REVIEW OF FIELD REPORTING ON THE DISAPPEARANCE AND DEATHS OF AMBASSADOR MELOY AND EMBASSY OFFICER WARING (LEBANON)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00171R001800090008-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 24, 2002
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: January 14, 1977
• Content Type: MF

5X1A
January 14, 1977
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr.
Director o:_ -er-ormance Evaluation
and Improvement
Intelligence Community Staff
FROM Harold H. S tin e S,
Director of Intelligence and Research
SUBJECT Review of Field Reporting on the
Disappea_ =trace and Deaths of Ambas-
. sador Nc_'_oy and Embassy Officer
Waring (Lebanon)
Thank you for forwarding a copy of and inviting my
comments on the IC Staff review of the non-use of CRITIC
procedures for reporting the disappearance and deaths of
Ambassador cloy and Embassy Officer Warning.
Clearly it would have been consistent with CRITIC
reporting guidelines for thel and the Embassy
in Beirut to have used CRIT.T. for the early reporting
on these events. At the same time, recalling the condi-
tions in Lebanon at the time, I believe the use of flash
and EXDIS by the Embassy was also appropriate and justifiable.
As the IC Staff review and the CRITIC Handbook note,
the essential element in the use of CRITIC is one of judgment--
does the information require attention by the President or the
NSC? In this case, the information in the Embassy cables
was given to the White House immediately. The use of flash
EXDIS instead of CRITIC did, not preclude or significantly
slow down this dissemination,
The problem was that because CRITIC was not used, the
initial information was not in the hands of all members of
the intelligence community and military commands simultane-
ously with its distribution to the White House and State
Department decision makers.
1 share the IC Staff's concern on this aspect of the
non-use of CRITIC. But I believe we have to accept the
State Dept. review completed
-Annroved For Release 2002/05/23 CIA-RDP83M00171R00.1800090008-
Approved For Release 2002/05/23 : CIA-RDP83M00171 R001800090008-2
 Approved For Release 2002/05/23 .; CIA-RDP83M00171 R001800090008-2
SECRET
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idea.that in some highly charged and sensitive situations,
such as prevailed in Beirut, initial close control of
dissemination of crisis information might override the
admittedly important potential advantages of wider dis-
tribution.. This is a judgment call on the part of the
originator and the decision makers in Washington to be
made on a case-by-case basis, and I urge that we not attempt
to establish inflexible rules that would eliminate or
seriously curtail the options of the man on the scene or the
Washington leadership.
Your,concern over the delay in the Department's dis-
tribution of the CRITIC Handbook is well taken. However,
you will be pleased to know that the Department has just
completed a review of its CRITIC procedures and the Handbook
is now being sent to all posts as an annex to the Department's
revised instructions.
S/S-O:APShankle
INR/CIS:DRWahl:ajc
Approved For Release 2002/05/23: CIA-RDP83M00171 R001800090008-2