HEADQUARTERS COLLECTION REQUIREMENT 52 (HQ CR 52) SMUGGLING SOUTHWEST ASIAN HEROIN THROUGH THE USAF TRANSPORATION SYSTEM (AEVEN CRESCENTS)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00171R001500010011-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 6, 2006
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: January 9, 1981
• Content Type: LETTER

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS AIR FORCE OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS
BOLLING AIR FORCE BASE, DC 20332
REPLY TO
ATTN OF: IVG
9 JAN 1981
SUBJECT: Headquarters Collection Requirement 52 (HQ CR 52) Smuggling Southwest Asian
Heroin through the USAF Transporation System (SEVEN CRESCENTS)
TO: All AFOSI USAFE Dists, Dets, and RAs (CAT VII)
1. The attached collection requirement (CR) is forwarded for your action.
The CR aims at insuring that AFOSI and the USAF are doing everything possible
to counter the very serious threat Southwest Asian (SWA) heroin poses to this
country and our forces stationed in Europe. As such, it is part of a
national-level, coordinated effort.
2. For AFOSI operations in USAFE, we recognize that some of the levies
duplicate levies contained in HQ CR 50. We are not asking for duplicate
collection efforts or reporting. If SWA heroin prices/availability have not
changed since submission of your last AFOSI Form 161, an AF Form 158 reporting
this fact will meet the requirements of paragraph 2a of this CR. As outlined
in the attached CR, AFOSI Forms 161 and 165 should be used to report
information responsive to this CR whenever feasible. In general, when SWA
heroin is involved, report under this CR, vice HQ CR 50.
3. Although most of the detachments have probably collected much of the
information requested by this CR during the course of routine operations, we
realize we are asking for additional and, in some cases, time-consuming
written reports. We have limited the CR to collection of that information we
see as the absolute minimum needed to meet our obligation under this program.
We have done everything we could think of to simplify the organization and
requirements of this CR. We would appreciate any constructive suggestions you
may have to improve this CR.
4. As you will note, this CR is basically a one-time tasking in that the
micro-analysis required by the CR will not be a recurring requirement. On the
other hand, any information responsive to this CR which is developed during
the course of normal operations should, of course, be immediately reported via
a 456, AFOSI Form 161 or AFOSI Form 165. All information reported under this
CR should be eaveated with the words "SEVEN CRESCENTS."
USAF Atch
OE L. HARVELL, Jr.
Colonel
,
,
HQ CR 52
Director of Criminal Investigations
FORD E 92 0N1Y
USAF review(s) completed.
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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS AIR FORCE OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS
BOLLING AIR FORCE BASE, DC 20332
9 A
REPLY TO IV G
OF: IVG
SUBJECT: Headquarters Collection Requirement 52 (HQ CR 52)
AFOSI Dists, Dets, and RAs (CAT III)
1. Target: Smuggling Southwest Asian Heroin through the USAF
Transportation System (SEVEN CRESCENTS).
2. Organization. Since the organization of this CR differs from other HQ
CRs, a word of explanation is appropriate. The body of the CR is divided
into five sections: Target, Organization, Background, Introduction to
General and Specific Interrogatories, and Suspense. These sections, with
the exception of the "Introduction to General and Specific
Interrogatories," are self-explanatory. This introductory section outlines
for AFOSI managers and collectors the overall purpose of the CR and
explains, in general terms, how collectors should go about obtaining
information responsive to the CR and how this information should be
reported. The CR has three attachments: (1) References, (2) General
Interrogatories and (3) Special Interrogatories. These attachments
provide collectors with the general information and specific
interrogatories necessary to fulfill the goals of the CR. They are set
forth as attachments rather than included in the body of the CR so that
collectors will have a concise, separable package to use in their
collection efforts rather than having to search through the body of the CR
for these interrogatories and governing directives.
3. Background: An excellent opium harvest in the "Golden Crescent" area
of Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan during 1979 made more than a hundred
metric tons of Southwest Asian (SWA) heroin potentially available to the
illicit, international drug market. Intelligence estimates, confirmed at
least in part through customs seizures, indicate that the major markets
targeted to receive this heroin are Western Europe and the United States.
