1981 SPRING PLANNING REVIEW NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00171R001100060010-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 50
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 5, 2003
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: January 1, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

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RESOURCE MANAGEMENT STAFF
8 May 1979
NOTE FOR: D/CLLO
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SUBJECT: Draft 0MB Spring Review Book
Attached is a draft of the 0MB Spring
TOTHR
TOTHR
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comments by close of business tomorrow. If
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L_j to forward to OMB.
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lie
SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE MATERIAL
STATOTH
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RETURN BY HAND TO: A/1 g~/,5
ATOTHR T, M SECFE1 4 Ised leir-r;c,
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1981 Spring Planning Review
National Foreign Intelligence Program
Issue 11 NFIP Level
Statement of Issue
What should be the level of NFIP funding for 1981-83?
Background
Planning figures for the 1981-83 NFIP approved in the 1980 budget were based on:
? the President's decision on the future satellite imaging mix;:
? his decision on the NFIP funding level for 1980 and the outyears; and
? projected rates of inflation anticipated in January.
Since then, a number of factors have changed that require reconsiderations of the 1981-83
planning figures. Principal among these are:
? the President's recent decision on
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collection alternatives to replace the loss
? mixed Congressional reaction to some of the proposed imagery and SIGINT programs;
? revised programmatic considerations and expectations; and
? . revised inflation rates that are approximate
one percent higher thin previously estimated.
Most of these items are discussed in detail in the att s
Alternatives
lll. Increase the January planning ceiling by
o accommodate
changes in inflation, telemetry collection initiatives, and other possible increases;
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(2) Inflation Estimates: The effect of a 1 percent increase in aril.lcipated inflation
rates on. the NFIP is not large -- in the range of
be offset by increased emphasis on efficiency and productivity without a severely adverse impact..
(3) Confidence in Intelligence Assessments: Even with the loss of collection from 25X1
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U.S. confidence in its ability to monitor SALT and other non-SALT aspects of Soviet
strategic and Warsaw Pact general purpose forces remains high. The increpental value
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of significant additional, resources applied to these problems
This is not true of our assessment of non-Communist World intelligence
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It could
The initial results of an 0MB study on this problem indicate
that reasonably small amounts of additional resources may have a high return.
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Budgetary effects (in millions of dollars)
Planning base
Alternat.ive #2
Alterna.pVEo#Od For Release 200 i
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1981 Spring Planning Review
National Foreign Intelligence Program
Issue 4i : Soviet Strategic and Warsaw Pact General Purpose Forces Intelligence
Statement of Issue
What adjustments should be incorporated in the 1981-83 planning ceiling for Soviet strategic and Warsaw
Pact general purpose forces?
Sack round -
Last year's 0MB reviews of the National Foreign Intelligence Program placed considerable emphasis upon that
roughly
pf the targeted resources of the National Foreign Intelligence Budget dedicated to the collection,
processing and production of intelligence on Soviet strategic forces and Warsaw Pact general purpose forces. The
specific elements assessed included order-of-battle, weapons system technology, treaty monitoring, doctrine and
strategy, and warning. The assessments contained in those reviews reflected a reasonably satisfactory current
and prospective fulfillment of most peacetime intelligence objectives related to these issues, as shown on the
following table:
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We believe these assessments remain valid today and will continue to be valid through the planning period based
on the results of 1980 budget decisions. Nonetheless, because of changes proposed by Congress and other pro-
grammatic considerations and because of the considerable interest at this time in :SALT monitoring, it is useful
to review SALT monitoring capabilities and the events which may affect these capabilities. To place the contribu-
tions to SALT capabilities in perspective, a March 1978 DCI study assessed the relative contributions of the
various collectors. The DCI's assessment was as follows:
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"Near Term (1979-1983) Contribution to SALT Intelligence /l
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Issue 1l Non-Communist World Intelligence
Statement Of Issue
Are improvements needed in analytic and collection capabilities in order to respond effectively
to Non-Communist World intelligence needs?
Background -
The President and other high-level policymakers have repeatedly expressed dissatisfaction
with Non-Communist World intelligence; in other words, with the quantity and quality of
information produced by the intelligence and foreign affairs communities on Non-Communist
World countries. The President has asked Dr. Brzezinski, Admiral Turner, and Secretary
Vance to look closely at this area for possible improvements. In addition, the President
has publicly expressed his concern that open source information may have been inappropriately
de-emphasized during the last 15 years. The events in Iran and the attendant claims of
intelligence failures have created a special incentive to pursue improvements in Non-Communist
World intelligence.
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Thus, the Intelligence Branch, in cooperation with the International Affairs Division, has:
(1) reviewed current studies and initiatives related to improving Non-Communist World intelligence,
and (2) initiated an in-depth study on Non-Communist World reporting.
The OMB-initiated study is designed to (1) expand and verify or modify OMB's assessment
of Non-Communist World intelligence, (2) identify current and projected resources devoted to this
intelligence, (3) analyze deficiencies and constraints contributing to problem areas, and (4) develop
alternative resource levels and other recommendations related to improving Non-Communist World
intelligence. On a preliminary basis, our-current assessment of capabilities on Non-Communist
World intelligence is provided below.
Our review of current studies and initiatives related to improving Non-Communist World intelligence
has included the following major ongoing actions:
(1) David Aaron (NSC), David Newsom (State), and Frank Carlucci (CIA) are members of a Political
Intelligence Working Group. The group meets regularly and has focused on improving intra-
mission coordination lnd developing more comprehensive collection requirements on key Non-
Communist World countries.
developed reporting profiles on several key Non-Communist World countries and,
based on the coverage and information gaps identified, has prepared a preliminary proposal
for 723 additional political officer positions`
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(3) The DCI's collection staff is expanding its evaluation of mission reporting and initiating
a country-based tasking and evaluation system, starting with it is also rev,.ibwing STATOTH
several improvements for open source collection, including the establishment of a permanent
working group on this subject.
(4) The DCI's resources staff is studying the implications of resource reallocations to improving
political and economic intelligence and examining the linguistic problem within the
Intelligence Community.
(5) CIA has developed a professional inventory containing background information, skills, and
work data on almost all CIA intelligence analysts and is considering ways to alleviate gaps
identified.
It is possible that these initiatives will be translated into specific resource or non-resource-
related recommendations. At the moment, only State has identified a preliminary request for additional
political reporting officers.
Alternatives
1/1. Increase NFIP and State Department ceilings to provide for improvements in Non-Communist
World reporting.
112. Have the President request a comprehensive plan be developed jointly by the DCI and the
Secretary of State. and submitted to NSC as soon as possible (August 1). Retain previously
approved ceilings.
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The major questions associated with this issue are:
What information needs on Non-Communist World countries are not being satisfied?
What are the deficiencies and constraints which need to be corrected to improve Non-Communist
World intelligence?
Based upon a review of Community evaluations of mission reporting, discussions with consumers
and National Intelligence Officers concerned with Non-Communist World countries, a surprisingly
consistent picture emerges regarding what is and what is not being covered well. Generally,
consumers and analysts seem satisfied with coverage of the country's foreign policy, htl;ghest
governmental leadership, current political and economic events, support on critical U.S.
negotiations and crisis reporting. The reporting gaps cited below are virtually universal.
STATOTHR
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We believe that one of the principal reasons that these gaps remain is that corrective actions run
against the priorities that have been internalized by the Intelligence Community and the Foreign,Service.
