LETTER TO THE HONORABLE DANIEL K. INOUYE FROM STANSFIELD TURNER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00171R001200130001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 68
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 10, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 27, 1977
• Content Type: LETTER

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WashingtoRaC.20505
27 December 1977
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye, Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
Dear Mr. Chairman:
In your Committee's report on the FY 1978 National Foreign Intelli-
gence Program (NFIP) budget, a request was made for a series of studies
to be conducted by the Community.
I am forwarding the requested report dealing with steps to be taken
to improve the quality of analytic work. While this report addresses
all of the points of interest outlined in the Committee's request,
specific dollar figures relating to the FY 1979 NFIP budget have been
omitted, pending White House approval of the budget.
On the basis of discussions with the NSC Policy Review Committee, I
have directed my staff to prepare a comprehensive five-year program, as
an element of the CY 1978 program development cycle, to further strengthen
the quality of analytical products.
USAF, DOE, ONI, DIA, DOS review(s) completed.
USMC review(s) completed.
Enclosure:
Quality of Intelligence Analysis
DOWNGRADED TO UNCLASSIFIED
UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT
STANSFILD TURNER
0671338
CLASSIFIED BY
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'Report
to the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
QUALITY OF INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS
November 1977
Prepared by the Intelligence Community Staff, on behalf of the
Director of Central Intelligence, in cooperation with National Foreign
Intelligence Board components.
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QUALITY OF INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS
CONTENTS
Summary
Page
Background
Organizational and Management Changes ii
NFIP Budget and Planning Emphasis iii
Goals and Objectives
Report
I. The National Foreign Assessment Center 1
II. NFIP Agency Plans and Programmatic Actions 3
A. Summary Table 4
B. Narrative Description 9
C. Discussion 54
III. Trends in NFIP Analytic/Production Manpower 57
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QUALITY OF INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS
SUMMARY
I. Background
A. (C) This responds to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
(SSCI) request that the DCI:
1. report on "steps to be taken to improve the
quality" oT national foreign intelligence analysis and
production;
2. address such subjects as:
a. the balanced use of all sources of
intelligence;
b. the use of outside experts and con-
tractors;
c. the development of area specialists'
programs;
data;
d. the utilization of clandestinely acquired
e. the value and use of unclassified data;
f. the role of libraries and reference
facilities;
g. the impact of security restrictions on
access to data;
h. improving analytic techniques, both quanti-
tative and qualitative;
i. the grade levels and promotion opportunities
for analysts in each agency;
j. the role of adversary processes in improving
the quality of products;
k. the role of presentational techniques; and
1. the use of products--particularly national
intelligence estimates--by consumers; and
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3. treat objectives, goals and plans "in sufficiently
specific terms to enable the Committee to evaluate actions
requested in the FY 1979 budget."
B. (U) While the Intelligence Community continues to provide a
broad base of timely, relevant and high quality products, the requirement
to improve our performance is a never ending one. The desire for better
intelligence analysis has been underscored during the period of the
Revolutionary War and ever since, culminating most recently in the
President's new Executive Order, "U.S. Intelligence Activities," to
"establish policies to improve the quality of intelligence needed for
national security...12
C. (U) The impressive array of planned and ongoing programmatic
actions by Intelligence Community elements cited in this report demon-
strates the attention and resources presently devoted to this problem.
These actions have been organized around the twelve, interrelated, specific
subjects highlighted in the basic SSCI request, augmented by a review of
FY 73-79 trends in the Community's analytic/production manpower base.
D. (U) Because we as yet lack measurement techniques for assessing
where, how, and to what degree these various initiatives to enhance
analysis would actually be reflected in product improvement, it is
exceedingly difficult to analyze the relative impact on product quality
of alternative resource allocations toward that end. Nonetheless, we
have set forth below certain organizational and management changes,
planning and programming initiatives, and a statement of overall goals
and objectives for improving the quality of analysis as a framework for
more systematic efforts to grapple with this challenging subject.
II. Organizational and Management Changes
A. (C) Several major national-level/interagency actions regarding
the organization and management of intelligence production are underway
which should contribute ultimately to improving the quality of our
analysis. Principal among these are:
1. The assignment to the NSC Policy Review Committee of
responsibility to, inter alia, "conduct periodic reviews of
national foreign intelligence products, evaluate analytical
intelligence product performance, develop policy for assuring
high quality intelligence products, and provide guidance in
areas requiring change" (Executive Order on "U.S. Intelligence
Activities");
2. The establishment of the DCI's National Foreign
Assessment Center (NFAC) which will:
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a. consolidate CIA's limited analytical
resources to better cope with the full range of
production responsibilities;
b. provide the basis for a concerted effort
to improve the national intelligence product and the
analytical capabilities of the combined Directorate
for Intelligence (DDI) and National Intelligence
Officer (Nb) organizations;
c. establish mechanisms to ensure the intro-
duction of skills and knowledge outside the Intelli-
gence" Community into the production process;
d. improve the process by which key intelligence
products are reviewed; and
e. further the interdisciplinary treatment of
intelligence problems (NFAC is discussed further in
Section I of the report.); and
3. The undertaking of comprehensive Intelligence Community
staff-sponsored studies of (a) the Community's ADP systems; and
(b) enhanced application of new analytical methodologies.
III. NFIP Budget and Planning Emphasis
A. (C) NFIP program managers have accorded a high priority in their
FY 1979 budget requests to improving the quality of their analytic work,
inasmuch as approximately 'of total NFIP production and pro-
duction support dollars (including relevant ADP systems) pertain to actions
which are perceived as furthering this goal. And the majority of the
requested actions are expected to be funded. This should represent a
substantial increase in effort related to improving analytic quality from
FY 77-78 levels. The major portion of these FY 79 budget-related dollars
is concentrated in three specific areas: (1) use of unclassified data/
libraries/reference facilities (16%); (2) use of outside experts and con-
tractors (30%); and (3) improving analytic techniques/methodologies (42%).
Most NFIP production agencies have budgeted FY 79 funds for a wide range
of activities in each of these three areas.
B. (C) In addition, programs are underway or planned in other areas
related to analytic quality of special concern to the SSCI. The small
but representative selection of these actions outlined below (in no
particular priority order), serves to illustrate the diverse ways in which
the Community is seeking to improve its analysis.
1. NFAC(CIA):
a. plans in FY 79 to assign analysts to
positions in embassies in Third World Countries from
which they will do on-site reporting and analyses; and
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b. established in late 1976 a Publications and
Presentation Group, one of whose responsibilities is
to investigate and develop new means of presenting
increasingly complex finished intelligence to a
growing variety of consumers.
2. State/INR:
.
a. plans'to continue development of a high-
speed, computerized distribution and retrieval
system to facilitate analysts' access to all sources
of information; and
b. has a modest program underway to assign a
handful of permanent officers to an embassy abroad
for one-two years of field experience before returning
to INR.
3. DIA:
a. is continuing the NMIC modernization program
designed to provide enhanced computer support to
indications and warning analysts via a near paperless
environment and rapid communications capabilities; and
b. plans, in cooperation with the Military Services,
an analysis of all analytical jobs in DIA and the
development of selection procedures for entry level
analysts, following which a comprehensive training plan
for DIA analysts and more explicit guidelines for
recruiters will be fashioned.
4. Army:
is forming a new Intelligence Threat and Analysis
Center to consolidate limited analytical resources and
provide the synergistic effects of a true multidiscipline
approach to intelligence analysis within the U.S. Army.
5. Navy:
is completing a major restructuring of the Naval
Intelligence Support Center's threat analysis and pro-
duction effort to apply the majority of available
resources toward enhanced support to the U.S. Naval
weapon systems planning, development and acquisition
process.
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6. Air Force:
? plans to improve the Foreign Technology Division's
analytic input to the worldwide Intelligence Data
Handling System (IDHS) through: modifications to the
IDHS general analytic capability; processing of C3
data; changes to the electronic warfare analysis
capability; and development of an integrated analysis
methodology for aerodynamic systems.
7. Department of Energy:
is implementing the all-source worldwide Special
Nuclear Materials Tracking and Management System
(STAMAS) which incorporates both classified and un-
classified commercial information.
(These and other pertinent NFIP agency programs are
described and discussed in Section II of the report.)
C. (C) Finally, as a result of NFIP agencies' attempts to preserve
their analytical/production manpower resources while absorbing total NFIP
manpower decrements, the Community's analytic/production manpower in
FY 79 represents a I Iproportion of total NFIP manpower than
in FY 78 (frail I which continues
a trend begun in FY 74-75. (See Section III of the report.)
IV. Goals and Objectives
A. (U) Despite the above, however, much remains to be done to
assure that our national intelligence analysis is of the highest possible
quality. In particular, we need to:
1. apply even more attention to the problems of recruit-
ment, training and career development of our analytic
personnel;
2. make further improvements in our capacity to analyze
complex, multidisciplinary issues and develop the data bases
required to support such analyses;
3. subject NFIP agency programs for (a) external
research and (b) analytical methodology development to
closer Community-wide review and coordination;
4. find better ways of enhancing the man-machine
interface within the Community so as to cope more effectively
with the massive volume of data that our technology is
providing;
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5. accelerate the development of Community-wide ADP
data bases accessible to all analysts; and
6. understand better what kinds and amounts of
finished intelligence are most needed by users.
B. (U) The formulation of comprehensive, explicit FY 80 NFIP
program guidance incorporating the necessary next steps for achieving
these goals _and objectives will be a priority DCI task in the coming
months.
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REPORT
I. The National Foreign Assessment Center
A. (C) CIA's Directorate for Intelligence (DDI) and the Office of
the Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence (Nb) have been merged
recently into the National Foreign Assessment Center (NFAC). This has
been done to facilitate meeting the DCI's responsibility for the pro-
duction of national intelligence by removing artificial organizational
barriers. NFAC will also provide a foundation upon which additional
efforts to improve the quality of our finished products can be based.
B. (C) The merger has some well-defined purposes:
1. to consolidate our limited analytical resources to
better cope with the full range of production responsibilities;
2. to provide the basis for a concerted effort to
improve the national intelligence product and the analytical
capabilities of the combined DDI and NIO organizations;
3. to improve mechanisms for ensuring the introduction
of skills and knowledge outside the Intelligence Community
into the production process (see the subsection on the use
of outside experts in Section II);
4. to enhance the process by which key intelligence
products are reviewed (see the subsection on the adversary
process in Section II); and
5. to further the interdisciplinary treatment of
intelligence problems.
C. (U) Achieving these purposes will require that we adopt some new
operating styles, procedures, and organizational mechanisms. The new
organization, for example, will encourage senior managers to concentrate
on substantive matters and to work directly with analysts on specific
intelligence problems. High priority will be given to the formulation and
implementation of a planned program of production and research.
D. (C) Procedures will be developed and organizational changes made
where they are required to achieve the objectives of the consolidation and
the type of operations sought. An early task will be the development of
procedures that will ensure:
1. program formulation and oversight with the full
participation of those involved in directing the research
and analysis from both the disciplinary and issue-
oriented points of view;
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2. a critical review, from outset through completion,
of major intelligence products that incorporates perspectives
drawn from outside the Intelligence Community;
3. a systematic program to enhance the analytical
capabilities for the production of national intelligence; and
4. the maintenance of close relations with those
collection, processing, and R&D elements of the Community on
which analytical activities rely.
E. (C) The only major organizational changes now contemplated are
the merger of the Offices of the Deputy to the DCI for National Intelli-
gence and of the Deputy Director for Intelligence, and of the National
Intelligence Officers with the DDI/Center for Policy Support. These
changes will result in a single front office supported by a single
substantive staff for the entire organization.
