THE SHARE OF THE SOVIET DEFENSE EFFORT ATTRIBUTABLE TO MEETING THE PRC THREAT (U)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00171R001100010003-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 9, 2004
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: May 26, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY
SPECIAL DEFENSE
INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
THE SHARE OF THE
SOVIET DEFENSE EFFORT
ATTRIBUTABLE TO MEETING
THE PRC THREAT (U)
26 MAY 1977
DIA review(s)
completed.
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to
Criminal Sanctions
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SPECIAL DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
THE SHARE OF THE SOVIET DEFENSE EFFORT
ATTRIBUTABLE TO MEETING THE PRC THREAT
This Estimate has been coordinated with the Intelligence Chiefs of the Army,
Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. All concur in the Estimate as written.
Comments or questions concerning this Estimate should be referred to the
author, Dr. John Ashton, Directorate for Estimates, OX4-8106.
JAMES A. WILLIAMS
Brigadier General, USA
Deputy Director for Estimates
SDIE SOV 1-77
26 May 1977
CLASSIFIED BY DIA-DE
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 2
DECLASSIFY ON 31DECEMBER2007
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THE SHARE OF THE SOVIET DEFENSE EFFORT
ATTRIBUTABLE TO MEETING THE PRC THREAT
TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE
The Estimative Issue
Conclusions
Discussion
Growth in Major Individual Force Elements 2
Implications for the Focus of the Soviet Defense Effort 6
Outlook 6
Annex A: "Methodology"
The Approach to the Problem 9
Backup Analysis and Calculations 10
Annex B: "Cost Differentials of Soviet Forces Against the PRC" 21
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FIGURE 1. SHARE OF SOVIET DEFENSE EFFORT ATTRIBUTABLE TO MEETING THE PRC THREAT (IN
PERCENT OF TOTAL SOVIET DEFENSE EXPENDITURES)
TOTAL
EFFORT
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THE SHARE OF THE SOVIET DEFENSE EFFORT
ATTRIBUTABLE TO MEETING THE PRC THREAT (U)
THE ESTIMATIVE ISSUE
(U) In the context of relating US defense expenditures to those of the USSR,
.a question often arises concerning the portion of Soviet defense expenditures that
is directed against the PRC, and, by implication, not attributable to countering
the US and its allies. The question persists in spite of the fact that, for whatever
purpose raised, military forces can be used against any enemy.*
A. (S) The Soviet defense effort directed against the PRC threat is estimated
to have grown from about 5 percent of the total Soviet defense effort in 1964
to about 12 percent in 1971-1972, and then to have declined to about 11 percent
in 1976-1977 (see Figure 1). We see the long term trend as favoring greater relative
efforts against the US and NATO, and less against the PRC.
B. (S) The rapid growth in the effort against the PRC is largely a thing of
the past; it accounted for about 30 percent of the growth in Soviet military
expenditures 1964-1972, but less than 5 percent in the years since 1972.
C. (S) The slackening of the growth in the effort against the PRC has enabled
the effort against the US and NATO to grow much more rapidly in the last five
years than in the previous eight years.
D. (S) The Soviet effort against the PRC has also been a highly selective
one, accounting for some 40-50 percent of the total growth in Soviet expenditures
for ground forces and Frontal Aviation, but for negligible amounts of the growth
in expenditures for ICBMs, SLBMs, LRA, Navy, and research and development.
*The presence of any Soviet forces in the Far East poses a threat to US bases,
interests, and Asian allies, as well as to the PRC. Their mere existence would tend
to pin down US forces in the Far East in the event NATO-Warsaw Pact hostilities
were limited to the European theater.
**The conclusions are based on a number of calculations, judgments, and
assumptions, which are set forth in detail in Annexes A and B.
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GROWTH IN THE MAJOR INDIVIDUAL FORCE ELEMENTS
1. (S) The major Soviet defensive effort opposite the PRC, as measured by
estimated Soviet military expenditures, has been the buildup of ground and Frontal
Aviation forces along the border. This effort is estimated to have accounted for
almost all of the growth in the total effort against the PRC in the years 1964-1972,
and to be equivalent to about one-half of the total growth in Soviet expenditures
for those force elements. The effort levelled off in the years 1972-1977, except
for a major Frontal Aviation effort in 1975. Preparation for deployment of the
SS-X-20 has resulted in some growth in the effort against the PRC in the past
few years. Developments in other Soviet force elements opposite the PRC have
had a negligible effect on the growth in the overall Soviet defense effort (Figure
2 depicts the share of the effort in each individual force element estimated to
be attributable to meeting the PRC threat.) As can be seen, over 50 percent of
the Border Troops effort is against the PRC, about 25 percent of the ground and
Frontal Aviation effort, and lesser shares of the effort in other force elements.