Funding constraints and employment reduction programs have tended to accentuate traditional emphasis
toward correction and analysis on the Communist World and toward current events reporting. Not only
has this affected current allocation of resources, it has significantly influenced the kinds of long-
term investments needed to build and maintain an effective Non-Communist World collection and analysis
effort.
But there also arc a multicudcc of other variables which now contribute to less than satisfactory per-
formance against Non-Conmiuni:.i U rld i.r,t.:lligence requirements including foreign language deficiencies,
U.S. policy restriction',:: agali,si. claud, stine collection in some count1-les, inadequate regional and
sectoral coverage Ly U.S. n sions overseas, insufficient. intra-mission coordination, inadequate.
utilization of open source information by analysts, deficient data handling systems, and less than con-
ducive analytic environments. The relative impact of changing non-resource related variables on
improving Non-Communist World intelligence is not clear. This should be examined prior to concluding
that additional collection or analysis resources are required.
OMB's preliminary view is that significant improvements in Non-Communist World intelligence can be
achieved with existing resources, but selective additions in additional resources and personnel may be
required to achieve satisfaction. The nature of these additional resources (improved open source
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collection programs, more specialized attaches, more State Department political officers, more CIA
and country.
more analysts in headquarters, etc.) varies grehtly by'subject
OMB staff is concerned that the initiatives underway within the Department of State and thq Intelligence
Community are not adequately dealing with the Non-Communist World intelligence.problem. The efforts
of the Political Intelligence Working Group have concentrated on State and CIA collection and have
not selectively identified, from the wider range of information resources available, the best and
most efficient way to solve Non-Commn,nist.World information needs. Most importantly rhis effor
to have nverin._ o_kSA_4_he pri,:;pects for ;.orrectiv e~ ._tilon_i -bin the analytic arena. Other initiatives
are being pur:.ued o? an ad hoc basis and are not effectively tied into the larger question of improving
Non-Co,,uwnist World into ? tgence. , t,4rU ?
The Department of State's proposal to add 723 political officers is indicative of the problems cited
above. It is not based on a comprehensive analysis of information gaps; it has failed to acknowledge
the role of non-State reporting resources; it has not been coordinated with CIA or Defense; and it
assumes the Non-Communist World intelligence problem is entirely collection-related. Given the
multitude of variables which need to be examined to effectively deal with Non-Communist World intel-
ligence requirements, what appears to be missing is a well-coordinated, comprehensive and logical
approach.
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We recommend that the President communicate his concern about current initiatives to improve Non-
Communist World intelligence and request the DCI and the Secretary of State to submit a comprehensive
i)laa/to- Nae CSC by August 1, 1979. The plan should include an articulation of Non-Communist World
intelligence information needs that are not now being satisfied, a review of alternative ways of
filling these gaps and a justification for the alternative(s) proposed. Resource and non-resource-
related initiatives should be presented, and all aspects of the intelligence process should be considered.
Finally, initiatives should be prioritized in terms of their significance to improving Non-Communist
World intelligence and the difficulty and time involved in implementing them.
Since the resource sensitivity of thts.problem is not clear, 0MB staff does not now recommend an
increase in the NFTP or State Department 1981 ceilings. We do consider the question of improving Non-
Communist World intelligence to be a current c:uncer.n that needs to be dealt with in the near term.
While improvements in Non-Communist World intelligence may involve long-term investments which could
affect 1981 funding, more.immediate steps need to be taken either by redirecting or reallocating current
resources or by seeking additional 1979-1980 funding.
Alternative #I1 (Agency request)
No specific agency request is available at this time. The Department of State has proposed and
the Intelligence Community may propose increases in collection activities and initiatives in
other areas in response to the President's.interest in improving Non-Communist-World intelligence.
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STATO
., d' Q_
addition of iilli6o/to the NFIP and State Department 11981 ceilings may encourage the
development of cr
Additional resources
tive solutions to the Non-Communist World intelligence problem. However,
trary one; it is not known how resource-sensitive this problem is.
STAT T t ive 112 T Z""r-L___ 7 " f r
The current NFIP and State ceilings should be retained. Admiral Turner and Secretary Vance should
be requested to develop a comprehensive strategy for early NSC review on improving Non-Communist
World intelligence. The strategy should identify tradeoffs required to accommodate these new initia-
tives within existing resources, but the NSC should address the possibility of both 1980 and outyear
increases, if required.
Budgetary effects (in millions of dollars)
Alternative 411 - Agency request
Alternative 412
Implementatio
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 STATQTHT
OMB will prepare a propo etter from he President to the Director of Central Intelligence and
bouti,efforunder way in response to.his interest in
improving Non-Communist World intelligence and which ~ts jointly developed plan to be submitted to
the NSC no later than August 1, 1979. The letter would outline the lirf xt~atio~n desired and the dimensions
of the problem to be considered. OMB's policy letter would reference the President's-~a ter and would
o the extent they are justified, may be more appropriate in 1979-1980.
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request that all 1981 initiativ related to improving Non-Communist World intelligence be
highlighted in the ZBB submissions and ra both as part of the overall programs and separately,
as'part of a joint NFIP/State ranking.
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5/7/79 DRAFT-
Overview of DOD Intelligence
and Intelligence-Related Activities
Defense intelligence activities outside of the IP generally consist of programs to provide jnemy
information to users in wartime for the purposes of command an d control (i.e., operational planning
and maneuvering-of forces) and targeting. Four types of warfare are supported by these programs --
Theatre warfare (e.g., NATO, Korea), Naval warfare (e.g., sea lane protection, blockades), Inter-
continental warfare (e.g., missile and bomber attacks), and Space warfare (e.g., Anti-satellite
system operations). Many types of systems and forces have been and are being developed to address
the diverse needs of users concerned with these various types of conflict:
_4 A
,,)and multiple types of ground-
Radars for long-range detection of aircraft (e.g.rE3 AWACS_,
and ship-based air surveillance radars 25X1
Radars for monitoring the disposition and activities of surface forces (e.g., radars on
RF4, TRl, and OV1 aircraft; artillery-locating radars; and small moving vehicle and personnel-
detecting radars);
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? Signal intelligence systems for detecting, locating, and collecting against enemy radios
and radars on the ground, in the air, and at sea (e.g., COMINT and ELINT?sensors on RF4, TR1,
V1, RU21, and EP3 aircraft, numerous naval vessels and trucks);
Imaging systems for monitoring the disposition and activities of surface forces (e.g., film
cameras carried on RF4, SR71, and OVI/10 aircraft and electro-optical and/or infrared sensors
carried by these same types of aircraft as well as drones and remotely piloted vehicles).
Human intelligence collection for observing ground forces (e.g., observation aircraft and
helicopter units, prisoner-of-war interrogation teams, artillery sound and flash-ranging
teams, and unattended ground sensor platoons);
Acoustic intelligencesystems to detect and track submarines (e.g., the Sound Surveillance
System - SOSUS and the Surface Towed Array Surveillance System - SURTASS);
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Processing and dissemination equipment and personnel associated with each type of sensor,
along with multiple source processing (e.g., WS430B imagery processing center, the transportable
sound intercept facility (for COMINT), possible Battlefield Evaluation and Target Acquisition
(BETA) type centers).,
Collectively, these activities will be termed "combat surveillance" in this paper and the equipment
used will be called "Combat Surveillance Systems" to distinguish them from both weapons systems
funded in DOD and national intelligence systems funded within the NFIP. Many of these systems
can support operations in more than one type of warfare area. For Instance, U.S. E3 AWACS can
provide information to users in intercontinental, theatre, and naval warfare, BMEWS radars support
both intercontinental and space warfare, and naval reconnaissance and SIGINT aircraft and air sur-
veillance radars can support both naval and theatre warfare. II
Peacetime contributions are also significant. NATO E3 aircraft will provide surveillance of East
European air movements; SOSUS detections are very important in the peacetime tracking of Soviet
submarines, space surveillance radars and camerasare critical in tracking the growing inventory of
Soviet space objects and DSP provides trajectory information on launches of ballistic missiles worldwide.
