REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ON THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND STRUCTURE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00171R001100060008-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 85
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 5, 2004
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: July 1, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301
NMCS Study Group, Room 1B 737-JCS
The Pentagon
12 July 1978
STATOTHR
Attached, for your personal reference, is a copy of
the final report on the National Military Command
Structure which has been submitted to the Secretary
of Defense.
I greatly appreciate the time you spent with me dis-
cussing certain issues related to the report. Your
views were very helpful to the overall effort.
The project director, Richard C. Steadman, has asked
that I also convey to you his personal appreciation
for your contribution.
Sincerely,
Dr. Joseph W. Annunziata
DOD Study of the National
Military Command Structure
JCS review(s)
completed.
On file OSD release
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REPORT
TO THE
SECRETARY" OF DEFENSE
ON THE
NATIONAL MILITARY
COMMAND STRUCTURE
JULY 1978
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? Report of a study requested by the President
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and conducted in the Department of Defense
Washington, D.C.
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July 1978
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? TABLE OF CONTENTS
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AND CRISIS MANAG
? The Unified Command Plan .6
US European Command ............................. 9
US Atlantic Command ::::::::::::.:::::::::::::::: 13
US Pacific Command .14
US Readiness Command ............................ 18
? US Southern Command ............................. 21
Strategic Air Command ..22
Military Airlift Command ........................ 23
Aerospace Defense Command ....................... 24
Wartime/Crisis Management ......................... 24
Management of the Unified and Specified
Commands ..................................... 32
The Role of the CINCs ........................... 32
The Role of the Chairman, JCS .34
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SECTION PAGE
PREFACE ........................................... i
I INTRODUCTION ...................................... 1
II COMBAT READINESS, WAR-FIGHTING CAPABILITY,
III POLICY, PLANS, AND ADVICE
The Secretary of Defense and OSD
? Civilian Control ................................ 40
Policy Direction .42
Studies, Analysis, and Gaming ................... 44
The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy ....... 45
? The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff
Organization, Functions, and Procedures ......... 48
? Military Advice ................................. 52
Alternatives For Improving Military Advice
to the NCA ................................. 58
? Enhancing the Role of the Joint Staff ......... 58
Increasing the Responsibilities of the
Chairman, JCS .............................. 65
National Military Advisers.................... 70
? GLOSSARY ..................... 78
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EMENT
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PREFACE
The last major amendment to the National Security
Act occurred in 1958. Since then, a pattern of relation-
ships has evolved between the Secretary of Defense, the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the Joint Staff, and the Unified
and Specified Commands. The resulting National Military
Command Structure (NMCS) is the subject of this Report.
As defined, the NMCS includes all facets of interaction
among these groups, including both how the Secretary pro-
vides guidance and instructions to the JCS and the field
commanders and how they provide planning and military
advice to him, the President, and the Congress.
In this study I have examined the elements of the
NMCS and have attempted to evaluate various aspects of
their performance. I have tried to pay particular atten-
tion to ways in which organizational structure as well as
personalities and attitudes influence results.
In conducting this study, my staff and I examined
the relevant legislation and directives, both Secretarial
and those of the JCS, that define the structure. In addi-
tion, we reviewed earlier reports on defense organization
by various governmental commissions and semi-public groups
as well as analyses of the NMCS by both military officers
and academic specialists.
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Our major source of information and judgment,'however,
has been the several hundred interviews my staff and 1,
conducted with incumbent and former policymakers, mili-
tary officers, and non-governmental observers. These
included Secretaries, Deputy and.Assistant Secretaries,
senior officials in the National Security Council-
interagency system, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and
Commanders-in-Chief of Unified and Specified Commands
and their respective staffs.
I am deeply grateful to all these individuals who
have been so generous with their time and frank and help-
ful with their observations and judgments. These form
the foundation of this study. I am especially indebted
to General George S. Brown who, as Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, provided full support for this effort
from its inception and requested the Joint Staff and
the field commands to give it their complete support
also.
I, alone, am responsible for the judgments and recom-
mendations contained in this Report. However, I could not
have conducted the study without the able assistance of
the following superior group of military officers and
civil servants so generously detailed to me by the Chiefs
of Staff and by the Assistant Secretary of Defense,
International Security Affairs: Dr. Joseph W. Annunziata;
Col John B. Bellinger, Jr., USA; Col Roger C. Hagerty, USMC;
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"apt Ronald F. Marryott, USN; Capt Kenneth M. Stewart,
? USAF; and Col John J. Wolcott, USAF.
Finally, I am gratefully in debt to Admiral John P.
? Weinel, USN (Ret.) for his extraordinarily able assis-
tance. His keen insight and wise counsel, though not
? always heeded, importantly improved the final product.
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Richard C. Steadman
Washington, D.C.
July 1978
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INTRODUCTION
In September 1977, President Carter requested that
the Secretary of Defense initiate a searching organi-
zational review of the National Military Command Structure
(NMCS). He requested an unconstrained examination of
alternatives for making it more effective and efficient
in carrying out the national security mission. This
Report presents and evaluates alternatives responsive
to the President's instructions.
What emerged from the discussions and studies was a
consensus that, by and large, the system has been gen-
erally adequate to meet our national security needs in
peacetime, crisis, and wartime. We did find, however, a
general perception of some fundamental shortcomings which
may make it incapable of dealing adequately with our
future needs.
The present National Military Command Structure was
created by the National Security Act of 1947, as amended.
It has evolved, through a series of amendments up to 1958,
from a decentralized National Military Establishment of
separate Military Departments to today's Department of
Defense (DoD) headed by a Secretary of Defense with full
authority and responsibility for its operation. This
authority has permitted central and coherent management
of the Department, and its exercise is a major reason
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why DoD, while it has its failings, is among the best
managed departments in the Executive Branch.
The Military Departments organize, train, and equip
the forces of their Services. They have no role in the
operational employment of these forces. Combatant forces
which have completed their initial training are assigned
to the operational command of Unified and Specified (U & S)
Commanders. The 1958 Amendment made these commanders
directly responsible to the Secretary of Defense and
the President.
As a matter of policy, the Secretary generally.exer-
cises his command authority through the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, who include the Chairman, the Army and Air Force
Chiefs of Staff, and the Chief of Naval Operations. The
Commandant of the Marine Corps participates with the JCS
on matters of direct concern to the Corps. Their primary
statutory function is to be the principal military advisers
to the Secretary, the National Security Council (NSC),
the President, and also the Congress. They have accordingly
been charged by the President with presenting in governmental
councils the military viewpoint for the effective formulation
and conduct of national security policy. OSD and the JCS
both provide staff assistance to the Secretary and, though
separately identified and organized, are formally charged
to function in full coordination and cooperation. The
Joint Staff is the staff of the JCS and is managed for them
by the Chairman.
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The structure, which emerged in 1958 and which
remains essentially the same today, was a compromise
between a recognized requirement for unified direction
of the armed forces and for military advice rising above
individual service interests, on one hand, and the
natural desire of our military services organized sep-
arately for land, naval, and air warfare to preserve
their historic autonomy, on the other. It is not sur-
prising, then, that we find some of the fundamental pro-
blems of the NMCS today to be products of the tensions
inherent in that basic compromise. The central issue
today is whether the NMCS, as presently organized, can
work well enough to cope with the national security
problems of the future.
The world has become both more complex and more
dangerous for the United States than it was in 1958, and
the need for sound planning of defense policy and resources
and their coordination with foreign and economic policy
is even more essential. The period of American pre-
eminence following World War II has given way to one of
precarious strategic nuclear balance. Other elements of
national power are more widely diffused throughout the
world, with our preponderance correspondingly reduced.
New problems have arisen, such as the proliferation of
nuclear capabilities at one end of the spectrum of violence
and terrorism at the other, shortages of natural resources,
and major changes in the international economic structure.
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Moreover, defense budgets are tight, weapon systems are
expensive, and technological changes are providing new
possibilities which may result in altered roles for
various elements of the armed forces.
This Report divides the National Military Command
Structure into two broad areas. The first addresses the
organization for war-fighting, as
well as command and
control of forces in the field. The strengths and weak-
nesses of the Unified and Specified Commands as now
established and the experience of recent crisis'situations
are also examined. The second part of the study covers
those aspects which relate to policy, planning, and advice.
It discusses the interactions and functions of the Secre-
tary of Defense, OSD, JCS, Joint Staff, and the field
commanders in these areas.
Two important areas relating to national security are
not addressed in this study. First, the National Military
Command Structure, as defined in this Report, is just a
part of the broader interaction of offices within the
Executive Branch interested in national security and
we did not address the interaction of the Secretary, the
JCS, and the CJCS with the NSC and its staff, OMB, CIA,
and the Department of State. Second, we did not address
the command structure for nuclear war or its safeguards.
Some of the recommendations of this Report are self-
evident; some are non-specific; some may be controversial.
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They are mainly directed at ways to enhance the joint and
unified military contribution to the national security
decisionmaking process. Hopefully, they will stimulate
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discussion of the fundamental philosophies underlying
our Defense organization.
? Whatever recommendations are adopted, it is important
that, within the framework of clearly defined authorities
? and responsibilities, the National Military Command
Structure remain flexible enough to respond. to different
? leadership, different circumstances, and different events
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0 composed of forces from one Service, e.g., the Strategic
Air Command or the Military Airlift Command.
By law, the chain of command runs from the President
to the Secretary of Defense to the Unified and Specified
Commanders, who exercise operational command over all
? forces assigned to them. The Joint Chiefs of Staff act
as the military staff to the Secretary for operational
direction of those forces. The Military Departments are
not in the chain of command. They are responsible for
the administration, training, and supply of the forces
assigned to the Unified and Specified Commanders.
The Unified Command Plan is designed to reflect per-
ceived military and political "realities" at a particular
moment in time and has thus undergone numerous reviews
and considerable change since 1947. Moreover, changes
to the UCP are usually controversial, producing split
opinions among the JCS. There are many reasons for this,
such as pride of Service and allocation of four-star
billets. However, debate over the UCP is intense in part
because it is not possible to devise a perfect plan. It
is possible to draw up four or five alternative UCPs,
each one about as good as the other. For this reason,
the Report contains no ultimate solutions, but rather
suggests some alternatives that could be adopted in the
interests of a more effective Unified Command Plan.
Several generalized recommendations have evolved
from our review of the UCP. First, given the evolutionary
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nature of the underlying political and military "realities,"
the UCP should be reviewed by the JCS and the Secretary
of Defense at intervals not to exceed two years. Second,
Unified Commands are joint commands by definition and as
such selection of the CINC should be on the basis of the
best available qualified officer with consideration
given to mission and forces assigned rather than strictly
to Service affiliations. Third, in considering UCP
organization and functions, a CINC's "military-diplomacy"
role should be an important consideration. For example,
CINCs should retain at least an overview responsibility
for security assistance to countries in their area; in
this way they can play a useful role as spokesmen for US
military interests with those countries. Finally, there
is no need for Unified Commands to cover all areas of
the world.
