1985; a backup spacecraft is being built, but has not
been approved for launch. except in the case of an early failure of
Landsat-D. The question of experimental continuity will be taken up
in the FY 1981 budget process. (U)
C. CHARACTERISTICS OF AN OPERATIONAL SYSTEM
Responsiveness to User Requirements for Data. Even when aggregated
and prioritized, civil user data requirements show a wide range of
diversity in terms of frequency of coverage (daily to annually),
spatial resolution (5 to 100 meters IFOV), areal coverage (10 km2
to the globe), spectral response (UV through visible to thermal IR),
and delivery time (hours to months). The detailed requirements
analysis undertaken in the Phase I study suggests that a selected
combination of satellite.instruments--MSS, TM, pointable imager,
film camera, and imaging radar-would meet almost all the data
requirements identified by the user community, both public and
private. However, an initial operational system configuration in
the late '80's would have to be based upon proven as opposed to
experimental space and user technologies. (U)
Approved For Release 2003/04/25 S I83M00171 R002300100001-1
1iO7OP
25X1 -
 Approved For Release 2003/04/25 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100001-1
Management for Multiple User Communities. Given the multiplicity of
users, the management of an operational system. must maintain a continuing
inventory of data requirements and balance competing demands. This
requires a willingness to consider changes while providing stability and
avoiding domination by any single use or user. Whether the system is
operated by a Federal agency or by some form of commercial enterprise
with Federal support, it needs a stable budget or source of funds.
Division of responsibilities for the system between organizations may
lead to loss of system integrity. (U)
Growth Potential. An operational earth observations program may start
with a system derived from the Landsat experience. Additional tech-
nologies, both space and ground, can be brought on line incrementally as
the utility and importance of other sensors are demonstrated. (U)
Agreed Cost/Price Structure. The "operational" concept for land programs
has frequently carried the. connotation that the data can be treated as
a commodity whose sale to users-will pay for the entire system. Although
this may be a desirable goal which eventually could be attained, it is
not a precondition for an operational system. Recovery of total costs
may not be reconcilable with the "public good." Many Federal agencies
make various types of data and information available as a "public good."
Therefore, established prices are designed to recoup only a portion of
their costs. Earth observation data could, initially, be treated in the
same way. At the same time,. an effective operational system must clearly
inform each user of the real costs of meeting functional requirements.
Only in this way can institutionally approved data requirements be kept
realistic. Whether those costs are borne totally by the users or are
wholly or partially borne by the Federal Government, there needs to be a
simplified means of assessing the cost of the data a user consumes.
Data pricing, on the other hand, is a separate and deferrable policy
issue. How the sale prices of data reflect actual costs will need to be
determined on the basis of social, political and economic criteria. (U)
D. KEY CONSIDERATIONS
Current Policy Framework. While no formal or traditional body of
policy specifically focused on operational civil terrestrial observation
systems has been enunciated, Presidential Directives, law and Congressional
actions, treaties, and agreements provide some guidlines for establishing
the balance among possibly conflicting program and policy requirements
of an operational civil remote sensing service. (U)
25X1 i.
NSC
Approved For Release 2003/04/25 : CI, -~-R83M00171R002300100001-1
 N0 'O .
Approved For Release 2003/04/25 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100001-1
2. "Data and results from the civil space programs will be provided
the widest practical dissemination, except where specific exceptions
defined by legislation,-Executive Order, or directive apply."
PD/NSC-37 (U)
3.