Early Strengthening Of Border Troops
2. (S) The early Soviet reaction to the growing hostility of the PRC was
to reorganize the border troops in 1962-64. The USSR has continued to strengthen
the units opposite the PRC in the years since, supplying more APCs and other
equipment to units opposite to the PRC than to border guards in other areas.
This upgrading has in the years since been overshadowed by the effort in other
force elements, particularly in ground forces.
Major Growth In Ground Forces
3. (S) Soviet line divisions along the PRC border increased from 16 in 1964
to 40 in 1972, and to 41 in 1976. (Figure 3 shows the location of ground force
divisions along the border.) They now make up 24 percent of the Soviet ground
force line division strength and approximately the same share of divisional
manpower.
4. (S) Soviet line divisions along the PRC border tend to cost less than does
the average Soviet line division, however, and thus require less than their share
of resources. Although the forces along the border account for 24 percent of ground
force strength, they have received only some 20 percent of new ground force
armaments over the past few years, and have only 15-18 percent of ground force
ammunition and petroleum storage.
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FIGURE 2. PERCENT OF INDIVIDUAL FORCE ELEMENT EFFORT
THAT IS DIRECTED AGAINST THE PRC THREAT
Force Element
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
Border Troops
45
50
50
55
55
55
55
Ground Forces
10
20
20
25
25
25
25
Helicopter Aviation
10
10
10
30
40
30
30
Frontal Aviation
5
5
10
20
25
25
25
Transport Aviation
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
LRA
10
10
10
10
10
5
5
SRF
10
10
Negl
5
5
Air Defense
-
-
Negl
Negl
5
5
5
Navy
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
a/ EXCLUDES ONE DIVISION EACH IN SIBERIAN AND CENTRAL ASIA MDs WHICH WERE DROPPED
SUBSEQUENT TO 1964.
b/ ACTIVE FRONTAL AVIATION BASES ARE SHOWN. USUALLY ONE REGIMENT IS ASSIGNED PER
BASE.
GROUND FORCE DIVISION a/ o
FRONTAL AVIATION UNITS b/ p
1
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5. (S) In the past year, the Soviets have again increased their ground forces
against the PRC, so that the share of the effort against the PRC has stopped its
decline of the previous four years. In particular, the Soviets have since October
1975 expanded their ground forces in Outer Mongolia by activating an additional
tank division at Bulgan. They have also introduced a mobilization division at
Arvayheer and major elements of an unidentified division at Mandalgovi.
6. (S) The general upgrading of Soviet troops along the border has lagged
behind that in the West, however, and new equipment has been introduced more
slowly, as a substantially greater threat to the USSR emanates from NATO.
Expansion And Modernization Of Frontal Aviation
7. (S) The growth in ground forces has been paralleled by growth in Frontal
Aviation forces along the border. From a force of some 200 fixed-wing aircraft
in 1964, Frontal Aviation grew to strength of some 1100 aircraft in 1972, mostly
through the reactivation of older aircraft. (Figure 3 shows the location of new
airfields along the PRC border.) The rate of growth slowed since then. The some
1200 aircraft along the border now account for about 26 percent of total fixed-wing
aircraft in Frontal Aviation.
8. (S) The modernization of Frontal Aviation opposite the PRC clearly lagged
until 1975. Then for a year, forces opposite the PRC were favored and in 1975-1976
almost one-half of new aircraft went to the border. Since mid-1976, the priority
has again returned to the forces opposite NATO.
9. (S) The growth in fixed-wing aircraft in Frontal Aviation along the PRC
border was accompanied by a rapid growth of helicopters in Frontal Aviation.
In 1965, there were only some 60 helicopters near the PRC border, out of a total
of over 600. Helicopters were added rapidly in the years 1969-1971 so that almost
40 percent of the Frontal Aviation helicopter force was opposite the PRC by 1972.
Since then, however, the helicopter force has grown more rapidly in the west.
At present, some 30 percent of the 3,000-plus helicopters in Frontal Aviation are
opposite the PRC.*
*This number includes those helicopters supporting two air mobile regiments.
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Adjustment Of The SRF To The PRC Challenge
10. (S) Concerned that its missile complexes near the PRC border presented
too tempting a target, the SRF in 1967-1970 removed its MRBMs and IRBMs
from within range of PRC weapons, and stopped construction on ICBMs in the
three eastern-most complexes. In the years 1967-1971, the USSR deployed 190
SS-11 in five complexes so oriented that their area of fire could cover the PRC.