While we examined the component commands as to
their operational responsibilities under the Unified
Commanders and determined that the present organization
can be responsive, we did not study.the relationship of
the component commander with his Chief of Service on
matters such as supply, equipping, maintenance, adminis-
tration, and discipline. Thus, we have not studied
possible redundancies in functions and personnel in the
Unified and component command headquarters. A special
study should examine the component commands with a view
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toward identifying redundancies in functions and personnel
and recommending which of these redundancies are necessary
and which should be eliminated. In particular, the
feasibility of consolidating the components' logistic
functions should be closely examined.
US European Command
The United States European Command (EUCOM) estab-
lished in 1952 is a Unified Command with three component
commands: US Army, Europe; US Naval Forces, Europe; and
US Air Forces, Europe. EUCOM's present area of respon-
?sibility covers all of Western Europe, including the
United Kingdom and Ireland, the Mediterranean Sea and
its littoral countries, and the Middle East land mass
to the eastern border of Iran, the Persian Gulf, and
the Red Sea.
EUCOM is unique in that in a NATO war it will func-
tion primarily as a support command while the NATO com-
mand structure will exercise operational command. The
US Commander-in-Chief, Europe (CINCEUR) is dual-hatted
as the NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR),
while his Army and Air Force component commanders are
dual-hatted as NATO Commander, Central Army Group, and
NATO Commander, Allied Air Forces, Central Europe. In
peacetime, EUCOM responsibilities are much the same as
for all Unified Commands.
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EUCOM's geographical area of responsibility is an
issue of widespread concern. There are convincing
arguments for limiting EUCOM's area to NATO Europe.
There are also convincing arguments for maintaining its
present area of responsibility, particularly the Middle
East. In the case of the former, it is argued that
EUCOM should be totally absorbed in its NATO mission.
EUCOM should not be distracted in war or peace outside
the NATO area, which in security matters is second in
importance only to the United States itself. Further,
advocates of this approach point to lack of European
support for US efforts during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War
and allege that in future possible US involvements in
the Middle East, EUCOM most likely will be by-passed.
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They would make EUCOM's area of responsibility identical
with that of NATO Europe. This should lead to a smaller
EUCOM staff devoted almost exclusively to NATO-related
matters, which could in turn reduce political problems A"" /
inherent in relocating EUCOM headquarters near the SACEUR
another worthy objective.
uarters
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On the other hand, there.are equally strong advocates
for leaving the Middle East in EUCOM's area of respon-
sibility. They argue that EUCOM exercises operational
command over those forces, particularly naval and air
forces and the communication facilities, that would most
likely first be used in contingencies in the Middle East.
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They also argue that the Middle East is contiguous with
NATO Europe. Finally, there is the fact that the survival
of NATO is as likely to be decided in the Middle East/
Persian Gulf as on the plains of Central Europe. There
is, therefore, a mutuality of NATO interests in the
Middle East and a need for concerted, not conflicting,
allied policy toward it. A USCINCEUR/SACEUR responsi-
bility for the area will assist in furthering this goal.
A practical difficulty of removing the Middle East
from EUCOM's responsibility is the problem of to whom
it would be given? REDCOM is too far removed. The US
Pacific Command already has an enormous area of respon-
sibility, and its headquarters is too far away even
though its area is in some cases contiguous with the
Middle East. The US Atlantic Command would be a candi-
date if it were responsible for the Mediterranean Sea
and thus had the forces in an area contiguous to the
Middle East area. The Middle East could be made the
responsibility of a sub-unified command reporting to
EUCOM. This would enable EUCOM to concentrate on NATO-
related problems and still assure senior level attention
to Middle East contingency planning. It would also pro-.
vide flexibility in the command structure since the sub-
unified command could operate either under EUCOM or, if
the situation warranted, directly under the JCS. On the
other hand, a sub-unified command may involve setting up
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another layer and another headquarters at some expense in
manpower and infrastructure. The location of such a
headquarters might also be a problem. Finally, the
Middle East could be assigned to a joint task force report-
ing directly to the JCS, although many feel that a Unified
Commander is best equipped and motivated to handle area
responsibilities.
A related EUCOM issue is the assignment of respon-
sibility for Africa south of the Sahara. Some argue
that, given its political importance and level of mili-
tary activity, this area should be assigned to a Unified
Commander. EUCOM is already involved in security assis-
tance and intelligence matters in this area and it clearly
is an area with historic as well as present ties to Europe.
Nevertheless, while present arrangements may be untidy,
assigning the area to any CINC now would send signals
and perhaps create expectations of involvement beyond
the present intent of policymakers.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The Middle East should remain a EUCOM area of
responsibility.
o EUCOM should continue to plan for, and execute
when directed, all contingency operations in the Middle
East.
o There should be sufficient flexibility in the
Middle East planning to permit a contingency to be run
directly from Washington, with EUCOM in a supporting
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role and/or to permit establishment of an on-scene
Unified Command reporting either to EUCOM or direct to
Washington.
o The JCS should examine the concept of a sub-
unified command for the Middle East, reporting to EUCOM,
and then provide their advice on the proposal to the
Secretary of Defense. 17
W~,ur
o Africa south of the Sahara should not now be
assigned to EUCOM.
US Atlantic Command
The US Atlantic Command (LANTCOM) is a Unified Com-
mand with area responsibility for the Atlantic Ocean
(excluding European coastal waters), the Caribbean Sea,
the Pacific Ocean on the west coast of South America, and
part of the Arctic Ocean. The Commander-in-Chief,
Atlantic Command, is also Supreme Allied Commander,
Atlantic (SACLANT), a NATO Command. In addition, he
is the Commander-in-Chief, US Atlantic Fleet, because
naval forces and responsibilities dominate this command.
There are no pressing problems or disputes relating
to LANTCOM's present areas of responsibility. While it
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would be desirable to make LANTCOM a more truly unified
command this would require additional area responsi-
bility (e.g. Panama, or the Middle East) which would
not be appropriate at this time.
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There is some ongoing discussion of command arrange-
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ments for US and NATO maritime assets in the Eastern
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Atlantic and the Mediterranean and alternatives to
present arrangements would have important implications
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for LANTCOM if adopted. Under one concept all maritime
assets in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean would be
under a single NATO commander, who would report to a
Supreme Allied Commander, NATO. Other concepts would
have CINCLANT/SACLANT having either operational or
allocating authority over maritime forces in the
Atlantic and the Mediterranean. Each of these concepts
has the objective of greater flexibility in the use of
naval assets in support of NATO.
While these concepts are NATO-oriented, they primarily
involve US forces and implementation if any would require
changes in the UCP.
RECOMMENDATIONS
o LANTCOM should retain its presently assigned
areas and responsibilities.
o The JCS should review the command arrangements
for US maritime assets in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean
and determine whether these achieve optimum effectiveness
for US and NATO defense postures.
US Pacific Command
The US Pacific Command (PACOM) is a Unified Command
with area responsibility for the Pacific Ocean west of
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the coast of South America, the Far East, Southeast
Asia, the Bering Sea, part of the Arctic Ocean, and
the Indian Ocean.
While there are currently no particular problems
requiring changes in the PACOM area of responsibilities,
there are two issues which will require consideration
and decision sometime in the near future.
The first, and the most important, concerns the
command of forces in Korea. Currently the Commander,
US Forces, Korea, is under the operational command of
the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific. In recommending the
establishment of a Combined Forces Command in Korea,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not change the concept of
CINCPAC exercising operational command of US forces in
Korea. Some argue that we should now create a new
Unified Command in Northeast Asia or at the very least,
have a system whereby the Commander, US Forces, Korea,
remains under PACOM in peacetime but in times of crises
or war reports directly to Washington. Others believe
we should maintain the present arrangements and the inte-
grity of the Pacific command. Recognizing that each
alternative has its advantages and disadvantages, our
judgment is that if we fight again in Korea, we will
establish an area command reporting directly to Washington.
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What is often overlooked is that we do not know
precisely how or where the next crisis, the next short
war, or the,next long war will eventuate in the Pacific
area, including Korea. Further, we have no way of know-
ing the personalities of the key players, each of whom
will have his own perceptions, inclinations and preferences.
The key, therefore, is flexibility. Our UCP and our
attitudes must be flexible enough to handle future
crises/conflicts from Washington through PACOM to the
Korean Command; from Washington direct to the Korean
Command with PACOM on line in a support role, ready to
step in and take over from Washington on short notice;
or, the Korean Command acting as a Unified Command with
all the responsibilities and authorities that pertain.
The other PACOM issue concerns the US Army command
arrangements in the PACOM area. Currently, there is no
Army component commander in the PACOM organization.
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There is, instead, a CINCPAC Support Group (CSG) headed by a
major general that provides some of the functions of a
component commander such as liaison, advice and assis-
tance to Headquarters, PACOM and the Navy and Air Force
component commanders. However, PACOM exercises opera-
tional command over Army units through subordinate
Unified Commanders in Korea and Japan and through the
US Army Support Command in Hawaii.
Some believe that the Army component, US Army
Pacific, should be reestablished. Among the reasons
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on regional Army matters and for more senior Army repre-
sentation in military-diplomatic activities in this large
area where ground forces play important roles in many
countries. Others believe that a component command is
not needed since support of Army forces in the Pacific
is handled directly between Washington and the sub-
unified commands. Therefore, they argue that if CINCPAC
needs more senior Army representation, a three-star
Army officer on CINCPAC's staff would be sufficient
since there is no need to build a larger headquarters
for this purpose. Others argue that the current CSG
organization should be maintained as a test bed for
future, more streamlined component command structures.
RECOMMENDATIONS
o PACOM should retain its presently assigned areas
and responsibilities.
o Planning, practices, and attitudes regarding
crisis/wartime command arrangements for US Forces, Korea
should retain maximum flexibility to permit alternative
arrangements to include the present command organization,
direct command by Washington of US Forces, Korea or a
combination of the two. Where organizational decisions
cannot be made to accommodate these alternatives, they
should be made in favor of an assumption that there will
be a Unified Command reporting directly to Washington.
