THE RESCUE OF THE SS MAYAGUEZ AND ITS CREW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00171R001800150001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 28, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 20, 1975
• Content Type: MF

TOP SECRET/,
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20 May 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Gerald R. Ford
The President of the United States
SUBJECT The Rescue of the SS Mayaguez and Its Crew
1. The attached is in response to yourl.memorandum of
18 May 19.75 requesting the instructions, verbal or written,
issued by the intelligence community during the Mayaguez
incident.
2. The responses to the other requests in your memo-
randum will be forwarded by close of business Friday, 23 May.
DIA & DOS & NSC review(s) completed.
W. E. Colby
*NSC Review Completed for Pg 22, para 1 & Pgs 23
THRU 29*
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20 May 1975
DRAFT
INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM*
SUBJECT: The Rescue of the SS Mayaguez and Its Crew
The following memorandum covers the instructions,
verbal or written, which were issued by the intelli-
gence community during the time of the Mayaguez incident.
* * * * * *
1. The National Security Agency (NSA). NSA was prolific
both in coverage and instructions to field components during
the Mayaguez-affair. Tab A contains a listing of all instruc-
tions forwarded to NSA field elements prior to and during the
Mayaguez incident.
2. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). During the
period of the Mayaguez incident, DIA relied primarily on secure
telephone contacts for issuing instructions and making requests,
both within the Washington intelligence community and to various
field components. Tab B contains a log of DIA activities relating
to the Mayaguez affair.
3. Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of
State (INR). Although .INR did not issue any. specific instructions
to the field for coverage of the capture of the Mayaguez and
This memorandum was prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency,
the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency,
and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State.
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reactions thereto, the various policy desks within the Depart-
ment did put all overseas embassies on alert to report reactions
to developments relating to the Mayaguez incident.
5. The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). In addition
to coordinating the activity of the Intelligence Community during
the course of the Mayaguez affair, the DCI levied two tasks on
the Intelligence Community Staff: (a) to determine how intelli-
gence procedures relating to the handling of CRITIC messages
could be improved; and (b) why intelligence on earlier seizures
of vessels had not been forthcoming in time to alert other ships
planning to transit near Cambodia. Tab D contains extracts from
the DCI's morning meetings with his key staff personnel on these
matters. .The responses of the Intelligence Community Staff to
these two requests appear at.Tab E and Tab F.
6. In addition, the National Intelligence Officer for
South and Southeast Asia, acting for the DCI, was in constant
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Approved
secure telephone communication with the various components of
the intelligence community to ensure that each agency provided
maximum coverage of the Mayaguez affair.
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De:-cripti.m
12 May Asked NOSIC for list of all ships enroute to or
scheduled for Cambodian port of Kompong Som
(Sihanoukville). Specific info was to include
shipname, flag, voyage departure, current location,
and cargo, if known.
121400 EDT DC M-'mo to JRC, requesting urgent requirement for
121544 ? EDT
121708 EDT
Asked NOSIC for list of all ships within 24 hours
steaming time of Gulf of Thailand.
Asked NOSIC for details on Cambodian merchant fleet.
TELECON to Subic Bay, Philippines requesting
debriefing of any refugees with knowledge of
TELECON to U-Tapao Refugee Center for any information
concerning Poulo Wai Islands.
TELECON to NSA re NSA tasking for 25X1A
dedicated coverage of comms activity in off
shore area.
TELECON to NOSIC (Mr. Spaulding) requesting
information on crew, home port, last port of call
and destination of Mayaguez.
INDICOM to CINCPAC for information on status of
Poulo Wai Islands.
Msg USDAO Bangkok requesting info on events of"
the seizure of Panamanian ship on 7 May.
Poulo Wai photo research initiated to identify .
photo coverage Poulo Wai.
J3 message to CINCPAC, requesting continuous P-3
coverage of northern Gulf of Siam multiple RF-4C
recce flights of Phnom Penh, Sihanoukville and
Poulo Wai, and U-2R coverage of Poulo Wai.
com~
DC-5Ckmessage to PACOM, SAC and SRC, providing
detailed operational guidance.
121737 FT)T CINCPAC to USSAG - Photo recce request
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122210 EDT CPG 72.3 message to CTF 72, reporting positive ID
of Mayaguez and that surveillance aircraft received
hole in vertical stablizer from small arms fire.
122240 EDT.. CINCPAC message to Det, 7602 AIRINTG, Bangkok;
SPACTYS GP, Bangkok; USDAO Bangkok; and 500th MI
GP, Hawaii, regarding urgent debriefing requirement.