F. (C) The Director of NFAC will be responsible, of course, for
the full range of the Center's activities, but his primary activity will
be to serve as the principal substantive alter ego of the DCI. In this
capacity, he will give special attention to improving the quality of
National Intelligence Estimates and other papers prepared for the senior
policy community. He will work directly with the senior officers and
analysts engaged in preparing these papers. He will also have immediately
available to him the services of a Review Panel and outside experts for
substantive review and critique of major production efforts; A discussion
of how we conceive of the Review Panel is in the Section II subsection
on the adversary process.
G. (C) In addition to the Review Panel, a Production Board will
be established to assist in the accomplishment of NFAC's objectives.
The Production Board will be the principal mechanism for shaping the
focus and content of the intelligence production program. It will
function as a collective body to advise the Director on all aspects of
intelligence production and research. It will be chaired by the Director
and its membership will include the Deputy Directors, and, when pro-
duction programs within their area or subject responsibilities are being
considered, production office directors and National Intelligence
Officers.
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II. NFIP Agency Plans and Programmatic Actions
(C) This Section describes and discusses steps being taken by
NFIP production components to improve the quality of their analytic
work. It is organized around the twelve subject areas highlighted by
the SSCI:
1; the balanced use of all sources of intelligence;
2. the use of outside experts and contractors;
3. the development of area specialists' programs;
4. the utilization of clandestinely acquired data;
5. the value and use of unclassified data;
6. the role of libraries and reference facilities;
7. the impact of security restrictions on access to
data;
8. improving analytic techniques, both quantitative
and qualitative;
9. the grade levels and promotion opportunities for
analysts in each agency;
10. the role of adversary processes in improving the
quality of products;
11. the role of presentational techniques; and
12. the use of products--particularly national
intelligence estimates--by consumers.
(U) The Section contains:
1. a summary table of pertinent FY 1979 NFIP budget-
related actions (pp. 4-8);
2. a narrative description of major actions (pp. 9-53);
3. a brief discussion of several programmatic issues
related to quality of analysis improvements (pp. 54-56).
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A. Summary Table of FY-79 NFIP Quality of Analysis Budget-Related
Initiatives, by SSC(I) Area
1. Balanced Use of All Sources of Intelligence
AGENCY ACTIVITY CENTER
DIA Defense Intelligence School
Organizational Support
Navy
Army
ADP Support
Threat Analysis Center
Intelligence Support
Detachment
Inscom Intelligence Group
Imagery Interpretation
Foreign Science and
Technology
Missile Intelligence Agency
Medical Intelligence
DOE Nuclear Proliferation
CIA/ORD Production R&D Analytic
Methodology Support
INITIATIVE
Exploitation Techniques
Analyst Exchange Program
2. Use of Outside Experts and Contractors
DIA Organizational Support
Science and Technology
Defense Intelligence School
Intelligence Production
Improve IAIPS
Major Consolidation; Multi-
discipline Approach; All-
Source Analysis Center
Science and Technology
Intelligence
Foreign Materiel Exploitation
All-Source Data Integration
All-Source Analysis System
(STAMAS)
Political Economics; Statistics
Research; Deception Research
Consultant Hire
Scientific Advisory Board
External Assistance: Plutonium
Production; Electronic War-
fare; C2 Research and
Technology Projections; Nuclear
Fuel Cycle Model Development
Board of Visitors
Estimating Industrial Economic
Parameters; Economic Evaluation
of Alternative Limited Nuclear
Attack; Warsaw Pact Weapons
Costing; Analytic Methodology
Handbook; Comparative Analysis
Methodology; Production Esti-
mating Methodology
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NFAC
Army
State/INR
DOE
CIA/ORD
DIA
CIA
Army
Estimates
Production
Inscom/Threat Analysis
Missile Intelligence Agency
Medical Intelligence
External Research
Nuclear Proliferation
Production R&D Analytic
Methodology Support
3. Development of Area Specialists'
State/INR
Organizational Support
Intelligence Production;
Estimates; Science and
Technology
Intelligence Production
Production
Foreign Area Specialists
Program
U.S. Army Russian Institute
Production
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Methodology Upgrading for
Estimates
External Analysis; Consultants;
Miscellaneous Contracts;
Scholars in Residence
Contractor Support
Contractors and Outside Experts
Experts for Biomedical Research
External research analyses; Con-
sultant Inputs; Analytical
Conferences
Consultant; Increase use
technical expertise in
laboratories; Increase
technical expertise at
Ridge
of
weapons
use of
Oak
Presentational Means; Management
Alternatives; Deception
Research; Statistics Research;
Culture; Strategic and Policy
Program; Political Economics;
Climate
Programs
Training
Orientation Trips
Career Ladder
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Establish Positions Over-
seas; Additional Overseas
Positions; Advanced Analyst
Training
Three-phase program being
sustained
Unique program being maintained
Assigning selected analysts to
overseas posts
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Army
DIA
Navy
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4. Development of Clandestinely Acquired Data
Intelligence and Security
Command
Foreign Science and Technology
Missile Intelligence Agency
5. Value and Use of Unclassified Data
Air Force
CIA
CIA/ORD
Army
DIA
Navy
NSA
Intelligence Production
Intelligence Support Center
Foreign Technology Division
Production
Production R&D Analytic
Methodology Support
Document Center, Japan
Opposing Force (OPFOR)
6. Role of Libraries and Reference
Air Force
Central Reference
ADP Support
COINS Decision Unit
Foreign Technology Division
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New Intensified Effort Against
R&D targets
Foreign Materiel Exploitation
Data Exploitation
Open Source; Handbook and
Tactical Analysis Section;
Federal Research Division
Library of Congress
Federal Research Division
Library of Congress
Machine Translation
Subscriptions; Indices and
Retrieval Systems; Maps,
Documents, and Books;
Procurement
Presentational Means; Management
Alternatives; Deception Research;
Statistics Research; Culture;
Strategic and Policy Program;
Political Economics; Climate
Direct Exploitation
Unclassified Data for Training
Facilities
Central Reference Facilities;
Data Entry System; DIALog/ORBIT/
NYTimes; Microfiche
Automated EW Library
Computer Network Reference System
CIRC; Materials and Technologies
Studies
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CIA
Army
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See 5
? USASSG
ITAC
Medical Intelligence
Missile Intelligence
SCI Library
New Reference Center
Information Reference Facility
Greater Use of ADP
7. Impact of Security Restrictions on Access to Data
No Identifiable Budget-Related Initiatives
8. Improving Analytical Techniques
DIA Defense Intelligence School
ADP Support
Intelligence Production
Management
Navy PAC Command
Intelligence Support Center
ADP Support
NSA Training
Analysis DIA Analyst Jobs
ADP; DYNAMO; DIAOLs Improvements;
NMIC; AIRES
PACOM Data Systems Center
New Approaches to Increasing
Analytical Production
Analyst Console System
Analytic Training
USAF
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NFAC
CIA/ORD
Production
Production R&D Analytic
Methodology Support
Develop Analysis Center; Develop
Econometric Model; Price and
Production Model; Simulation of
Demand; Forecasting Economic
Trends; Soviet-Chinese Communist
Petroleum Resources; Political
Intelligence Analysis; Various
Models
Management Alternatives; Deception
Research; Statistics Research;
Culture; Strategic and Policy
Program; Political Economics;
Climate; Presentational Means
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Army USAICS Intelligence Preparation of the
Battlefield
FSTC Improving Use of ADP
Missile Intelligence Agency Utilization of Sensor Data
State/INR
NSA
CIA
Communications Handling Message Handling System
9. Grade Levels and Promotion Opportunities
Promotion Opportunities
10. Role ot Adversary Processes in Improving Product Quality
Production Senior Review Panel; Roster of
Specialists
11. Role of Presentation Techniques
DIA Intelligence Production Video Cassette Program
Organizational Support Briefing Training
NFAC Production Update Equipment; New Methods and
Equipment
CIA/ORD Production R&D Analytic Presentational Means
Methodology Support
State/INR Production Automated Cartographic/Geographic
Systems, etc.
12. Use of Products by Consumers
Navy Intelligence Support Center Provide Threat Data
Army Production Survey of Users
CIA/ORD Production R&D Analytic Presentational Means
Methodology Support
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B. Narrative Description of Major NFIP Actions
1. BALANCED USE OF ALL SOURCES OF INTELLIGENCE
A. Introduction
1. (U) It is both the intent and practice of the Intelligence
Community to encourage analytical elements to utilize data from as many
sources as possible in the production of finished intelligence. The
credibility of intelligence judgments is clearly enhanced when multiple
sources can be cited in support of a particular conclusion. The Community
is frequently confronted with situations where one source provides only
a shell or frame circumscribing an event. In those instances, it must
seek out as many additional sources of information as are available on
the subject. In other cases, conflicting information alerts the Community
to situations where additional study is needed. All source evaluation
is, therefore, the rule rather than the exception in the production of
finished national intelligence.
2. (U) Any definition of what constitutes a "balanced" use of
available data depends on the nature of the intelligence problem being
studied; the manner in which policymakers have phrased their demands;
and the amount of time allowed for a response to those demands. The
Community's system for distributing electronic and documentary data is
designed to ensure that each analyst receives a timely flow of raw data
on his subject area from all possible sources of information. It is an
integral part of every analyst's professional responsibilities to be
able to evaluate the validity and reliability of all available sources
of information. In evaluating data, the analyst measures it against
both his analytical requirements and his knowledge of a particular
subject. Analyst-to-analyst discussions on a continuing basis also
enhance the appreciation of each source. Finally, the coordination
process within and between agencies reduces the likelihood that conflicting
data or hypotheses, from the same or different sources, are left unexamined
before an analytical judgment is made. When differences of opinion do
.occur, or when hindsight suggests that unsound conclusions have been
reached, it is more often likely a result of faulty judgments made about
the data rather than a failure to consider a source of information.
3. (U) Improvement in the quality of analysis also depends, however,
on development of techniques for using all available sources of infor-
mation in an optimum manner. For example, research and development on
methodologies should provide analysts with new frameworks within which
all sources of information can be explicitly stated. And sensitivity
analyses should permit assessment of the value of additional intelligence
information and, hence, the identification of the most important new
collection requirements.
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B. Agency/Departmental Programs
Specific objectives, plans and actions which will be initiated,
continued or completed to improve matters in this subject area are
described below. Most of the steps fall into two broad categories:
changes in organizational procedures; and changes in personnel manage-
ment systems/training.
1. (S) Changes in Organzational Procedures:
a. As noted earlier, the Office of the Deputy to
the DCI for National Intelligence (D/DCl/NI) and the
Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence (DDI/CIA) are being
merged to form the National Foreign Assessment Center (NFAC).
Although this merger is being made to facilitate the meeting of the
DCI's responsibility for the production of national intelligence,
it will also enhance NFAC's ability to promote the balanced use of
all sources of information.
b. DIA, within its Intelligence Research Center, has
developed focal points to monitor its all-source requirement
systems and to assist the Center's analysts in stating requirements,
identifying availability of sources, and sanitization and decom-
partmentation.
c. The State Department intends to play a more significant
role in interagency activities concerned with requirements and
collection coordination by concentrating on the FOCUS program
(which evaluates overseas Country Team reporting) and the various
collection committees that determine priorities and tasking. The
State Department will also continue to utilize the NIO system as a
vehicle for bringing the full range of the Community expertise and
information resources to bear on policy-relevant problems.
d. The Army will continue to implement its plan for integrating
HUMINT, SIGINT, PHOTINT and CI tactical assets into "Combat Electronic
Warfare Intelligence" (CEWI) units. The Army is also planning to:
(1) establish a Technical Indications Element within its Foreign
Science and Technology Center (FSTC) and thereby encourage and
expedite the exploitation of all-source data; (2) improve the
Missile Intelligence Agency's (MIA) ability to receive ELINT and
non-imagery IR data by establishing an INTRADA link with NSA and a
teletype link with the Air Force's Foreign Technology Division
(FTD); and (3) improve its management and integration of all-source
intelligence by developing an All Source Analysis Center (ASAC) for
its tactical elements. In addition, the US Army Intelligence
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and Threat Analysis Center is being formed by the combination of
five Army intelligence analysis and production activities in CONUS.
