SUMMARY OF INTERIM RECOMMENDATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00171R001800040004-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 28, 2003
• Sequence Number: 4
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Here is a "stream of consciousness" thing which I prepared
this weekend. It was prepared primarily in response to paragraph IV
of your draft USIB memorandum. -- As you will see it slops over into
many other areas.
No particular claim to originality is made. The following
remarks might help as you read my recommendations to illustrate
where recommendations likely would have or not have support.
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SUMMARY OF INTERIM RECOMMENDATIONS
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1. IMPROVE IDENTIFICATION OF BOTH SOURCE RELIABILITY AND INFORMATION
RELIABILITY IN CLANDESTINE REPORTING (Both and Ed Proctor
support and advocate this idea but problem will be foundering on
detailed mechanisms. )
2. IMPROVE QUALITY OF SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE REPORTING WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS
ON PREPARATION OF INTEGRATED SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE ANALYTICAL REPORTS
CONTAINING DIRNSA VIEWS ON INTENTIONS OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS RESULTING
FROM SIGINT ANALYSIS. (NSA, although sensitive to its implications
and pit a s, I thin supports and advocates this one.)
3. ESTABLISH COMMUNITY-WIDE INTELLIGENCE FORUM FOR THE PURPOSE OF
COMBATING THE "MIND SET SYNDROME" (Everyone favors this and sees
it falling under NIO's aegis.)
4. CREATE A CHALLENGE MECHANISM EXTERNAL TO THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
TO COMBAT THE DUAL PROBLEMS OF ANALYST DESENSITIZATION RESULTING
FROM LONG TERM EXPOSURE TO CONFRONTATION SITUATIONS AND THE PROBLEM
OF THE REINFORCING CONSENSUS. (Everyone wants a challenge mechanism.
Quarrel will be how the details will be worked out.)
5. REVIEW THE ORGANIZATION AND EMPLOYMENT OF ANALYSTS WITHIN THE
PRINCIPAL INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION AGENCIES TO DETERMINE IF
PERSONNEL ASSETS CAN BE MORE EFFECTIVELY USED. (Views of post-
mortem staff -- In-house DDI post-mortem agrees, I believe, but not
for attribution.)
6. CONDUCT A COMMUNITY-WIDE REVIEW OF THE ADEQUACY OF PRODUCTION ASSETS
AND FUNDING TO INCLUDE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR COLLECTION TRADE-OFFS IF
REQUIRED. (Mine -- I think the collection/production funding issue
is the most important problem the community faces.)
7. EXAMINE THE ADEQUACY OF ANALYTICAL METHODOLOGIES USED IN INTELLIGENCE
PRODUCTION. (Views of Post-Mortem Staff and agreed with by some
working level types.)
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INTERIM RECOMMENDATIONS. (Usual caveat that this is an interim report...,
then proceed into the text.)
1. CLANDESTINE SOURCE REPORTING.
HUMINT reporting from clandestine sources continued to be a vital
source of intelligence. As was illustrated earlier in this report, the
effective exploitation of several crucial reports from this collection
source would have been pivotal in an analytical determination that war
was imminent. Yet, this analysis was not made.
Extensive interviewing of both collectors and producers of intelligence
indicate that a significant problem exists which impairs the analyst's
ability to determine the validity of a specific clandestine report. It
is obvious that the weight which an analyst will place on a specific report
is to a great extent a function of the reliability of the source and assess-
ment of the source's access to the information he is reporting on.
Currently, the assessment of these two factors is contained in the
introductory element of the report and is couched in one of several
alternative and specifically worded set phrases. The production analyst,
accustomed over the years to studying these types of reports, finds that
he is unable to pierce these set phrases so that he can distinguish STATINTL
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between
Part of this obfuscation is, of course, deliberate and for the
purpose of protecting the source of vital information. However, to
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protect information sources to the point where their message does not
impact upon that part of the community responsible for production of
intelligence is self-defeating.
Recommendation: That the clandestine service, in conjunction with
the major intelligence agency production managers, review present systems
for identification of both sources and the reliability of their informa-
tion in order to maximize the use of clandestine HUMINT reporting.
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2. COMMUNICATION AND SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE.
As a result of reviewing NSA products, NSA in-house briefings, and
interviewing a number of key Middle East analysts at NSA, we have con-
cluded that a sense of the imminency of war was felt more acutely at that
agency than anywhere else in the community. Prior to the outbreak of
hostilities, the chief of
group (Middle East) was recalled
from leave, emergency watch rosters prepared, an additional Arabic linguist
dispatched to a Middle East targeted collection site, and a series of NSA
"Spot Reports" were issued to the community. The chief of
group (Soviet Union) indicated in an interview that after consultation
with his opposite number in =[lroup, he left his office on Friday
evening, October 5, confident that hostilities would commence the next
day.