Large quantities of this SWA heroin have been seized by U.S. and foreign
customs officials and by other law enforcement officials in the U.S. and in
Europe. Still, narcotics intelligence analysts believe that stockpiled
heroin in SWA will continue to flow into Western European and U.S. markets
for at least another year. At the present time, there is nothing in AFOSI
investigative and intelligence reports to suggest that the USAF
transportation system is being used, or that it has been targeted for use,
to move SWA heroin. None-the-less, the USAF transportation system is
vulnerable to attempts to smuggle SWA heroin from and to any point serviced
by the system. Detailed background information regarding the threat posed
by the abundance of high purity, low priced SWA heroin to the USAF and the
U.S. in general has been discussed in Crime Information Reports 80-1, 80-3
and 80-4. The specific vulnerabilities of the USAF transportation system
to illicit drug smuggling activities have been outlined in Crime Special
Study (CSS) 80-14 and that study is, effectively, a preamble to this CR.
FR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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4. Introduction to General and Special Interrogatories:
a. References. Attachment 1 to this CR is a list of references which
contain essential information for agents tasked to collect data responsive
to the general and special interrogatories in this CR. These documents
detail the SWA heroin threat to the USAF and existing inspection
requirements designed to interdict attempts to use the USAF transportation
system to smuggle contraband.
b. General Interrogatories.
(1) Applicability. General Interrogatories (outlined in
Attachment 2) apply to all AFOSI operating locations worldwide.
(2) Purpose. The General Interrogatories develop available
information of interest to AFOSI and the USAF concerning SWA heroin.
Specifically these interrogatories are designed to identify:
(a) Local availability and price of SWA heroin.
(b) Source countries and traffic patterns/routes.
(c) Current concealment techniques.
(d) Efforts to recruit couriers from among USAF-associated
personnel, i.e., members, dependents, and civilian employees.
(3) Sources. Information should be collected from all sources,
including open sources (local law enforcement officials), OSI/Cs, potential
OSI/Cs and subjects/witnesses identified through substantive investigations.
(4) Reporting Requirements. There are two mandatory suspense
dates established by the CR. One date is for USAFE and other specially
designated AFOSI units and the other date is for all AFOSI units. Although
the interrogatories in the "Special Interrogatories" section (Atch 3) are
intended as the basis for a one-time, micro-vulnerability target analysis,
any AFOSI unit which obtains information responsive to these
interrogatories in the normal course of collection or investigative
operations should report that information via a 456 report.
(a) All AFOSI Units. All AFOSI units are required to submit
at least a one-time report regarding the availability and price of SWA
heroin in their area (paragraph 2a, "General Interrogatories," Atch 2).
Districts may consolidate these reports and submit one report for the
district. These reports are due 28 Feb 81 unless reports have already been
submitted which meet the requirements of this interrogatory. For USAFE
Districts, if AFOSI Forms 161 have been completed and forwarded for the
fourth quarter of CY 80, these will meet the requirements of this
paragraph. (For Districts not in USAFE: the AFOSI Form 161 is a form being
used by USAFE Districts in connection with HQ CR 50, a CR which only they
have.) Other Districts which have already reported the price and
availability of SWA heroin in their area in a recent 456 report should send
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an AFOSI Form 158 to HQ AFOSI/IVGSC setting forth the 456 report number so
involved. Follow-up 456 reports responsive to this interrogatory or other
interrogatories in the "General Interrogatories" (Atch 2) should be
prepared as the information becomes available.
(b) For USAFE AFOSI Units and Detachments BIDs Servicing
McGuire AFB, NJ; Dover AFB, DE; Andrews AFB, MD; Charleston AFB, SC; and
Tinker AFB, OK. 456 reports providing the micro-vulnerability target
analysis required by the "Special Interrogatories" (Atch 3) will be
submitted by 30 Mar 81. This is a one-time requirement; however, as new
information responsive to this section of the CR comes to the attention of
AFOSI units, additional 456 reports should be prepared. AFOSI units
preparing these micro-vulnerability target analyses are encouraged to
review these quarterly and forward necessary changes/additions.