DC-1 passed copies to Col Pribram for appropriate
action.
13 May INDICOM to CINCPAC - urgent request for information
from Cambodian refugees on status of Kaoh Tang
island.
Followup IqDICOM to CINCPAC requesting any infor-
mation immediately available to support CJCS
requirement. Followup with refugee report --?______._
l3 May
TELECON to NOSIC requesting information. on number
and status of Cambodian merchant fleet.
TELECON to State Dept requesting any information on
news broadcast reporting that the Mayaguez will be
released after "US apologies and return of Khmer
aircraft that were flown to Thailand."
.INDICOM to CINCPAC from Gen Faurer for info on KC
combat strength, and weapons, type and number on
Islands. Any info available from pilot debriefing.
TELECON from Gen Faurer to SA, on U.S. 25X1
ability to enter KC radio ne .
130209 EDT CINCPAC message to JCS and CINCPACFLT, recommending
consideration of armed escort for RF-4C sorties
and instructing CINCPACFLT to maintain continuous
surveillance.
130430 EDT CINCPAC response to JCS query for information on 25X1
Poulo Wai island.
130710 EDT
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Description
Research later coverage of Poulo Wai & Tang Island
Measurement of Tang Island & Photos
130853 EDT USSAG/7AF message to CINCPAC, reporting processing
and exploitation procedures of P-3 mission imagery.
DC-1 queried DI-8 as to DIA requirement for this
type imagery and passed requirement on to DC-5C.
130900 EDT' INDICOM from CINCPAC, responding to query, regarding.
military and civilian personnel, military equipment,
and various facilities on island.
1000 Initial measurements to DI/NMCC J-3 of Tang
131345 EDT SACRECON message - directed continuous 24 hour.
T T._._ ^ coverage with OLYMPIC TORCH until further notice-.'--------
131358 EDT JCS/J-3 to CINCSAC - Concurred in continuous
OLYMPIC TORCH coverage to provide communications
link for command and control.
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Requested check with NSA on reasons for lack of KC
communications intercepts regarding MAYAGUEZ
Refined measurements to DI/NMCC P_dm Gayler Task
Force of Tang
INDICOM Msg fm CINCPAC to DIA stating P-3 photo
.graphy had arrived Cubi Point and is being read out.
CINCPAC Msg to JCS - Unless otherwise directed,
consider authorization continued for Face Value
ops in vicinity of Mayaguez.
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At approx 0900 the DI informed US that the NIO
for South and Southeast Asia had identified a private
citizen that was knowledgeable
of Koh Tang Island. We were requested to determine
if secure communications could be established with
the source and to draw up a set of questions for
a debrief. When secure communications could not be
established we decided, based on a review of
preliminary information, that the source's
knowledgeability warranted immediate transportation
to the Pentagon for a debrief with the Services,
Joint Staff and DIA.-' Source arrived here at 1530 25X1
for a successful debrief.
131715 EDT I
estimates one reinforced KC company
1800 Asked NSA what data needed to help in search for
KC communications. Requirements passed to CINCPAC
for HUMINT collection from knowledgeable former
Khmer Navy personnel via INDICOM approx 2000.
131807 EDT DIADC-5C msg to ARFCOS/CINCPAC concurs in CINCPACs
recommended delivery procedures.
131857 EDT DIRNSA delcares SIGINT ALERT
Cambodia.
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131946 EDT' CINCPAC to USSAG/JCS - Photo Recon request:
coverage of Koh Tang Island. Expedited preparation
and handling via Compass Link requested.
132141 EDT J-3 msg to CINCPAC - reporting 10 survivors in raft
and SAR efforts underway.
132212 EDT CINCPAC msg to Bangkok Agencies & 500 MI Gp - Stating
urgent debriefing requirement - debrief survivors
of sunken Cambodian boat.
132325'EDT CINCPAC msg to COMUSSAG - Requesting daily photo
coverage of Kaoh Tang - minimum altitude of 6500'
still in effect.
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140054 EDT NSA msg to DIA - acknowledged DIA requirement for
SIGINT coverage relating to Mayaguez.
140207 EDT CHSPEACTS Bangkok msg to 500 MI Gp - Reporting
urgent debriefing requirement-for Det K interrogator
at Camp Pendleton.
140420 EDT ACJCS request to DIA for 8x10 photos of Ream afld,
Ream Naval base and Kompong.Som harbor for use at
NSC mtg on 14th.
140437 EDT CINCPAC msg to COMUSSAG - For photo coverage of
Sihanoukville/Kompong Som naval facility and afld
and Ream port facility and afid.