Regardless of this NSA sensing of the imminency of war, our review
of both the written record and our conduct of interviews indicates that
NSA was unable to transmit their conviction to the principal intelligence
production agencies. Several factors were responsible for this, but the
principal ones related to the means by which signal intelligence derived
materials was transmitted to the production analyst and the latter's
ability to absorb them.
In a typical non-crisis week, as many as several hundred signal
intelligence derived reports will cross the desk of the production
analyst. It is his task to sift these reports to separate the wheat
from the chaff.
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A recurring theme noted in interviewing production analysts was their
sense of being overwhelmed by the volume of the NSA reports they received.
As one analyst put it, "I was deafened by the 'noise' of signal intelligence."
No production analyst was found who wanted the volume of NSA's message
traffic reduced. However, there was an almost universal desire expressed
by these analysts for NSA to provide greater focus to their information
and, in addition, provide integrative reports. The production analysts
view is that such assistance is needed primarily due to the limited
availability of analysts. In brief, the provision of raw intelligence
exceeds the producers capability to analyze and report.
The response of NSA to these views were several. They noted that
an effort to highlight what they believed were particularly significant
items of information had been made by them and was provided the producer
in the form of "NSA Spot Reports". Perhaps of even greater significance,
the interview process clearly revealed a sensitivity on the part of NSA
to criticism which might be engendered should NSA involve itself too
deeply in providing finished products derived from signal intelligence.
As one principal production manager at NSA opined, "the intelligence
community reserves for itself the right to analyze the product of the
National Security Agency."
Our review of existing documents does not reveal the existence of any
directive which precludes the National Security Agency from providing
written, integrated analysis of signal intelligence and rendering their
judgment as to the meaning of their signal intelligence analysis in terms
of the intentions of foreign governments.
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Recommendation: That NSA, in conjunction with the principal production
agencies, investigate means by which alternative signal intelligence products
can be developed to better assist the production analyst.
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3. ESTABLISHING OF A COMMUNITY-WIDE INTELLIGENCE FORUM FOR THE PURPOSE
OF COMBATING THE "MIND SET SYNDROME".
It is our judgment that the analytical problem was compounded by
the fact that the majority of the intelligence community's analysts held
preconceived views concerning several crucial aspects of the Middle East
equation.
This is what has been referred to as the "mind set" syndrome.
Among the most important of these "mind sets" was the belief that as
an Arab attack on Israel was unnecessary politically, it would not occur.
As is the case in most established "mind sets", there was a sub-
stantial basis for this analytical judgment. From a political point of
view, the subscribers to the "no-war" theory built their position on the
basis of several seemingly sound indicators. Among them were these:
a. Sadat's conduct, over the long haul, had appeared
rational, moderate, and measured. He was not viewed as a
man who would choose the military option given other
alternatives.
b. While less was known concerning Asad, the general
direction in which Syria had been heading also signified
a moderate rather than extreme course.
c. The Sadat-Faysal talks of late August 1973 and the
coolness which characterized the 1973 Sadat-Qadaffi relation-
ship were interpreted as further signals that the Egyptians
and Syrians were opting for the Saudi Arabian strategy of
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using oil as an economic weapon. The leverage which the
Arabs could bring to bear in resolving the Israeli problem
through limiting or embargoeing Middle East oil was apparent.
Little emphasis was placed upon examining the validity of alternative
Arab political options. Specifically, the above-described "mind set" gave
insufficient consideration to two important factors. First among these
was the possibility that the "oil-squeeze" strategy, which would take
several years to fully implement, might not meet the needs of the Egyptian
and Syrian leaders who were facing serious dissident domestic problems.
Second, the "no-war" view gave insufficient consideration to the
rage and frustration which Arabs who share contiguous borders with Israel
experience. The Israeli incursions across the Lebanon and Syrian borders,
the commando raid in Beirut, the Israeli air hijacking incident, and the
heavy air losses sustained by the Syrians on 13 September, all provided
fuel to the Arab advocates of jihad.
Third, and perhaps most significant of all, there was only a limited
recognition that Arab oil strategy and an Arab resort to arms were not
necessarily mutually exclusive alternatives. They could complement each
other and even be particularly effective in an atmosphere of Great Power
detente.
Regardless of these shortcomings in the political analysis, the
"mind set" view of. the Arab political scene would have had only limited
validity by itself. However, it was buttressed by a second "mind set"--
the belief that as the military effectiveness of the Arab military forces,
when measured against the Israelis, was so weak that an Arab initiated
war would be a suicidal undertaking.