The Army Component Command should not be rein-
stated unless a convincing argument is made that this
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would be demonstrably more effective than present arrange-
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US Readiness Command
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The United States Readiness Command (REDCOM) is a
Unified Command exercising operational command over all
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US Army and US Air Force combatant forces in the
United States not assigned to other Unified or Speci-
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fied Commands. REDCOM's primary responsibility is to
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provide a general reserve of combat-ready forces to
reinforce other Unified or Specified Commands. REDCOM
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is charged with the planning for overseas deployment of
Army and Air Force units to support the contingency
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plans of the overseas commander. REDCOM is also respon-
sible for joint training and joint exercises as well as
for the development of joint tactics, techniques, and
procedures for joint employment of forces.
Navy and Marine Corps general purpose forces are
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not assigned to REDCOM. They are assigned to PACOM,
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LANTCOM, and EUCOM. There are, however, Navy and
Marine Corps officers assigned to REDCOM headquarters
to help assure compatibility of joint force employment
and deployment planning.
There is a vocal body of opinion which favors dis-
establishing REDCOM and assigning its functions else-
where: joint training and doctrinal developments on a
rotating basis between Training and Doctrine Command
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(Army) and the Tactical Air Command (Air Force), and
deployment planning to a unit attached to the JCS. This
leaves unanswered the question of where to assign opera-
tional command of those forces without violating the
principle of command of combatant forces by Unified and
Specified Commanders, through the JCS to the Secretary
of Defense. (More Army divisions and Air Force tactical
aircraft are assigned to REDCOM than any other Unified
Command.) As importantly, it would diffuse the emphasis
on joint training when the emphasis should be to expand
these efforts. Finally, in the area of deployment planning,
REDCOM has developed expertise and capability far beyond
any other command or organization which might assume
this function if REDCOM were disestablished.
REDCOM should be considered for an increased role
as the focal point of the day-to-day aspects of the
mobilization/deployment planning of all the CINCs,
particularly as they pertain to coordination of lift
requirements for all Services and the detailed management
of the movement of men and materiel during a major
reinforcement of a CINC or CINCs. REDCOM would not have
authority to allocate lift between CINCs. This would
remain with the JCS/Joint Transportation Board (JTB)?
REDCOM would coordinate the requirements of all CINCs
as articulated in the Time Phased Force Deployment
Lists. Because of its computer capability and staff
expertise, REDCOM appears to be ideally suited to assume
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the additional responsibilities as the CINCs' point of
contact for coordination of lift requirements for all
Services, thus relieving the CINCs of tedious detailed
management of force movements within CONUS.
Coordination of common user lift assets of the
three Transportation Operating Agencies.(TOAs) is a
function of the JCS/JTB as defined in the JCS Pub 4.
However, it is envisioned that during a major rein-
forcement of a CINC or CINCs, the JCS/JTB will be deeply
involved in the adjudication of major airlift/sealift
allocation issues and will not be able to address
detailed wartime transportation movement problems.
REDCOM thus becomes an ideal candidate to relieve the
JCS/JTB of the detailed management of transportation
problems/issues.
Increased participation of Naval and Marine forces
in REDCOM joint exercises should be directed by the JCS.
Finally, REDCOM should play a more active role in
developing joint tactics/doctrines for all forces,
including identifying deficiencies in materiel or
Service training programs and procedures whose cor-
rection would enhance joint operations.
RECOMMENDATIONS
o REDCOM should be designated as the focal point
for the coordination of the day-to-day aspects of
mobilization/deployment planning of all CINCs, partic-
ularly as they pertain to lift requirements and detailed
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follow-through during major reinforcements.
o REDCOM should have greater Naval and Marine
forces participation in its joint training exercises.
o REDCOM should be given a broader, more active
role in developing joint doctrine for all forces.
o Navy and Marine participation on the REDCOM
staff should be increased to achieve these objectives.
US Southern Command
The US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) is a Unified
Command with area responsibility, except for air defense
and protection of sea communications, for Central and
South America (excluding Mexico). Except for the defense
of the Panama Canal and Canal Zone, contingency planning
is oriented primarily toward evacuation of US nationals
and disaster relief. SOUTHCOM's other responsibilities
include security assistance activities and Service
.training missions.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff have previously recom-
mended disestablishment of SOUTHCOM as a Unified Command.
This recommendation was made at a time when there were
great pressures to reduce headquarters and staffs.
Since that time SOUTHCOM has reduced its staff by almost
50 percent. It has reduced its flag officers from six
to three and dual-hatted two of the three.
As a result of the new treaty with Panama, there
will be an initial transition period of some 3-5 years
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for turnover of Canal responsibilities and facilities.
Unquestionably, it serves the best interests of everyone
concerned not to disestablish SOUTHCOM during this
transition period.
RECOMMENDATIONS
o Retain SOUTHCOM as presently constituted for
at least the period of negotiation and transfer of
responsibilities and facilities resulting from the
Panama Canal treaties.
o When this transition period is over, review
the future of SOUTHCOM in light of the then-prevailing
military/political environment.
Strategic Air Command
The Strategic Air Command (SAC) is a Specified
Command composed of US Air Force forces whose primary
responsibility is the strategic retaliation mission.
Because of the assignment of ballistic missile
submarines to PACOM, LANTCOM, and EUCOM, these commands
also share a responsibility for the strategic retalia-
tion mission. The establishment of a Unified Strategic
Command to control all strategic forces has previously
been recommended, although not within DoD. At present,
target selection and integration of assigned delivery
vehicles are done by the Joint Strategic Target Planning
Staff (JSTPS), a combined effort of the Air Force and
Navy. We could find no serious complaint with the
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"joint nature" of its work.
In addition, a Unified Strategic Command would
not eliminate the requirement for naval control of
all sub-surface and surface vessels to prevent mutual
interference. Thus,. positioning of ballistic missile
submarines would in any event be delegated to subordinate
commands.
A Strategic Command, while looking neat on a wiring
diagram, would be an unnecessary layer between the NCA
and the fighting forces.
RECOMMENDATIONS
None.
Military Airlift Command:'
The Military Airlift Command (MAC) was designated
a Specified Command in 1977. MAC's primary mission is
providing airlift support to the Unified and Specified
Commands.
Examination of MAC raised the related issue of
establishment of a Unified Transportation Command com-
posed of the Military Airlift Command, Military Sealift
Command (MSC), and the Military Traffic Management
Command (MTMC). A Transportation Command is an attrac-
tive concept, but.on examination it is difficult to find
any clearly demonstrable benefits. What is clear is that
it would require the establishment of a major headquarters,
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expensive in money and manpower, which would, in fact,
be a presently unjustifiable layer in the total command
structure.
RECOMMENDATIONS
None.
Aerospace Defense Command
Aerospace Defense Command (ADCOM)--a Specified
Command--is the single manager of US forces for the
surveillance, warning, and defense of the United States
against aerospace attack. ADCOM's Commander-in-Chief
is dual-hatted as the commander of NORAD, a bi-national
United States and Canadian command.
The Air Force has conducted a study of alternatives
for changing the management of assets currently assigned
to ADCOM without changing its basic missions. This
classified study is currently being reviewed by appro-
priate authority for possible implementation. Therefore,
it is not discussed in further detail in this Report.
WARTIME/CRISIS MANAGEMENT
Vietnam is the only war we have fought since the
major reorganization of 1958 and it was thus a test of
the NMCS under wartime conditions. We did not undertake
a detailed analysis of the DoD management of the war in
Vietnam, as this would have been far beyond the scope of
this study. Nevertheless, some general observations
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about the management of this war can be made.
First, and most importantly, however imperfect
our command arrangements may have been, few would make the
case that the nature of the command system had any
appreciably negative effect on the conduct of the war.
Good people, operating under the pressure of war, made
the command structure work despite its shortcomings.
Second, in thinking about the future we should take
little comfort in the fact that we were able to work with
a jury-rigged command structure in Vietnam. In that war,
we had lots of time and a relatively low level of direct
military threat under which to make adjustments. Planning
today must assume a requirement to adjust to war overnight.
Third, Washington certainly was too deeply involved
in the details of actually running the war, particularly
the air war in the north. On the other hand, we believe
that Washington failed to use the analytical tools
available to evaluate both overall policy and opera-
tional performance. Neither the reasonableness of
stated objectives and the strategy for obtaining them,
nor the cost-benefit analysis of various tactical options
was subjected to rigorous scrutiny. Moreover, Washington
did not always exercise independent judgment when eval-
was a tendency to give the commander what he wanted.
If the US ever again is involved in a protracted
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war, its basic premises, its strategy, and its tactics
should be subjected to rigorous analysis in Washington.
Much as Vietnam provided a test under wartime con-
ditions, a crisis involving the use of military force
is also a key test of how well the National Military
Command Structure performs under pressure. A crisis
tests not only the war-fighting and readiness capa-
bility of the forces; it also tests the ability of the
system to produce advice that is usable to key
decisionmakers and the ability of the system to relay
their orders.
The following crises were examined: Middle East
War (1967); Sinking of the USS Liberty (1967); Capture
of the USS Pueblo (1968); Middle East War (1973);
Cyprus War .(1974); Evacuation from Cambodia (1975);
Evacuation from Saigon 1975); Seizure of the SS
Mayaguez (1975); Beirut Evacuations (1976); and the
Korea "Tree Cutting" Incident (1976).
Each of these crises was unique: some were large
and some were small (in terms of forces required); some
were fast-breaking and some slow: some had tight, cen-
tralized control and some were decentralized; some
could be foreseen and pre-planned in detail and some
could not. In other words, these ten crises provided
a broad spectrum for analysis and an indicator of the
range of situations to be expected in the future.
By and large, the command structure performed well
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in these crises. Put another way, the overall structure
itself was seldom a factor in any of the shortcomings
observed. One reason is that the system has been self-
correcting. Deficiencies noted in one crisis were
generally corrected before the next.
Information is a key ingredient in any crisis.
The information gathering and reporting system has
changed dramatically over the past 20 years. Rapidly
developing technologies have improved the speed,
quality, and quantity of the information flow through
communications and data processing systems. Major
organizational improvements in the flow of information
have come with the gradual improvement of the World
Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS). Since
the early 1970s communications failures have increasingly
become a rarity. Policymakers can now reasonably expect
to obtain timely information from the field (although
early reports probably will be confused or inaccurate)
and to have their instructions quickly and accurately
relayed to the appropriate military forces. At the same
time, the virtual revolution in information system
capability presents the NMCS with a new set of challenges.
One of the major issues in crisis management is the
extent to which the established chain of command is
actually used during crises.. The military command
structure has changed little since it was established in
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1958. Yet, communications capabilities have improved to
a point where it now is possible for a remote decision-
maker to talk directly to an on-scene commander. Thus,
it is relatively easy to by-pass the military chain of
command.