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1981 Spring Planning Review
NFIP and DOD Intelligence
Issue 111IIC - Theatre Battlefield Surveillance
What level and mix of combat surveillance systems is needed to support theatre air and ground olperations?
Background
Intelligence needed to support ongoing theatre air and ground operations comes:from three generic sources -
combat forces and weapons systems, national intelligence systems
and from combat surveillance systems which exist primarily to detect and monitor the enemy in wartime. DOD
funding projections. now provide for the indefinite retention of most existing combat surveillance systems
and the development and procurement of a number of new systems-, most of which are associated with data
collection. While some of these, are ground-based, many are airborne to provide coverage of more distant
ground and low-altitude air targets. Other collection systems (not covered here) are sea or space-based and
are being improved and could provide theatre information in many circumstances. Processing systems needed to
extract the most useful information from the various data streams, combine it with other data and disseminate
54C to users are also included here.
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111. Expand combat surveillance capabilities by maintaining most current collection systems and investing
in families of airborne and ground based sensors in the early 1980s and imaroov d nrocessi d
dissemination capabilities for the mid to late 19809.
0".
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1/2. Emphasize improved all-source processing and dissemination In the early 1980s with selected collection
improvements centered on standoff aircraft supporting NATO-wide operations, and ground systems to
support U.S. artillery targeting. U -e m hasize other improvements centered mainly on aircraft collection
and phase out some less cost effective systems.
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0
Analysis
The major issues associated with these programs are:
? Processing and dissemination - the extent to which collected data can and will be rapidly and reliably
evaluated, communicated to, and absorbed by many tactical users. Communications and processing have
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historically presented serious probjems both within and among U.S. air III_ . Communications
difficulties alone have been a major factor. preventing timely collection tasking and/or information
dissemination. The more severe environments expected in future conflicts will further compound these
problems, as will the multi-national nature of the forces involved (most of the forces involved in likely
conflicts (e.g., NATO, Korea) will probably be non-U.S.,.and these forces have both less technical
collection capability and less effective communications with U.S. forces). Major U.S. intelligence
processing and dissemination deficiencies in the past have been both technical and administrative; these
are correctable but, due to%the lack of any joint service architecture for tactical intelligence, will
probably remain a serious impediment for some time. A multi-national architecture, although also needed,
is e'-en further away. F1
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 Information .utilityApplrbereebdtenReteas*2Cb3M2 reQ"D 81.A Mn74R3'41 $O1ib11ty can be reasonably
expected to influence the course of battle. In wartime as well as peacetime, considerable information
is collected which turns out to be of low value for many understandable reasons which do not relate to
collection system performance per se. Notwithstanding this lack of a necessary correlation between collec-
tion volume and intelligence value, combat surveillance systems are customarily justified on the inability
to collect data, as opposed to providing the data that can seriously affect the course of battle. The
ultimate utility of more data to potential recipients (in terms of battle outcomes) is rarely examined
and is often questionable on several grounds: n 25X1
- limited recipient ability to receive and absorb data
- limited recipient ability to exploit data (e.g., munitions or transportation constraints)
- limited recipient ability to reconcile conflicting, ambiguous, or incomplete data
relatively large information inputs from other sources (notably including direct observation and
P5X1 reporting from engaged units).
II
In short, the extent to which, additional information from these systems can be relied upon to "multiply" force
capabilities is not clear, and may not justify large expenditures which ultimately must come at the expense
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? Redundancy - the extent to which coverage of the same targets by multiple systems is needed. The most
'y,`~'./4_J(f) common types of high-priority intelligence targets in theatre war are relatively few in number:
- tank infantry, artillery and air defense units and equipment
fighter/attack aircraft and helicopter units and equipment
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- supporting C31 units and equipment.
II
Because these targets are both important -and numerous, many types of surveillance systems have been conceived to
detect them. Some system redundancy provides backup in case.of jamming and deception and compensates for the low
sustainability of some systems. Extensive redundancy, however, may also compensate for poor and unreliable communi-
cations, which is.perhaps a principal underlying cause. The ultimate utility of providing multiple types of systems
is not clear, however. In those circumstances where the improved sharing of available information is permitted by
ighly.redundant collectip'n a
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pears unnecessary and may be a luxury. In those circum-
to regularly prevent dissemination of critical intelligence to some
types of military units, the utility of providing costly independent collection systems to these units is probably
low because they would likely be ineffective in any case - due.to a lack of command and control.
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m Effective sustainability - the extent to which these systems can be expected to survive and operate in
a severe defensive, electronic. jamming, and weather environment using personnel projected to be on hand.
All of these systems operate in combat theatres and are subject to wartime attrition. Some are inherently
less s1rvivable than others, however, particularly those which must operate within range of SAMs and
artillery and/or which are easily detected and identified. In wartime, these types of systems may be forced
to operate in ways which significantly reduce their surveillance capability. Alternatively they may operate
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to provide the collection capability desired but may suffer high attrition. Attrition buys at realistic
rates are usually not programmed; if they were, costs would be significantly higher. ^ ,2 5X1
Collection systems based on light aircraft and helicopters have inherently low unit sustainability
because of fuel constraints. In addition, the effective operation of many radar, ELINT, and COMINT
systems depends heavily on the electronic jamming environment (both enemy and friendly) and collection
utility will likely decrease (due to interference) with increases in this growing threat. Moreover,
all of these systems require highly skilled personnel (e.g., pilots, aircraft mechanics and crewmen,
linguists, radar image interpreters, computer operations, electronics technicians) to operate and main-
tain the complex equipment and to process its output. It is highly questionable if these personnel will
be available in the quantities and qualities needed to sustain high-tempo operations by all of the pro-
jected systems. F
r.ernative /11
The predominant theme is development, procurement and use of independent surveillance systems by different
types, echelons, and nationalities of forces. Almost all existing collection systems are retained indefinitely
d
an
major additional investments are m::
U.S. E3, TR1, AND UH60 and NATO AWACS).
Processing and dissemination of information to multiple users is not
heavily relied upon, although Improvements will ultimately be fielded. Redundancy increases and becomes
relatively extensive near U.S. forces, but a variety of tactical users will have some access to relatively
responsive collection systems, at least in peacetime and in the early stages of conflict. II
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Alternative #J2
The predominant theme is to emphasize critical improvements in processing, dissemination, and aircraft
collection until a joint service architecture has been constructed and implemented, and until more and better
assessments of the effects of improving intelligence on military operations have been completed. Moist existing
collection systems (including several hundred combat surveillance aircraft) are retained until better methods
of securing needed data are in operation. A major investment is made in radar and SIGINT aircraft (NATO AWAGS
and a multisensor TR1) capable of providing support to both U.S. and Allied ground and air forces. Greatly
improved processing and dissemination, artillery location, and close-in imaging capability for U.S. forces is
also provided. Redundancy is only slightly greater than at present, except in air surveillance., Some older
and less cost-effective systems are phased out. (The increased capabilities of weapon sensors and national
intelligence systems are acknowledged and will be fully exploited. A summary of major system adjustments is
P5-Mown in Table ? 1.