Eighty of these have been modernized with SS-1 1 Mod 2/3. The others will probably
be converted to SS-17 and SS-19, when the SS-X-20 can take over their targeting
responsibilities.
11. (S) During the past year, preparations for deployment of the SS-X-20,
which has the range to cover all of the PRC, have been progressing at three
complexes, two opposite the PRC. We estimate that some 30 percent of the final
total SS-X-20 force will be allocated against the PRC.
12. (S) There is little indication, however, that concern with the PRC has
caused the USSR significantly to change the deployment of other force elements
over the past decade.
-- Soviet strategic air defenses along the border have accounted for about 17
percent of PVO Strany air defense resources from the mid-1960s to the present,
and have lagged air defense forces in the west in getting new equipment.
-- Soviet general purpose naval forces deployed in the Pacific Fleet have
remained close to 28 percent of the total since 1964. Even this fleet is structured
and trained primarily against the US. The newest ships, submarines, and aircraft
have been deployed to the Northern and Black Sea fleets in the west.
-- Fixed-wing transport aircraft opposite the PRC have remained at about
14 percent of the total 1964-1976; again the newest aircraft have been deployed
against the West.
-- Numbers of LRA BADGER deployed opposite the PRC (no BLINDER are
so deployed) have remained at 14-15 percent of the BADGER force since 1964.
BACKFIRE has been deployed only in the west, and the BEAR and BISON force
was developed and deployed primarily for use against the US.
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IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FOCUS OF THE SOVIET DEFENSE EFFORT
13. (S) These force element programs against the PRC are estimated to have
accounted for 30 percent of the growth in the Soviet defense effort (as measured
by expenditures for defense) in the years 1964-1972. As a result, resources
attributable to meeting the PRC threat are estimated to have grown from 5 percent
of the total Soviet defense effort in 1964 to some 12 percent in 1972.
14. (S) During the years 1972-1974, however, the effort is estimated to have
remained at about the 1972 level. The increments in the Soviet defense effort
during those years were directed at meeting the US and NATO threats, and the
share of the effort against the PRC declined. In 1975, however, the effort against
the PRC spurted as a result of the extensive Frontal Aviation deployments mid-1975
to mid-1976. Since then, Frontal Aviation deployments have been below normal.
Despite new ground force deployments, the share of the effort against the PRC
has fallen to less than 11 percent.
15. (S) Figure 1 graphically shows the importance of the impetus given by
expansion of Soviet ground forces and Frontal Aviation along the PRC border
to the growth of the effort against the PRC in the late 1960s and the slackening
of the relative effort in the 1970s.
16. (S) As the growth in the Soviet effort against the PRC has slowed in
the past few years, and as the share of the Soviet defense effort attributable to
meeting the PRC threat has dropped, the effort against the US and NATO has
grown more rapidly and claimed an increasing share of Soviet defense resources.
During the past five years, the average annual rate of growth in the cost of the
effort against NATO and the US has grown over the average for the years
1964-1972. In the past five years, over 95 percent of the growth in the Soviet
military effort is to be attributed to meeting the US and NATO threats, and less
than 5 percent to meeting the threat from the PRC.
17. (S) We believe the effort against the PRC will require a decreasing share
of Soviet defense resources in the future.
-- With creation of a combined arms army in Mongolia, current ground force
requirements will apparently have been met.
-- Ground force and Frontal Aviation modernization will continue opposite
the PRC, but, in the long run, with lower priority than opposite NATO in the
west.
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In the next several years, deployment of the SS-X-20 opposite the PRC
will require substantial resources, but not more than 10 percent of total
expenditures for the SRF, whose effort will remain almost wholly to meet the
US and NATO threat.
-- Some YANKEE-class SSBNs may be allotted PRC targets, but this will
involve no great expenditures of resources.
-- Expensive Soviet military R&D, strategic offensive and defensive, and naval
forces will continue to be preponderantly developed and maintained to meet the
US and NATO threats.
7
(Reverse Blank)
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ANNEX A
METHODOLOGY
THE APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM
1. (U) A study was made of each of the force elements of the Soviet military
establishment. Judgments were then reached about the share of the effort for each
force that, in Soviet eyes, would reasonably be allocated to defense against the
PRC rather than against US and NATO. The shares ran all the way from over
a half for border troops to negligible amounts for the military RDT&E effort,
which was considered to be wholly oriented against the challenge of western military
technology.