Some believe that the very existence of this capa-
bility impels decisionmakers to become overly involved
in the details of crisis management. Crises are impor-
tant events and the speed and extent of the flow of
information to the public makes every crisis an event
with political implications. Thus, key decision-
makers get involved in what may seem to some to be
minute details because they want personally to insure
a successful outcome. In addition, there is a natural
tendency for a key decisionmaker to want to speak with
someone at the scene of the crisis--to add a flavor
that is unobtainable in Washington or to verify a key
piece of information upon which to base a subsequent
decision.
On the other hand, the professional military tend
to believe that the chain of command should generally
be followed as closely as possible. They believe that
the principle of "unity of command" is important and
that the commander on the scene is best qualified to
exercise it. They feel that by-passing levels of com-
mand increases the risk of failure and the risk to the
forces involved. Further, the professional military
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believe that commanders should be told "what" to accom-
plish--and not "how" to do it.
Many military officers are concerned also with the
possibility that lower echelons/commanders will "pass
the buck" and not take effective action in a crisis
situation if they know that their every move is subject
to immediate scrutiny from a very high level. They
may lose their initiative, a quality which can be
decisive in a fast-moving situation.
In sum, military commanders must be aware that
an use of military forces will be of interest to the
National Command Authorities and that employment of
these forces may be closely directed from Washington.
The civilian leadership, on the other hand, should be
aware that by-passing the established chain of command
does cause problems and may add some risks.
A related issue concerns the need for close
coordination between the President and the Secretary
of Defense during a crisis. Although in a crisis the
President has a number of advisers in addition to the
Secretary of Defense, orders to the field commands
should be clearly identified as emanating from the
Secretary as well as from the President--and not be
transmitted separately by Presidential advisers act-
ing in his name. By-passing the Secretary undermines
his authority over the combatant forces.
A further issue is the possible misinterpretation
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of decisions made by the National Command Authorities.
In some crises directives were not written and veri-
fied; they were issued orally. At times, different
receivers interpreted the guidance differently, and a
degree of confusion resulted.
In addition, there has not always been a "feedback"
channel to the decisionmakers to inform them whether or
not their decisions have been implemented. For example,
in June 1967, a message was directed to the Liberty to
move away from a combat area well before the attack on
the ship occurred. Although there was plenty of time,
the message did not arrive before the attack which
disabled the ship and killed/wounded members of her
crew. However, there was no feedback to key decision-
makers that the message had not been received.
Another facet of crisis management is the adequacy
of the system in providing key decisionmakers with
military options, and risk assessments, in a timely
manner. In general, we found that during crises the
system has provided a range of military options suffi-
ciently broad to satisfy the decisionmakers.
Risk assessments, however, are only as good as the
information on which they are based. In some crises,
such as the recapture of the Mayaguez and the landing
on nearby Koh Tang Island, the intelligence information
available to military commanders in the field did not
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accurately reflect the actual size of the hostile forces
to be encountered. Thus, these risk assessments tended to
be inaccurate and unexpected losses were taken.
Those crises that were built around a CINC's plan
seemed to run more smoothly than those that were pre-
dominantly conducted ad hoc. This was in part because
events for which there are plans are, by definition,
to some degree foreseeable. The value of a contingency
plan is not so much in the completed product, but in
requiring staffs at all levels to pre-plan their
arrangements for meeting various possible crisis situa-
tions. Congingency plans were used in part or in toto
in most of the ten crises.
Finally, there is some question as to whether the
NMCS adequately utilizes data-processing capabilities
that are now economically feasible and available in pre-
paration for its support of the NCA at a time of crisis.
In particular, the system may need to improve its
capability quickly to generate adequate responses to
"what is" and "what if" questions asked by decision-
makers. There is no such thing as enough information
in a crisis. Somebody will always want more. Neverthe-
less, the state of the art in data management has changed
radically in the last few years and the system may not
have evolved to take full advantage of these changes.
The way to find out is to exercise the system on a real-
time basis against realistic hypothetical crises.
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RECOMMENDATIONS
o The chain of command to be used in any partic-
ular crisis should be clearly enunciated at the outset.
If any element is to be by-passed, it should remain
fully informed of developments. There should be no
confusion as to the proper flow of communications and
the locus of responsibility.
o NCA decisions during crises should be written
and verified whenever possible. Even oral decisions
required during emergencies should be followed up
immediately in writir}g. In addition, feedback mech-
anisms should be established to insure that decision-
makers know the status of implementation.
o A variety of NMCC-centered command post exer-
cises responding to realistic hypothetical. crises should
be undertaken to test the ability of the NMCS to support
the NCA. Senior level policymaking personnel should be
encouraged to participate.
MANAGMENT OF THE UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMMANDS
The Role of the CINCs
The CINCs command all forces assigned to them and
are responsible to the President and the Secretary for
the operation of these forces. At times in the past
there have been questions regarding the control a CINC
has over forces assigned to him. However, we found
that each CINC believes he has full operational command
over his forces, as provided for by the 1958 amendment
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to the National Security Act.
The CINCs are key figures in the NMCS. They are
responsible for assuring that the forces under them
are capable of protecting US interests, in a combat
situation if required, on a moment's notice. CINCs
are given large geographic and/or functional responsi-
bilities for which they are held fully accountable.
On the other hand, most CINCs have limited power
to influence the capability of the forces assigned them.
Although they provide inputs to the JCS on force struc-
tures and readiness, their views have no formal_ artiCU-
lation in the budgetary decisions at either the Service
or the Secretarial level. Secretary Brown has taken
steps to overcome this shortcoming; he now receives a
quarterly report direct from each CINC. These reports
establish a useful dialogue in areas of research and
development, force balance, resource allocation, and
readiness. They provide the CINCs' personal judgments
on areas which impact on his mission.
This mechanism, however, does not address the
fundamental difficulty inherent in the organizational
structure. The CINCs' forces are trained and equipped
by their parent Services, who control the flow of men,
and materiel to the CINC's components. The
money
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influence on both the structure and the readiness of
the forces for which the CINC is responsible. Later
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in the report we will suggest ways for the CINCs
to participate in the resource allocation decision
process (PPBS), as it relates both to capabilities
of forces in being (O&M f>nds) ?anc?to the composition
of future forces.
Role of the Chairman, JCS
The Chairman is key to the superior functioning
.of the command system. He is, in practice, the link
between the operational commands and the NCA. As such
he passes NCA directives in the field and is the CINCs'
primary point of contact in Washington.
Nevertheless, DoD directives now in force do not
provide the CINCs with a single military superior in
Washington. This has two negative aspects. First,
the CINCs do not have a. formal spokesman in the Wash-
ington arena to assure that their viewpoints are part
of the decisionmaking process. Second, there is no
single military officer responsible for overseeing and
directing the activities of the CINCs: they have no
military boss per se. These are both functions which
the Chairman now informally, and in part, fulfills,
but he is naturally inhibited by not having a clear
formal mandate. We believe the Chairman should now
be given authority to play a more active role with the
CINCs, and that this authority should be formally
delegated to the Chairman by the Secretary. The CINCs
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would continue to be directly responsible to the Secre-
tary, as required by law, but the Chairman would become
both their.spokesman in Washington and the Secretary's
agent in managing the CINCs.
It is important that the JCS as a body continue
? to act as the immediate military staff to the Secretary.
This insures that he will be directly exposed to dif-
fering judgments and advice where they exist. However,
a committee structure is not effective for the exercise
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of military command or management authority. Such
? authority could be more effectively exercised by the
Chairman, who in being so empowered, should also be
? directed to act in consultation with the other JCS
? members when time permits.
An expanded and formalized role for the Chairman in
? managing the Unified and Specified Commands would include
a responsibility for advising the Secretary on the war-
fighting capabilities (readiness) of the forces and
for assuring that the CINCs' views on resources required
to correct identified deficiencies are adequately
? addressed in the allocation process.
There are now many detailed reports on the opera-
? readiness and war-fighting capability of the
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combatant forces. However, these reports are focused
on unit, not joint combatant force, capabilities,; they
? use differing standards among Services; they are not
designed to tie into the resource allocation process;
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and they do not focus on alternative corrective action
possibilities.
Reports to senior levels should concentrate on
joint combatant forces, not unit capabilities. However,
the JCS definition of operational readiness is narrow:
The capability of a unit, ship, weapon
system, or equipment to perform the
missions or functions for which it is
organized or designed. May be used in
a general sense or to express a level
or. degree of readiness.
This definition describes a mere aggregation of uni-
Service units and systems. The reports, therefore, do
not describe the capability of a joint combatant force
"to perform the mission or function for which it is
organized or designed." Existing reports do not address
the full spectrum of choices for improving joint war-
fighting capabilities, which include modernization,
force structure changes, and even roles and mission
changes. Standardized reports probably are not suitable
for the address of such a broad spectrum of alternatives,
but reporting from the CINCs themselves should address
these possibilities. Finally, there is no direct
linkage between the readiness reporting systems and
the JCS role in the budget process; thus, there is no
joint military advice to the NCA for the correction
of identified capability deficiencies.
The recommendations of the CINCs and the Services
on improving the joint war-fighting capabilities of the
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combatant forces are provided in a very general way in
JSOP Volume II. However, this document is not designed
?~ for the assessment of readiness, and its inadequacies
for NCA decisionmaking on resource allocation will be
? noted later in the Report. Further, since many "readiness"
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deficiencies fall into the Operations and Maintenance
portion of the budget, they do not appear in the JSOP.
Constrained resource recommendations combining
the various aspects of war-fighting capability, such as
readiness, modernization, and force structure, are pro-
vided only in the Service Program Objectives Memoranda
(POM) submitted annually to the Secretary. There are,
? however, no constrained joint recommendations on the
Service POMs. The continuing refinement of the DoD
program and budget subsequently involves the joint pro-
cess only on selected major issues, rather than on alter-
natives, trade-offs, or a total program approach. Thus,
? the CINCs have no direct input into the budget process
and no joint spokesman in the PPBS to represent their
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views on improvements to the capabilities of their
forces. Moreover, the Secretary lacks joint military
advice on resource allocation issues regarding readiness,
except to the extent that it is provided informally by
the CJCS. These gaps represent serious limitations in
the NMCS in the planning and management procedures for
maximizing the war-fighting capability of the combatant
forces within the limitations of fiscal realities.
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. Because the CINCs and the JCS now have a minimal
role in the corrective decisions, the initiation of
corrective action is left largely to the Services.
Because such actions relate mostly to expenditures on
forces in being they are particularly important to the
CINCs. The process should be changed to provide a
formal input from the CINCs to the Chairman regarding
the CINC's assessment of deficiencies of forces assigned
to him and resource actions required to correct these
deficiencies. With appropriate staff support, the
Chairman could analyze inputs from the CINCs and then
assure that these assessments of priority actions are
considered by the Services and the Secretary of Defense
in the budget decision process. Some of this now goes
on in a continuing and generally informal manner. But
the role of the CINCs and the Chairman in the resource
allocation process should be expanded and formalized.