This merger will result in a consolidation of limited analytical
processes, and provide the synergistic effects of a true multidiscipline
approach to intelligence analysis.
e. The Navy plans to improve its intelligence analysis,
collection managment and administrative support for all-source
analysis by using the Integrated Automated Intelligence Processing
System (IAIPS). The Navy will also consolidate CINCLANT's intelligence
data handling system activities into a single, all source, integrated
data base which will include a transition to an expanded, computerized
computer system at FICEURLANT. Additionally, the Navy plans to
enhance its analysis, exploitation and interpretation of time-
critical digitized imagery so as to improve its support to its
operating forces. Finally, the Navy will improve IAIPS by interfacing
it with other existing systems and incorporating new or upgraded
ADP support systems.
f. The Marine Corps will continue to develop its Marine Air
Ground Intelligence System (MAGIS) designed to provide its tactical
elements with more timely and accurate intelligence from all sources.
g. DOE will develop and maintain an all-source worldwide
special nuclear materials tracking and management analysis system
(STAMAS) containing classified and unclassified commercial information
in support of the national nuclear proliferation program.
2. (S) Changes in Personnel Management Systems/Training:
a. NFAC will broaden the range of data that each analyst
can competently evaluate by cross-training analysts in areas outside
of their major field of expertise.
b. DIA will continue to involve selected analysts in an
exchange program with NSA in an effort to acquire some enhanced
experience in SIGINT activities. DIA also plans to send analysts
to formal courses in Imagery Analysis Familiarization, SIGINT
Training, Cryptologic Familiarization and the Advanced Imagery
Requirements and Exploitation System.
c. State/INR will increase efforts to indoctrinate analysts
in the importance of checking and using all sources of information
in the production of finished intelligence. It will also strengthen
its efforts to educate policy officials about the differences among
the various types of sensor-derived intelligence.
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d. The Army plans to ensure that analysts at MIA and
FSTC receive maximum exposure to all sources of information relating
to their areas of interest.
e. The Marine Corps is designating selected billets at
the tactical staff levels to ensure proper access to all sources of
information. The resulting shifts and modest expansion in numbers
of people having such access will help assure adequate consideration
of information from all available sources. These changes will also
help upgrade tactical analytical capabilities and provide better
trained personnel throughout the USMC intelligence system.
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2. USE OF OUTSIDE EXPERTS AND CONTRACTORS
A. Introduction
(U) The retention of outside experts and contractors is viewed by
the Intelligence Community as essential. They are used to: (1) augment
in-house skills and capabilities by producing substantive studies and
analyses required by consumers in areas in which it is not feasible to
maintain agency expertise; (2) bring outside expertise to bear on complex
substantive and management problems; (3) review and critique intelligence
assessments and analytical techniques; and (4) develop and test new
techniques and improved means of support to the production process. The
use of outside experts also permits the introduction of policy-informed
perspectives to analysis, demonstrates by example ways to improve the
intelligence product, permits broader dialogue on key issues, and helps
to build the confidence of users.
B. Agency/Departmental Programs and Views
1. NFAC
a. (C) The DCI and/or CIA has used outside experts--
both individual consultants and panels--for a number of
years. They are used to advise, consult with, produce, and
critique analytical components. Some of the panels are the
1 25X1 B
Conference, the Nuclear Intelligence Panel, the Scientific
and Technical Advisory Panel, and the Military Economic
Advisory Panel. These efforts are given high marks by
those in NFAC who work with consultants. They are described
as making valuable substantive contributions and providing
significant means by which analysts can keep up with new
developments in their fields. Moreover, the value of these
panels was recently revalidated by the DCI to the President
as part of an Executive Branch review of advisory
committees.
b. (C) Expansion of formal consultative relation-
ships and establishment of a number of regional and
policy-issue panels with close ties to working-level
analysts is planned. More use will be made of outside
experts to advise and critique current and planned
research; to advise on analytical technique innovations;
recommend new lines of analysis; and to make NFAC analysts
aware of ongoing research in academia and other parts of
the private sector. In addition, a full-time Review
Panel of about five nationally-recognized authorities
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will be created to review and critique important
national intelligence products. This should result in
better products that set new and higher standards which
the entire Community can emulate. The roster of
specialists available to consult on a part-time basis
on special problems will also be expanded.
c. (C) The FY 1979 external analysis program
is a major part of NFAC's overall attempt to strengthen
analytical capabilities to meet growing demands for
analyses of world resources, Soviet and Chinese energy
needs., advanced technology and weapons systems, as well
as other high priority matters in a more sophisticated,
interdisciplinary way. Contract work to improve
analytical techniques will also continue in FY 1979,
with funding from NFAC.
d. (C) In addition, the scholar-in-residence
program is to be expanded. In this program a university
scholar works in a regular production office for a year
or so. One scholar was in residence in FY 1977; NFAC
hopes to have five academic researchers by FY 1979.
2. CIA/ORD
(U) Contract work will also continue in FY 79, with
CIA Office of Research and Development funding. The
contract funds will support the following programs:
presentational means, management alternatives,
deception research, culture, political economics, and
climate. Contract funds will also be used in support
of the Statistics Research Center and the Analytic
Support Center.
3. DIA
a. (U) Although some of DIA's contracts are
substantive studies and analyses that cross Service
lines, primarily in science and technology, most of the
effort is devoted to research and development of
methodologies and software and the acquisition of hard-
ware to improve analytical capabilities.
b. (U) DIA also has a number of experts and con-
sultants, most of whom fall into two advisory groups:
the Scientific Advisory Committee (SAC) and the Defense
Intelligence School Board of Visitors. The SAC is
composed of engineers and scientists from the private
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sector who provide advice on highly technical substantive
intelligence matters. The Board of Visitors consists of
consultants from the academic, diplomatic, and scientific
communities who review the curriculum and organization of
the Defense Intelligence School.
4. State Department
a. (U) The Department's Bureau of Intelligence and
Research (INR) will continue to employ experts and con-
tractors to address substantive foreign affairs questions
posed. by INR officers, but mostly by policy officials.
This 'program: brings outside experts into INR on a short-
term basis to assist with the design, execution, or
criticism of an in-house analysis; convenes conferences
in which analysts, policy customers, and external experts
explore a complex situation or development in depth;
commissions more extended and basic research than INR
is prepared to perform in house; makes available to INR
analysts, as well as to analysts and policy officials
throughout the government, a wide range of external
research products; and commissions projects specifically
designed to develop new analytical approaches or to test
the applicability of different techniques.
b. (U) The return from these efforts, in improved
quality of analysis, takes several forms: through
participating in the design of projects in conjunction
with policy customers, analysts forge additional links
and gain additional experience in this critical relation-
ship; through helping to select contractors or consultants,
analysts extend their knowledge of fellow professionals
in the private sector; and through monitoring and evaluating
projects, analysts sharpen their capabilities to assess the
quality of analysis.
c. (U) In FY 1979, priority will be given to
products of nearer term utility with little basic research
being done. Most of the effort will be devoted to the
newer, generally global issues.
5. Army
(C) Contractors are used by the Army to develop
intelligence concepts, to provide systems descriptions,
and to produce materiel-related documentation requirements.
Contract work also contributes to training and combat
development activities. For example, INSCOM has budgeted
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contract funds for threat analysis studies; MIA's
contract base includes acquiring the use of unique test
facilities not available within Government (e.g., wind
tunnels and antenna ranges); and the proposed number of
contractors to support MIIA's biomedical research for
FY 1979 has been tripled.
6. Navy
(U) In addition to regular contractual support, the
Navy receives assistance from the Naval Postgraduate
School and the Naval research laboratories. The labora-
tories help with the exploitation of recovered foreign
material. The Navy also conducts an exchange program in
which intelligence analysts spend a year at a Navy
laboratory and laboratory personnel spend a year at the
Naval Intelligence Support Center assisting in intelli-
gence analysis and learning how intelligence can be used
better in the R&D laboratories.
7. Air Force
(U) Outside experts routinely provide opinions on
the significance of foreign S&T publications, review the
relative status of foreign and domestic weapons technology,
suggest and develop ways to improve intelligence
collection and analysis, and review Air Force intelligence
assessments for congruency with recent developments in
their areas of expertise. Production agencies convene
panels of well-known outside experts to review analytical
judgments or new assessments of national interest. These
panels also review and pass judgment on new analytical
techniques as well as suggest solutions to management
problems.
8. Department of Energy (DoE)
(C) The DoE makes extensive use in nuclear pro-
liferation intelligence of the expertise available in
DoE laboratories. In FY 1979, DoE plans to increase
its use of technical expertise at nuclear weapons
laboratories to evaluate and interpret nuclear weapons
and nuclear explosive developments information and to
use expertise at the Oak Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Plant
to evaluate intelligence on foreign uranium enrichment.
NOTE: See pp 54-55below for a further discussion of the use of outside
experts and contractors.
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3. DEVELOPMENT OF AREA SPECIALIST PROGRAMS
A. Introduction
(C) Although the Intelligence Community has long recognized the
need for and the importance of area specialization, little has been
done--with the exception of Service Foreign Area Officer Specialty
Programs--to provide centralized direction to a program designed to
further the career objectives of analysts who desire to specialize in a
particular area,, or to satisfy organizational goals for assigning area
specialists to key substantive areas.
B. Agency/Departmental Programs and Views
1. National Foreign Assessment Center (NFAC)
a. (U) NFAC's predecessors encouraged individual
offices to develop and implement specialist programs in
response to their specific needs. One such program involves
sending a promising analyst every year tol I 25X1A
Studies Program. In addition, two or three analysts have
received sabbaticals each year to do graduate level work
related to their area of specialization.
b. (C) NFAC recognizes, however, that not enough has
been done in the past to sharpen analytical skills, particu-
larly with respect to an interdisciplinary approach to area
studies. Steps are being taken to correct this deficiency.
One such effort is the Advanced Analyst Training Program
scheduled to begin FY 79 pending budgetary approval. This
will be a 2-year program for GS-14 and below analysts who have
demonstrated skill in analysis and writing. The program will
provide for one year of academic work and one year of in-
country work on a research project. Up to five analysts wll
participate in this program each year.
c. (C) The DCI has also expressed a very strong
interest in placing NFAC personnel in substantive analytic
positions in key Third World countries. Seven countries have
been tentatively selected I
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it is hoped that analysts
will be in place within a year. lhe purpose is not only to
broaden the analysts knowledge of key areas, but also to
improve the quality of current intelligence production by
reporting from the scene.
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2. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
a. (U) In DIA, there is no formal program designed
to develop area specialists. DIA does, however, arrange
for full-time academic study at selected universities;
conduct in-house specialized training classes in area and
functional studies; and provide for attendance at courses
at the Foreign Service Institute and after hours study
at local universities.
b; (U) DIA also has a modest but growing program
to provide travel for selected analysts. Travel is funded
as part of the overall travel budget of the affected pro-
duction element. This program affords the analyst a
valuable first-hand "feel" for his area as well as allowing
him to speak with the authority of on-the-scene observation.
c. (U) DIA also benefits from the assignment of
military officers who are foreign area specialists. The
agency makes every effort to assign them internally where
the use of their expertise will be maximized. In addition,
DIA hires entry level professionals with top academic
credentials in special areas and provides them with
appropriate assignments and training to further develop
their expertise. It has also succeeded in establishing
six supergrade positions for highly qualified substantive
area specialists. These consist of the Defense Intelli-
gence Officers and Special Assistants to the Deputy
Director for Estimates.
3. State Department
a. (U) INR has no formal program for training
area and functional specialists. In recruiting new
staff, whether from the Foreign Service or from out-
side, it tries to select only those individuals who
have had considerable experience in their fields.
This is not always possible, however. For selection
to be effective, for example, the personnel system
within the Department must give INR equal access to
the FSOs already on the rolls. Tours of duty must be
long enough for these officers to learn INR's ways.