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C3I GUIDANCE ANNEX
to
SECTION 0
COMMUNICATIONS, COMMAND, CONTROL, AND INTELLIGENCE
of the
Department of Defense
DR/DD PI INFO DRAFT
CS l CONSOLIDATED GUIDANCE
D10
~I
DC I 1981 - 1985
AH MzW,
RS
R CC
RCM ;{
RSS
RSO
RDS
RSP
DM April 12, 1979
ACTION
Office of rhp Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Communications, Command, Control, and Intelligence)
Classified by ASD (C3I)
Review on 12 APR 1985
Declassify on 25 FEB 1991
R EppAI~ OR DES7K;
SECRET .
ASD (C3I) CONTR. NO. 059-79
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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301
April 12, 1979
COMMUNICATIONS, COMMAND,
CONTROL, AND INTELLIGENCE
MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMEN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (MANPOWER, RESERVE AFFAIRS,
AND LOGISTICS)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION)
ADVISOR TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ON NATO AFFAIRS
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, NET ASSESSMENT
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE COMMUNICATIONS AGENCY
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
COMMANDERS-IN-CHIEF OF THE UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMMANDS
SUBJECT: C3I Annex to the Consolidated Guidance
My memorandum of 12 February 1979 forwarded the draft C3I Guidance Annex
to Section 0 of the DoD Consolidated Guidance FY 1981-1985, and solicited
your comments and suggestions. These have been reviewed, and zany have
been incorporated in the attached revision. The diligence exhibited by
OSD, OJCS, the Services, and the Defense Agencies has helped produce a
substantially improved basis for achieving balance and coordination in
the interdependent, evolutionary, and multi-Component activities which
typify the C3I portion of the Defense Program.
My staff and I wish to express our appreciation for the help received
in producing this supplemental guidance, and we look forward to seeing
our collective efforts come to fruition in the Program Objective
Memoranda.
UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT THIS SECRET
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED. ASD(C31) Contr No. 059-79
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C3I GUIDANCE ANNEX
to
SECTION 0
COMMUNICATIONS, COMMAND, CONTROL, AND INTELLIGENCE
of the
Department of Defense
DRAFT
CONSOLIDATED GUIDANCE
FY 1981 - 1985
April 12, 1979
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Communications, Command, Control, and Intelligence)
3ssified by ASD?(C31)
view on 12 APR 1985
-classify on 25 FEB 1991 SECRET ASD (C31) CONTR. NO. 059-79
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C3I GUIDANCE ANNEX
FY 1981 - 1985 ``C=
Foreword: (U) This annex is furnished in accordance with Section 0:
Communications, Command, Control, and Intelligence (C31) of-the
Department of Defense Consolidated Guidance, FY 1981-1985, and
supplements the C3I Objectives, Policies, Issues, Requirements,
and General Guidance that are furnished in Section 0.
I. STRATEGIC C31 (U)
A. STRATEGIC COMMAND AND CONTROL (U)
(S) Air Force shall finalize results of the DT&E/IOT&E test
program on the E-4B test bed aircraft in preparation for DSARC III
in early FY 1980; program for a fleet of six interoperable E-4B
aircraft with an FOC of FY 1987; structure the program to accommodate
one E-4A to E-4B modification per year during FY 1980, 1981, and 1982
with procurement of the fifth and sixth aircraft in'FY 1983 and 1984
at the Decremented level; and accelerate aircraft procurement at the
Basic level.
(S) Air Force shall investigate mission effectiveness of and
program for future E-4B system improvements, e.g., additional SHF
channels, improved secure data, voice and graphics conferencing
capability, the data bus concept, and IONDS direct readout; and
perform and report on trade-off and economic utility studies regarding
modifications vs. acquisition of equipments such as the ARC-58 and
ARC-89 systems. These studies shall be coordinated with the WWMCCS
System Engineer (WSE) as they become available.
(S) In addition, Air Force shall program for essential C3
enhancements to those EC-135 aircraft required to augment the E-4B
fleet.
(U) The JCS, with support from Air Force and DCA, should con-
solidate plans and implement common ADP capabilities on EC-135's and
E-4's for respective airborne command post roles.
B. STRATEGIC SURVEILLANCE AND WARNING (U)
a. Missile-Attack Warning (U)
(S) Air Force shall improve survivability of DSP connectivity
to users by programming.for austere backups to existing ground stations
and fully mobile ground terminals in accordance with the FY 80-84 FYDP.
Survivable communications between these additional ground stations and
survivable user facilities should be an integral part of these program-
ming actions to enhance end-to-end (satelli.te.-to-user) data survivability.
An approach calling for additional-dedicated satellites for DSP communi-
cations (Snuggler) is not to be pursued.
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(S) BMEWS attack assessment capabilities shall be improved
by upgrading or replacing current equipment. BMEWS Site I improvement
is to be completed by FY 1983 in accordance with the FY 1980-84 APDM.
A study delineating benefits and costs of attack-assessment upgrades
to BMEWS Site II upon completion of the Site I upgrade is to be sub-
mitted to OSD by December 1979. A program for the BMEWS Site II up-
grade should be included in the FY 1981-1985 POM at the Enhanced
level. Air Force shall retain PARCS as a backup until the BMEWS I
improvement is operational. Improve the COBRA DANE TOR, communications
and radar hardware and software.
(S) Air Force shall plan for missile-warning dual-phenomenology
coverage of present and potential threat areas for attacks against CONUS.
Specifically, it should define least cost options for providing dual
phenomenology coverage for potential SLBM launch areas to the south
of the U.S.
(S) Air Force shall submit a recommendation and proposal to
OSD regarding a DSP follow-on which provides earlier attack characteri-
zation than the radars and is significantly more survivable than DSP.
Air Force should include net costs, DSARC I, II, and III milestones
associated with an operational prototype, and consider utilization of
DARPA technology where appropriate.
b. Aerodynamic-Threat Warning (U)
(S) Air Force shall program for improvement of the current
DEW Line capability and maintenance of that capability. Air Force
shall: continue the restructured 0TH-B prototype effort including
planning for limited azimuthal coverage systems, to permit earlier
operational deployment and reduced investment costs if approved; and
program for bomber/cruise-missile-carrier warning in two phases with
near-term emphasis on a low-cost warning network sufficient to alert
the NCA of an impending attack from the Northern and coastal approaches
to CONUS, and research and development of a longer-term space-based
system capable of airspace surveillance. Additional funding should be
provided in FY 1981 to examine space-based concepts appropriate not
only to CONUS air warning requirements, but to a broader range of
missions, including support of worldwide naval operations and theater
warning applications. R&D should be programmed at a level adequate
to determine probable performance, cost, schedule and technical risk
data pertinent to space-based alternatives.
c. Space Surveillance (U)
(C) Navy shall program for continued modernization of
NAVSPASUR.
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C. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS (U)
(C) DCA, Navy, and Air Force shall accelerate adaptive HF
programs to ensure completion as soon as possible. Except in cases
where OSD has determined that existing equipment will be logistically
unsupportable prior to FY 1986, Air Force shall withhold decision on
procurement of replacement HF radios for strategic aircraft pending
decisions resulting from the adaptive HF program.
