(Sanitized) REVIEW OF WOHLSTETTER ARTICLE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00171R001600010003-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 29, 2005
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: November 13, 1974
• Content Type: PAPER

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13 November 1974
This past summer Professor Albert Wohlstetter published
an article in Foreign Policy to the effect that official
intelligence, as reflected in Defense Posture Statements,
tended during the 1960's to underestimate the future de-
ployment of Soviet ICBM and SLBM forces. I have undertaken
to research appropriate NIEs going back to 1960 to determine
whether or not the same criticism could be directed at the
official judgments of the corporate body whose task it is to
communicate the views of the US Intelligence Community, the
USIB, as set forth in NIEs.
In pursuing this task, I have researched the history of
estimates on ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers. I have also
sought to lay out the estimative history as regards an-
ticipated qualitative improvements in weapon systems and
their predicted IOCs.
And now I have some good news and some bad news.
First, the bad news:
Having done the required research, I find that Dr. Wohlstetter
is essentially correct in the case of ICBMs. There are some
minor differences between what the Intelligence Community
said and the data Wohlstetter used, but not enough to make a
case against Wohlstetter's findings.
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In reading the past NIE's, I hoped to find some rationale
for this repeated underestimation. I found that in many
years the Community expressed the view that the Soviets
would not deploy as many ICBMs as the US for fear of touching
off a new round of deployment in the US that would leave
them even worse off than they were. Clearly this was not
the case. In other years, however, no solid rationale was
presented for the projected numbers. I had felt, when I
embarked on this venture, that I would find that we had
credited the Soviets with rapid technological advances that
would have improved the quality of their weapon systems, and
that those improvements would tend to limit the numbers that
need be deployed (e.g., MIRVs, high accuracies, etc.). This
was not the case. Our judgments on when the Soviets were
likely to introduce certain qualitative improvements into
their systems fit pretty well with what has happened.
Having been directly involved in the production of the
11-8 series of NIEs for some 10 years, three as the DIA rep
and seven as the ONE staff man, I would now like to express
some personal views.
I suspect, but obviously cannot document the fact, that
part of the reason for the repeated underestimation of the
growth of Soviet ICBM forces was a subconscious (or maybe
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even conscious) overreaction by the Intelligence Community
to the gross overestimation of Soviet ICBM growth during the
days of the "missile gap." The Intelligence Community took
quite a public flailing for that error in judgment.
I also feel that part of the problem was a lack of
appreciation on the part of the Intelligence Community of
how deeply Khrushchev, and probably others in the Soviet
hierarchy at the time, felt about the "facing down" they
took as a result of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. At
that time the Soviets had less than 50 ICBM launchers
operational and we knew it. Whether or not President Kennedy
communicated this to Khrushchev or not, I don't know. In
any event, the Soviets knew they were dealing from a position
of weakness and probably at least suspected that we were
aware of their lack of ICBM strength. The chronology of the
growth of their ICBM force fits very neatly with a decision
that might have been taken shortly after the pull out from
Cuba to expand their ICBM force at a rapid rate and probably
to a size never originally intended. Deployment of the SS-9
and SS-lls really started to take off four years after the
crisis.
In the case of heavy bombers, Wohlstetter is again
correct. From 1960 through 1971 the NIEs always phased out
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the Bison and Bear bombers at it faster rate than actually
occurred. There has, in fact, been no reduction in the
heavy bomber force for the past six years. I still think
that the NIE judgments were logical, albeit erroneous. Why
the Soviets would go to the expense of retaining such a
small, obsolete fleet of heavy bombers defies well-reasoned
explanation.
Now for the good news:
In the case of Soviet submarine launched ballistic
missiles, Wohlstetter is wrong. The NIE history on those
systems is mixed. In 1961 through 1963 the NIEs overes-
timated. The spread of 160 to 250 projected in the 1964 NIE
for the year 1970 was exceeded, but only in that one year.
From 1964 to 1968 the actual count generally fell within the
postulated spreads and from NIE 11-8-68 on, the actual count
always fell within the projections. (I feel it only fair to
point out that the only year Woolstetter used in his al-
legations about numbers of SLBMs was the 1964 projection,
and that isn't cricket.)
Well, that's the story and welcome to it for whatever
use it may be. The USIB repeatedly erred in two out of
three areas and, in this game, two out of three ain't good.
But, after all, the USIB is comprised of men (for the most
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part, honest men) and men are not infallible--particularly
when trying to anticipate the actions of so enigmatic an
entity as Soviet leadership several years into the future.
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Remarks:
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