RECOMMENDATIONS
o That the role of the CINCs be expanded to include
a participating voice in determining requirements of
the forces under his command.
That the Secretary designate the Chairman as
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his agent for supervising the activities of the CINCs
and that to facilitate this, he amend present directives ?
to indicate that he will normally transmit his orders
to the CINCs through the Chairman who will act in
0
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consultation with the JCS when time permits. The JCS
would remain as the immediate military staff to the
Secretary.
o That the Services/JCS/OSD conduct an in-depth
review of readiness/capabilities reporting with a view
toward developing a system which will provide the
Secretary with detailed, thorough, and well articulated
information on readiness, and force capabilities including
limitations, and recommendations for deficiency correc-
tion.
o That the Chairman, supported by the CINCs, be
given a formal role in resource allocation planning and
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POLICY, PLANS, AND ADVICE
Clear and responsive professional military advice
to the NCA is a prerequisite to successful defense plan-
ning. Equally, the articulation of clear national
security policy is a prerequisite to sound military
planning and advice. This section deals with these
three important functions of the NMCS--policy, planning,
and advice--and its effectiveness in producing them.
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND OSD
Civilian Control
Civilian control over the military has been a basic
tenet of our Nation since its founding, and the effec-
tiveness of this control has been a basic question in
the evolving legislation on DoD organization. We find
that the concept of civilian control over the military
is unquestioned throughout the Department. It is a non-
issue. Our military forces, are fully responsive to the
command and control of the duly constituted civilian
authorities; the President, the Secretary of Defense,
and the Deputy Secretary.
Problems do exist in the relationship between other
OSD officials and the military. There is a perception
among many military officers that OSD officials below
the Secretary and Deputy Secretary sometimes improperly
att t t di ect th Joint Chiefs the Joint Staff,
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or the field commands. The military feel this is an
extension of the concept of civilian control beyond the
intent of the law. A different and more important
problem is the manner in which civilian control is some-
times exercised. Many military officers believe that
OSD's increasing involvement over the last thirty years
in details of implementation--the "how"--as well as the
establishment of the policies--the "what"--represents
an intrusion into details beyond that needed for the
legitimate exercise of policy direction. Moreover,
they contend that detailed "how" directions from OSD
authorities tend to stifle military initiative which
will, over the long run, result in degraded performance.
Organizational adjustments cannot deal with these
issues. It is a matter of attitudes, management styles,
and perceptions of the proper role and level of OSD
direction. Officials in OSD should be sensitive to
these issues and careful to exercise only such authority
as has been clearly delegated to them by the Secretary.
On the operational side OSD should limit its "how"
directives and encourage military initiatives to the
extent compatible with reasonable exercise of OSD
policy direction. Field commanders are responsible
for the security of their forces and are sensitive to
the possibility that detailed "how to" orders may so
limit their flexibility as to jeopardize their discharge
of this. responsibility. On the other hand, military
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actions have political implications, and the Secretary
of Defense thus must be able to monitor JCS messages
which provide operational instructions that derive
from mission-type orders.
Policy Direction
Policy direction is the primary responsibility of
OSD. Such direction naturally encompasses all areas of
DoD activities. That which relates to the NMCS includes
guidance for strategic planning, both in the near term,
to include the preparation of contingency plans, and
future force plans.
In the area of force planning, effective policy
direction requires the statement of policy and objectives
which can form the basis for military planning and
from which derive the DoD program and budget. Most
military officers believe that more clear and definitive
national security policy guidance is needed for strategic
planning. If adequate policy guidance is not given to
military planners, they must prepare their own, as a
necessary starting point. Some argue that previous
national security policy guidance was too general to
be useful, and it certainly is true that vague or all-
encompassing statements of defense policy objectives
are of little help in detailed force planning. On the
other hand, programs constructed without clear policy
directives can only be prepared on the basis of policy
goals determined by the programmer himself, but often
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not made explicit for senior decisionmakers to accept or
reject. Policy goals and alternatives should be made as
explicit as feasible and subjected to the. test of
scrutiny and debate. This procedure would insure rigor
in their formulation, consistency with the goals of
the NCA, and better understanding of the policy by those
who are charged with its execution. We believe, there-
fore, that a serious effort must be made to provide
policy guidance which defines the national security
objectives we expect our military forces to be able
to attain.
In the area of policy guidance for operational plans
there is a need for at least an annual review by the
Secretary and selected key assistants of the principal
military plans to assure that their political assumptions
are consistent with national security policy. Such
briefings also would broaden the understanding of key
policymakers of military capabilities and options in
the event of crisis or conflict.
The JCS are sensitive to the fact. that only the
Secretary and the Deputy Secretary are in the operational
chain of command and, thus, strictly interpreted, only
they have a "need to know" regarding operational plans.
While security of operational plans is critical, present
arrangements place too great a burden on the Secretary
and Deputy Secretary for assuring that there is sufficient
continuing policy guidance in these areas. This responsibility
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should be delegated to the Under Secretary for Policy.
Studies, Analysis, and Gaming
The OSD, the JCS, and the Services all have in-house
and contract capabilities for studies, analysis, and
gaming which form the basis for recommendations in key
areas of policy, strategy, and force planning. These
studies often have differing results due to wide diver-
gence in models, assumptions, approaches, and computer
applications.
Few argue that all defense studies, analysis, and
gaming should be centrally controlled. To do so would
severely restrict each agency in developing its positions.
On the other hand, centralized coordination and dissemi-
nation of results would reduce some overlaps and insure
wider benefits for the work done.
Secretary Brown has already taken action to
improve the management of DoD studies performed by OSD,
the Joint Staff, and the Services, particularly in
support of the PPBS. These studies would be more useful
to the Secretary of Defense and the JCS if some proceeded
from a common focus, while insuring that dissenting
views are expressed. The issues for such analyses
include those identified areas of uncertainty or disagree-
ment in the preceding year's PPBS cycle and should be
promulgated as early as possible in the next cycle.
Each agency has a particular set of responsibilities
unique to it, and study assignments in these programs
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of reference for the.work in each analysis should be
coordinated among interested staff agencies by the study
originator. When disagreements arise on assumptions or
data, they should be identified and the rationales for
the opposing views made explicit. Decision authority on
which assumptions or data to utilize should rest with the
program originator with the dissenting views recorded.
Closer adherence to schedules, wide dissemination of
study results among all interested staff agencies, and
avoidance of duplication are necessary. These management
functions are inappropriate burdens for the Secretary
of Defense/Deputy Secretary of Defense to assume and
should be done by the Under Secretary for Policy.
Similar improvement by the JCS in the management of the
study program to support JSOP or its successor is also
5 needed and will be discussed later.
The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
We believe that the Under Secretary for Policy can
? play an important role in the NMCS. He should be the
focal point for policy coordination between the OSD and
? JCS, as well as between DoD and the rest of-the national
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security bureaucracy. He should act for the Secretary
in monitoring JCS plans for conventional, limited nuclear,
and strategic nuclear war to assure that they reflect
Presidential and Secretarial guidance and should bring
to the attention of the Secretary and/or the JCS issues
in these areas which merit fresh consideration in DoD
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or elsewhere. This office should work with the Joint
Staff and appropriate elements in OSD and other govern-
ment agencies in developing long-range plans on national
security policy matters. Defense planning is now largely
limited to the five-year length of the Defense Program
and such coordinated long-range planning should prove
useful to the Secretary and Joint Chiefs in their con-
sideration of future force structures or other policy
issues and as guidance for military planning. This
office should be responsible for assuring that the annual
Consolidated Guidance and documents based upon it
clearly define the security objectives, and their order
of priority, our forces are designed to attain. It should
also manage the OSD program of studies, analysis, and
gaming in the areas of policy, strategy, force planning,
and resource allocation. Finally, the Under Secretary
for Policy should coordinate the DoD input to the imple-
mentation of national intelligence matters.
The offices of the Assistant Secretaries (ISA) and
(PA&E), the Director of Net Assessment, and the DoD
intelligence agencies. should be integrated under the
Under Secretary for Policy. This integration would
enhance coordination between OSD offices dealing with
policy issues, insure that all studies and analyses are
in the context of national security policy, and relieve
the Secretary of the burden of arbitrating the details
of dissenting views. It would also clarify and sharpen
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debate surrounding program issues. The various propo-
nents often proceed from different and unidentified
policy premises, making it virtually impossible to
? rationalize differences in program terms. On the
? other hand, on many key issues the Secretary will need
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the unfiltered judgments o
should be no compromise to this principle.
RECOMMENDATIONS
o Specific national security policy guidance,
which sets objectives our forces should be capable of
attaining, should be provided to the JCS but without
undue detail about how they are to be attained.
o The Secretary of Defense, his Deputy, and selected
? key assistants should regularly review current military
? operational planning.
o The role of the Under Secretary for Policy should
include:
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is
0o Assuring that national security policy and
objectives are provided to and reflected in JCS/JS plans
for contingencies/crises, conventional wars, and tactical
and strategic nuclear wars.
0o Developing long-range national security policy
plans for consideration by the NCA.
? oo Assuring that national security objectives
?
are reflected in the Consolidated Guidance and other
PPBS documents.
0o Coordinating DoD input to national intelli-
gence matters.
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0o Coordinating the annual study, analysis, and
gaming program conducted by DoD and outside agencies
to resolve major issues in policy, strategy, force
planning, or resource allocation.
o The Assistant Secretaries for ISA and PA&E, the
Director for Net Assessment, and the DoD intelligence
elements should report to the Secretary through the
Under Secretary for Policy, who would have tasking and
coordinating responsibility for these offices, while they
would retain responsibility and control over the sub-
stantive judgments and evaluations of their offices.
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AND THE JOINT STAFF
Organization, .Functions, and Procedures
The Joint Chiefs of Staff were formed during. World
War II for combined strategic planning with their
British counterparts. Their legal status and functions
were formalized by the National Security Act of 1947
and have remained essentially the same since.
An underlying principle of the 1958 amendment to
the Act, as proposed by President Eisenhower, was that:
"...separate ground, sea, and air warfare
are gone forever...our country's security
requirements must not be subordinated to
outmoded or single-service concepts of
war."
To this end, a Service Chief's duties as a member of
the JCS take precedence over all his other duties.
However, problems inherent in the dual roles of the
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Chiefs as both the military leaders of their Services
and members of the JCS charged with providing military
advice that transcends Service positions have been
recognized by every major study of DoD organization as
well as in the Congressional debates on the various
amendments since the 1947 law. Thus, in 1958 a Vice
Chief of Staff was established for each Service, and the
Chiefs were directed to delegate Service-related duties
to their Vice Chiefs, so as to insure the Chiefs adequate
time to devote to their Joint duties.