INR must also have the opportunity to recruit from
outside the Department and the Foreign Service at
favorable grade levels.
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4. Army
(U) The Army's Foreign Area Officer Specialty
(FAOS) program is an advanced entry specialty program covering
these functional areas: plans and operations, security
assistance, attache duty, politico-military affairs, intelli-
gence and civil-military operations. FAOS training has three
phases:
Phase I: Graduate school training (1-year of area studies)
and 6 months of area studies at the Army's Institute for
Military Assistance;
Phase II: 6 to 12 months' language training;
Phase III: 1 to 2 years' overseas assignment in the officer's
area of specialization; finally,
Phase IV: The officer travels extensively in the country of
his language specialty and peripheral countries and performs
extensive economic, social, and military research in those
geographic areas.
b. (U) US Army Russian Institute (USARI) in Garmisch,
Germany, is a special program originally developed independently
of the FAOS program, but subsequently incorporated into it.
Its objective is to produce area specialists who understand
the USSR and its people and who are capable of formulating
sound politico-military estimates concerning capabilities,
limitations, and potentials of the Soviet Union and East
European states. The institute program of instruction
(2 years) is prepared and conducted specifically as part
of the 4-year Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Program (Russian).
USARI tour substitutes for a 2-year period of residence and
study in the Soviet Union. Other US Government agencies
have also used the institute for advanced training of
selected personnel.
5. Air Force
a. (U) The Air Force's Area Specialist Program
provides a valuable source of regional political-military
intelligence analysts. Area specialists are becoming
increasingly more important to current intelligence
operations. Area specialists with in-depth knowledge of
the new and underdeveloped countries play an essential
role in current intelligence by providing "cultural
perspective" to political analysis and military operations
in third world countries.
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6. Marine Corps
(U) The Marine Corps FAO program prepares carefully
selected officers for future assignment on high level
Marine Corps or joint staffs in operations, planning and
intelligence billets. Graduates of this program constitute
a nucleus of Marine Corps area expertise with enhanced
analytical capability. It is not uncommon for an FAO
student (captain or major) to be assigned to a high level
analytical billet after he reaches the grade of lieutenant
colonel or colonel.
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4. UTILIZATION OF CLANDESTINELY ACQUIRED INFORMATION
A. Introduction
(S) The Intelligence Community relies heavily on clandestinely
acquired information to provide insights into foreign policy developments,
foreign intentions, future plans, and the technical strengths and weak-
nesses of particular programs and/or policies. In terms of actual
quantity, such information represents only a small portion of the overall
collection take. Its capacity to provide unique insights into intentions
and basic motivations, however, is the true measure of its significance.
B. Agency/Departmental Programs and Views
1. NFAC
(S) The use of clandestinely acquired information frequentlyj
involves a more complex process than that required for other
sources of information. There is, for example, the question of
reliability and access of the source. Also, the protection of
human sources is an extremely sensitive and vital requirement.
And the use of such material in finished intelligence usually
requires that stringent dissemination controls be placed on those
products. There is, therefore, a tendency not to make direct use
of clandestine materials in finished products when similar or
corroborating information can be obtained from other sources.
There are also some problems in expediting the formal release
of raw reports for use in time-sensitive analyses. These matters
are under present study.
2. DIA
(S) DIA uses clandestine information to gain insights
foreign intentions and plans, as well as corroborate data. It
also uses the information to develop alternative approaches to
an intelligence question or to derive different conclusions about
a given subject. It is within this context that clandestinely
acquired information is indispensible. For example, DIA's
Scientific and Technical Directorate has made extensive use of
a file of very sensitive clandestine reports. This file has been
researched on several occasions and produced significant input to
a number of articles and to at least one National Intelligence
Estimate.
3. State Department
(S) INR is not itself a collector of such data; it is dependent
on the efforts of others to supply the information it needs. Since
the Department is one of the principal end-users of such information,
INR has a major stake in ensuring that State's priorities are
taken into account. As a result, INR has taken several steps to
improve its posture and ultimately to make possible better analysis.
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5. USE OF UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION
A. Introduction
(U) Many intelligence publications are in some way affected by
information from unclassified sources. Under certain circumstances
unclassified data provide a broad framework within which classified data
can be placed to arrive at accurate assessments and estimates. Histori-
cally, open sources have also provided valuable tip-off information on
events and situations that are pursued by the analyst in classified
sources or sensitive channels. The Foreign Broadcast Information Service
and the news media are particularly valuable in this respect. There are
problems, however, associated with using unclassified data. For example,
the intelligence analyst must estimate how closely the data reflect
actual practice. Also, only highly qualified analysts can recognize the
gems in voluminous amounts of data. In this regard, the DCI's Scientific
and Technological Intelligence Committee (STIC) has created a special
working group to study the effectiveness of open source data collection
in support of S&T analysis.
B. Agency/Departmental Programs and Views
1. NFAC
a. (C) NFAC is acutely aware of the fact that
unclassified information can make a valuable contri-
bution to the quality of its analytic effort. It also
actively seeks out open sources whenever possible.
Terminals for the various wire services are located in
the CIA Operations Center and are monitored 24 hours a
day, seven days a week. On many occasions, news of an
impending crisis, such as an attempted overthrow of a
foreign government or change in leadership, is received
first through these services. In fact, FBIS trans-
lations are frequently the only current source of
information in denied areas such as China and the
Soviet Union. Analysts rely heavily on these trans-
lations for background information and to supplement
their overall knowledge of developments in particular
countries.
2. CIA/ORD
(C) Two major analytic projects supported by
CIA/ORD1
_Irely heavily on open sources of
information. Two types of data are sought: technical
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For example, it has expanded its dialogue with collection
offices; itensified its participation in the FOCUS program (to
evaluate overseas Country Team reporting); established an office
through which it can channel its requirements for certain types
of coverage; played an increasingly active role in interagency
assessments of products; and started to work closely with CIA in
assessing the utility of clandestine reporting.
4. Army
a.- (S) During the past two years the Army's INSCOM has
initiated new organizational, operational, and management efforts
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and statistical. Technical data can be used after
some validation from covert sources. Statistical
information requires extensive scaling and correction
from covert sources, but is nonetheless essential to
these projects. The loss of open sources would
critically affect the ability of these projects to
continue.
3. DIA
a. (C) Unclassified data are of great value in
providing general background and in many instances
technical data. Unclassified materials also constitute
the primary source of information in certain functional
areas. For example, unclassified sources provide 60 to
70 percent of the data for transportation studies and
about 50 percent of the data for biographic studies.
The analysis of structural vulnerability is also
dependent on unclassified data to provide information
on construction technology.
b. (C) DIA makes extensive use of the Federal
Research Division of the Library of Congress. This
arrangement allows DIA to exploit unclassified data
available not only in the Library of Congress but also
in the wealth of other libraries and research facilities
in the Washington area. Through this funding arrange-
ment, DIA has the services of a wide variety of multi-
lingual research specialists able to sift through
unclassified library data more efficiently than can its
own analysts.
c. (C) Also, DIA's Handbook and Tactical Analysis
Section on Warsaw Pact Ground Forces has been expanded
and restructured. One major element of this Section
deals exclusively with foreign language open sources.
4. State Department
(U) As a matter of routine, INR supervisors
indoctrinate their analysts about the importance of
unclassified sources and open references. Analysts are
expected to keep abreast of such sources. Some super-
visors also informally survey the Department's library
holdings so as to recommend acquisitions in those
fields in which it is weak. Office directors are also
encouraged to give attention to requirements for open
sources in much the same way as they do for intelli-
gence collection.
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5. Army
b. (C) The Opposing Force Program (OPFOR), which
is being implemented in Army-wide combined arms training,
is an attempt to provide soldiers and commanders with the
most realistic and up-to-date knowledge of their potential
adversary. Two of the more innovative features of OPFOR
are the development of unclassified training literature,
aids and films, and the use of actual items of Soviet
materiel in training. Until recently, all training
literature and information on the Soviet Army was
classified and not available to the majority of the
soldiers. OPFOR will be implemented on an Army-wide basis
by the ed of 1978. There are plans to extend the use of
the OPFOR concept to selected allies and the other services.
6. Navy
(C) Naval Intelligence Support Center (NISC) is
funding a sizable effort at the Library of Congress in
FY 1978 to exploit Soviet R&D associated literature.
The effort will be increased during FY 1979. This work
will be augmented and assisted by the scientific and
technical assistance of the Naval Laboratory System.
After comprehensive data bases have been established in
several naval-related R&D areas or fields, the quality
and accuracy of NISC's long-range threat forecasts and
assessments should measurably improve.
7. Air Force
a. (C) Air Force Intelligence recognized the value
of using unclassified data to improve the quality of
intelligence analysis in the early 1970's and instituted
machine translation techniques to increase the availability
of pertinent unclassified material to the Intelligence
Community. Recent emphasis on the importance of technical
intelligence predictions and forecasts, rather than
intelligence reports of past technological achievements
and designs, has prompted Air Force improvements in
machine translation capabilities. The selection and
translation of more pertinent Soviet and PRC literature
should contribute to increasing the quality of our pre-
dictions of foreign power capabilities.
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b. (U) New sources of scientific and technical
information are continually being screened and made
available to analysts. Changes in the software
associated with computerized data storage and retrieval
systems will increase the accessibility of data and
decrease the time required to respond to analyst
requirements. The possibility of developing an optical
printed-character reader is also being investigated.
Such a device, coupled with the present Russian-
English machine translation capability, could greatly
reduce information dissemination time and substantially
increase both the number and timeliness of trans-
lations. In addition, exploratory efforts are underway
to develop a German-English and Chinese-English machine
translation capability.
c. (C) FTD has budgeted for studies in FY 1979
to determine the feasibility of expanding its existing
machine translation capability to serve other DoD users
and to provide for further refinement of the operational
S&T-related program.
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6. THE ROLE OF LIBRARIES AND REFERENCE FACILITIES
A. Introduction
(U) High quality analysis requires the ready availability of both
current and past information applicable to the topic under study. To
trace trends, compare present with past events, and perform other types
of analysis, it is necessary for the Community to maintain libraries
and reference facilities and to exploit similar facilities maintained by
other public and private research organizations. The volume of the
needed data, and the varying intervals at which it is used, results in
the requiremenefor library systems to index, catalogue, store and
retrieve specific items reliably and promptly. The essential services
of a library system assure major savings of critical analytical resources
and a more efficient and accurate storage of data.
B. Agency/Departmental Programs and Views
1. CIA
a. (C) Reference functions are fundamental to
the Agency's research, analysis, and intelligence
production efforts. The CIA Library provides loan
services on books, periodicals, newspapers, films,
videotapes, and information reports. The collection
consists of 81,000 titles. The Library also subscribes
to approximately 1,700 English and foreign language
newspapers and journals. Unclassified data banks of
the New York Times Information Bank, the National
Library of Medicine's MEDLINE, Systems Development
Corp., and Lockheed DIALOG can be accessed via
remote terminals. The Library also arranges inter-
library loans from the Library of Congress and other
reference facilities in the Washington, D.C., area.
A TWX terminal is available to facilitate inter-
library loan requests with libraries outside of the
local area. The Agency also maintains a library of
motion picture films, videotapes, and personality
photo negatives. The film and videotape collection is
controlled by a computer-based subject index. The
Agency acquires approximately 30,000 photos and
2,000 films and videotapes annually.
b. (C) The Office of Geographic and Cartographic
Research (OGCR) operates a map library as a service of
common concern for the Intelligence Community. It
provides more than 500,000 maps and other cartographic
materials a year. The Library of Congress has esti-
mated that approximately 85 percent of its foreign
cartographic purchases have been made through the
interagency map procurement program administered by OGCR.