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Our review of military intelligence leads us to the conclusion
that an inadequate reassessment of Arab combat effectiveness had been
made in the wake of the 1967 war. It is our view that the absolute
victory of Israeli arms in 1967 had a severe impact upon later analysis
made by the intelligence community. The unchanging nature and tone of
this analysis was noted in a number of documents. Some of the most
specific judgments concerning the static state of Arab arms are provided
as Attachment
Of particular interest in this regard was the faithful and accurate
chronicling of the arrival of ever more sophisticated Soviet weapons
systems,
the identification of numerous Arab
military exercises without concluding that the Arabs effectiveness might
have been improved by this almost continuous effort.
In sum, the two "mind sets" were apparently mutually reinforcing--
an Arab initiated war was politically unnecessary, and militarily suicidal--
therefore, it will not occur. These views received inadequate challenge.
Recommendation: That the intelligence community, under the aegis
of the appropriate National Intelligence Officers, establish a community-
wide forum for the purpose of combating the "mind set syndrome". Crucial
success
to the effectiveness of this body will be the presence of all elements
of the community on a fully participative basis. (Ed. Note: What we are
getting at here is the problem that DDO is sometimes reluctant to
participate in meetings involving representation outside CIA.)
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4. A CHALLENGE MECHANISM TO COMBAT THE TWO PROBLEMS OF ANALYST DESENSITIZATION
RESULTING FROM LONG TERM EXPOSURE TO CONFRONTATION SITUATIONS AND THE
REINFORCING CONSENSUS.
We note that in a long-standing confrontation problem, such as the
Arab-Israeli situation represents, an analytical desensitization process
takes place. This desensitization is a result of the analysts experiencing
a series of crisis situations among the adversaries, each of which subsides
short of a major resort to arms. There may have been as many as a dozen
of these danger points in the Arab-Israeli problem during the past.three
years, any one of which might have precipitated a war. Given these
circumstances, analysts are most unlikely to be able to predict war in
"case 12" when cases 1 through 11 passed into history without initiating
the fourth Israeli war.
The Arab-Israeli intelligence analysis problem is not unique. We
believe it is typical of a number of world-wide confrontation situations
each of which is crucial to U.S. interests, i.e., the Koreas, Indochina,
Sino-Soviet border, etc. They exhibit certain similar characteristics.
In each case the political views of the adversaries are known, their long-
term national objectives identified, a comparison of their relative military
strengths available, the constraints believed to be limiting, the range of
prospective adversaries' courses of action defined, and the confrontation
is likely to continue indefinitely.
In each of these confrontation situations, the analytical problem
is complicated by two factors. First, the proximity, even physical
contiguity, of the adversaries allows for the possibility of almost
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instant war, thus complicating the intentions identification problem.
Second, as in each case a confrontation will have global implications,
analysis is complicated by the need to determine accurately the intentions
of a larger number of players than the prospective belligerents.
Confrontation analysts develop an overview of the problem which
exhibits these characteristics. They recognize the depth of the enmities
involved and accept the unlikelihood of their resolution. They are
accustomed to dealing with the problem over the years and are, therefore,
unlikely to be alarmist. And finally, they are acutely conscious of their
limited ability to determine the confrontation players' short-term inten-
tions.
Confrontation analysts determine what they know and don't know.
After making every effort to close "the gap" among these unknowns, they
tend to accept the fact that there are likely to be critical elements of
information they will be unable to determine. However, to reach conclusions
concerning their confrontation area, they review their analysis of the
problem with other community analysts charged with the same problem. As
all of the confrontation analysts are operating from the same collection
base, it is not surprising that their conclusions are quite similar, with
differences in judgments usually more apparent than real. As a result,
the intelligence community analysts perhaps unconsciously find themselves
reinforcing each others judgments.
Recommendation: That a mechanism be established within the intelli-
gence community to challenge these problems of analyst desensitization
and the reinforcing consensus. While we recognize that manpower
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constraints are such that it would not be possible to challenge every
view held by the intelligence community, those views which are identified
as crucial to U.S. policy interests must be subjected to formal and
external challenge.
One means by which this could be done would be to require the
National Security Council to identify those specific problems which
they consider crucial to U.S. policy interests. Upon identification of
the issues, a small staff of substantively knowledgeable analysts be
established under the direction of the Director of National Security
Affairs on a one-for-one basis, i.e., one analyst for each specific
problem. These analysts would be charged with taking the same information
as is available to the confrontation problem analyst to determine with
these same indicators the "worst case" which could evolve as it would
impact upon U.S. policy interests.
A restructured Watch Committee could serve as a body to assess the
validity of the challenge which these independent "worst case" analysts
present with their findings to the NSC.