(5) Report Formats and Distribution.
(a) All Districts. Reports should bear the file number
80HQD456-3 and the "SEVEN CRESENTS" nickname. In addition, each report
should identify the source (by number, if appropriate) of the information
and provide an evaluation of the source and the information (See AFOSIR
124-11, paragraph 4-lh and 4-1j(6)). In all cases where information may be
of interest to another district, direct distribution to that district will
be made and reflected in the report.
(b) USAFE Districts. This CR does not replace reporting
requirements set forth in HQ CR 50. Duplicate reporting is not required;
however, information dealing specifically with SWA heroin or responses to
levies contained in this CR should be reported under 80HQD456-3 and should-
be marked "SEVEN CRESCENTS." USAFE Districts should use an AFOSI Form 1 to
report efforts by individuals /groups to recruit couriers among USAF
associated personnel, but AFOSI Forms 161 and 165 may be used to report
availability/price information and smuggling techniques.
(c) Districts Other than USAFE. Districts other than USAFE
Districts should use an AFOSI Form 1 to report responses to interrogatories.
c. Special Interrogatories
(1) Applicability. Special interrogatories (outlined in
Attachment 3) apply to all AFOSI units in USAFE and detachments/BIDs
servicing McGuire AFB, NJ; Dover AFB, DE; Andrews AFB, MD; Charleston AFB,
SC and Tinker AFB, OK.
(2) Purpose. The "Special Interrogatories" solicit the
preparation of a micro-vulnerability target analysis of the USAF
transportation system at these specified locations.
(3) Sources. There are three classes of persons capable of
providing information responsive to the "Special Interrogatories":
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(a) Canmanders/supervisors and customs officials can describe
established customs inspection procedures at each location.
(b) Military Customs Inspectors (MCI), drug detection dog
(DDD) handlers and aircrew members can describe the actual customs
inspection procedures being practiced at the installation.
(c) Aircrew, maintenance, life support and aerial port
personnel with access to aircraft can describe specific aircraft areas that
are most vulnerable to hiding packages of illicit drugs.
(NOTE: Developing information from these sources assumes a basic knowledge
of AFR 75-12 and local supplements (See References).)
(4) Report Timing. Initial micro-vulnerability target analyses
should be prepared by 30 Mar 81 and updated as necessary. The target
analysis should be reviewed by the preparing detachment at least quarterly
and if information has come to AFOSI's attention which necessitates changes
to the initial target analysis, these changes will be reported via a 456
Report. If no changes are noted, an AFOSI Form 158 indicating this should
be sent to HQ AFOSI/IVGSC.
(5) Reporting Format and Distribution. Target analyses should be
reported via AFOSI Form 1 using file number 80HQD456-3 and the "SEVEN
CRESCENTS" nickname. A separate section of the analysis should describe
each area of the transportation system, i.e., USAF aircraft, PAX travelers,
cargo/HHG shipments and mail. Appendix C of Crime Special Study 80-14
should be used as a basic guide for the preparation of these
micro-vulnerability target analyses. When a target analysis is prepared
that has a bearing on another district, direct distribution of the analysis
will be made to that district and this distribution will be reflected on
the AFOSI Form 1.
5. Suspense. This CR will remain in effect for one year.
3 Atchs
1. References
2. General Interrogatories
3. Special Interrogatories
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REFERENCES
1. CRIME INFORMATION REPORTS (CIR): The following CIRs provide detailed
background information on the Southwest Asian (SWA) heroin threat to the
USAF:
a. CIR 80-1, Middle Eastern Heroin Alert, 22 Feb 80.
b. CIR 80-3, "SEVEN CRESCENTS," An Introduction, 15 Apr 80.
c. CIR 80-4, "SEVEN CRESCENTS," Significant Heroin Encounters in the
USAF, 30 May 80.
2. CRIME SPECIAL STUDY 80-14, The USAF Transportation Sys tem and the
Heroin Smuggling Threat: A Macro-Vulnerability Study (SEVEN CRESCENTS) -
This study represents the Headquarters, AFOSI, perspective on the SWA
heroin threat. The study was prepared after coordination with DEA, U.S.