25X1
NSC
4. "The United States shall encourage domestic commercial exploitation
of space capabilities and systems for economic benefit and to
promote the technological position of the United States, except
that all United States earth-oriented remote sensing satellites
will require United States Government authorization and supervison
or regulation." PD/NSC-37 (U)
5. "The United States shall conduct civil space programs. . . to
develop and operate civil applications of space technology; to
maintain U.S. leadership in space science, applications, and
technology; and to further United States domestic foreign
policy objectives." PD/NSC-37 (U)
6. "NASA and Commerce jointly will be the contacts for the private
sector on this matter (private sector involvement in remote
sensing) and will analyze proposals received before submitting
them to the Policy Review Committee (Space) for consideration
and action." PD/NSC-42 (U)
25X17
NSC
Congressional Interest. In recent months,.both the majority and
minority parties in the Senate have again proposed U.S. operational
terrestrial observation programs that bear significantly on the
alternatives discussed in Section IV:
Senator Schmitt's Bill (S.657) calls for the creation of
a publicly owned, Federally chartered, profit-making corporation
under FCC regulation to "serve the needs of the U.S. and other
countries." (U)
Approved For Release 2003/04/25: CIA-1t9P!100171R002300100001-1
 rOF01~
Approved For Release 2003/04/25 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100001-1
-- Senator Stevenson's Bill (5.663) calls-for-an immediate
declaration of operational status (starting with Landsat)
under initial Federal (NASA) management with a seven-year
demonstration period after which an ultimate Federal or
private operator would be selected by the President. (U)
An Administration move toward an operational terrestrial observation
program might obviate Congressionally directed action. (U)
User Interests. Several classes of users of terrestrial remote sensing
data have evolved over the past decade that need to be recognized in the
next steps toward operational service. Currently, the major users of
experimental earth resources data are various Federal and state govern-
ment agencies. Foreign users and commercial domestic users follow in
that order. All projections agree that the Federal agencies are likely
to remain the largest volume consumers of such data for the forseeable
future. (U)
A growing class of data consumers are the private sector "value added"
procesors--those companies that create saleable products from data. This
user class responds to perceived information needs of a broad range of
potential public and private customers and should therefore be recognized
in the establishment of an operational system. (U)
International Considerations Because of tape recorder unreliability,
the desire to promote international acceptance of U.S. remote sensing
activities and encourage worldwide evaluation of data utility, foreign.
participation was an inherent part of the initial Landsat experiment.
Open Landsat data availability has been an important element in main-
taining the U.S. position supporting the unimpeded right to collect data
from space without prior permission of the sensed state. (At present,
many non-western states support a concept of prior consent for data
dissemination.) To date, a.dozen nations have invested in their own
ground stations and many more are using experimental Landsat data operation-
ally whether acquired from direct readout stations or from U.S. archival
sources. Direct reception of data by foreign stations from an operational
system--whether Federally or privately managed-would encourage continued
foreign acceptance of U.S. remote sensing satellite activities. In
addition, such stations would provide a backup for. U.S. data collection
activities and would provide the potential for foreign sharing of U.S.
operational system costs through increased station access fees. An
effort directed toward elimination of foreign direct readout access
would, on the other hand, result in serious international reactions. If
it is felt necessary to protect the direct readout data stream from
unauthorized interception and acquisition, commercial coding techniques
could be used with decoding keys provided to participants. This approach
would probably be acceptable to foreign users provided they had access
to the key on non-discriminatory terms. (C)
Approved For Release 2003/04/25 : CIA-RDP 3M0O'1:' R002300100001-1
.Or01
 Z; Or OR'q
Approved For Release 2003/04/25 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100001-1
Competition to U.S. leadership in civil remote sensing technology and
services is growing. France is developing the SPOT satellite which,
after launching in 1984, will acquire 10-and 20-meter IFOV data. Japan
and ESA (with support from France and Germany) are planning additional
earth survey satellite programs for the 1985-1990 period. Canada is
discussing participation (possibly through a hardware contribution) in
both the French and ESA programs. The USSR has flown a multispectral
earth resources camera, developed by the German Democratic Republic, and
has offered to acquire data for other countries. These foreign remote
sensing satellite programs represent a challenge to U.S. space technology
leadership, to the U.S. commercial leadership (in the ground and data
processing and analysis hardware areas), and to U.S. prestige abroad
(particularly in developing countries where Landsat data are considered
highly useful). (U)
Most of the countries operating or committed to funding Landsat ground
stations are also planning to upgrade their facilities in order to
receive and process data from the Thematic Mapper on Landsat-D. An
unresolved issue which could affect these plans stems from export
control concerns associcated with the sale of U.S. Thematic Mapper
ground station equipment. If these concerns remain unresolved, they
could lead to: adverse international reactions; the forced development
of indigenous European, Canadian and Japanese capabilities; and the
associated loss of U.S. hardware markets. (C)
In the past several years, a number of proposals have been advanced to
establish an internationally-managed operational remote sensing system
under UN or separate international agency auspices. While this concpet
would be well received by the UN and many developing countries, it would
not be in the interest of either the U.S. or other space segment operator
nations. It would affect U.S. flexibility to optimize for national
objectives. Accordingly, the U.S. has argued in the UN and other forums
against any efforts to pursue such a possibility. At the same time, and
recognizing the inevitability of foreign remote sensing satellites,
bilateral discussions are being undertaken with France, ESA and Japan
which are aimed at encouraging these countries to make their satellite
orbits, downlinks and data formats compatible with those of U.S. systems.