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2. DIA
? a. (U) DIA library and reference services
support not only DIA analysts, but also the Offices
of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, Military
Services, and other Defense agencies as well as the
Unified and Specified Commands and non-DoD govern-
mental activities.
b. (C) DIA recently developed an intelligence
thesaurus which will provide a single entry, standardized
vocabplary for modernized library operations. This
single vocabulary will greatly enhance the analyst's
ability to retrieve specific information. The net
result will be more time to review and analyze the
pertinent information. Another anticipated upgrade
is a library Data Entry System which will allow infor-
mation to be stored magnetically and accessed at remote
indexing and cataloguing stations via cathode ray tube
devices. This will significantly ?improve information
report processing by decreasing the time required to
handle field reports. And a new Microfiche Storage
and Retrieval System will enhance the accuracy and
efficiency of microfiche retrieval.
c. (C) The DIA library also is in the final
stages of acquiring computer access to non-government
data banks which will provide the analyst new fields
of information. Lockheed's DIALOG System and System
Development Corporation's ORBIT System will provide
analysts with comprehensive data bases on research in
petroleum, social sciences, agriculture, science and
technology, and Congressional publications.
d. (U) In addition, DIA intends to expand its
library services in the Pentagon by providing an all-
source library, primarily for appropriately cleared
OSD and Joint Staff personnel. DIA expects to cover
the cost of necessary physical space modification out
of its existing budget requests and staff the facility
from existing internal resources.
3. Army
a. (C) The Army Special Security Group (USASSG)
is developing a Sensitive Compartmented Information
(SCI) Library located within a secure facility in the
Pentagon. The USASSG SCI Library will function as the
sole SCI reference facility for HQDA personnel.
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b. (C) A key objective of the Intelligence and
Threat Analysis Center (ITAC) planning is the creation
of a Reference Center which combines the now separate
reference capabilities and resources of ITAC production
elements. This center will serve the needs not only
of ITAC analysts, but of other Army intelligence users
as well. The ITAC Center will maintain hardcopy docu-
ments, microform material, and terminals accessing
several national intelligence data bases.
c. (U) MIIA plans to expand its information
reference facilities in FY 1979, including improved
electronic communications between these facilities.
And MIA plans to upgrade its library services and
ensure more timely information input into formal
intelligence retrieval systems.
4. Navy
(C) During FY 1979 the Navy intends to initiate
a program to develop an automated Electronic Warfare
(EW) library. The purpose of thelibraryis to provide
interactive query, report, and update capabilities in
support of fleet EW requirements as well as require-
ments for data on foreign techniques, capabilities
and characteristics.
5. Air Force
(C) Some years ago Air Force elected to centralize
its intelligence source data files. FTD designed the
Central Information Reference and Control (CIRC) system
in 1967 and has operated it since that date. To improve
the CIRC system, FTD plans to simplify computer
instructional language, upgrade the central processing
unit, and install terminals with faster response. FTD
also plans to review more documentation and identify
those items that meet expanded user information require-
ments. Finally, FTD plans to identify more information
on materials and technologies to support requirements
of engineering analysts working on specific aerospace
technologies.
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7. IMPACT OF SECURITY RESTRICTIONS
A. Introduction
(U) Ready access to information derived from a multiplicity of
open and covert sources is a prerequisite for both informed analysis and
relevant reporting to intelligence users. In general, most area and
functional analysts have access to that information which they need to
perform effectively as intelligence analysts. In those instances where
analytical access is limited, provisions normally exist for either
gaining access ;to the information and/or for insuring that the sensitive
information is included in at least one all-source analysis of the
problem at the national level.
B. Agency/Departmental Views (Note: No specific budget-related steps
which address this subject have been identified.)
1. NFAC
(C) Security restrictions pose few problems
regarding access to data. Analysts hold clearances
which assure them access to all but a few categories
of necessarily restricted information. Analysts
working on time sensitive issues occasionally
experience delays in obtaining the release of com-
partmented information which originates in other
agencies.
2. DIA
a. (C) DIA routinely seeks to produce at the
lowest level of classification consistent with pro-
tection of sources and methods. DIA often produces
a number of documents or briefings on a given topic
each carrying more and more of the facts and findings
or analysis as the classification level increases.
As a result, consumers without the appropriate
clearances are frequently denied the intelligence
findings of the highest quality. In addition, many
consumers with appropriately cleared people do not
have storage facilities for compartmented data. This
tends to reduce the consumer's awareness and use of
the best intelligence available pertinent to his
field of interest. DIA has assisted consumers in
gaining access and storage authorization to sensi-
tive data and will continue to do so.
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b. (C) There is one area where restrictions on
access do have a serious impact on the intelligence
analyst. Information related to U.S. actions, plans,
or operations is frequently denied him. The absence
of this information places the analyst in a position
of attempting to report on the causes and predict the
outcomes of certain events without full knowledge of
essential portions of the puzzle. An uninformed
Intelligence Community, not knowing behind the scenes
negotiations or understandings of U.S. operations,
cannot provide consumers with the highest quality
intelligence. Measures to help remedy this situation
are dhder development within the Community.
3. State Department
a. (C) Problems here relate less to the question
of access to data than to other aspects of the security
issue. First, the exotic classifications on some docu-
ments occasionally inhibit some analysts from using
these sources. Second, security restrictions do limit
distribution and thus the utility of INR studies.
Third, restrictions consume an inordinate amount of
the time of INR analysts, primarily because they must
personally brief or deliver compartmented materials to
high-level officials located in non-secure areas.
Finally, the current freeze on special clearances is
causing INR some embarrassment in its dealings with the
policy bureaus because some officials who have a need-
to-know have been unable to obtain these clearances
until other officials are dropped from the list of
cleared persons.
b. (C) Proposals are under study to put INR
offices in a secure area so that the analysts will be
closer to compartmented materials and security require-
ments can be observed without impinging unnecessarily
on the time available for analysis. The concept of
secure "vaulted" areas outside the present secure area
in INR has also been examined; and the possibility of
giving policy bureau officers more convenient access
to the INR secure area is being considered.
4. Army
(C) A Survey Team has been visiting Army intelli-
gence users and found a broad consensus for publication
of intelligence products at the lowest possible classi-
fication level. The vast majority of Army users are
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concerned
?
concerned only with results of the intelligence process
and would be willing to do without information concerning
sources and methods in order to facilitate dissemination
of intelligence products. This is particularly true of
dissemination of intelligence products used for training.
Users may also be willing to do without some intelligence
in certain products to permit wider dissemination at a
lower classification.
5. Air Force
(C) Security restrictions impact on the quality of
Air rorce departmental intelligence in four ways. First,
if administrative costs of security could be reduced, the
savings could be applied to collection and analysis.
Second, special handling instructions that prohibit
dissemination of data to friendly foreign governments and
contractors inhibit information flow between people
working on the same projects. Third, compartmentation
reduces the understanding intelligence collectors and
users have for each other's problems and capabilities.
Finally, sanitizing certain COMINT data before the
analyst reviews it increases the probability that the
censor will unknowingly omit useful data and reduce the
analyst's perception of the information's credibility.
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A. Introduction
1. (U) While NFIP manpower has dwindled, or, at best, has remained
constant, demands on these resources continue to increase. The analysis
of new global issues involves the complex interplay of many factors that
demand integration of disciplines, methods, and large amounts of infor-
mation. New collection technologies and the scale of collection activities
provide ever-increasing volumes of data which must be thoroughly and
rapidly synthesized and interpreted in order to produce timely intelligence
products. As a result, new and improved analytical techniques are
needed.
2. (U) The Community also recognizes, however, that new does not
always mean better. It is clear that some tried and true analytical
methods will continue to meet a large portion of the Community's needs.
Indeed, there is no substitute for a good, well-trained, and experienced
mind. Nonetheless, all NFIB production agencies are pursuing intensive
programs to research, develop, test, and apply new and improved analytical
techniques. And the subject of better Community-wide coordination of
such programs is under investigation.
B. ligency/Departmental Programs and Views
1. NFAC
a. (U) NFAC's efforts to improve the quality of its
products are centered on enhancement of the capabilities of
analysts. Part of the effort consists of providing advanced
substantive training and foreign travel opportunities to
improve the qualifications that analysts bring to their jobs.
These efforts are now being supplemented by programs to identify
new analytical methods which can be incorporated into the day-
to-day activities of NFAC analysts.
b. (C) NFAC has taken a number of steps to accelerate
the development and application of new analytic techniques. First,
the Development Analysis Center has been established in the Office
of Economic Research (OER) and tasked to identify and adapt new
quantitative methods, to train personnel in the use of econometric
methods, and to provide liaison with public and private sector
experts. Second, the Office of Geographic and Cartographic Research
(OGCR) has recently established an Environment and Resource Analysis
Center to support improved analysis of key global issues such as
food, population, agriculture, water, petroleum and other resources.
Third, the Office of Regional and Political Analysis (ORPA) has
created a division to identify non-traditional analytic techniques
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and assist analysts in their use. Among the techniques which ORPA
has tested and chosen to pursue are statistics, Bayesian analysis,
cross-impact analysis, gaming, Delphi, and nominal group techniques.
c. (U) A seminar program has been developed to improve
analysts' understanding of the analytic process and to strengthen
their capability to do high-level intelligence analysis. If the
program is approved, the initial seminar--three weeks in duration--
could begin in early 1978. The intent is not to teach fixed approaches
as techniques, but rather to provide a framework for group discussions
and individual reflection. The seminar will concentrate on four
general areas: the analytic process; the objectives of finished
intelligence; aids and procedures related to analysis; and coping
with life as an analyst.
2. CIA/ORD
(C) The Analytic/Methodology Research Division will undertake
or continue the following programs in FY 79 which are directed
toward improving the quality of analysis: (a) Deception - a research
program will be established to identify concepts and develop methods
to aid in the detection of deception or assess the strategic impli-
cations of deception; (b) Culture Research - develop aids for analysts
in interpreting and predicting the action of foreign leaders and
groups by determining the role and impact of their culture value
systems; (c) Political Economics - develop new methods to assess
foreign resource capabilities which could have an impact on the U.S.
or other free world economies; (d) Climate - develop techniques
for forecasting both seasonal and long range climate which can be
used to estimate the food production of foreign countries. CIA/ORD
will also continue funding the Analytic Support Center which focuses
on developing and applying new methodological techniques to a variety
of political and strategic intelligence problems, with the thrust
of the effort being multidisciplinary. And the Analytic Methodology
Research Division will continue to fund and partly staff the
Statistics Research Center (SRC), a technical research and con-
sulting group established within ORD. The SRC develops and applies
quantitative techniques and works closely with intelligence analysts
so that the techniques can be fully implemented and used.
3. DIA
a. (C) DIA uses both in-house and contractual support to
improve its analytical capabilities. In fact, a number of efforts
are underway to explore the feasibility of applying several new
analytical techniques to intelligence problems. Some of the
more important contractually supported efforts are:
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command and control research, technological projections, nuclear
fuel cycle model development, estimating industrial economic parameters
from physical characteristics, aggregating and communicating uncertainty,
Warsaw Pact weapons costing and military expenditures, analytical
methodology handbook, comparative analysis methodology, and production
estimating methodology, and production estimating methodologies.
b. (U) In the training area, an essential aspect of
analytical methodology improvement, DIA is pursuing four concurrent
efforts-to improve the quality of analysis. First, DIA, in cooperation
with the Air Force Human Resources Laboratory and the Army Research
Institute, is about to undertake a project which will evaluate all
analytical :positions in the Agency; develop selection procedures
for entry level analysts; develop a comprehensive training plan for
analysts; and develop more explicit guidelines for DIA recruiters
to use. Second, the Personnel Directorate has used the CIA Information
Science Center to introduce intelligence production analysts and
managers to new techniques for analyzing and evaluating raw data.