140442 EDT USDAO Bankok msg to CINCPAC - Stating urgent
debriefing.request. - DAO Bankok has no capability-..-
to fulfill requirement regarding Kaoh Tang Island -
Det K, 500 MI Gp will debrief Khmer refugees at
Utapao.
140450 EDT CINCPACFLT msg to CINCPAC - Requesting dupe neg
photos of all FACE VALUE missions be positioned
at Utapao for use by Coral Sea.
141600 EDT JCS directs readiness posture for recce support assets.
.?15 May Msg to USDAO Bangkok re defection of KC vessel
involved in capture of Mayaguez.
NSA/State re initial press reports_indicating KC
were prepared to release US crew of Mayaguez.
16 May Message to SSO Singapore re debrief of Mayaguez
161426 Z crew.
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UNITED STATES GOVERNNE4T IS CONSIDERING WIDE RANGE OF OPTIONS FOR
DEALING WITH KHMER COMMUNIST SEIZURE OF VESSEL MAYAQUEZ AND HOLDING
IT JUST OFF OF KOH TANG ISLAND, LOCATED ABOUT 30 MILES SOUTHiO S i OF
KO4 PONG SO1l. : F IT DECIDED THAT OPTION WHICH IS SELECTED INVOLVES
LIMITED MILITARY ACTION AGAINST KOH TANG ISLAND TO INCLUDE LANDING.
MARINES, THEN IT WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL FOR HQS TO HAVE PROMPT RE-7-
PORTING VIA IMMEDIATE PRECEDENCE TRAFFIC OF HOST COUNTRY REACTION TO
THIS UNITED STATES HOV .. E-2, IMPDE 0, .d
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EXTRACT FR 4r ORNING MEETING MINUTES OF 13 May 1975
11
Lehman highlighted the latest reports on the seizure of the U.S.
ship N aguez.by Cambodian armed forces in the Gulf of Thailand. The
Director observed that he had been briefed in preparation for the NSC
meeting scheduled this morning on this topic. Later in the meeting,
Wilson noted that he would be meeting with those responsible for
conveying CRITIC messages to Watch Office principals, in light of the
President's concern that he and Dr. Kissinger, as well as others, were
not immediately advised of the incident. The Director observed that
a post-mortem on this matter by needs identification 0,~5X1A
of conclusions and some recommen ation on how to avoid redundancy in ,
reacting to CRITIC's. `
EXTRACT FROM MORNING MEETING MINUTES OF 14 May 1975
Lehman updated information on the Mayaguez situation, as reported
in today's NID, and called attention to an unconfirmed report that a
Swedish ship in the Gulf of Thailand has come under fire (from surface
elements rather than aircraft). The Director asked for a compilation
of Cambodian air and naval order of battle prior to today's NSC meeting,
and Carver assured him that it is in preparation. The Director noted
that ships passing Poulo Wai and Koh Tang Islands had been stopped by
Cambodia prior to the seizure of the Mayaguez and asked Wilson to
determine why intelligence on these earlier incidents hadn't been
forthcoming in time to alert shipping.
EXTRACT FROM MORNING MEETING MINUTES OF 16 May 1975
Wilson reviewed the sequence of events in notifying top Government
officials of the Ma, yaguez incident. He also reported that responsibility
for issuing shipping advisories--formerly a Navy matter'--now resides in
the Hydrographic Office of the Defense Mapping Agency.
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MEMORANDUM 1'01t: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Report on Community Handling of
Mayaguez Incident
1. I convened a meeting today of operations/ watch officers (or
their representatives) from CIA, the White House Situation Room,
NSA, the State Department, and DIA. Much of the conversation at
that meeting confirmed information conveyed to you last night in a
preliminary memorandum on the same subject. The conversation
also helped to crystalize. our own thinking about the alerting problem .
in general, and we offer you some conclusions and recommendations
in para. 8 of this paper.
The Problem of Delay
2. The principal immediate problem seems to be: Why weren't
the principals concerned notified of the contents of the initial CRITIC
messages within 15 or so minutes of these messages in the ops center?
The first three messages arrived between 0512 and 0526 EDT. You
were notified at 0630; Secretary Schlesinger learned of the messages.
some time between 0700 and 0730; General Scowcroft at 0730; the
President around 0800 (courtesy of Mr. Peterson); and Secretary
Kissinger some time after his regular morning staff meeting had begun
at 0800.