These discussions are designed to preserve U.S. flexibility in establishing
its operational earth resources system, to defuse potential criticism
from other users over the prospect of incompatible satellite systems,
and to preserve the options for possible future, nationally operated,
complementary and mutually beneficial remote sensing satellites. (U)
Approved For Release 2003/04/25 :
 NOPORN?
Aooraverl Far Release 9003104195 ? CIA-RI1PR311A00171 8009300010000 -1
E. ALTERNATIVES
There are three areas of decision to consider in the process of
moving toward a civil operational system: (1) The selection of the
Federal management mechanism to plan and execute the next steps;
(2) The scope and extent of private sector involvement to be sought;
and (3) The range of international participation desired in an
operational program. Of these, the selection of a Federal mechanism
is by far the most critical and is treated first in some depth. (U)
Federal Management.'lechaiiisms. Whether the Federal Government manages
a civil terrestrial observation space system in the operational phase
or eventually transfers it to another sector, there is a requirement
for an initial Federal program management structure and for a con-
tinuing Federal goordination and regulation. A Federal charter must
include meeting the institutionally approved priority data requirements
of the entire civil community--public, private, and international.
A key mechanism that applies to any of the alternatives outlined below
is the establishment of an interagency, inter-sector Program Board.
The Board would include representatives from the involved Federal
organizations (e.g., EOP, DOS, DOD, DOI, DOA, DOC, DOT, DOE, AID,
DCI, EPA, NASA). Organizations such as the National Governor's
Association and the National Conference of State Legislatures would
Approved For Release 2003/04/25: CIA-RDP8 IE j002300100001-1
117
 ir0~ Ot'i~
Approved For Release 2003/04/25 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100001-1
also be involved. The role of the Board,__chaired by a senior Federal
official from the lead agency or selected by the President, would be to
oversee the management of'the overall program with particular emphasis
on: (1) The aggregation and inventory of approved requirements; (2) The
prioritization of data services; (3) The provision to user agencies and
NASA of R&D guidance; (4) The maintenance of working interfaces with
military and other program data sources useful to the civil community;
and (5) Interagency/intersector coordination and information exchange.
The Board would forward unresolved issues to the PRC(S) for policy
consideration. Its operations would not affect the established infor-
mation, resource management, or regulatory responsibilities of the user
community and agencies. (U)
The three broad choices of an executive agent for the operational
program responsive to the Board are:
A new Federal organization;
o A joint multiagency approach; or
o An existing organization as lead agency.