(S) Air Force shall program for procurement of UHF SATCOM
terminals for an appropriate mix of LCCs, B-52Ds and tankers and
subsequent SHF conversion of the LCC terminals, and for an SHF
satellite downlink to the LCCs. Air Force shall also program for
continuation of MEECN VLF improvements, e.g., mini-VLF receivers
for B-52 and FB-111 bombers, 616A modems, and Diversity Reception/
Automatic Combining on airborne command posts (E-4s and EC-135s) and
bombers (B-52s and FB-llls). Air Force should examine Navy TACAMO
capabilities and initiatives for VLF/LF received-signal processing
as alternatives to Piecing.
(S) Navy shall program to continue the Service Life Extension
Program and procure additional TACAMO aircraft to ensure 100-percent
airborne coverage in both the Atlantic and Pacific. In addition to
completing the EC-130 modification and replacements, Navy shall install
Diversity Reception/Automatic Combining on TACAMO VLF/LF receivers.
Compatibility with Air Force VLF/LF must be ensured.
(S) In accordance with the 18 January 1979 DSARC, Air Force shall
initiate a definition and validation phase for the Strategic Satellite
Space (SSS) segment which includes preliminary system design and develop-
ment of high-risk subsystems. Planning should include consideration of
Theater Nuclear Force communications needs, and reflect approval and
implementation of a limited upgrade of the Satellite Data System,
until SSS risks have been reduced and schedules-are clear as determined
at future DSARC meetings. Air Force shall determine feasibility, cost
and impact of using existing and planned single-channel transponders
to provide report-back, via experiments and contract studies. These
tests and studies must be completed before SSS space segment definition
and validation phase contracts are awarded.
(U) Navy shall continue its site-independent planning for an
austere ELF communication system, and program for continued operation
of the Wisconsin Test Facility in support of system design refinements
and transmitter and receiver improvements, using propagation validation
testing results; and accomplishment of ecological/biological research
as deemed necessary for satisfaction of system environment considerations.
(S) JCS, in conjunction with the CINCs, Services, and Agencies,
shall delineate operational needs for reconstituted strategic communi-
cations. DCA, in conjunction with the CINCs, Services and Agencies,
and in coordination with the Office of the Manager, National Communications
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System and the Federal Preparedness Agency, shall develop a compre-
hensive plan for management of the strategic communications recon-
stitution process, to include means for identification of surviving
assets, interconnection, and system control, responsive to those
requirements.
(C) JCS, in coordination with the CINCs and Agencies, shall
update Continuity of Operations Plans, Operations Concepts and the
Alert System, and in coordination with the CINCs, develop a WWMCCS
exercise plan for training and evaluation of the strategic communi-
cations reconstitution process.
(U) Services shall program for implementation of recommendations
of the SAC and Navy Connectivity Studies as approved by the ASD(C31).
_(S) DCA, in conjunction with the Navy and Air Force, shall
develop comprehensive plans for reconstitution of satellite communi-
cations and for assessing the contributions which could be made to
strategic communications reconstitution by: balloon-lofted trans-
ponders for UHF/UHF and UHF/VLF relays; mini-air pods at MF and above
for military and civil aircraft; surface ship relays; VLF/LF assets
on contingency communications platforms; and power distribution grids.
(S) DCA, in conjunction with the JCS, CINCs and Services,
shall formulate.a structured approach to HF radio usage for recon-
stitution of strategic communications, and in coordination with the
Office of the Manager, National Communications System, shall develop
a strategy and formulate recommendations for use of common-carrier
and civil communications assets to facilitate reconstitution of long-
haul connectivity.
D. STRATEGIC INFORMATION SYSTEMS (U)
(U) The Services, DCA and WSE should plan to field WWMCCS
Automated Message Handling Systems through FY 1981-83 as outlined
in the DoD Automated Message Handling Systems Plan.
(U) The WSE, with OJCS, Service and Agency support, shall conduct
the System Alternative Definition Phase of the WWMCCS Information
System (WrS) Program to provide a first assessment of WIS evolution
for review by the WWMCCS Council in late FY 1980, and alternative
architectural options to the WWMCCS Council in early FY 1982. Services
and Agencies will identify to the WSE technical work currently being
performed, or planned, that is supportive of evolution of the WWMCCS
Automatic Data Processing (ADP) System into the WIS. Prior to FY 1982
POM submittal, the WSE with support from the OJCS, Services and Agencies
shall develop an acquisiton strategy to guide the implementing phase
of the WWMCCS ADP System into the WIS. The WSE, with support from
the JCS, Services and Agencies, shall assess funding requirements for
the FY 1983 to FY 1986 period for hardware acquisition and system
software developments for the WIS. This assessment should be reported
in sufficient time for inclusion in the FY 1982 POM.
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(U) JCS, Services, Defense Agencies, and WSE shall continue
efforts to improve the correlation of operations and intelligence
information to support command decision-making. JCS, in collabora-
tion with the Services and Agencies shall develop a management
structure for establishing and maintaining evolutionary.DoD standard
software for the growing inventory of minicomputers.
(U) Near-term improvements of the WWMCCS ADP system should
continue with emphasis on improvements in the period FY 1981-1983 to
selectively extend the useable life existing systems beyond FY 1986.
DCA should develop programs to provide improved terminals and display,
query and response and data management capabilities for WWMCCS ADP
community use during FY 1980-85 period.
(U) The WSE, with Service and Agency support, shall continue
with the R&D in the Operational Utility of ADP Program through FY 1984;
after the WWMCCS Council decision on WIS architectures, emphasis should
be on performance specifications for the WTS Target Architecture. An
assessment should be made of continued use of the Operational Test-
bed for C3 demonstrations after FY 1984 and implementation of an advanced
technology test-bed to complement WIS evolutionary development.
(U) Services, OJCS, Agencies and WSE will continue to implement
interface standards and operational procedures to ensure effective
data and information exchange, and ensure that existing and programmed
C3 digital data transfer requirements can be supported by AUTODIN II.
(U) Services and Agencies shall continue to fund near-term O&M
of the dedicated WWMCCS Intercomputer Network (WIN); including funds
for lease of communications circuits and maintenance of ADP equipment.
Funds should be programmed for the transfer of the dedicated WIN to
AUTODIN TI which will be implemented during FY 1981. Funds are needed
in the following areas: purchase and/or lease of computer hardware
for the WWMCCS Network Front Ends (WNFE) to interface the WWMCCS
computers to AUTODIN II; communications leases for access lines to
AUTODIN II switches; and preparation of sites for installation of
AUTODIN IT associated ADP Equipment and communications.
II.. THEATER AND TACTICAL C31 (U)
A. THEATER COMMAND AND CONTROL (U)
(C) JCS and Services, in coordination with the WSE, shall complete
systems definition efforts for the full range of capabilities the Joint
Crisis Management Capability (JCMC) program is intended to provide.
Army supported by the Air Force shall establish a JCMC program manage-
ment structure with strong WSE involvement. Army shall program to
procure JCMC to completion of first set in FY 1981, and Air Force shall
program aircraft modification for JCMC.
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(C) Air Force shall program for maintenance of the present
ground-alert posture of the CINCPAC, CINCLANT, and CINCEUR airborne
command posts.
B. THEATER SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE (U)
(S) Navy shall continue advanced technology efforts-on the
interaction of acoustic and non-acoustic sensors and data correlation
techniques for both surface and undersea surveillance.
C. THEATER INFORMATION SYSTEMS (U)
(C) Services, NSA and DCA shall program resources to support
the Computer Security consortium and research in general-purpose
multilevel secure ADP systems. NSA shall program resources to estab-
lish a capability, in accordance with direction to be furnished by
OSD, to evaluate commercial and military developed ADP systems for
potential use in DoD multilevel secure applications. Services and
Agencies should establish a capability to implement and maintain
qualified secure ADP systems for use in system developments within
their cognizance.