Third, on-the-job programs are used to familiarize analysts with
subjective probability assessments and available computer systems
support. Finally, contractors are used to train analysts in the
use of newly developed techniques.
c. (U) To coordinate its efforts in this area, DIA has
established an Analytical Methodology Working Group specifically
charged with developing an overall plan, seeking and disseminating
new techniques, and preventing duplication or divergence of actions.
3. State Department
a. (U) INR economic analysts use standard statistical
methods in conducting their research on long-range projects. The
majority of INR reports, however, are not based on what most outside
scholars would regard as advanced analytical techniques. There are
several reasons for this situation, but the most compelling one is
the fact that there is usually not enough time to employ them.
b. (U) In 1970, INR established an Analytical Methods
Group to enhance analysts' knowledge of new quantitative methods
and to examine their applicability to the Bureau's substantive
work. This effort had an impact on the Foreign Service
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Institute's (FSI) curriculum and led to the establishment of an FSI
course in Quantitative Methods. This Group also sponsored a working
seminar on the use of Bayesian probability in current intelligence
analysis.
c. (C) INR has also cooperated with the interagency
Analytic Support Center by facilitating access to the Department's
reporting and by arranging a series of interviews with participants
in various international negotiations. The two Center projects in
which the Bureau was directly involved were: the formulation of a
"negotiation assessment" model and a research effort to assess
means of enhancing the Intelligence Community's ability to evaluate
the Soviet :Union's perception of its need for technology from the
West.
d. (U) Additionally, within the last year, the Director, INR,
has appointed a Special Assistant for Research and Analysis whose
function is to make the Director aware of analytical approaches
drawn from the social sciences that can usefully be applied to INR
analyses.
4. Army
a. (C) A new program--called Intelligence Preparation of
the Battlefield--has been established to develop and standardize
analytical techniques within tactical elements to increase the
usefulness of the intelligence product. This effort addresses the
need for detailed analysis of terrain, weather and enemy doctrine
as the basis for determining enemy capabilities and courses of
action within the context of standard Army battlefield scenarios.
b. (C) FSTC's computational and simulation capabilities
were substantially upgraded in FY 78 by the procurement of an IBM
360/50 computer. In addition, an in-house imagery enhancement
capability is scheduled for FSTC in early FY 79.
c. (U) MIA has submitted justification documents to
acquire a computational support system. Anticipated payoffs are
improved intelligence assessments of foreign weapon systems capabilities
and weaknesses as well as more accurate assessments of future
systems.
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b. (S) During FY 79, for example, FTD improvements
will include increased use of infrared data, improved radar data
processing, more effective use of electronic and telemetry intelligence
data, and increased use of laser collections. FTD has also budgeted
for the equipment required to modernize its telemetry and imagery
analysis capabilities. The inputs from these data sources constitute
major portions of the engineering analysts' intelligence on foreign
weapon systems.
8. (U) DOE
DOE has long been concerned with improving analytical techniques
for the study of foreign nuclear capabilities and nuclear proliferation.
In FY 1979, DOE intends to expand and improve its use of multidisciplinary
analysis of potential proliferating countries by combining political,
economic, and social factors with military and technical considerations
in analyses of proliferation potential.
NOTES:
-- See pp. 55-56 below for a further discussion of the use of
analytical techniques/methodologies.
-- A number of ADP programs are being developed to enable more
efficient and effective use of analytical skills. In addition to those
mentioned earlier, these include: (1) DIA's NMIC Modernization Program;
(2) the DIA DYNAMO software package for computer supported simulation
modeling; (3) DIA's On-Line System (DIAOLS) enhancement; (4) Air Force/FTD's
improvements to IDHS; and (5) the CIA and DIA Support to Analysts' File
Environment (SAFE) system. As previously noted, the Community's ADP
programs are the subject of a separate IC Staff study being prepared for
the SSCI.
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5. Navy
a. (U) The Navy Postgraduate School has been under
contract for the past two years to develop a long-range threat
forecasting methodology. The methodology will be produced in
textbook form; tested for a period by NISC analysts; and then
refined prior to disseminating it to the Community as a whole.
b. (C) The Navy also intends to establish a PACOM Data
Systems-Center (PDCS) to improve intelligence quality, access,
accuracy, and computer research capabilities, to permit economies,
and to increase automated methodologies, particularly all-source
data correlation, fusion and display. In addition, the Navy plans
to develop and test new methods of increasing analyst productivity;
and to develop and install specialized analyst console systems for
the Ocean Surveillance Information System.
6. Marine Corps
(U) The heart of the Marine Air Ground Intelligence System
(MAGIS) is the Intelligence Analysis Center (IAC). The IAC is an
automated data processing tool being developed for the Marine
Corps' tactical intelligence analyst. In preparation for the
advent of the IAC, Naval Surface Weapons Center, Dahlgren, has
provided a computerized software program which will allow Marine
students to utilize actual intelligence data bases during training
Marines will receive this training at Landing Force Training
Command, Atlantic, during the early as well as middle levels of
their careers as intelligence analysts and analytical supervisors.
The IAC simulation, and the IAC itself, are expected to significantly
enhance Marine Corps analytical capabilities at the tactical level.
7. Air Force
a. (C) The Technical Applications Center upgrades its
analysis equipment and methodology as new equipment and technology
are identified. Foreign Technology Division has made significant
improvements in its ability to analyze data in the last five years.
The FTD "Modernization Program" is an improvement effort comprised
of a wide range of large and small projects designed to make
analysis easier and better and to present the results of the
analysis in more graphic ways to an increasingly diverse audience.
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9. GRADE LEVELS AND PROMOTION OPPORTUNITIES
A. Introduction
(U) It is axiomatic that, without high caliber analysts, product
quality will suffer. To attract and retain the best personnel, grade
levels and promotion opportunities must be competitive with private
industry and other segments of government. The Intelligence Community's
personnel system must be flexible enough to provide adequate grade
levels and promotion opportunities. Unfortunately, the Congressional
mandate to reduce high grade positions (GS-13 and above) will have a
negative impact' on the Community's ability to retain its most competent
analysts and attract first-rate entry level personnel.
B. Agency/Departmental Programs and Views
1. NFAC
a. (C) Loss of seasoned, high quality personnel
to other components of the Agency, elsewhere in the
government, or private industry frequently arises because
of a sense of limited promotional opportunities. One of
the most prevalent complaints is that there are too few
opportunities for analysts to achieve senior grades
without taking on supervisory responsibilities. While
this is certainly true at the supergrade level, it is
not from a lack of trying. Despite a number of attempts,
NFAC's predecessors were unable to secure a supergrade
ceiling for analysts. Grade limitations also have an
adverse impact on NFAC's ability to encourage lateral
entry. Over the years the number of GS-15's (with
non-supervisory jobs) has increased from fewer than
10 in 1971 to 28 today. NFAC also has approximately
150 GS-14 analytical positions. Efforts are continuing
to upgrade analytical positions and to push for the
supergrade analyst concept.
b. (C) The basic tenet of NFAC's promotion
policy is merit. The quality of performance is the
primary criterion for promotions, while headroom is the
basic constraint. Potential and time in grade are also
relevant considerations. Median times for promotion
in NFAC are as follows: GS-10 (15 months), GS-11 (13
months), GS-12 (32 months), GS-13 (37 months), GS-14
(44 months), and GS-15 (49 months).
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2. DIA
a. (C) Advancement opportunities for entry level
analysts are in two grade increments, permitting pro-
motions on the basis of performance criteria to be made
from GS-7 to GS-9 and from GS-9 to GS-11 with a minimum
of one year in grade. Promotion to GS-12 and GS-13
working levels is based on the complexity of job
assignments. Promotion to the GS-14 and above levels
for non-supervisory analyst expertise is recognized in
the DIA personnel system and is borne out by the
folloming grade structure:
Grade
GS-16 - 18 & PL 313
GS-15
GS-14
Non-Supervisory
Supervisory
b. (U) DIA is faced with two problems that impact
on grade levels and promotion opportunities for analysts.
First, DIA does not have a sufficient number of GS-16 -
GS-18 and PL 313 positions to hire or promote outstanding
analysts. Second, DIA is deeply concerned with the
Congressionally imposed reductions in the number of
civilian grades for GS-13 and above positions. These
reductions will have a deleterious effect on the grade
structure for analysts. Measures to achieve the
reductions will necessitate imposition of a hiring and
promotion freeze. This will limit replacement hiring
to entry levels rather than permit the hiring of
personnel with superior expertise. It will also seriously
curtail career advancement opportunities for analysts.
3. State Department
a. (U) The INR analytical work force is distributed
among three different personnel systems: Foreign Service,
Foreign Service Reserve, and Civil Service. The grade
levels of Civil Service analysts and supervisors range
from GS-9 to GS-16 and are comparable with those of
colleagues in other agencies. The FSO and FSR analytical
positions, again including supervisors, range from FSO-7
to FSO-1. Unless the incumbents have significant super-
visory responsibilities, the top grade to which they may
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normally aspire is GS-14, FSO-3 and FSR-3. FSRs and
FSOs are promoted by specially constituted promotion
panels which meet on an annual basis. In the Foreign
Service system, rank is in the man, whereas in the
Civil Service system, rank is in the position.
Therefore, it is not unusual for a person to be of a
higher grade than his position. Conversely, he may
also be of a lower grade.
b. (U) Departmental policy dictates that all
non-Foreign Service Officer positions be filled by
hire ;through Civil Service procedures and regulations.
This policy has been in effect for approximately one
year. INR has been experiencing some difficulty in
recruiting the kind of candidate best suited to
analytical work because: the Civil Service analyst
series is too broad in its definitions to capture the
specialized positions important in the intelligence
field; the system for qualifying potential candidates
does not take into consideration the specific require-
ments for an analytical job, i.e., technical, language,
area expertise, etc.; and there are inordinately long
delays in obtaining Civil Service certifications.
c. (U) Several actions are underway to improve
the analytical workforce. First, INR is endeavoring
to make use of the personnel resources of other
agencies, e.g., temporary assignments in INR of
analysts from CIA and DoD on reimbursable details. In
addition to providing analysts experienced in esoteric
specialties not normally found on the Civil Service
rolls, this arrangement promotes cross-fertilization
between INR and other elements of the Intelligence
Community. Second, INR has used affirmative action
programs as a means of obtaining the services of
qualified FSRs. These officers are admitted at the
FSR-5 level on the basis of prior experience and their
anticipated contribution to the work of the Department.
Finally, INR is exploring Civil Service programs in
the area of part-time and temporary employment as a
means of fulfilling its requirements for area and
functional specialists. The external research program
also is helpful in this regard because expert consultants
can be used to perform tasks for which INR may have no
capability at present.
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4. Army
a. (U) Army intelligence production capabilities
are adversely affected by a number of personnel policies.
They include: hiring freezes; failure to obtain recognition
of the high degree of skills/grade levels required by
technical production activities; continuous reduction of
the average grade; and reductions-in-force.
b. (U) MIA and FSTC have average grade levels of
10+ and 11+, respectively, which are below the journeyman
level.. INSCOM has authorizations for civilian analysts
in grades GS-9 through GS-14. Upward mobility at these
levels is restricted and grade limitations inevitably place
these agencies in a noncompetitive position with respect to
retaining analysts, scientists, and engineers, and
recruiting promising applicants. Promotions above GS-13
take a skilled analyst out of production and into manage-
ment. The result is often the loss of a good analyst, a
manager who wants to be an analyst, or a poor manager.
5. Air Force
a. (U) With current emphasis on the reduction of
the average grade and the number of high grade positions
(GS-13 and above), promotion opportunities are being
constricted. If continued as forecasted, promotion
opportunities above the GS-12 level will be very restricted.
While the need for increased intelligence competence
becomes more acute, the above handicaps will make it
difficult to sustain even current standards.
b. (U) Federal salaries for college graduate engineers
for example, are not competitive with private industry.
The top salary the Air Force can offer these graduates is
GS-7, Step 5, $13,059 per annum. The average starting
salary for graduate engineers exceeds $14,000 per annum.