Whichever is selected, there appear to be some basic characteristics. and
conditions that apply to all. The executive agent would clearly have to
have stature and visibility commensurate with the service responsibilities
of an operational service activity. It would have a defined budget for
its functions. Its initial responsibility would be to develop a time-
phased transition and operating plan covering: (1) The establishment of
the Board; (2) The organization for system management and regulation;
(3) The system financing approach; (4) The development of a technical
program; (5) The establishment of private and international participation
approaches; and (6) The identification of implementation actions such as
the executive orders and legislation required to establish authorities,
transfer functions, and staff the activity. The executive agent would
make maximum use of U.S. industry as a supplier and contract operator to
hold down Federal staffing. Existing Federal capabilities--launch vehicles,
data relays, and data centers--would be used instead of developing new
facilities. Federal organizations--NASA, DOD, and others--would be
tasked and reimbursed for development and procurement activities. (U)
option 1. New Federal Agency
Under this approach, a new independent agency reporting to the President
would be established by legislation for the purpose of implementing an
operational terrestrial observation program. The Board would take the
lead in proposing appropriate legislation to create such an entity. (U)
Approved For Release 2003/04/25 : Cl~tii.i3M00171R002300100001-1
0,10
 Approved For Release 2003/04/26 TA-RD A1711 002300100001-1
Advantages. Creation of a new agency would be a highly visible dramatic
political commitment to the importance placed by the Administration on
such program objectives as global information, effective management of
diminishing resources and international cooperation. A new agency might
be perceived to have no vested interest in a particular technical or
management approach. (U)
operator experience may reduce responsiveness and efficiency. (U)
taken in a negative light. Proposed legislation might be subject to
considerable delay, changes, or redirection. The absence of any user or
become effective. Proliferation of the Federal establishment may be
expensive routes. A new agency takes time, money, and personnel to
Disadvantages. The same advantage could be achieved by other less
Option 2. Joint Multiagency Activity
Under this approach, the Board would, under a Chairman selected by the
President, employ more tan one executive agent for program implementation.
For example, NASA would be responsible for space system definition and
acquisition, NOAA for space segment operations, and Interior for ground
data handling and dissemination. The Board would provide an overall
integrative management function, while each agency would budget for and
manage its allocated program function. (U)
Advantages. This approach appears to be the least perturbing to existing
agency and department organizational structures, relying as it does on
existing expertise without new staffing. It might be the most rapid way
to begin, leaving open future options for institutional streamlining.
It could provide for added specialized services by incorporating additional
agencies, as required by new demands. It could be established without
new organic legislation.. (U)
fund sources and the numerous Congressional Committees involved. (U)
bilities. The system's budget would be vulnerable because of the multiple
system performance, thereby interfering with the agencies' own responsi-
day-to-day management control over several agencies to assure smooth
the probability of conflicts. The Board would have to exercise detailed
agent, responsibility, thereby diluting accountability and increasing
by the Board. System architecture would be a Board, rather than executive
ment. Substantial new staff and financial resources would be required
a new interagency agency, and creates a very complex management arrange-
Disadvantages. Under this approach, the Board becomes, de facto,
T
Approved For Release 2003/04/25 : CIA- W 71 R002300100001-1
.A J
 Approved For Release 2003/04/25 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100001-1
Option 3. Lead Agency
Under this approach, one of the four agencies--NASA, DOI, DOC, or DOA-
with applicable terrestrial observation systems experience would be
selected as the program's executive agent under Board oversight. (U)
Advantages. NASA has developed experimental remote sensing spacecraft
and ground data systems, including the Landsats, and is the developer
and procuring agent for NOAA's operational METSATs. NASA is used to
working with multiple user communities--domestic, foreign, military, and
civil-in terms of system specifications and operational services. NASA
has experience in both foreign participation and technology transfer to
the private sector. The NASA Congressional Committees wish to see an
operational system established and support an initial NASA management
role. As manager and operator of an existing experimental space segment,
NASA could effect a rapid transition to an operation system. (U)
Disadvantages. NASA does not want the assignment. The Space Act might
have to be amended to permit it. NASA has no operational experience in
ground data handling and dissemination. A major drawback of combining
within the same agency a prime R&D mission and service operations for
others is that one or the other tends to suffer in the management and
budget processes. The NASA R&D emphasis might bias the operational
system toward unneeded change and growth, increasing costs, and adversely
affecting dependent users. (U)
Interior
Advantages. Interior wants the assignment and would establish a program
management structure at the Departmental level. Interior's experience
in the use of space data for its own mapping. and resource management
functions involves all major Earth resources disciplines, and qualifies
the Department to understand and serve the needs of the diverse user
community, both domestic and foreign. The EROS Data Center (EDC) is the
major distributor of standard Landsat image and tape products and developmental
activities at IDC and the Center for Astrogeology have made Interior a
leader in digital image analysis techniques. The six Interior service
centers represent the largest part of the nation's civil capability to
convert satellite earth observation data to information products. The
EROS Program has established channels with other Bureaus in Interior,
other Federal agencies, state and local governments, and private sector
users (including formal liaison with the private sector Geosat Committee).