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variety of reasons, inclucding; (1) concern that information provided
in the initial CRITICs was inadequate, that further data was needed
before principals could be properly briefed; (Z) a belief that the
US would be unable to react immediately, at least with force, and
that therefore time was not of the.essence*; and (3) related to this, .
a conviction that principals 3 should not be awakened at home at, say,
0530 or 0600, when they could "just as well" be informed upon their
arrival at the office at, say, 0700 or 0730.
4. As far as we can tell, none of the principals were initially
upset about receiving the news when they did, with the exception of
Secretary Kissinger. The Secretary, by the way, maw have first
learned of the incident from the President., `i.e., before he was briefed
by his own people.. (If so,.this clearly was the fault of the State
Operations Center, which did not, make an effort to alert Kissinger's
aides before his -morning staff meeting.
-~: ^=)
NMCC, for example, reportedly advised State ops around 0635
that, in view of the non-availability of US forces, the matter at
that point was primarily diplomatic in nature.
CIA ops officers were aware that you .would probably awaken
around 0630 and deliberately delayed informing you until about
that time.
The State Ops Center, not INTR, is charged with alerting the
Secretary.
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5. Sat-ne other problems, real or potential, have emerged from
our investigation. NOIWON was not used, and all the operations
centers agree with us that it should have been. The alerting mechanisms
in both DoD and State are divided into operations and intelligence sections,
which are supposed to be in close touch with one another but, in fact,
sometimes are not. Finally, in this list, many INR Watch Officers
are junior and inexperiencdd.
6. Yet another aspect of the problem deserves further attention,
viz. the concepts and qualifications of individual operations /watch
officers. Bureaucratic changes, the invigoration of NOIWON, and
other conceivable proposals can only do so much if these officers
are not aware of a truth propounded by
(a truth which 25X1 A
In a warning situation, the quality of indicators varies inversely with
the potential seriousness of the event being reported on. If the latter
is high, the warning threshhold is reached with low quality indicators
(indicators which under normal circumstances would be disco-anted).
The problem is to ensure that watch officers understand the relationship
of these variables.
Some Non-Problems
7. Fortunately, the CRITIC system functioned as it should have.
It notified the various Ops Centers immediately and automatically of the
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CRITIC messages. Further, within four minutes (by 0516 EDT),
NS P~SOC Operations Officers -- responsible for the functioning of
the system -- had checked and confirmed that all Ops Centers were
in possession of the messages. There seems to be no need to revise
either NSCID No. 7 or DCID No. 7/1 (both dealing with critical
intelligence communications). Moreover, there would seem to be
little point as yet in seeking to. attack the problem of "sovereign"
operations centers head on. But we do have some notions of what
might improve the community's ability to handle alerting problems
of this (the Mayaguez incident) character.
Conclusions and Recommendations
8. We have already politely, encouraged the several ops centers
to reexamine their own procedures, look again at the effects of divided
responsibilities, (specifically in DoD and State), and consider the
desirability of improving the qualifications of ops/watch officers in
general and those on duty at night in particular. We suggest three
additional measures for your consideration:
-- NOIWON should be strengthened. The IC Staff
can propose ways to you and to USIB to ensure the
functioning of the network during instant crises (e. g. , any
.ops/watch officer who decides to alert his own principal
can be required automatically to activate the net so as to
inform the other centers of his decision). This, in turn, could
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-- The senior ops/watch officers in tovni should get
to know one another better and should exchange experiences,
problems, ' etc. (This seemingly minor proposal, if
accepted, could produce substantial benefits for the
community and its consumers.) I would be happy to play
host for bimonthly luncheons dedicated to this purpose.
i
Finally, and must important, it seems to me to
be both possible and appropriate for you to take action
on your own to alert the President, Secretary Kissinger,
and probably Secretary Schlesinger whenever you deem it
desirable. It may be that in some instances your "alert"
would prove to be redundant: But, as the Mayaguez incident
demonstrated, perhaps not. If you concur, we will seek to
provide you with a more detailed proposal.
Samuel V. Wilson
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy to the DCI for the
Intelligence Community
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14 May 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Coverage of Events in the Gulf of Thailand
Prior to the Seizure of the Mayaguez
1. The first indication of a threat to shipping in the Gulf of
Thailand was received by U$ operational forces on 4 May 1975. On
that date, ..the USS GRIDLEY'advised that it had received merchant
ship communications reportizig the capture of a Korean tanker by an
"unidentified Communist ship" in an area in the general vicinity of
Poulo Wai island (where the Mayaguez was subsequently captured).