Customs, NIS, USACIDC and AF/LET. The study can be used to:
a. Prepare a concise summary of the SWA heroin threat to the USAF.
b. Describe USAF air traffic routes vulernable to exploitation.
c. Characterize known and suspected SWA heroin trafficking patterns.
d. Describe specific areas of the USAF transportation system
vulnerable to exploitation.
e. Form the basis for micro-vulnerability target analyses (See
Appendix C).
The information in this study is essential for AFOSI commanders and agents
involved in briefing USAF commanders, supervisors, Military Customs
Inspectors (MCI), customs officials, drug detection dog handlers, DOD
Passenger (PAX) service representatives and aircrew members.
3. AFR 75-12, Border Clearance, Customs Program and Other United States
Entry Requirements and Related Areas - This document, as supplemented
locally, sets forth the USAF standard for:
a. Inspection of aircraft traveling from overseas areas to the CONUS
and aircraft landing at "special foreign clearance bases" (paragraph 3-7,
Chapter 3; paragraph 4, Attachment 2; and Attachment 5).
b. PAX inspection procedures (paragraph 1, Attachment 2; and paragraph
4, Attachment 5).
c. Inspection of Cargo/HHG shipments (paragraphs 3-8, 3-13 and 3-14,
Chapter 3; paragraphs 2 and 3, Attachment 2; and paragraph 3, Attachment 5.)
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4. AFR 182-1, Postal Responsibilities and Policy Service Center and Unit
Mail Room Operations - Paragraphs 8-4 and 8-5 describe procedures aimed at
preventing the flow of contraband through the mail.
5. DOD 5030.49R, Customs Inspection - This is the DOD Regulation on which
AFR 75-12 is based. Paragraph 6003 describes procedures intended to
prevent the flow of contraband through the mail.
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GENERAL INTERROGATORIES
1. Introduction. The following general interrogatories apply to all AFOSI
units and address USAF transportation system vulnerabilities and the local
situation with respect to heroin in general and Southwest Asian (SWA)
heroin in particular. Administrative information regarding sources to be
used and report timing and format pertinent to these interrogatories is set
forth in paragraph 4b of the body of the CR.
2. Interrogatories.
a. Determine the price and availability of SWA heroin in the local
vicinity of USAF installations serviced by AFOSI units. (Local vicinity
should include nearby metropolitan areas which would be expected to have a
heroin market.)
b. Determine, whenever possible, the source of heroin involved in
active or monitor investigations regarding the use and/or distribution of
heroin by USAF associated personnel (USAF active duty military personnel,
dependents and DAF civilians). Specifically, through interviews of
subjects, sources and local law enforcement/DEA officials, attempt to
determine the source country/region of the heroin (i.e., SEA, SWA, Mexico)
and the suspected route over which the heroin traveled prior to arriving in
the local area. Here again we are looking for the possibility that other
USAF associated personnel or the USAF transportation system were involved
in the transportation of the heroin at any point along this route.
c. Report any AFOSI or other agency identified drug smuggling
technique involving the USAF transportation system (See CSS 80-14, Appendix
C) which could be used to smuggle SWA heroin.
d. Report any approach of a USAF member that indicates an effort to
access the USAF transportation system for the purpose of smuggling illicit
drugs. There are indications that organized, civilian criminal elements
involved in smuggling operations are resorting to classic hostile
intelligence collection techniques in their approaches of civilian aircrew
members and maintenance and cargo handling personnel employed by civilian
airlines. Specifically, agents of these criminal elements target known
"hang-outs" to recruit these civilian airline employees by involving them
in compromising situations or by playing on established friendships.
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SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES
1. Introduction. The purpose of these special interrogatories for all
AFOSI units in USAFE and the detachments/bids servicing McGuire AFB, NJ;
Dover AFB, DE; Andrews AFB, MD; Charleston AFB, SC; and Tinker AFB, OK, is
to guide the preparation of a micro-vulnerability target analysis of the
USAF transportation system at their locations. Administrative information
regarding sources to be used and report timing and format pertinent to the
following interrogatories is set forth in paragraph 4c of the body of the
CR.