Interior works with other countries through the Geological Survey's
Office of International Geology and the Department's Office of International
Programs, through AID, the Inter-American Development Bank, and other
organizations. (U)
Approved For Release 2003/04/25 3M00171R002300100001-1
 V+r%*S 1100
NOYQ
Approved For Release 2003/04/25 : CIA-RDP83VI00171R002300100001-1
Disadvantages. Interior has no experience in spacecraft design, procure-
ment, or on-orbit management. As a major data user, Interior could feel
pressures to focus on its own needs for its own programs. Interior's
Congressional Committees have not had exposure to the front-end financing
requirements of major multi-user space systems. Interior's main responsi-
bility is widely perceived as the U.S. land area rather than the globe.
It would take time to bring the program into being. (U)
Commerce
Advantages. Within DOC, all civil operational satellite remote sensing
systems would be the responsibility of a single Federal agency, opti-
mizing technical expertise in providing data to the terrestrial,
meteorological, and oceanic user communities. The option for future
interdisciplinary civil system integration and for reducing costs
and improving services to all sectors, would be enhanced. DOC's
NOAA has successfully operated three generations of polar orbiting
meteorological satellites and two generations of geostationary
environmental satellites. NOAA has experience in system design and
secification, establishing major facilities for space operations,
on-orbit control of spacecraft, and data acquisition, processing,
archiving and dissemination. NOAA operates a global sensing system
which includes international dissemination of the data and foreign
contribution of subsystems to NOAA spacecraft. Responsibility for
an open terrestrial system is compatible with NOAA's present mode
of operation, including its geodetic and charting functions. NOAA
has established data servicing arrangements with user agencies,
notably, DOA, DOD, and DOT. The Commerce Congressional Committees
understand large, public service satellite systems with a strong
integration user component. (U)
Disadvantages. NOAA's main present responsibility lies in the
atmospheric and oceanic areas rather than in the terrestrial area.
Consequently, NOAA has less experience in dealing with the terrestrial
user community. If resources are inadequate, NOAA might feel pressures
to favor its oceanic and atmospheric responsibilities. Maintaining
institutional and programmatic diversity for civil remote sensing
activities may have a value which might be lost by placing all programs
in a single agency. (U)
Agriculture
Advantages. Agriculture would accept the assignment. Agriculture
is the largest single Federal user of land observation data and,
following the precedent established that primary users of meteoro-
logical satellite data (DOD, DOC) are operators of satellite systems,
Approved For Release 2003/04/25 : CIA gBP83M 0171 R002300100001-1
N0 'O
 Approved For Release 2003/04/25 : CIA-RDP8'31EOMR002300100001-1
would be an appropriate lead agency for civil terrestrial observation
space systems. If users are to pay for data,. Agriculture will have to
fund a significant portion of the system for the data products and might
well go to Congress for the total system funding. Agriculture is
testing, under operational conditions, procedures and methods for use of
space data. Agriculture has a research responsibility for global improve-
ment of decision-making in the agriculture and renewable resources
areas. Agriculture's requirements for repetitive data in near-real time
would make a system highly responsive to immediate user needs. Agriculture
has had experience in remote sensing programs, with emphasis on land
applications which can be transferred to space systems. The extensive
network of (County) extension services and Land Grant Universities
provides an established system to deliver data and information services
to a wide variety of users, as well as to expand the use of space-
acquired data. Agriculture's multi-faceted international activities
include assistance to foreign countries in use of space-acquired data.