(U) Navy shall program to exploit the Pacific MME and pursue
Automated Test Message Handling.
D. TACTICAL COMMAND AND CONTROL (U)
(S) Services shall implement plans and training to ensure
against catastrophic failure of tactical C2 systems, e.g., all
automated systems should have a fallback manual operation mode.
(S) Services shall program for continued support to the joint
BETA project. BETA results and end products are to be fed as appro-
priate into the Army's All Source Analysis System (ASAS), TOS and
TACFIRE; the Air Force's Tactical Fusion Division, Intelligence
Integration System (IIS) and 485L; the Navy's TFCC/IC's; and the
Marine Corps' IAC. The BETA test bed should be designed and developed
to ensure that NATO objectives are met. Test plans should ensure
that all interfaces with Service/NATO systems are examined and tested
where appropriate.
(U) Services shall continue to work closely with the JINTACCS
program to ensure that joint interoperability of tactical C2 systems
is achieved at the earliest possible time. The program shall empha-
size hardware testing for compatibility demonstration.
(S) Army should continue its efforts to achieve early fielding
of the Tactical Operations System (TOS). Software development should
ensure sufficient flexibility to allow TOS to be an evolutionary
system which is adaptive to chaining commanders and combat situations.
TOS should also be closely coupled with the BETA program to derive
maximum benefit from the products of that effort.
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(U) Services shall program for continued RDT&E (on a shared
basis) and procurement of the Class II JTI'DS terminal, in accordance
with the ASD(C31) memorandum of 15 March 1979; and for RDT&E efforts
necessary to develop a Class III terminal based on ATDMA technology..
Army, Navy, and Air Force Frequency Managers will complete necessary
actions to achieve JTIDS frequency clearance in NATO countries and
other areas.
(U) Army, Navy, and Air Force, in coordination with JCS,.shall
program for development of a detailed NATO-integrated employment
and operational concept plan for use of JTIDS voice and data, in
concert with U.S. and NATO efforts to secure JTIDS frequency clearance
in NATO countries where JTIDS will be operated in peacetime. Army,
Navy, and Air Force, in coordination with JCS, shall program for
development of a NATO-integrated operational concept for each weapon
system to be equipped with JTIDS and planned for deployment to NATO
during 1982-1990.
(S) Army shall:, continue its efforts to field an interim quick
reaction capability Control and Analysis Center (CAC); accelerate the
development of its military family of computers to meet production
schedules for new systems such as TOS, and to expedite early availability
of ASAS;-and follow through with plans to develop a Division Air Defense
Command and Control test-bed at sufficiently high priority to allow for
early fielding of an operational system.
(C) Air Force shall continue its effort to automate the Tactical
Air Control Center (TACC). Plans for incorporation of the FRG-developed
Eifel/Distel System at the Sembach ATOC should continue.
(S) Air Force should continue efforts underway to ensure that
the AWACS Enhancement Program and NATO AEW program plans are carefully
coordinated to achieve interoperability and cost/schedule efficiency.
Particular emphasis should be placed on the resolution of the APY-l/
Rapier EMC problem.
(S) Air Force shall review Navy E-2C accomplishments and programs
for automatic track initiation and tracking for applicability to the
E-3A and furnish a report to OASD(C31) (Combat Support), delineating
technical feasibility and programmatic issues for using Navy technology
to achieve a major upgrade in E-3A track capacity, prior to the FY 1982-
1986 POM.
(S) Marine Corps shall investigate the possibility of adopting
the NATO Allied Command Europe-Air Command and Control System (ACE-ACCS)
concept for application in the Tactical Combat Operations System.
(S) Navy shall prepare quantitative performance requirements and
resolve intelligence, command and control, and communications inter-
faces for the Tactical Flag Commander Center (TFCC) prior to entry into
system validation. Emphasis in the TFCC should be on evolutionary
development consistent with integration of existing shipboard C I
facilities.
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E. TACTICAL SURVEILLANCE, RECONNAISSANCE AND TARGET ACQUISITION (SR&TA) (U)
1. Army (U)
(S) Army shall plan to achieve "fail-soft" interrelationships
to enhance functional survivability in combat for such systems as QUICK
FIX/TRAILBLAZER, QUICK LOOK/TEAMPACK, and GUARDRAIL/TACELIS; fusion of
SOTAS and OV-1D imagery with SIGINT products; and real-time utilization
of SOTAS to cue, for example, SHORADS. Appropriate data-exchange
mechanisms with Air Force and Marine Corps counterpart systems are
required.
(S) Army shall program for continuation of the GUARDRAIL V
(COMINT) product improvement program, emphasizing interoperability with
the Air Force TR-l/COMPASS QUASAR to achieve a near-term communications
time-of-arrival (TOA) emitter-location capability, and retain the RU-21J
aircraft in a developmental test-bed configuration for use in prototyping
GUARDRAIL improvements.
(U) Army shall program for continued implementation of a
.tactical DDP to provide timely dissemination of imagery in the theater.
2. Air Force (U)
(S) Affordability of the TR-l platform necessitates its
utilization in a multifunction role to include PLSS, AMTI surveillance,
ASSAULT BREAKER target acquisition and weapons guidance, and ELINT pay-
load alternatives. Air Force shall develop a comprehensive plan for
such utilization, and program to support implementation.
(C) Modular standardization of airborne reconnaissance and
surveillance radar programs is needed in two generic functional cate-
gories: 1) continuous area surveillance of moving ground targets at
.extended range and normal resolution, and 2) periodic swath or spot
mapping of fixed targets at high resolution and nominal ranges. Air
Force shall plan and program efforts in this area accordingly.
(C) Air Force should evaluate jointly with Army and NSA
the feasibility of using Army direct intelligence support assets for
the Mobile Mission Equipment Upgrade program to avoid unnecessary
duplication of ground based equipment.
3. Marine Corps (U)
(U) Marine Corps shall continue to coordinate acquisition of
tactical intelligence support systems with Army and Air Force.
(C) Marine Corps shall program for acquisition of a man-
transportable VHF/UHF intercept and direction-finding capability which
can be consolidated with the Integrated Communications Collection System
(ICCS). Army shall assist in this effort.
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(C) Marine Corps shall program for a real-time airborne
multisensor correlation capability utilizing Air Force UPD-4/TEREC
experience.
4. Navy (U)
(C) Navy shall program for acquisition of a fleet reconnais-
sance/surveillance capability, in accordance with the findings of the
CHESS study, Navy photo reconnaissance study, and the Navy Master Plan
.for Ocean Surveillance, and reflecting close coordination with Army/Air
Force interoperability efforts and utilization of previous equipment
investments.
F. TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS (U)
(U) Services and DCA shall complete or update their transition
planning, including COMSEC, to identify quantitative requirements for
TRI-TAC and other tactical communications equipment. Further procure-
ment of equipment, including COMSEC, which accomplishes the same func-
tion as, or is to be replaced by, TRI-TAC equipment shall not be
initiated except by approval of OSD. Services should develop necessary
installation kits and plans for field deployment of new TRI-TAC COMSEC
subscriber terminal devices (e.g., KG-84). Programming of resources for
testing of TRI-TAC equipment shall include those required for the Joint
Test Element.
