INTELLIGENCE ISSUES FOR EARLY REVIEW BY THE NEW ADMINISTRATION

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP83M00171R002100100013-0
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RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
4
Document Creation Date: 
December 19, 2016
Document Release Date: 
November 8, 2001
Sequence Number: 
13
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
January 14, 1981
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP83M00171R002100100013-0.pdf151.08 KB
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SECRET 14 January 1981 Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP83M00171 R00210010001 -0 INTELLIGENCE ISSUES FOR EARLY REVIEW There are a number of issues associated with satellite collection of intelligence that warrant early and thorough review by the new admin- istration. Seven generic categories of issues are discussed in turn below: Launch Strategies, Robustness, Surge Capacity, Survivability, Defense versus National Systems, the Changing Collection Environment, and Budgetary Concerns. ? Launch Strategies: The issue of launching satellites via the Shutt a versus Expendable Launch Vehicles (ELV) has not been ade- quately resolved. ? Robustness: Intelligence capabilities have been refered to as the "fourth leg" of the TRIAD. Executive, legislative, and military leaders have become accustomed to daily and in some instances hourly service consisting of accurate and timely indications and warning intelligence information. The concept of robustness deals with the ability of the Intelligence Community to consistently provide needed intelligence regardless of natural, hostile, or technological events or malfunctions that otherwise would disrupt its vital mission. Robustness can be achieved in a number of ways. Depth and diversity are two examples. Depth can be achieved by planning for backup sate- llites, either on orbit or ready for launch, that fill in for lost or degraded asserts. Diversity can be achieved by collecting the same or equivalent information by different and unrelated collection systems thereby hedging against loss or failure of one of the systems. Much remains to be done to achieve balanced insurance against unanticipated failure of collection systems. 9 Surge Ca acit The Intelligence Community has been commended by various policymakers for its ability to respond to crisis, Third World, and other ad hoc coverage requirements. The caveat to these com mendations deplored the sacrifice in collection of high priority standing requirements, Future collection and processing systems should explicitly take into account potential Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP83MOOl71 R002100100013-0 Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002100100013-0 surge collection requirements, both in terms of collection capacity and geographical access. o Survivability: Considerable progress has been made in iden- tifying and addressing the vulnerabilities of national collection satellites. o Defense versus National Systems: The defense versus national systems issue is related to but transcends the narrower issue of survi- vability. There is a clear and growing trend toward respective paro- chialism within the defense and intelligence communities. The recent creation of the Defense Recconnaisance Support Program is one example. The mission of the DRSP seems to be to procure and operate intelligence satellites tailored specifically to Department of Defense needs. The functions of many of these systems will-be ider tical to those provided by Intelligence Community assets. The change of administrations offers a timely opportunity to reassess this trend toward divergent consumer tailored specialization and to determine whether the trend should be encouraged, altered, or abated. There may be potential benefits in terms of robustness, capacity, and survivability. There also may be potential costs in terms of competitiveness, management control, redundancy, and expense. The extent and nature of benefits and costs should be clearly identified and weighed to arrive at a coherent and consistent policy that meets the reasonable needs of all consumers. o The Changing Collection Environment: The determination and tfle technological advances of the Soviet Union have substantially altered the dynamics of the collection environment. The rapidity with which the target environment changes is accelerating. At the same time, it is taking longer and longer to field new systems for collection. It is not at all inconceivable that during the five to seven, ten cr more years required to deploy a new system that the collection envircn- Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP83MOOl71 R002100100013-0 SECRET Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002100100013-0 ment could change enough to diminish or even negate the utility of the system. There is currently no explicit or formal mechanism within the Community to track the changing environment and identify program- matic implications. Increased emphasis on longer range planning and the establishment of program review milestones are two potential ways of resolving the problem. ? Budgetary Concerns: There have been many changes and improve- ments in the Intelligence Community budget process. The centralized resource management function has considerably improved and smoothed the budget review process. The improvements in process have not been accompanied by improvements in our knowledge of and ability to assess budget content. Specifically, we know very little about the prepara- tion of budget submission packages and even less about how monies are actually spent after the budget is approved. We do know of in- stances where budget package costs are "padded" by as much as three or four hundred percent. We also know of instances where millions of dollars approved for one purpose are spent for-another. There are undoubtedly many valid reasons for this situation, not the least of which is providing program managers with much needed flexibility in exercising their responsibilities. However, not knowing how money is spent reduces the value of a centralized budget process. The problems are associated with the transition from the decentralized "streamlined management" process of the past towards something akin to the DoD system acquisition process. Currently, we have neither. Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP83MOOl71 R002100100013-0 Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002100100013-0 Next 5 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP83MOOl71 R002100100013-0