2. (U) The shares for each force element were aggregated for the USSR by
using ruble expenditure figures as a common denominator. In general, the share
of the force element effort, in percent, was applied to CIA figures for expenditures
for each force element, as measured in constant 1970 rubles, to arrive at ruble
expenditures in each force element attributable to the effort against the PRC.*
These force element expenditures were, in turn, summed to arrive at the total
expenditures against the PRC for the force elements involved. The sum of the
expenditures against the PRC, so derived, was then compared to the total
expenditures for those force elements in order to arrive at a percentage of the
total effort against the PRC. It was assumed that the share of expenditures for
command, support, reserve and retired was probably close to the share for other
force elements, taken together, and was not explicitly calculated.
3. (U) As the ruble estimates were used only as a means of aggregation, and
involved no independent judgments, they are not reproduced here. The ruble figures
and the calculations can be seen by arrangement with the author of this report,
4. (U) The conclusions about the shares of the force element efforts directed
against the PRC were not based only upon location of forces. The Soviet Pacific
Fleet, for instance, is located so that it can attack the PRC. But its major concern
remains the US Pacific Fleet; its effort cannot thus be wholly allocated against
the PRC. The assumptions, estimates and calculations for each element and for
the total effort are addressed in the following pages of this Annex.
x
*The ruble costs used in this analysis are those calculated by CIA in April 1977.
These figures are considered by CIA to be subject to further revision. Later studies
by CIA may thus adjust the conclusions of this paper to some degree.
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5. (FOUO) A study was also made to ascertain what regional factors should
be applied to the expenditures, if any, to account for the fact that much of the
buildup against the PRC was in high cost eastern areas. It was found that, because
forces against the US and NATO were of higher quality and average cost and were
also deployed in high cost areas, no adjustment need be made. The bases for this
judgment are addressed in Annex B.
6. (U) Figure A-1 summarizes the shares of the total Soviet force element
effort which is estimated to be attributable to meeting the PRC threat to the
USSR. The supporting data, analysis, and assumptions for the PRC-oriented share
are presented in backup sections for each force element following the table. As
is clear, the analytical approach to a great extent drives the answer. For this reason,
the approach and the assumption have been explicitly set forth.
FIGURE A-1. SOVIET DEFENSE EFFORT AGAINST THE PRC,
AS PERCENT OF INDIVIDUAL FORCE ELEMENT EFFORT
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
SRF
-
-
-
-
8
16
12
-
-
-
4
10
7
7
LRA
10
11
11
11
11
10
10
9
8
7
7
7
7
7
Air Defense
-
-
-
-
1
1
1
3
4
5
5
5
6
6
Ground Forces
10
17
19
20
21
24
26
27
26
25
25
23
25
25
Frontal Aviation
6
5
6
9
11
16
21
25
25
25
25
37
21
22
Helicopters
9
9
9
9
9
20
30
38
39
34
29
30
31
32
Transport Aviation
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
General Purpose
Navy
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
4
4
4
Border Troops
45
50
50
55
55
55
55
55
55
55
55
55
55
55
TOTAL DEFENSE
5
6
7
7
8
10
11
12
12
11
11
13
11
11
7. (S) The only ICBMs specifically deployed to counter the PRC are 190
SS-11 deployed 1967-1971 with all the PRC in their sector of fire. While they
could reach other targets, ability to hit the PRC was a primary consideration in
their deployment. And while some other ICBMs could reach parts of the PRC,
they were clearly deployed for other purposes. The silo groups involved originally
contained SS-11 Mod 1, which has now been replaced by the SS-11 Mod 2/3 at
two complexes. Conversion at the other complexes is moving more slowly; missiles
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oriented, against the PRC will probably be replaced, after SS-X-20 IOC, by SS-17
and SS-19 deployed against the US. Although the latter missiles, and the SS-18,
can hit the PRC because of their greater flexibility, they were not developed and
deployed for that purpose.
8. (S) No allocation of MR/IRBM effort was made against the PRC until
1974.
(S) The 43 M RBMs and I RBMs in the Far East, removed in 1967-1970,
were deployed against US and allied forces, and were not part of
the forces opposing the PRC.
(S) Preparations for deployment of the SS-X-20 are underway to
replace all or part of the MR/IRBM force. Early preparations indicate
some 50 percent of the current SS-X-20 effort is against the PRC.
We estimate some 30 percent of the total SS-X-20 force will
eventually be deployed opposite the PRC.