(U) Services shall program for implementation of programs to
provide Joint Multi-Trunk Switching System (JMTSS) capabilities as
requirements are validated by the JCS and confirmed by DUSD(Policy Review)
(U) The GPSCS program is redefined as a technology-only effort
to support development of technology for future jam-resistant satellite
communications to tactical and mobile forces of the Army, Navy, Marine
Corps, and Air Force. Responsibility for the development of acquisition
of space-segment hardware for GPSCS and other future satellite communica-
tions programs continues to be assigned to the Air Force. Services.shall
provide their requirements and specifications to the MSO for consideration
and transmittal to the Air Force for development and eventual acquisition
as appropriate.
(S) Army, in coordination with. the MSO and Air Force, shall investi-
gate options and program development efforts to improve communications to
nuclear weapons storage (NWS) sites in a combat environment, to include.
jamming, nuclear effects, and hostile emitter location activities.
Consideration shall be given to upgrading, in an evolutionary manner,
the UHF satellite communication terminals planned for delivery to
NWS sites with an SHF receive capability utilizing the SCT/SHF EAM
downlink on DSCS III satellites. These efforts are not to delay essen-
tial procurement upgrades called for in paragraph IV.B.1 of Section 0
of the Consolidated Guidance.
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(C) Navy shall accelerate its. efforts on the. SHF terminal
(AN/WSC-6) for sh.i'pborne operation. This effort shall be accomp-
lished in conjunction with the fielding of the OM-55 modem in order
to provide jam-resistant secure communications to major combatants
and flag ships. Navy shall program for continuation of efforts to
develop effective tactical communication systems for coordination
of air, surface, and submarine operations.
G. ELECTRONTC WARFARE AND COUNTER-C3 (U)
(C) Services shall program for accomplishment of objectives
set forth in the NATO LTDP Task Force 7 Report. Counter-C3 programs,
both lethal (destruction) and non-lethal (jamming, deception and
exploitation) shall be made an integral part of each Service's RDT&E
and procurement programs, with the objective of fielding effective
capabilities in the early 1980s.
(S) There is a critical shortage of ECM pods for tactical air-
craft, and Services shall program for high-priority procurement of
such pods. Where required, internal ECM capabilities are to be
acquired as a matter of high-priority.
(U) Air Force shall take the lead for DoD, and program to
implement and support the Airborne Electronic Warfare Tactics Facility
in accordance with the Memorandum of Agreement to be signed by the
USDRE and the Armament Directors of France and Germany at the April
1979 CNAD.
(C) Air Force shall plan funding for the EF-111A for FY 1981
and beyond to permit accomplishment of the production program as near
as possible to the $858 million total used at DSARC-III.
(S) Air Force shall program to restructure and move ahead with
the Precision Location and Strike System (PLSS) Program to provide for
integration of DME guidance with the GBU-15 Planar Wing Weapon.
III. INTELLIGENCE (U)
A.- CONSOLIDATED_CRYPTOLOGIC PROGRAM (U)
(U) Additional guidance is given in the Intelligence Annex to
Section 0 of the Consolidated Guidance, to be issued at a higher
classification.
B. GENERAL DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS (U)
(U) Additional guidance is given in the Intelligence Annex to
Section 0 of the Consolidated Guidance, to be issued at a higher
classification.
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C. INDICATIONS AND WARNING (U)
(S) DIA shall: program to expedite completion of the Warning
Improvement Study and Plan and the Central Region test case, according
WISP a more rigorous role in the overall planning for the DoD I&W
System upgrade, particularly as it encourages and enjoys the support
from the intelligence community and as it focuses upon both hard and
soft indicators of crises; develop a functional implementation plan
for the phased upgrade of the I&W system; and develop performance
evaluation techniques for the measurement of collector performance
against I&W requirements, initially for imaging systems and subse-
quently for other collection disciplines.
D. OTHER INTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS (U)
(U) The. following supplements material in the Consolidated
Guidance pertaining to Intelligence-Related Training.
(U) Improve on performance/position evaluation programs with
specific emphasis on required modifications to intelligence curricula.
This includes the foreign language capabilities in, and in support of,
intelligence and SIGINT missions.
(U) Executive agent training shall be continued and expanded in
accordance with appropriate DoD Directives/Instructions. Each Service
shall report, in their respective POMs, the level and extent of training
provided to other components.
(U) Services shall submit, not later than 30 May 1979, a listing
of all new systems with IOC's in FY 1981-1985 that will require new or
modified curricula at the mi'li'tary intelligence schools. Major program
elements should be identified and training development costs should be
included.
(U) The enlisted fill rate at the Defense Language Institute
Foreign Language Center.shall not deviate by more than 15 percent from
annual Service projection to the DLIFLC.
(U) Each Service shall identify in its POM submission all Reserve
and Guard units with M-day assignments in intelligence. For these units,
current state of manning, readiness, and a brief summary of training
activities shall be presented.
IV. DEFENSE-C31. SUPPORT (U)
A. NAVIGATION AND POSITION-FIXING (U)
(C) Air Force shall program to ensure a system IOC for NAVSTAR
GPS by FY 1986, including appropriate funding for space launch support;
and identify increments to this program to achieve a system IOC in
FY 1985.
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(C) Services shall program to support full-scale competitive
development of GPS user equipment; plan on a system IOC by 1986 and
identify increments to their programs to support IOC in FY 1985.
Service POMs should report user equipment acquisition schedules and
numbers of user equipments that will be operational, by fiscal year.
Funding for procurement and installation should be programmed in
consonance with the JCS phase-in/phase-out plan.
(U) Navy should consider the need for development of NTS-3 and
should provide supporting rationale for continuing or canceling this
effort.
(U), Where operational considerations permit, Services shall
continue to use commercial inertial navigation systems meeting the
ARINC-561 specifications for all land-based military aircraft.
(U), Air Force shall continue to pursue Form, Fit, and Function
(F ) standardization of inertial systems for high-performance, land-
based military aircraft and possible extension to NATO. Both develop-
ment and procurement should be competitive with multiple-source awards
where practical for full evaluation of this approach.
(U) Services, with Navy leading the effort, shall program for
continued development of ring-laser gyro sensors and systems for
broad applications to aircraft and weapons. Commonality among the
Services remains a primary long-range goal.
SUPPORT AND BASE COMMUNICATIONS (U)
(U) Services should program for early consolidation and automation
of GENSER and Intelligence telecommunications centers on an intra- and
inter-Service basis wherever possible. Services and Agencies should
continue to consider use of contractor installation, operation and main-
tenance of base communication system and facilities, giving considera-
tion to combat mission support, location, training and mobilization
requirements for skills which need to be maintained.
(U) Army shall program for early implementation of the European
Telephone System.
(U) Services shall program and implement Defense Metropolitan
Area Telephone Systems in accordance with guidance provided in the
ASD(C3I) memorandum of 12 February 1979.
C. COMMON-USER COMMUNICATIONS (U)
1. General Guidance (U)
(C) Services and Agencies shall program to ensure intercon-
nection and interoperability of U.S., NATO, European National Military
and European National Civil Communications Systems to achieve best
possible communications survivability in Europe. Theater communica-
tions systems developments shall conform with NATO standards for inter-
operability with national C3 systems as they emerge.
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(U) Where ayai.lable. to meet U.S. needs in NATO Europe, Services
and Agencies shall lease commercial communications facilities rather than
installing U.S. procured equipment. U.S. unilateral communications will
be used only to provide minimum essential control of U.S. forces and to
complement NATO and NATO member nation telecommunications when NATO or
host telecommuni.cattons are nonexistent, inadequate, or not cost-
effective for U.S. use.
(C) Services shall develop plans- to protect critical U.S.-
owned satellite earth stations from attack by paramilitary and/or
terrorist threats in both peacetime and wartime.