This report was immediately passed by the CINCPAC Intelligence
Center to the NMCC which, in turn, immediately passed it to the
CIA Operations Center. Because of CINCPAC's use of an "Address
Indicator Group" (AIG 8724), it is safe to assume that its initial
message also went to a large number of operational commands and
intelligence centers within the Defense establishment. In any event,
there is no evidence that anyone took any action on this report.
2. On 5 May, CINCPAC advised the NMCC (and other addressees)
of a US news service report of the incident involving the Korean tanker..
This report indicated a Cambodian Communist ship had fired upon,
damaged, but failed to stop the Korean tanker. STATE f INR picked up
this account of the news service report and a 5 May FBIS item from
Seoul, which dealt with the same incident, and prepared a briefing
paper for Mr. Hyland and Secretary Kissinger on the same day. No
other element in the US intelligence community took any action.
3.. On 6 May, the FBIS reported in its Daily Report that Seoul
had advised the South Korean Ministry of Transportation to alert all
Korean shipping to the.dangers of Communist attacks "on the high
seas of Cambodia."
O
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4. NSA reports (issued, interalia, to the community, beginning
on 7 May) reveal that Cambodian attacks on foreign shipping actually
began on 2 May. They also reveal that from 2 May until the seizure
of the Mayaguez on 12 May, the Cambodians, in at .least 5 separate
incidents, either fired on or detained some 17 vessels (See Annex
attached). One of these, a Panamanian freighter, was the subject of
a 9 May NSA report, the gist of which was conveyed by Mr. Lehman
of OCI during the DCI1 s morning staff meeting of that date. But we
know of no other similar briefings or reports provided elsewhere in
the.community. (That same 9 May report also stated that, according
to the master of the Panamanian vessel, the. Cambodians had extended
their territorial waters some 30 n. m. beyond Paulo Wai Island. There
is no other evidence of suchi to extension.)
5. The seizure of the Mayaguez appears to have caught everyone
by surprise. Neither CIA, DIA, nor the military services issued any
report or analysis which would have indicated their consideration of
a potential threat situation. No warning notices were issued.
6. The US agency responsible for issuing "notices to mariners"
is the Hydrographic Center of the Defense Mapping Agency. There is
no formal link between this agency and any current intelligence entity,
and as far as we can ascertain at this juncture, intelligence concern-
ing 'incidents in the Gulf of Thailand (2-12 May) was not sent to the
Hydrographic Centeeby any element of the community.
J4 0%Lk ~ft4AAJ6
c 'M
unuei V. Wilson
Li tenant General, USA
D uty to the DCI for the
Intelligence Community
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Reports of Cambodian Communist
Actions Against Foreign Shipping in the Gulf of Thailand
DATE OF VESSEL
DATE OF REPORT SEIZURE NATIONALITY REMARKS
COMIPAC Message 4 May South Korean Report from USS
041029Z GRIDLEY that Korean
tanker being captured
by unidentified commu-.
nist ship near Poulo Wai .
Island.
COMIPAC Message 4 May J. Same incident Report by US News
051112Z (Same inci- ; as above Service that.a Cambodian
dent as above) communist ship fired
upon but failed to stop
Korean ship 200 n. m.
S. E. of Thailand.
5 & 6 May FBIS 4 May South Korean Seoul broadcasts reports
Reports (Probably same (1 Vessel) of ship fired upon by
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incident as communist boat. Official
above) warning to all shipping .
of danger of attack "on the
high seas of Cambodia. "
7 Ma r 2 May Thai Seized in what Cambodian
(7 Vessels) Communists describe as
" " t t ' 1 t
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7 May
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our errz oria wa ers.
Capture includes 27 Thai
seamen.
2 May South Vietna- Seized in what Cambodian
mese Communists describe as
(2 Vessels) "our" territorial waters.
Also captured entire
crew.
6 May "Chinese" (6 Cambodian Communists
Vessels) report that vessels were
"fleeing from Saigon,
headed toward Thailand. "
Vessels were taken to
Cambodian mainland.
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DATE OF VESSEL
25XdATE OF REPORT SEIZURE NATIONALITY REMARKS
8Ma
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E!y
6 May South Vietnamese All seven persons on
board reportedly
executed by Cambodian
Communists.
7 May
Panamanian 94 Vietnamese/34 Thai
on board. Master of
vessel reported that
vessel fired on without
warning by Cambodian
navy craft and detained
20 miles outside Poulo
Wai, and also reported
that the "new Cambodian
boundary" had been
extended 30 miles "outside"
of Poulo Wai. (See Map.)
Vessel departed
Cambodian waters on
8 May.
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP83M00171 R001800150001-2
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