The Chairman of the JCS is the highest ranking
officer of the military Services; however, he holds no
command authority. He has the unique functions of
representing the JCS in the deliberations of the National
Security Council and of acting for the JCS in time-
sensitive operational matters. Normally, he becomes a
close personal adviser to the Secretary and the President.
The JCS are supported by the Office of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (OJCS) manned by some 1300 people, of
whom some 700 are military officers or their civilian
equivalents. OJCS includes the statutorily limited
Joint Staff, the Office of the Chairman, and JCS agen-
cies. The Joint Staff is headed by a Director, who is
selected by the Chairman in consultation with the other
Chiefs and approved by the Secretary of Defense.
Each Chief is responsible to the Secretary of his
Department for the management and military leadership of
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his individual Service in its mission of organizing,
training, and equipping its forces. This responsi-
bility for administering an organization and budget
larger than that of any American commercial enterprise
can consume as much time and energy as any person can
devote to it. Since 1958, the advent of the PPBS has
imposed new and greater demands on a Chief's time in
the management of his Service. Each Chief, therefore,
has a Service Staff of over a thousand officers to
assist him in this role. This staff also supports him
in his role as a member of the JCS.
No law or Secretarial directive dictates how the
JCS should conduct their business, nor what the relation-
ship should be between the Joint and Service Staffs.
The Chiefs themselves determine how their staffs will
interact and to this end have issued a series of pro-
cedural directives covering the processing of JCS
actions.
These procedures are designed, in general, to assure
as extensive consultation between the Joint Staff and
the four Service Staffs as the urgency of the action per-
mits. Consultation and coordination can occur in commit-
tees at one to five levels, from the action officers
(Major/Lieutenant Colonel level) to the Chiefs themselves,
depending on the difficulty of the issue, the amount of
time available, and the degree of contention involved.
If an expedited action is necessary, the paper can be
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addressed immediately by the JCS or by their principal
representatives in the joint arena, the Operations
Deputies, who are also dual-hatted as Deputy Chiefs of
Staff for operations and plans in the respective Ser-
vices. The time of the Chiefs and Operations Deputies
is conserved by procedures permitting papers to be approved
? at levels as low as Service planners (Colonels and Navy
? Captains) when appropriate. These flexibilities in the
system notwithstanding, it is the norm for each level
? to be involved in the preparation and/or review of a sig-
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nificant joint paper and, as well, for coordination
among the various elements of each of the five involved
staffs, which may be extensive on major plans or policy
papers.
It is difficult for the Joint Staff to perform
creditably under these procedures. The problem has been
compounded by the historic unwillingness of the Services
to heed the pleas of various Secretaries of Defense and
Chairmen of the JCS to assign their most highly qualified
officers to the Joint Staff. The Services have not
perceived such duty as being of the highest priority
and have made their personnel assignments accordingly.
Many of the best officers have noted this fact and thus
avoid a Joint Staff assignment if at all possible. In
consequence, while the Joint Staff officers are generally
capable, the very top officers of the Services more
frequently are on the Service staffs.
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Military Advice
We found a generally high degree of satisfaction
with the military advice which the Chairman and the
Joint Chiefs of Staff personally. provide the Secretary
and which the Joint Staff officers provide their counter-
parts in the National Security Council interagency
system. On the other hand, the formal position papers
of the JCS, the institutional product, are almost uni-
formly given low marks by their consumers--the policy-
makers in OSD, State, and the NSC Staff--and by many
senior military officers as well. In formal papers
argumentation and recommendations usually have had such
extensive negotiation that they have been reduced to the
lowest common level of assent. Consumers often criti-
cize formal JCS positions as being ponderous in presenta-
tion and predictably wedded to the status quo. Thus,
the joint military voice does not play the role it might
on many important issues.
The joint decisionmaking system is able to deal with
some issues better than others. In general, it has
handled operational and most planning matters quite
k
well. On the other hand, the nature of the organization
virtually precludes effective addressal of those issues
involving allocation of resources among the Services,
such as budget levels, force structures, and procurement
of new weapons systems--except to agree that they should
be increased without consideration of resource constraints.
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A Chief's responsibility to manage and lead his Service
conflicts directly with his agreement in the joint forum
to recommendations which are inconsistent with programs
desired by his own Service. A Chief cannot, for example,
be expected to argue for additional carriers, divisions,
or air wings when constructing a Service budget and then
agree in a joint forum that they should be deleted in
favor of programs of other Services. In doing so he
would not only be unreasonably inconsistent, but would
risk losing leadership of his Service as well.
Accordingly, in.the resource allocation area, trade-
offs and alternatives are developed through dialogue
and debate between OSD and the Services. The joint
system plays virtually no role in this allocation
process. The JCS do attempt to assess the military
risk involved at various program levels and force compositions.
While this is a necessary function, it is not a substi-
tute for joint military advice on the preparation of
constrained force structure options.
While the JCS are essentially reactive on arms
control matters, this is an area in which their judgment
of what proposals are acceptable for national security
? has weighed heavily in the formulation of national
policy. Some feel the JCS have been essentially a
? negative factor, resisting change, and are too reluc-
?
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tant to participate in developing arms control proposals.
Others believe their advice is useful in defining
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the outer limits of the acceptability of arms control
proposals from the standpoint of minimum risk. This
is not unnatural or improper, since the.primary respon-
sibility of the JCS is to insure national security. On
the other hand, some consider that JCS/Joint Staff par-
ticipation in the development of innovative arms control
measures which would improve security could lead to
improved arms control policies. Others contend that there
are sufficient arms control advocates in other Government
agencies charged with that responsibility. Thus,
judgments differ as to the value of the JCS advice as
well as their approach to the problem..
There are also differing views as to the effective-
ness of the annual JCS plan (formerly called the JSOP)
which provides their recommendations for future military
strategy and forces necessary to carry out national
security policy and objectives at what they consider
to be a prudent level of risk. This document has
been criticized by many as too remote from fiscal
reality ("a wish list") and too voluminous to be useful
to the Secretary and the President. In consequence,
the critics say, it is not read by the audience for whom
it is primarily intended. On the other hand, this
plan has been described by others, principally in the
military, as stimulating interaction among the military
staffs to develop joint military strategy and force
recommendations. While its force proposals may be
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considered high by some, they represent a considerable
scaling back of the total requests of the CINCs.
Finally, its advocates note, the JSOP establishes a
benchmark which the JCS can use as a reference point
in assessing the risks of various program/budget alter-
natives and as a goal to plan toward, even though it may
be less useful to its consumers in reaching program
decisions regarding forces for the near term. On balance,
the JSOP is of more value to the JCS than its intended
consumers.
Other contentious issues in which important Service
interests or prerogatives are at stake tend to be
resolved only slowly, if at all. These include basic
approaches to strategy, roles and missions of the
Services, the organization of Unified Commands, joint
doctrine, and JCS decisionmaking procedures and documents.
Thus, addressal in the system of such contentious issues
as control of close air support of ground forces is
initiated only when the pace of technological change or
Secretarial directives force it. Changes in these con-
tentious areas are approached reluctantly and deferred
to the extent possible. This difficulty is bascially
systemic, although it is also related to inherent mili-
tary conservatism. There is a natural tendency to be
comfortable with what one understands and knows will
operate and a natural skepticism to accept theoretical
assertions of improvement. This tendency (pejoratively
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56
labeled by some "fighting the last war over again")
needs to be challenged more often, but challenges are
difficult within the existing system which provides
many, avenues for delay.
Other aspects of JCS papers, more procedural than
substantive, tend to reduce their acceptance among
civilian consumers. The military style of writing
papers is often foreign to those unfamiliar with it.
.Also, the extensive line-by-line negotiation by layers
of multiple authors tends to reduce the continuity and
incisiveness of the papers.
Furthermore in the JCS approach to problems there is
a tendency to provide only what is specifically requested.
Some believe this too often leads to "single solution"
papers which may not be compatible with fiscal or poli-
tical constraints. Others feel that this problem is a
two-way street, in which the civilian leadership should
formulate more precisely the questions on which they
desire advice--as well as stating political, economic,
or other limits on responses to the question posed.
There is also a tendency to be reactive, rather than
innovative or participative. There has been a trend
in recent years toward fewer "split" JCS papers being
forwarded to the Secretary for decision. Pressures
have thus built toward developing positions on which
all Services can agree, and "coordination" among the
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staffs is often interpreted as a requirement for con-
currence. Since the number of people who must agree
on the details of a paper is large, the process tends
to inhibit initiative.
Some military officers argue that the reason formal
JCS advice is not found more useful by the civilian con-
sumers is that the JCS tell them what they do not want
0 to_ hear While there may be some element of truth to
?
this view, it implies that senior civilian leaders are
not concerned about our national security and do not
really want military advice. We believe rather that
they are as concerned as our military leaders, but that
they necessarily view the problems from a different and
somewhat broader perspective which includes fiscal,
political, and other imperatives besides military ones.
In fact, the pleas of the decisionmakers for more forth-
.
omin military advice seem to belie this argument.
c
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In sum, the present system makes it difficult for
the Joint Staff to produce persuasively argued joint
papers which transcend Service positions and difficult
for the JCS to arrive at joint decisions in many impor-
tant areas.. These limitations are related in part to
? JCS/Joint Staff procedures and style of presentation as
well as to inherent tension between Service interests
? and a joint perspective. The style is marked by lack
of crispness and incisiveness, and the approach
? to problems by reactivity, general conservatism,
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and single solutions. Substantive content, while varying
in quality depending on the subject, is either not
provided, ambiguous, or of low utility in many areas of
great importance. The examples described are only a
selected cross-section; however, many of the issues on
which effective joint advice is not being provided by
the JCS are of fundamental importance to the ability of
the United States to deter war and to fight one success-
fully, if necessary. The development of force struc-
tures and weapons systems within feasible budgets and
the resolution of contentious joint military issues are
the very decisions most difficult for the Secretary, the
President, and the Congress to make. Thus, the joint
military voice does not carry the weight it could in
the decision process, especially in areas where it could
be most useful and influential.
Alternatives For Improving Military Advice to the NCA
Enhancing the Role of the Joint Staff
Several adjustments to current JCS procedures,
which could be made within existing legislative statutes,
would, we believe, lead to improving the effectiveness
and impact of the joint institutional product. One is
to enhance the role of the Joint Staff and to reinforce
its capability to provide the kind of integrated national
planning and advice envisioned by President Eisenhower
in submitting the 1958 legislation:
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Strategic and tactical planning must be
completely unified, combat forces organ-
ized into unified commands, each equipped
with the most efficient weapons systems
that science can develop, singly led and
prepared to fight as one, regardless of
Service.