(U) The MSO, supported by the Services and Agencies, shall
develop and submit to OSD a Technical Program Plan for a coherent DoD
satellite communications system R&D program in accordance with the
MSO's "Framework for MILSATCOM Development." The first issue of the
Plan should frame a sound technical foundation for the next generation
of satellite communication systems with distinctly enhanced military-
unique attributes, and address the need for a developmental satellite
.payload and complementary terminals. Until the Plan is approved, Army
and Air Force shall support R&D projects identified in the FY 1981-85
DSCS Program Plan.
(U) Redundant single Service systems must be consolidated
into joint Service systems. New systems must be compatible with
already existing C3I systems, procedures, and standards. Automation
must be selectively exploited to improve effectiveness and efficiency
and to reduce manning. Examine the use of commercially available
technology and equipment in the acquisition of small quantities of
special C3I systems. A comprehensive plan must be implemented for
consolidation of redundant individual-Service dedicated communication
centers.
2. Specific Guidance (U)
a. Long-Haul Communications (U)
(C) Defense Communication System (DCS) and intelligence-
related arch.i.tectural concepts and implementation efforts should be
restructured to provide reduced vulnerability and improved flexibility,
reconstitution and survivability in. crisis and wartime operations. Increased
use of host-nation and NATO assets should be planned for DCA connectivity.
(C) DCA, in coordination and participation with NSA, the
Services, NICSMA, TRI-TAC and as appropriate the Manager, National
Communications System (NCS),.should: complete development of a World-
wide Digital System Architecture wh.ich.incorporates the architectures
(or required changes to them) for the Worldwide Secure Voice (WWSV),
Integrated AUTODIN System (IAS), TRI-TAC, NICS II, and major Service
programs and networks; continue efforts towards digitization and
modernization of DCS; develop analog and digital interfaces to provide
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for improved interoperability between military systems, non-DoD
Federal Government systems and leased commercial systems; carry out
approved plans for DCS bulk encryption; plan to interconnect AUTOVON
and IVSN to enhance DCS/NATO i;nteroperability; continue efforts to
fully define an evolutionary IAS; develop and implement the hardware,
software and means for integrating existing and programmed DoD data
networks; plan, fund and implement a Secure Voice Improvement Program
(SVIP) (successor program to AUTOSEVOCOM II) with initial secure
voice terminal procurements in FY 1981 and completion of procurement
in FY 1985; and continue implementation of the Digital European
Backbone with completion of procurement in FY 1984. Leasing of
communications and support services shall be employed wherever
cost-effective, operationally feasible, and security requirements
permit. Any changes to AUTODIN I, AUTOVON, AUTOSEVOCOM I or exten-
sion of AUTODIN II service to overseas areas shall be made only
with the approval of OSD.
(C) Commercial off-the-shelf, or modified, equipment will
be used for the DCS where practical. DCS use of mobile/transportable
equipment should normally be limited to applications where there is a
need for rapid reconstitution or extension of the DCS, use of both
commercial and tactical equipments to support tactical and/or NATO
interoperability requirement, or where the need for mobility/rapid
recoverability is overriding.
(C) Services and Agencies shall plan for integration of
data networks into AUTODIN II at the earliest practical date and
early extension of service to Europe and the Pacific. It is intended
that Services and Agencies reduce dependence on dedicated data net-
works after implementation of AUTODIN II. Data transfer systems and
networks not utilizing AUTODIN II must be approved as exceptions to
this guidance by OSD.
(C) Services, JCS, and Defense Agencies and WSE will
continue to implement interface standards and operational procedures
to ensure effective data and information exchange. They will ensure
that existing and programmed C3 digital data transfer requirements can
be supported by the planned AUTODIN II system when implemented.
b. Satellite Communications (U)
(C) In accordance with FY 1980 budget decisions, procure-
ment of DSCS III satellites is delayed to 1981 and two additional DSCS
II satellites shall be procured with FY 1980 funds to preclude a gap in
service until DSCS III satellites are available. In consonance with the
MSO Framework for MILSATCOM Development published in November 1978,
initial efforts to define a long term DSCS program should be initiated.
Accordingly, DCA and NSA should begin efforts to define an EHF system
for intelligence users. Similarly, DCA and Army should begin efforts
to define an EHF system for the Ground Mobile Forces.
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(C) To continue use of each.other's SHF SATCOM systems,
it is imperative that the. next, generation of U.S. and NATO SATCOM
systems be interoperable. The DCA, MSO, and the DoD lead agency will
work with. NATO to achieve . commonality of U.S. and NATO space segments,
with a goal of completely interoperable ground terminals.
D. COMSEC (U)
(S) Services and NSA shall continue their programs directed
toward providing secure, interoperable communications for tactical
data systems. Services, OJCS, and Agencies. shall specify requirements
for weapon-system test ranges, and weapon and space system telemetry
encryption. NSA shall continue to develop devices for securing
telemetry subsystems. In addition, Services shall design all nuclear
command and control systems to meet the numerical standards of DoDD
5200.16. Services and Agencies which have not done so shall imple-
ment DoDD 5200.16.
(C) Navy and NSA, with. Director, TRT-TAC as DoD Executive Agent,
shall continue development of a family of 2.4 Kbps digital voice
'terminals which are consistent with the Worldwide Secure Voice Archi-
tecture.
(S) In view of the continuing compromising emanations threat,
Services and Defense Agencies shall maintain personnel and other
TEMPEST resources at or above FY 1980 levels. In order to support
operational deployment of the new TRI-TAC COMSEC terminal with the
TYC-39 switch, Services shall program teletype conversion from high-
level to low-level keying in accordance with MIL STD 188. Other
teletype terminals now passing classified traffic should be similarly
modified i'n accordance with national policy which required such con-
version by 1 January 1976.
(C) Services, in collaboration with NSA, shall continue efforts
to improve signals security monitoring and surveillance capabilities
in order to evaluate vulnerability to signals exploitation.
(C) NSA shall program to establish and maintain a national COMSEC
assessment program, and in collaboration with the Services shall estab-
lish and maintain a central data base on hostile COMINT threats to U.S.
government telecommunications and electrical processing systems.
(C) In accordance with OSD guidance, NSA shall program resources
in support of the need to meet national policy on securing civil
government voice systems.
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(C) Services should program an adequate level of COMSEC RDT&E
to ensure effective integration of new COMSEC systems into Service
operations. Services should program resources for the near-term
expansion of AUTOSEVOCOM I, DCS Secure Voice Improvement Program
(SVIP) and AUTODIN II in accordance with implementation schedules.
DoD components should begin to replace the existing inventory of
general purpose record security equipment where economies can be
clearly demonstrated or where maintenance support is no longer
feasible. Transition plans should be developed to ensure orderly
implementation.
(S) All Services shall commence planning for the incorporation
of interoperable jam-resistant secure data and voice communications
into tactical aircraft, with the earliest IOC and FOC by 1985.
E. TEST AND EVALUATION (U)
(U) Services and Agencies shall continue to strengthen operational
test and evaluation of C I systems, POMs shall delineate efforts to
accomplish the following specific goals: improved design and conduct
of tests, independent evaluation of test results, and reduction of
test costs.
(U) Services and Agencies shall program adequate resources and
appropriate schedules for both DT&E and OT&E which support acquisition
milestones, to ensure use of critical issues and thresholds derived
from operational requirements in designing and managing C3 system test
programs.
(U) NFIP activities are exempted from this guidance.
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