(U)
Disadvantages. Agriculture has no experience in spacecraft design,
procurement, or on-orbit management. As a major data user, Agriculture
could feel pressures to focus on its own needs for its own programs.
Agriculture's Congressional Committees have not had exposure to the
front-end financing requirements of major multi-user space systems. It
would take time to bring the program into being. (U)
Whatever decisions are made on the Federal management role, there would
be a continuing emphasis on encourageing the proper involvement of the
private sector in operational terrestrial observations. At present, the
private sector serves as the government's principal industrial resource
for contracted hardware, software and operational support services.
Private industry is not ready at this time to assume full financial
responsibility for an operational civil terrestrial observations system
and would require substantial Federal subsidy in the form of guarantees,
monopoly, and liability limitations. Since the private sector is not
yet ready to enter this market on its own, the Federal executive agent
might take a variety of steps to-encourage different degrees and forms
of further private sector involvement, depending on external factors at
the time. For example, the private sector role in "value-added" pro-
cessing could be increased by discontinuing potentially competitive
government activities. Another example might be a possible joint
venture with private industry. Such an approach would require a con-
siderable industrial investment, but there would be an assurance of
economic viability because of the Federal partnership. Such an initial
partnership could eventually lead to an all-private system. One example
could be a privately owned ground segment supporting a Government
satellite; another could be a privately owned satellite supported by a
Government ground segment. Although these two examples are not issues
for decision at this time, they are discussed below. (U)
Approved For Release 2003/04/25: CIA-RD 0171 R002300100001-1
 Approved For Release 2003/04/25 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100001-1
Private Ownership of Ground Segment. Data processing and distribution
within a regulated framework reflecting a reasonable profit are well
within industrial competence-and experience. The opportunity for
marketing of specialized data products could be an added incentive for
industry to participate with the Government as a regulated partner.
While total costs to the Federal Government would not necessarily be
reduced, commercial data operations would reflect the real cost to each
user of his data consumption. Since this approach embodies certain
elements of current legislative proposals, it is likely to enjoy Con-
gressional support. (U)
On the other hand, a monopoly service to create an environment conductive
to private investment in a. major ground facility could result in domestic
and international data policy problems. Regulation and supervision by
the Federal partner could become burdensome, as would the problem of
data ownership through copyright or sales contracts. The need for Federal
subsidy in the ground segment would not result in major reductions of
the taxpayers' burden. (U)
Private Ownership of Space Segment. The aerospace industry is competent
to design, build, and operate an operational terrestrial acquisition
system under Federal regulation and supervision. This approach should
be fully fundable by the private sector and could benefit from the
efficiency and innovation resulting from periodic competition for the
government contracts. As such, it appears to cons.titute a viable first
step of private sector involvement while keeping overall system control
and tasking in government hands. With guarantees of direct readout,
this arrangement might meet with foreign acceptance even if access fees
approached commercial levels. It would also be likely to attract Con-
gressional support. (U)
On the other hand, this alternative would set up a private monopoly
which may be perceived as being against the public interest. As a
private system functioning under the authority and supervision of the
U.S. Government, it would require the establishment of a regulatory
structure and the development--for national security reasons--of standby
protection. The savings to the taxpayer may be limited, and commercial
rates, if passed on to the user, may price some public service users out
of the market. (U)
International Directions
It will be necessary to consider the role of international participation
in civil operational terrestrial observation program under whatever
Federal management approach is selected. There are varying degrees of
foreign participation, ranging from present levels to eventual options
for further internationalization in a UN or Intelsat mode. (U)
Approved For Release 2003/04/25 : CIA. 0d171R002300100001-1
 Approved For Release 2003/0%
The degree of international involvement in the program would have a
direct impact upon foreign attitudes toward all space activities. Outlined
below, in order of increasing foreign involvement, are the advantages
and disadvantages of some U.S. policy directions for foreign participation.
(U )
Level 1.