To offset this disadvantage, engineers and scientists
had been recruited under a career development plan that
included rapid promotion. The Air Force now has a GS-12
ceiling on promotion opportunities for scientists and
engineers. This will lead to an increase in the time-
in-grade required for promotions to the next level.
The Air Force cannot attract competent scientists and
engineers under these restrictions.
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6. USMC
(U) The Marine Corps has no civilian analysts.
The military grade spread of analysts ranges from
corporal to lieutenant colonel. The newly created
Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) for unrestricted
intelligence officers will provide flexibility and
control in the training and utilization of its intelli-
gence officers. It will not only allow the Corps to
upgrade the analytical capability of personnel assigned
at the tactical, Joint and National levels, but also to
enhance the entire intelligence effort.
7. NSA
(U) NSA has identified FY 1979 funds to specifically
plan for promotion opportunities for analysts.
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10. THE ROLE OF ADVERSARY PROCESSES
A. Introduction
(U) The adversary process, when defined as independent intelligence
analyses by more than one group or agency using comparable resources, can
often improve the intelligence product. It is also felt by some to be a
necessity when dealing in matters of critical national concern. Intelli-
gence estimates involve subjective judgments and data interpretation.
Adversary processes should help to clarify the degree of uncertainty and
lead to a better understanding of how intelligence judgments are developed
and how dependent they are on subjective interpretation versus factual
data. The process should provide an important check and balance which
ensures that positions are sound, supportable by the evidence and germane.
It should also surface differences in interpretation where the supporting
facts are not all that clear. This process has been used by almost every
intelligence agency in one form or another for some time now.
B. Agency/Departmental Programs and Views
1. NFAC
a. (U) Since early 1977, NFAC's predecessors have been
actively reviewing the desirability of institutionalizing
adversary mechanisms in the intelligence production process.
Senior managers have been conscious of the need to ensure
that all data are rigorously examined; uncertainties clearly
stated; the implications of alternative conclusions made
explicit. The traditional analytic process, although con-
taining some adversary and checking mechanisms--layers of
internal review, the interagency coordination process, and
some duplication of effort within the Intelligence Community--
has been sharply criticized for failing to consider the range
of conclusions flowing from the same data; for not bringing
to bear outside perceptions and innovative methodologies;
and for becoming encrusted with institutional or component
biases.
b. (C) To improve the quality of products, the Director
of NFAC has created a Review Panel to provide him with an
independent review of major intelligence products, especially
those focusing on problems that have serious policy impli-
cations. The Review Panel will serve not only as a Devil's
Advocate, but will also surface alternative conclusions to
best judgments and assist in identifying critical intelli-
gence questions that merit formal alternative hypothesis
analysis or competitive analysis.
c. (U) The DCI intends to maximize public dissemination
of NFAC's analytic products, consonant with security needs.
This will contribute to the development of an adversary
process--albeit in a post-publication setting--by making a
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larger portion of NFAC's output on critical issues available
to experts in the private sector for critiques and alternative
analyses. Such an approach may also stimulate healthy
exchanges on NFAC's methodologies and substantive findings.
2. DIA
(U) DIA uses the adversary process in several ways.
Externally, interagency committees provide an excellent forum
for the employment of the adversary process in developing
Community findings. DIA elements participate in these and
consider tilem to be particularly fruitful efforts. There are
also a number of internal agency approaches. In some elements,
organized review processes and boards exist that, in effect,
constitute an adversary process where the authors must defend
their work as it is exposed to close pre-publication scrutiny
and sharp challenge. This process surfaces differing views
and opposing interpretations of the evidence. An informal,
and frequently overlooked, adversary system is that involving
discussions between analysts. DIA's analysts are in constant
touch with their counterparts throughout the Intelligence
Community. They confer on new bits of incoming data as well
as on their findings as they proceed through the analytic
process. A recent case in point was DIA's differing view
with CIA analysts on the Soviet oil situation.
3. State Department
a. (U) The interaction that takes place between INR
analysts and policy officials is an adversary process marked
by questioning and the expression of differing points of
view. This in-house debate is particularly useful because it
is based on a more or less continuous engagement with the
problems with which the Department's policymakers are dealing.
It not only gives INR analysts a sense of the questions that
they ought to be focusing on, but also helps them to produce
more sophisticated and policy-relevant papers.
b. (U) INR supervisors regularly engage in a form of
adversary procedure with their analysts in which they seek to
assure that no significant aspect of a subject has been over-
looked. During the past year, INR has also made special
efforts to engage embassies abroad in a dialogue by inviting
their comments on drafts and finished analyses. This pro-
cedure has led to sharpened analyses and more policy-relevant
papers.
c. (U) INR's External Research Program provides
numerous opportunities to bring into the usual in-house
adversary proceedings the analyses of outside experts.
Various conferences and special meetings with outside
researchers working on contract projects are especially help-
ful in this regard.
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11. ROLE OF PRESENTATIONAL TECHNIQUES
A. Introduction
1. (U) Clearly, if intelligence findings are not communicated to
the user so that he understands exactly what is meant by a given assess-
ment, then the entire intelligence effort is for naught or, worse, may
seriously mislead the user. Individual elements of the Intelligence
Community are fully aware of this and have efforts underway to explore
new presentational techniques. These efforts encompass a variety of
approaches, from the use of new media techniques to reformatting existing
reports and refocusing older techniques.
2. (U) Experimental work to date has shown that presentational
techniques can improve the utility of intelligence analysis in a number
of ways. First, graphic-oriented presentational formats can sharpen the
analytical focus of intelligence products as they demand a precision
that forces clear, concise presentations. Second, complex analytic
problems can be presented in a more meaningful manner to non-experts.
New presentational techniques can also provide analysts with an opportunity
to organize and record large quantities of relevant background information
on any given subject which consumers can review, in varying degrees of
depth, at their convenience. Finally, analysts can facilitate the
presentation of their evidence if they have access to media techniques
that permit the liberal use of visual material.
B. Agency/Departmental Programs and Views
1. NFAC
a. (U) Until recently CIA's efforts to improve the
methods of conveying the results of its analytical work have been
confined largely to printed matter. New publications tailored to
meet specific consumer needs have been introduced. In addition,
the designs of various publications have been revised from time to
time to improve their readability and appearance. During the last
two years, the Agency has begun to take a systematic look at new
means of presenting intelligence. For example, in late 1976, the
Directorate of Intelligence established a Publications and Presentations
Group which has among its responsibilities the investigation and
development of new presentational means.
b. (C) Much of the initial work has been concentrated on
experimenting with a videodisc system developed by the Music
Corporation of America. An experimental disc produced earlier this
year was sufficiently promising to justify work on a second disc.
This second disc, which is nearing
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completion, will present a series of briefings on Soviet
strategic military forces, short biographies on nearly 100
prominent Soviet leaders, and a catalog of hundreds of
individual pieces of military equipment. In early FY 1978,
plans call for the production of several 15-minute videotapes
dealing with such complex subjects as the methodology for
costing Soviet military expenditures, the Soviet anti-satellite
missile system, and problems in analyzing the Soviet civil
defense system.
c. (C) For the continuation of presentational work in
FY 1979 and beyond, the DDI Publications and Presentations
Group has 'proposed the establishment of a video center for
intelligence production. The center would have four main
functions: to determine the best methods for presenting
finished intelligence by video; to determine the types of
information that are best suited to this form of presen-
tation; to develop a video production staff; and to provide
an operational facility for the production of intelligence
using videodisc, videotapes, and real-time communications.
2. CIA/ORD
(C) In 1975 the Presentational Means project OLYMPIC
was established. The object of the program is to improve
the communicability and timeliness of finished intelligence
to high-level consumers. As a consequence of ORD studies,
a Presentational Means Steering Panel representing all
agency analytical, publication, distribution and research
functions was established. The Panel is responsible for
the oversight of R&D in the field of presentational means
and the prioritizing of those efforts. OLYMPIC has been
directed to explore the use of all media and to develop
ways to improve the content, design and distribution methods
of existing presentational means programs. A pilot program
to develop intelligence TV documentaries and optical video
disc programming is currently underway. Programs emphasizing
advanced paper and electronic media will be undertaken in
FY 1978.
3. DIA
a. (C) The Defense Intelligence Officers recently
developed a product designed for a few of the highest DoD
officials. This publication has now been transformed and
broadened in scope to meet the needs of the new adminis-
tration. DIA's current intelligence element has also
developed a Weekly Watch list to meet the needs of the Joint
Staff. This list is designed to ensure interaction between
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DIA production elements and the Joint Staff consumers.
The Military Services desire for a single daily current
intelligence publication led to the development of the
Defense Intelligence Summary.
b. (C) In addition to tailoring its products to the
user, DIA has taken internal initiatives to enhance the
receptivity of data. Its Research Center has, for example,
restructured all products to provide a measure of commonality
in numerical identifiers, nomenclature, and organization that
will result in the user's finding it easier to locate a
specific publication and, within it, the type data he desires.
Another initiative is the use of video-cassettes. The
Current Intelligence Directorate distributes cassettes to
72 consumers. This includes the White House Situation Room
which uses the tapes to brief the NSC and the NSC Staff.
The video-cassette program has passed the pilot stage and is
maturing into a standard element within the array of
briefings, hard copy, and messages that comprise DIA's multi-
media communication capability. DIA intends to expand the
video-cassette program in order to enhance the user's under-
standing of DIA, its products, and how to acquire them.
c. (U) Last year in an effort to fine tune its
communications with the consumer, DIA began to include
numeric expressions of subjective probability in selected
publications and briefings. The intent is to more precisely
state the intelligence analyst's evaluation and avoid
confusion over such words as "possible," "probable,"
"likely," etc. Reaction from DoD consumers has been quite
good and pm will continue the system.
3. State Department
a. (U) INR has long been aware of the value of graphics
as important tools in intelligence analysis. Until very
recently, however, INR had a very limited capacity to design,
compile, and draft maps and charts. Most maps and charts had
to be commissioned through another agency. As a result, INR
had to limit its use of specially made maps and charts largely
to reports that were not time-sensitive.
b. (U) In producing maps, charts, and diagrams for
departmental use, INR has continued to rely upon traditional
methodologies: manuscript compilation and drafting. Most of
INR's maps are printed in black and white owing to charter
restrictions placed on the Department's Publishing and Repro-
duction Division. At the present time, the Department is
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unable to produce multicolored, carefully registered maps
rapidly. During the current fiscal year, however, INR will
obtain an automated cartographic/graphic system for the
compilation and drafting of maps. The system comprises a
digitizer, a computer, a control unit, and a vertical
plotter, and will provide INR with a capability to produce
certain kinds of maps and graphics for Departmental use
that it could not do before.
4. Air Force
(U) FTD is using its computers to generate visual aids
for studies and briefings and to prepare messages that
disseminate technical intelligence information to a variety
of addressees. Selected briefings are recorded on videotape
and viewed when and where they are needed.
5. Army
(C) Army intelligence presentations over the past year
have had significant impact on the U.S. Army in many areas.
S&T presentations have been particularly valuable and include
such items as: Soviet Radio-Electronic Combat, Warsaw Chemical
Warfare capability, Soviet Assault Helicopter developments, and
the new Soviet Medium Tank. The Chemical Warfare briefing was
presented to top level Army and Defense personnel and to
Congressional elements. This briefing is believed to have been
an important factor in the decision to reconstitute the Army
Chemical Corps.
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12. IMPROVING PRODUCT UTILITY
A. Introduction
1. (U) Nothing so inspires an analyst to write the best possible
paper as the knowledge that a high-level policy official has requested
it and is pressing for its earliest completion. Nothing so encourages
an analyst as the knowledge that a policy official has used his paper.
If all papers were requested, there would be few problems, but many
papers are selfiinitiated on the ground that a policy official would
benefit from an analysis of a certain subject even though he has not
asked for it. The challenge is to prepare a paper that will throw light
on policy process at the point where it can be most helpful.