Adjustments to JCS procedures which have most promise
in this connection are: more guidance from senior levels
prior to formal staffing; reduced requirement for the
Joint Staff to "coordinate" with the Service staffs,
substituting a requirement merely to include differing
views in the body of its paper; increased use of analysis
? of pros and cons of alternative courses of action in JCS
papers; and Service assignment of their most qualified
? officers to Joint Staff duty.
Unproductive conflict, particularly at lower staff
? levels, could be reduced if the Chairman or the JCS
. provided the Joint Staff with general guidance, when
appropriate, on difficult and important issues prior to
is the initiation of staff action. In addition to reducing
lower-level conflict, early guidance could also result
? in a final product more closely reflecting the position(s)
? of the senior officers. Another advantage would be that,
because the principals would address the issues without
? responsibility to support previously prepared staff
efforts, they would be better able to agree on a genuine
? national approach. A disadvantage is that the complexity
?
?
and multiplicity of modern military problems preclude
principals from being expert on all simultaneously, and.
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that therefore, such initial high-level guidance may not
lead in all cases to more thorough or less negotiated
solutions and/or may preclude innovative initiatives by
the staff experts.
Another path to a more focused product would be for
the Joint Staff to be relieved of any requirement for
Service coordination and for it to present its product
directly to the Operations Deputies. Under this procedure
Joint Staff officers would solicit Service inputs, while
informing them of the development of the paper. This
procedure would sharpen the presentation of JCS views and
place greater emphasis on a joint military perspective.
Since it would eliminate the lower committees, time spent
on minor issues of an editorial or non-substantive
nature would diminish. Disadvantages of this procedure
include an increased number of issues faced by the
Operations Deputies. Moreover, their negotiations might
not improve the final product. However, reducing
the number of lesser issues and limiting the Operations
Deputies' deliberations to major issues might overcome
these disadvantages.
A variation on the above, which preserves the prin-
ciple of editorial integrity for Joint Staff/JCS papers,
would be for the Services and the Joint Staff to recognize
that there are legitimate, different points of view and
that it is the function of the Joint Staff to delineate
and analyze alternative choices, with its preferred course
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?
?
of action noted. The Joint Staff would articulate the
positions of the Service staffs as accurately as possible
and present them among other alternatives to the Opera-
tions Deputies and the JCS. This would remove the present
de facto burden of obtaining Service concurrence. Ser-
vice staff views would be included in the body of the
paper when fundamental substantive differences exist--
not as dissenting footnotes. The Operations Deputies
and the JCS would then be responsible for deciding
. which position(s) to adopt. This procedure would provide
? the Chiefs with analysis of differing courses of action.
Further, this format could be carried forward in papers
? sent to the Secretary by.the JCS.
Proponents of this latter procedure maintain that it
? would improve presentation by recognizing legitimate differ-
ences of views, and presenting them clearly; that the
quality of the argumentation would improve through
? successive stages of the paper; and that many divergent
?
?
views would be withdrawn as the strongest argumentation
became evident. Those who favor this procedure also
believe that by providing the Secretary more complete
military staff work for consideration of complex problems,
the JCS paper would be used as the basic framework for
decisionmaking and thus enhance the status of both the
JCS and the Joint Staff.
? On the other hand, this procedure might entail
an increased workload for the JCS and/or the Operations
? Deputies, though all papers would not require or lend
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themselves to the alternatives analysis approach. Some
oppose this procedure on the grounds that the JCS view
is more powerful if a single, united position is pre-
sented and/or that alternatives provide an opportunity
to select choices the JCS do not favor. This view does
not recognize, however, that in many situations the JCS
do agree on a recommended alternative; that in many, cases
the Chiefs advocate differing alternatives through
Departmental channels; and finally that not providing
alternatives leaves their development and analysis to
the staff of the Secretary.. Indeed, the view that
single solution positions enhance the weight of the JCS
seems to overlook the fact that because the JCS advise
and do not decide they may have the greatest influence
by presenting the policymakers with good analyses of the
pros and cons of alternative courses of action. By
this procedure, the Secretary would at least have the
benefit of being formally exposed to JCS analysis of
possible alternatives and would thus have a better under-
standing of the rationale for the JCS recommendations.
If the Joint Staff is to perform the staff leader-
ship role envisioned by the adjustments suggested in this
paper, it must be staffed with the best qualified officers
available. Historically, the Services have most often
assigned such officers to the Service staffs and not to
the Joint Staff, although recently the Services have,
on their own, taken commendable actions to attempt to
u ade the Reluali2004f officers assigned to the Joint
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Staff. Over.the long run, however, until the Service
Chiefs are committed to putting a share of their very
? best officers on Joint Staff duty, the situation pro-
bably will not undergo fundamental change. This will
? come about only when the Services believe that the
Joint Staff is playing a central role in helping to decide
? issues of critical importance to the Service--in short,
? when it is addressing resource allocation, constrained
force structure, roles and missions, and other conten-
tious issues and when the recommendations of the joint
? process in these areas weigh heavily in the final
decisions.
Secretary Brown already is taking steps to reissue
and strengthen the "Gates Memorandum," which requires
Joint duty as a prerequisite for selection to flag rank,
? in an effort to have the Services assign their best
officers to Joint Staff or other Joint duty. However,
? the Gates Memorandum of 1959 did not succeed in this goal
because the positions defined as joint duty were defined
? too broadly and because frequent exceptions were allowed
?
?
by the Services. To make a revised directive truly
effective requires that the exceptions be determined by
someone with a joint perspective. Therefore, the excep-
tion authority should be delegated by the Secretary of
Defense to the CJCS.
? Emphasizing joint duty as a promotion criterion
is important but will not in itself develop a Joint
?
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Staff with the standard of excellence it would require if
it is to provide the best possible support for the JCS
and the Secretary in the national security decisionmaking
process. To assemble the best officers from each Service
on the Joint Staff on a continuing basis will require
extraordinary measures. We suggest the Chairman be
empowered to obtain assignment to Joint Staff duty
of any requested officer, with due consideration for
rotation requirements and the officer's career develop-
ment. The criteria for such selection should be excel-
lence in performance of staff duty as well as capacity
for approaching problems from a national outlook.
Exceptions would naturally have to be made, but these
should be granted by the Chairman, for the Secretary,
and not by the Services. Such exceptions should be
recorded by the CJCS to insure 'that these officers are
requested at a later date when they become available.
By so empowering the CJCS, the Secretary would assure
an upgrading of the Joint Staff.
RECOMMENDATIONS
o The JCS should revise their procedures to:
0o Make the Joint Staff alone responsible
for authorship of JCS papers.
oo Present comprehensive analysis of alter-
natives whenever appropriate, encouraging expression of
differing views.
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0o Provide initial high-level guidance to the
Joint Staff when appropriate.
o The Secretary of Defense should reissue the
Gates Memorandum with a narrower definition of joint
assignments and delegate authority to determine excep-
tions only to the Chairman, JCS.
o The Service Chiefs should commit their most
? outstanding and highly qualified officers for assignment
? to the Joint Staff.
o The Secretary should empower the CJCS to obtain
? assignment to the Joint Staff of any requested officer,
?
with temporary exceptions determined by the CJCS.
Increasing the Responsibilities of the CJCS
Adoption of the foregoing procedural and personnel
? assignment suggestions should result in significant
? improvements to the formal product of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff and thus increase the weight of their advice
? in the national security decisionmaking process. They
would not, however, correct a central limitation in the
Present system, namely, its inability to address
?
is effectively resource allocation and constrained force
structure issues because of the Service Chief's dual
? role as a Joint Chief and as the military leader of
his Service.
? There are several possible adjustments to the present
? structure which would address this basic problem. One
would be to formalize and expand the Chairman's present
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role as an adviser to the Secretary on those issues the
JCS as a body are unable to address effectively.
Another alternative would be to create a body of National
?
?
?
Military Advisers, whose responsibilities would be limi-
ted ?
to the Joint arena, and concentrate the Service
Chief's duties on the leadership and administration of ?
his Service. ?
The Nation has been well served by a series of
Chairmen able to rise above Service interests in advising ?
the President and the Secretary and in reporting to the
The CJCS is the only officer with no present ?
Congress.
or future Service responsibilities, and thus he is in a
unique position to provide national military advice.
The Chairman already acts.as an adviser to the
Secretary of Defense on budget and constrained force
structure issues, but he now does so on an informal
and personal basis, generally by being a participant at
many of the decision meetings. He does not have adequate
staff support on these issues, nor does he have a regular
and formal input into the system. The Secretary could
ask the Chairman to develop expertise in the Joint Staff
to support him and establish a mechanism for the Chairman
to have a formal input into the program and budget.cycles.
If the Chairman were to be designated as the joint
military adviser to the NCA on resource allocation, the
views of the CINCs on major program and budgetary issues
could be better articulated in the PPBS. At present, while
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the CINC to some extent provides resource requirements
to the JCS - the EUCOM Master Priority List being the
most detailed submission - it is left to individual
Service Chiefs to consider that portion of the CINC's
recommendation which directly pertains to their particular
Services. Under this revised system, the CINCs would
provide the Chairman with a list of their resource
priorities, and he and his staff could then compile
the CINC inputs and attempt to adjudicate differences
? when required. Thus, the Chairman would end up with a
?
?
priority list of those items deemed most important by
the CINCs and would see that these views are considered
in the decisionmaking process. Such a list quite naturally
might differ from a Service-prepared set of priorities,
which is why it is important that the operators have a
spokesman in Washington.
? If the CJCS is given increased responsibilities
in the budget and resource allocation process, he will
need additional staff support in the studies, analysis,
? and gaming area, particularly in the areas of strategy,
force plans, gross costing, and analysis of risk and
? trade-offs. The JCS analytical capability was greatly
?
?
reduced when SAGA was reduced in strength and WSEG was dis-
established. The need for improved management of the
annual DoD studies, analysis, and gaming programs was des-
cribed earlier. The same improvements should be incorporated
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into the JCS program of studies in support of JSOP.
The program should be retitled to support the broader
PPBS, although its scope would probably not differ
greatly. Authority for the management of the program
should be delegated to the CJCS. He should undertake
this responsibility in consultation with the JCS and
the Under Secretary for Policy, as appropriate.
As an additional action formalizing the Chairman's role
as a joint adviser on resource issues, he could be made
a voting member of the Defense Systems Acquisition
Review Council (DSARC), the committee which makes
decisions on the development of new systems.