Assuring continued non-discriminatory access by foreign users to operational
earth remote sensing data. (U)
Advantages. This approach is consistent with our basic policy on open
access to civil data and demonstrates U.S. commitment to help developing
countries survey their resources. It retains flexibility to implement
open data policy in various ways in a future operational system. It
is consistent with national security and helps create an international
environment generally favorable to our space program. Adopting this
approach may provide a financial contribution to the cost of the pro-
gram. (U)
Disadvantages. It is not explicit with regard to the continued operation
of foreign ground station for Landsat data. This approach gives up some
flexibility to change our basic data policy. (U)
Level 2.
Assuring non-discriminatory direct readout to foreign ground stations. (U)
Advantages. This approach continues our present policy of providing
data to foreign users under specified terms and conditions. It demon-
strates U.S. commitment to using remote sensing to help developing
countries survey their resources. It may provide a contribution to the
cost of the program and it helps create an international environment
generally favorable to our space programs. (U)
Disadvantages. This approach may add to the cost of the planned U.S.
satellites and it reduces U.S. flexibility to modify data policies. In
addition it reduces the U.S. market share for processed Landsat data.
Moreover, it commits the U.S. to given technologies that may not be
optimum for its own national data requirements. (U)
SECRET
Approved For Release 2003/04/25 : E"831V100171R00230010000.1-1
 -31- NOFOES
Approved For Release 2003/04/25 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100001-1
Level 3.
Encouraging bilateral data processing arrangements and accommodating
foreign instruments on U.S. satellites. (U)
Advantages. This approach carries existing civil METSAT practices over
to the terrestrial area with a potential for reducing program costs or
increasing services. It also helps create an international environment
generally favorable to our space prcgrams. (U)
Disadvantages. Adopting this approach may make the U.S. dependent on
foreign suppliers of terrestrial data or instruments. The U.S. may have
to forego certain technical developments under this approach and it
could lead to technical program compromises. (U)
Level 4.
Encouraging development of complementary nationally operated satellite
systems. (U)
Advantages. This approach is consistent with our commitment to inter-
national cooperation in remote sensing. It reinforces international
acceptance of U.S. space activities. Adoption of this approach could
provide more frequent coverage of various areas and provide a backup
capability to our own systems. If we follow this approach it might
reduce U.S. operational program costs and could reduce pressure for
internationalizing remote sensing. (U)
Disadvantages. We could place our competitive technical leadership at
risk by adopting this approach and it could make the U.S. dependent upon
foreign systems for some data. Integration of U.S. civil and military
systems would be more difficult under this approach and it could fore-
close some opportunities to develop civil programs to improve U.S.
competitive positions. Moreover, it would complicate arrangements for
any private sector involvement in the U.S. program. (U)
Approved For Release 2003/04/25 : 6ii4>3M00171R002300100001-1
~OFORN
 NOFOBIJ
Approved For Release 2003/04/25 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300100001-1
V. REFERENCES
Policy and Direction
Presidential Directive NSC-37, May 11, 1978.
Presidential Directive NSC-42, October 10, 1978.
Memorandum from James T. McIntyre, Jr., Director, OMB, to
Robert A. Frosch, Administrator, NASA, February 1, 1979.
Studies and Reports
Interagency Task Force on Declassification of Photoreconnaissance
Imagery: "Declassification of Photoreconnaissance Imagery-An
Options Paper. (C)" March 1979.
Interagency Task Force on Private Sector Involvement in Civil
Remote Sensing. "Private Sector Involvement in Civil Remote
Sensing." A. report to the Administrator, NASA, June 15, 1979.
Interagency Task Force on Integrated Remote Sensing Systems
(Phase I). "Integrated Remote Sensing Systems. A report to
the Administrator, NASA." July 15, 1979.
Interagency Task Force on Integrated Remote Sensing Systems
(Phase II). "Polar Meteorological Satellite Program Options."
A report to the Chairman, PRC(S), July 23, 1979.
"Ocean Observation Satellite Management Options."
A report to the Chairman, PRC(S), August 15, 1979.
"Civil Terrestrial Observation Satellite Management
Options." A report to the Chairman, PRC(S), August 15, 1979.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2003/04/j*r P83M00171R002300100001-1