2. (U) Improving product utility is a major objective of the
Intelligence Community. Our ability to realize this objective, however,
is directly related to how effectively we achieve our other goals with
respect'to improving the quality of analysis. It is also dependent on a
fuller understanding of precisely what kinds and amounts of finished
intelligence are most needed by users.
B. Agency/Departmental Programs and Views
1. NFAC
a. (U) The Director of NFAC has indicated that he will take
a personal interest in improving the quality of National Intelligence
Estimates (NIEs) and other papers prepared for the senior policy
community. He intends to work directly with the senior officials
and analysts engaged in the preparation of these products. A new
Review Panel will also provide the Director with an independent
review of NIEs and other major intelligence products.
b. (U) Even before the merger of the DDI and NIO, Agency
officials made a comprehensive review of the role of National
Intelligence Estimates,:looking toward improving the products and
making them more useful. The findings were published in the
monograph "National Estimates: An Assessment of the Product and
the Process" in 'April 1977 by the Agency's Center for the Study of
Intelligence.
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2. DIA
a. (U) Efforts to ascertain the consumer's evaluation of
DIA's products is ongoing at a number of levels in a variety of
ways. Many of DIA's hard copy products carry a tear-out evalu-
ation sheet. Although not nearly 100% effective, this type of
survey indicates consumer reaction to the specific publication.
These evaluations are used by the production elements in planning
for subsequent issuances. DIA also includes the names of the
preparing analysts in some publications. Interested consumers
who contact these analysts to clarify or inquire about additional
data, frequently give the analyst an understanding of the use of
the data. There are also specifically designed consumer surveys
for various classes of products.
b. (U) DIA also has a specifically designed informal sys-
tem of contact with consumers at all levels. The Defense Intelli-
gence Officers, Deputy Directors, middle managers, and analysts,
through their day-to-day contacts, attempt to ascertain the con-
sumer's views on the utility of DIA products. These contacts are
continuous and numerous. It is often through these contacts that
requirements are refined and new tasks levied on DIA to meet the
consumer's needs.
3. State Department
a. (U) INR officersmaintain close working relationships
with the policy bureaus in the State Department. For this reason,
some of the problems faced by intelligence analysts in other
agencies--i.e., not knowing what the consumer wants--are less
frequently encountered by INR analysts. The fact that a substan-
tial portion of the INR analytical work force consists of FSOs
who have had experience at overseas posts also helps to keep
INR products responsive to consumers' needs. There is always
room, however, for improving producer-consumer relationships.
b. (U) INR is uniquely well placed to seek improvements
in the relevance of its own studies and of interagency estimates
to policymakers because of its proximity to and close relation-
ships with the policy bureaus in the Department. Toward this
end, INR managers have: (1) stressed the necessity of ensuring
that INR studies are not merely descriptive, historical, and
static but examine the implications of developments for US
policy and try to answer the question, "So what;" (2) encouraged
the National Intelligence officers to meet these criteria in
interagency estimates; and (3) sought to ensure that inter-
agency estimates are better focused on issues of concern to
c'
:CR ET
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policy officials by drafting terms of reference with care and by
soliciting the advice of principal end-users at the beginning of
the estimative process.
4. Army
a. (U) The Army is conducting a survey of its intelligence
users to determine how intelligence products are used and how they
can be made more responsive to user needs. The survey is being
made by a team which is visiting organizations representative of
the entire spectrum of Army intelligence user interests.
b. () Scientific and Technical Intelligence (S&TI) is used
to develop threat papers for the development cycle of US ground
force material to assure best possible performance against likely
adversaries. S&TI is also utilized to bring to the attention of US
developers foreign techniques and designs which may be useful in
the production of US material. FSTC cooperated in a program initiated
by DoD/CIA to track the use of covertly acquired HUMINT to the
ultimate user in the R&D community. Studies prepared by FSTC using
such material were tracked to Aviation Command, Dugway Proving
Ground, Electronics Command, and Tank and Automotive Command where
the usefulness of these studies was confirmed.
5. Navy,
a. (C) The Office of Naval Intelligence recently reviewed
the quality of its S&TI analysis and the applicability of its
products to major consumers. As a result of this self-analysis,
the Naval Intelligence Support Center has been restructured to
apply the majority of its analytical resources toward providing
threat support to the naval weapons systems planning, development
and acquisition process.
b. (C) In the process of establishing a new relationship
between intelligence elements and weapons developers, the Navy had
discovered that one of the best methods of improving the respon-
siveness of intelligence is to issue service-wide instructions
which make the consumer request specific intelligence support for
projects and programs. To insure that the consumer uses the
intelligence, the Navy has developed a system for checking on its
use during the Navy and DoD acquisition review processes. The
purpose of the reorientation is to provide current threat data and
forecasts to consumers in weapons development and acquisition
programs. This effort provides tailored-threat assessments
specifically designed to support R&D and systems development
projects.
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c. (U) After establishing a closer relationship with
its Material Community, Naval Intelligence now finds itself
analyzing intelligence which did not previously receive much
emphasis. Current intelligence has always occupied most of the
attention of intelligence analysts. The problem is that weapons
system developers do not especially need current intelligence.
They need information on the threat at some time in the future.
To provide this information, Naval Intelligence is now engaged
in making long-range threat forecasts.
6. Air Fot.ce
(U) Intelligence products and, in particular, National
Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) are widely used in supporting the
Air Staff. They also provide intelligence throughout the Air
Force because a significant amount of information in NIEs is
used in the Defense Intelligence Projections for Planning (DIPP).
Other intelligence products are also used in planning tactics,
designing modifications to existing systems, and in the design
phase of new systems.
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C. Discussion
(C) The large efforts noted above in (1) the use of outside experts
and contractors, and (2) analytical technique development--accounting
for approximately 72% of NFIP requested funds for quality of analysis
improvements--raise some programmatic concerns.
1. (C) Outside Experts and Contractors
Intelligence agencies and program managers have identified a
large amount of FY 1979 resources for the use of outside experts
and contractors to improve the quality of analysis. While the
Community has been criticized for being insular and assuredly
benefits from increased dialogue with outside experts, the magnitude
of these efforts raises several issues:
a. Since at least some of the external research funds
are also for contractual development and testing of improved
and new analytical methodologies (discussed below), there is
probably some double accounting of funds in these categories.
b. Some agencies identify their entire external research
contract program as contributing to improvement in the \
quality of analysis, while other agencies selectively identify
only a part of the external research as making such a contribution.
In the future, agencies should define the
external research efforts that are expected to make improve-
ments in the quality of the intelligence product and the
precise nature of the anticipated improvement.
c. Outside experts and contractors probably make the
most direct impact on the quality of analysis by reviewing and
critiquing intelligence products and advising agencies on
analytic problems. Examples of this type of action are:
NFAC's forming of a Review Panel of outside authorities to
review and critique national intelligence products; NFAC's
proposed expansion of its scholar-in-residence programs, which
will bring more outside experts into the analytical process;
INR's contracting with a wide range of academic experts to
participate in analytical conferences; and various agencies'
retention under contract of consultants to serve in advisory
panels and boards. More initiatives of this type should be
taken, and existing efforts should be selectively expanded.
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d. The external research programs, since they
enable the agencies to augment their in-house skills
and capabilities and to produce important products
that otherwise would not be possible, can indirectly
contribute to improve product quality. They help
agencies meet consumer demand and in many cases they
provide prototype products which the agencies can
later replicate internally. External assistance of
this type should be reviewed to identify the skills
and capabilities that are chronically in short supply
and tQ reexamine the agencies' recruitment programs
and use of available manpower resources.
e. The total Community external research program
involves substantial costs. It may also require
better coordination to: (1) avoid undesirable dupli-
cation; (2) ensure the accommodation of the needs of
other agencies in contracted research by providing for
mutual visibility of contract programs among agencies;
and (3) ensure that research results are transferred
to all agencies who can use them. In this regard, it
should be noted that State/INR has been charged by a
memorandum from Dr. Brzezinski of 27 April 1977 to
chair an interagency committee, involving virtually
all Executive Branch departments and agencies--includ-
ing CIA and DoD--for the coordination of external
research on foreign affairs. This group has the
advantage of keeping a broad range of consuming,
funding, and producing agencies informed about
government-supported research of cross-agency
interest. However, as various elements of the
Intelligence Community expand their use of external
experts and contractors, it may be desirable to
supplement the work of this government-wide group
with that of a more specialized sub-group. In such
a group, a greater number of analytical production
units could be represented for the more effective
coordination of the external research they support
for the purposes of advancing both substantive
production and analytical methodologies.
2. (C) Analytical Technique Development
The large effort devoted to analytical technique develop-
ment suggests that there is a need for future Community-wide
review and analysis of this type of program, also. The
reasons are:
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a. A high proportion of the effort is devoted
to the development and acquisition of ADP software
and hardware. By improving computer support to
analysis, these efforts are intended to improve the
analysts' working environment and efficiency. However,
these programs should be subject to Community over-
sight along with other ADP programs.
' b. It remains to be determined whether concentra-
tion of so much funding on this type of initiative
rather than others, such as improved selection and
trainitig of analysts, is an optimal allocation of funds.
c. Although methodological research has uncertain
payoff (a characteristic of most research), efforts
to develop new approaches and techniques should be
encouraged. Mechanisms should be established, however,
to provide rigorous evaluation and validation of them
and to foster the adoption of effective new or improved
methods.
d. At present, only CIA has the organizational
infrastructure to manage the R&D of methodologies and
to facilitate their application in intelligence analysis
and reporting. Other agencies should be encouraged to
create such organizations, or CIA should be authorized
to provide a service of common concern.
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III. Trends in NFIP Analytic/Production Manpower
A. (C) This section consists of graphs which portray trends in:
1. Overall FY 73-79 NFIP analytic/production manpower
strength by agency/program;
2. Overall FY 73-79 NFIP agency/program analytic and
production manpower as a proportion of total NFIP manpower; and
3. FY 73-79 NFIP agency/program analytic and production
manpower applied to the USSR area.
The data have been derived from the DCI's Consolidated Intelligence
Resources Information System (CIRIS). The figures represent Intelligence
Community resources for "evaluation, analysis, collation, correlation
and synthesis of information into end products." The Consolidated
Cryptologic Program (CCP) figures include resources for "analysis,
collation and correlation of SIGINT information" (plus, unavoidably,
resources for "dissemination and presentation of intelligence infor-
mation to intelligence producers and other consumers").
B. (U) It is important to note that the graphs do not:
1. Reflect actual manpower allocations, since all CIRIS
data represent (merely) manpower authorizations/planning estimates;
2. Reconcile acknowledged shortfalls in the quality of
agency data submissions to CIRIS over the years; or
3. Distinguish categories of "analyst" or "producer" by
job skill (e.g., national intelligence production, photointer-
pretation, crypto-linguistic processing), grade level, full or
part-time responsibilities, etc.
C. (S) With these limitations in mind, the figures show, among
other things, the following basic changes between FY 78 and FY 79:
1. A very slight overall increase in total NFIP
production manpower counterbalanced by a
larger decrease in total CCP analysis and reporting manpower (from
2. A slight increase in the proportion of total NFIP
;
which continues a
percent to approximately
manpower devoted to analysis/production (from approximatelYtI 1
begun in FY 74-75.
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3. A very small decrease in total NFIP analysis/produc-
tion manpower devoted to the USSR area
practically all of which is in CCP analysis ana reporting.
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Notes to the attached graphs:
(1) The sharp differences in Air Force production manpower figures
between FY 75-77 primarily represent USAF bookkeeping rule changes which
shifted certain manpower reporting categories from "production" to
"processing/support" in FY 76, and vice versa in FY 77.
(2) The CIA's decline in manpower applied to the USSR area beginning
in FY 75 represents increased use of the "world" area target versus a
specific country in its CIRIS reporting submissions.
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