The major advantage of this approach would be that it
would provide the NCA with a national military judgment
on contentious issues without substantially changing the
JCS structure which has been in existence for more than
thirty years. It also would provide a mechanism to insure
that the views of the CINCs are represented in the
resource allocation process. A possible disadvantage
of this adjustment is that it could have some adverse
impact on the Chairman's role vis-a-vis the other Chiefs.
The Chairman leads but does not command the JCS. To
do this effectively, he must have the trust and confidence
of the other Chiefs. While the Chairman's work in the
resource and constrained force structure decision process
would proceed in consultation with the JCS, he clearly
would act from his own national perspective and not on
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behalf of the individual Services or the other Chiefs.
Nevertheless, the judgments he gave the Secretary would
? be known throughout DoD and it is not difficult to
imagine how these judgments could cause friction with
? the Service Chiefs. On the other hand, this system
? would provide each Service Chief an incentive to work
cooperatively with the. Chairman. Our judgment is that
? this possible disadvantage would be manageable if the
? Secretary made clear to the other Chiefs his desire for
a national military viewpoint on these issues and his
? belief that this can come only from the Chairman.
RECOMMENDATIONS
? o That the Secretary of Defense designate the
? Chairman, JCS as responsible for providing military
advice from a national viewpoint on program and budget
? issues.
o That the CJCS be established as a voting member
? of the DSARC.
o That the CJCS, in consultation with the JCS and
? the Under Secretary for Policy, as appropriate, manage
? an annual study, analysis, and gaming program conducted
by the Joint Staff, SAGA, contract agencies, and the
? Services as appropriate.. It should.be designed to clarify
?
or resolve major issues in the areas of joint military
strategy, force planning, or resource allocation.
o That the Chairman be given appropriate Joint
Staff support to make broad program and budget judgments.
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70 ?
National Military Advisers
If the Joint Staff were strengthened through the
procedures outlined and the Chairman were given these new
responsibilities and the means to carry them out, it is
possible that much of the dissatisfaction with the joint
formal military advice would disappear. If this proves
not to be the case, then solutions of a more fundamental
nature directed at resolving the inherent tensions in
the current organization, such as separating the joint
advice and command functions from those of Service admin-
istration, would become necessary. This might be
accomplished by establishing a body of National Mili-
tary Advisers entirely independent of Service respon-
sibilities, although this would be a drastic and contro-
versial change.
The National Military Advisers (NMA) would be com-
prised of a senior officer from each Service, one of
whom would be the Chairman. Members might previously
have served as Service Chiefs or CINCs. They would be
the ranking officers of the military and would be the
principal military advisers to the Secretary of Defense,
the NSC, the President, and the Congress. Their functions
would be similar to those of the JCS today, but they
would not be dual-hatted as Chiefs of their Services.
Adoption of this structure would clearly separate joint
planning, operations, and advice from Service administra-
tion. The NMA would be responsible for all joint functions;
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the Chiefs of Staff of the Services would be responsible
for organizing, equipping, and training the forces
? assigned to the field commands. The NMA should not
? return to their Service for further assignment, but
could be eligible for assignment as Unified Commanders.
? The NMA would be supported by the Joint Staff.
practice, both the NMA and the Joint Staff would consult
frequently with, and rely importantly on, the specialized
? expertise of the Service Staffs, but the Joint Staff
would be independent from the Service Staffs to an extent
? not now possible.
? A National Military Adviser system would enable
the joint process to regain or undertake various functions
? not now done or done elsewhere, either because of lack
of management time or because policymakers judge the
? present system unduly influenced by Service interests.
The NMA would have the time to reassume administrative
? responsibility for various Defense Agencies such as the
? Defense Communications Agency, the Defense Nuclear Agency,
and the Defense Mapping Agency, which now report to OSD
? offices. Further, it could assume a broader and more
? direct role in the joint testing of weapon systems and
in the review of joint research and development projects.
? On the analytical side, the NMA could undertake expanded
joint war gaming and force capability analyses directed
? towards assisting budget and constrained force structure
? decisionmaking.
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The NMA concept has some important advantages as
well as some major disadvantages and risks. The major
advantage of the NMA concept is that it would create
a joint body of senior military advisers with the time
and sole responsibility to provide the best joint mili-
tary advice possible, uninhibited by Service responsi-
bilities. We have noted the inability of the present
JCS structure to play a major role in budget and con-
strained force structure decisionmaking. The separation
of the NMA from Service responsibilities would permit
them to address and provide advice in these areas. As
importantly, in other areas of joint military advice
the NMA would be able to address each issue from a
national perspective, free of any Service pressure.
They would not be dependent for support on separate
Service Staffs, who bring Service perspectives to the
addressal of the issues. Their support would come
from the Joint Staff.
Another advantage in separating the joint planning,
operations, and advice from Service administration
functions is that it would create two positions requiring
quite different abilities and would thus facilitate
the assignment of senior officers with the unique talents
necessary for each. The present JCS-Service Chief
position requires a combination of administrator,
leader, and national strategist. This is a rare
combination and officers who are well-qualified in all
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these areas are not always available.
We believe that establishing National Military
Advisers supported by a Joint Staff independent from
the Services could result in better and more influen-
tial military advice in national security matters.
Others, and this category includes many and perhaps
most senior military officers, believe that separating
joint advice from the Service responsibility would
result in reducing the weight of influence of the pro-
fessional military and could also result in less
meaningful military advice.
Many senior officers feel that there has been a
clear trend towards centralizing decisions at the OSD
level and that a major point of balance to this centrali-
zation is the weight of the dual role of the Service
Chiefs as members of the JCS and military heads of their
Services. In this dual role the JCS have a voice in
0 Congress and.in NSC affairs, which provides some
political offset to OSb decisions. Creating an NMA,
? it is argued, would result in there being two sources
of power (NMA and the Service Chiefs) where there now
? is one, neither as powerful as the present dual-hatted
? Service Chief of Staff. There is validity to both the
?
thesis and the argument. The counter-argument is that
an NMA system would produce advice--particularly on
budget and constrained force structure issues--which
would weigh more importantly in Secretarial decisions than
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that produced by the present system. A better articula-
tion of professional military views would have greater
impact in offsetting OSD views. Moreover, the weight ?
of the advice would be enhanced by its being truly joint
and national in outlook.
It is also argued that an NMA-Service organization
would risk fractionating present Service cooperation
and reverse the present movement towards a more joint
approach to operations and advice. Those who hold this
view see a possible return to the pre-eminence of
overriding Service interests, less consideration of
cross-Service trade-offs, and a polarization of differ-
ing and conflicting Service doctrinal positions.
They fear that much of the progress towards unity of
action accomplished since 1947 would be risked by crea-
tion of an NMA-Service organization. No clear evidence
supports or refutes these honestly-held judgments, but
the possible damage seen by those who hold these views
is clearly a risk.
Establishing an NMA would increase the number
of power centers within DoD and might make more diffi-
cult both internal management and external presentation
of DoD views. The Congress, for example, is not likely
to refrain from asking a Service Chief his views on
a national security policy issue, and absent his
present bond to the JCS corporate positions, a Chief
would be free to express views contrary to those of
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Separating Service responsibility from joint
advice has been criticized on the ground that it might
create an "ivory tower" mentality among the joint
advisers. This is summarized by statements such as:
"Separating advice from responsibility to carry it
out will produce unsound advice." Or, "If advisers are
not responsible for the day-to-day functioning of their
Service, they will lose touch with what's going on."
These arguments can be considered broadly under opera-
tional and planning advice.
Operations are now conducted by forces under the
command of the Unified and Specified Commanders.
They are responsible for fighting the combatant forces
under their command and it is to them that Washington
should go for information on the status of forces and
judgments on the feasibility of operational proposals.
We recognize that the Service Chief has proximity to
the Secretary and that his opinions will be solicited.
In particular, since the Services are charged with the
support of the forces their judgment on the feasibility
of such support would be a necessary ingredient to
decisionmaking. Nevertheless, the responsibility
for operations rests now, as well as under an NMA
structure, with the U & S Commanders.
The planning functions of a joint body, either the
present JCS or an NMA, clearly require Service-unique
special inputs. However, the very nature of such
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planning--either operations plans which originate
with the CINCs or force structure plans--usually
allows adequate time for the Joint Staff to solicit
and consider such input and would permit the National
Military Advisers to consult with the Service Chiefs
as appropriate.
Creating National Military Advisers and limiting
the Service Chief function to the military leadership
and administration of his Service would require
revision of the National Security Act. While we
recognize many advantages that may be attributed to
these more drastic alternatives, we. would also urge
that careful consideration be given to the strengths
of the current system and to the checks and balances
implicit in its design. We would argue that searching
and detailed study should be given to such proposals
prior to their implementation.
For the present, we recommend taking now the steps
previously outlined to enhance the role of the Joint
Staff, while changing the format and approach in pre-
senting JCS advice to the Secretary of Defense, and
to increase the responsibility of the Chairman, par-
ticularly in providing national advice on program/
budget and constrained force structure issues. In
the event that these measures are not implemented,
or if they should not prove effective in resolving
the basic problems of improving the professional
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military advice to the NCA and insuring that their
voice is more adequately heard in decisions on
important national security issues, the President
should consider the formation of a group. of National
Military Advisers.
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ADCOM
ASD/ISA.r._::.
ASD/PA&E,
CIA
CINC
CINCEUR
CINCLANT
CINCPAC
CJCS
CONUS
CSG
DOD
DSARC
EUCOM
JCS
JS
JSOP
JSTPS
JTB
MAC
MSC
MTMC
NATO
NCA
NMA
NMCC
NMCS
NORAD
NSC
OJCS
OMB
OSD
PACOM
PPBS
POM
GLOSSARY-
~A ace Defense Command
s
p
ero
Assistant,- :_Sec_retary -of Defense ,?
Security Affairs
:s_}start: S:edr,etary of + :Defense:; i-Program Analysis
and Evaluation
Central Intelligence Agency
Commander-in-Chief
Commander-in-Chief, Europe
Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Continental United States
CINCPAC Support Group
Department of Defense
Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council
European Command
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Joint Staff
Joint Strategic Objectives Plan
Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff
Joint Transportation Board
Atlantic Command
Military Airlift Command
Military Sealift Command
Military Traffic Management Command
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
National Command Authorities
National Military Advisers
National Military Command Center
National Military Command Structure
North American Air Defense Command
National Security Council
Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Office of Management and Budget
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Pacific Command
Planning, Programming, Budgeting System
Program Objectives Memorandum
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?AC
SACEUR
SACLANT
W AGA
OUTHCOM
TOA
?UCP
U&S Commands
WMCCS
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
0
Strategic Air Command
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (NATO)
Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (NATO)
Studies; Analysis and Gaming Agency
Southern Command
Transportation Operating Agencies
Unified Command Plan
Unified and Specified Commands
Worldwide Military Command and Control System
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