2. Interrogatories
a. USAF Aircraft: AFR 75-12 (See Attachment 1) outlines procedures to
be used in inspecting aircraft traveling from overseas areas to the CONUS
and those aircraft landing at "special foreign clearance bases." Paragraph
3-7, Chapter 3; paragraph 4, Attachment 2; and Attachment 5 of the
regulation provide specific information regarding the inspection procedures
required. These may be supplemented by theater or local commanders.
(1) Through discussion with appropriate commanders/supervisors and
customs officials determine the established customs inspection procedures
followed at each installation.
(2) Through sources, Military Customs Inspectors (MCIs), drug
detection dog (DDD) handlers and aircrew members, determine the actual
customs inspection procedures being practiced at the installation.
(3) Through AFOSI sources who are aircrew members or who, through.
duties in aircraft /munitions maintenance, life support or aerial port
units, have continuing, unrestricted access to USAF aircraft, determine
areas on the aircraft which are most susceptible to hiding small packages
of drugs. Also determine methods believed to be used to prevent these
packages from being found by MCIs or DDDs.
(4) Through sources mentioned above, identify any of their
coworkers who are exhibiting unusual affluence.
b. DOD Travelers (PAX): Paragraph 1, Attachment 2; and paragraph 4,
Attachment 5, AFR 75-12, outline customs inspection procedures for PAX.
These may be supplemented by theater or local commanders.
(1) Through discussion with appropriate commanders/supervisors and
customs officials, determine customs inspection procedures followed at each
installation.
(2) Through sources, MCIs, DDD handlers and PAX service
representatives, determine the actual customs inspection procedures being
practiced at each installation.
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(3) Through sources and PAX service representatives, identify
individuals who frequently travel to or from known source and transit
countries (Turkey, Italy, Greece, Germany, Spain and England) to other
USAFE areas or the CONUS. Identify individuals assigned to USAF activities
in Germany who travel regularly between West Berlin and/or Frankfurt and
other areas of Germany.
(4) Determine whether suspected drug traffickers/abusers are
traveling as PAX via USAF aircraft to those areas discussed above.
c. Cargo/HHG shipments: Paragraphs 3-8, 3-13 and 3-14, Chapter 3;
paragraphs 2 and 3, Attachment 2; and paragraph 3, Attachment 5, AFR 75-12
outline customs inspection and control procedures for cargo and HHG
shipments. Again, these procedures may be supplemented by theater or local
commanders.
(1) Through discussion with appropriate commanders/supervisors and
customs officials, determine the established customs inspection procedures
followed at each installation.
(2) Through sources, MCIs, DDD handlers, TMO and aerial port
personnel, determine the actual customs inspection and control procedures
being practiced at the installation.
(3) Following coordination with local SJAs, consider the
establishment of a systematic method for briefing MCIs on current illicit
drug intelligence matters to include identification of suspected major
abusers/traffickers who are known or thought to be anticipating a HHG
shipment.
d. Mail: Procedures aimed at preventing the flow of contraband
through the mail are set forth in paragraphs 8-4 and 8-5., AFR 182-1; and
paragraph 6003, DOD 5030.49R. Recent changes to paragraph 6003, DOD
5030.49R have rescinded all DOD involvement in the actual inspection of
mail for contraband. Subparagraphs 6003h and 6003i require military postal
clerks to identify every mailer by checking his official identification
card and that a complete and accurate return address is included on the
package. Current Air Force Policy is that drug detection dogs will not be
used to inspect mail within the U.S. or its possessions nor will they be
used to inspect mail from overseas area which is destined for the U.S. or
its possessions.
(1) Through interviews of local APO supervisors determine the
exact nature of local efforts to prevent shipment of drug contraband
through the APO system.
(2) Through AFOSI sources and/or PSC supervisors, determine
whether PSC personnel are properly closing out a member's PSC box when the
member notifies them of a PCS movement or otherwise requests terminaticn of
his PCS address.
(3) Through AFOSI sources, determine whether APO postal clerks are
checking return address information against identification cards for all
mail they receive directly from customers.
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