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5. SHORTCOMINGS IN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS
We conclude that sufficient military indicators were present in
late September and early October 1973 so that the intelligence community
should have been aware that the likelihood of a new Arab-Israeli war,
if not imminent, had markedly increased. The warning signs which military
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The military intelligence analyst must make
an assessment not only of the validity of the plan, but also of the likeli-
hood that the intent is there to actually carry it out. Given the number
must be considered equivocal. Only hindsight provides this reporting with
illusion of absolute clarity.
If it is accepted that forecasting most of the 1973 Arab-Israeli
war was a most difficult military analytical problem and that the likelihood
of misreading the indicators a distinct possibility, it would be comforting
if we could report that a continuous, detailed, systematic and integrated
analysis of military intelligence was being conducted during the fall of
1973.
Unfortunately, such was not the case. The two principal intelligence
production agencies assigned only professionals, on an exclusive
basis, to analyze military intelligence problems. Our interviews indicate
that the compartmentalization of these limited personnel resources in the
study of Arab air and air defense, ground forces, and logistics were no-
where organizationally drawn together. Thus, an integrated analysis of
the full spectrum of the military indicators present was not conducted
separately from the political'scene.
Instead, the principal military intelligence analysis was being
accomplished by the more senior elements of the intelligence community's
Middle East production staffs who were simultaneously fitting the precis
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of military intelligence provided them into the broader analysis of
"the big picture". Military activity was analyzed as it related to
political events. No challenge mechanism was available to present
military intelligence indicators in such a way as to force a review of
the conclusions of diplomatic and political intelligence. It is difficult
to escape the conclusion that strongly held political judgments concerning
Arab intentions blinded the analytical community to the dangers which
could be analyzed from a pure military intelligence review.
Recommendation: That the organization and employment of analysts
within the principal intelligence production agencies be conducted to
determine if personnel assets can be more effectively used.
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6. EXAMINATION OF ADEQUACY OF INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION ASSETS AND FUNDING.
When there has been a failure by the intelligence community to
forecast a major world development, such as the 1973 Arab-Israeli war,
there is a tendency to attempt to identify collection inadequacies as
the source of the problem. More sophisticated, more expensive collection
platforms and systems are asserted to be the solution.
Our examination of the community's performance lends us to the
conclusion that neither a major expansion of existing collection systems
nor the adoption of new collection platforms would have resolved our
October failure and it is unlikely that it will materially assist fore-
casting future Arab-Israeli confrontations.
As was noted earlier,
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In brief, while there is always room for more quantitative and
qualitative intelligence collection, it has been repeatedly demonstrated
that the Arab-Israeli failure was one of evaluation not collection.
In an era of level or diminishing funding to support the intelligence
community's efforts, our post-mortem requires us to touch upon this most
sensitive issue--allocation of funds between collection and production.
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Extensive interviewing throughout the community has led us to the
conclusion that a significant imbalance exists. There are insufficient
personnel assets assigned to analyzing intelligence problems crucial to
U.S. policy interests. An equation which is composed of inadequate
numbers of analytical personnel and a large number of production require-
ments will constantly result in the provision of superficial analysis.
Recommendation: That a community-wide review of the adequacy of
production assets and funding be conducted to include recommendations
for collection trade-offs if required.
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7. EXAMINATION OF ADEQUACY OF ANALYTICAL METHODOLOGIES EMPLOYED BY THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
Our review has led us to the conclusion that there is inadequate
recognition of the fact that seldom are intelligence indicators so distinct,
the evidence so clear, that the outbreak of hostilities can be predicted
with a relatively high degree of certainty.
The 1973 Arab-Israeli war is a case in point. A compelling argu-
ment can be made that regardless of improvements which can be made in
the community's collection, processing, and production systems, there is
the continuing possibility that a "no-war" community conclusion might still
have been reached. Expressed another way, in a complex and sophisticated
environment, the intentions of foreign governments seldom can be read
with precision.
However, we are of the persuasion that the use of systematic
analytical methodologies increases the likelihood that the probabilities
associated with an event occurring or not occurring can be provided to
the intelligence consumer. Applied to the Arab-Israeli war, if war could
not have been predicted, the application of probability evaluation would
have made evident the existence of a dramatically increased likelihood
of war. Our study did not reveal the use of specific analytical tools
to assist in determining probabilities. We also noted, particularly in
the area of current intelligence analysis, a tendency toward the
comparison of the most recently received information with that information
received immediately before rather than place it in a wider comparative
context.
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Recommendation: That, in conjunction with recommendations "5 and 6"
a study be made of the use of various analytical methodologies in intelli-
gence production.
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