9. (S) Soviet SLBMs were developed and deployed with the intent that they
be used against the US and its allies, although they can, of course, be directed
against the PRC. The SS-N-8 on DELTA-class SSBNs can hit both the US and
the PRC from home bases. As YANKEE-class SSBNs took up patrol stations off
the US, patrols of GOLF- and HOTEL-class submarines were limited to areas closer
to the USSR. One-half of the GOLF-class SSBs iq the Pacific Fleet were assumed
to have attacking PRC targets as their primary mission from 1970 on; the other
one-half of the GOLF-class in the Pacific Fleet were assumed to have targets of
US bases in Korea, Japan, and the Pacific Islands. All HOTEL-class SSBNs are
in the Atlantic or at Petropavlovsk, and were considered to be targeted primarily
against peripheral targets.
10. (S) The operating expenditures for the 6 GOLF-class submarines directed
against the PRC are negligible in terms of the total SLBM effort which was
dominated by the cost of procuring SSBNs, SLBMs, and warheads.
11. (S) The primary mission of LRA, even in the Far East, was against the
US and its allies during the period in which the present force was deployed. We
have no basis upon which to judge any change in orientation, although there has
certainly been greater concern with attack on the PRC since 1965.
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12. (S) In this study, all the efforts of the two bomber Corps in the western
USSR were allocated against the US and its NATO allies. In the Far East Bomber
Corps (FEBC), the BADGERS at Belaya were allocated against the PRC; other
BADGERS in the FEBC were divided 50:50 against the PRC and against US targets
in Korea, Japan, and the Islands. BEAR and BISON have exercised against the
PRC; however, this is mostly reconnaissance activity (see Figure A-2).
13. (S) No BACKFIRE have been deployed to the FEBC. The costs of
deployment of BACKFIRE have been attributed to meeting the US and NATO
threat.
FIGURE A-2. THE SHARE OF THE LRA ORIENTED AGAINST THE PRC
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
PERIPHERAL
BOMBERS
BADGER vs PRCa/b/
110
105
105
105
105
95
90
90
90
90
90
90
90
Total Bombers
770
725
690
670
665
660
655
645
625
620
590
590
590
Percent vs PRC
14.3
14.5
15.2
15.7
15.0
14.4
13.7
14.0
14.4
14.5
15.3
15.3
15.3
INTERCONTINENTAL
BOMBERS
Against PRC
(Reconnaissance)
Percent of Total Effort - - - - - - - - 1 2 3 3 3
14. (S) Soviet strategic air defense forces were expanded during the 1950s
and early 1960s when the US and NATO, not the PRC, were the threat to the
USSR. The growth of a PRC nuclear-capable bomber force after the mid-1960s
presented a strategic threat to the Eastern USSR, but US strategic and tactical
forces still remain a much greater threat in the Far East. We have no information
on how the Soviets evaluated the relative effort that should be allocated to combat
these two threats. The share of air defense resources going to areas east of the
Urals has not appreciably changed over the past 10 years, indicating no high Soviet
air defense effort primarily against the PRC (see Figure A-3).
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FIGURE A-3. CALCULATION OF THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR AIR THREAT TO THE USSR
1968 a/ 1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
FIRST APPROACH
US:
SAC
648 599
565
525
517
500
500
498
498
Forward-Based
845 851
851
765
705
819
753
753
753
UK & France
166 132
116
118
122
128
134
142
152
Total US and NATO
1659 1582
1532
1408
1343
1447
1389
1393
1403
PRC
15 15
20
42
62
71
73
75
85
Total Aircraft
1674 1587
1552
1450
1405
1518
1462
1468
1488
PRC as Percent of Total Threat
0.9
0.9
1.3
3.0
4.6
4.9
5.3
5.4
6.0
SECOND APPROACH
US Forward-Based West Pacific
293
299
299
213
201
207
207
207
207
PRC
15
15
20
42
62
71
73
75
85
Total Aircraft
308
314
319
255
263
278
280
282
292
PRC as Percent of Asian Threat
5
5
6
17
23
26
26
27
29
Soviet Asian Air Defense as
Percent of Total Air Defenseb/
16.7
16.8
16.9
17.0
17.1
17.2
17.3
17.4
17.5
PRC as Percent of Total Threat
0.8
0.8
1.1
2.8
4.0
4.4
4.5
4.6
5.1
a/The PRC strategic nuclear air threat started in 1968
b/ 1965, 1970, and 1975 calculated. Other years interpolated or extrapolated.
15. (S) In this study, it is assumed that the orientation of the Soviet strategic
air defense effort can be considered to be in proportion to the threat. The threat
to the USSR is defined as the numbers of strategic and nuclear-capable aircraft,
in the PRC as opposed to those in US and NATO strategic nuclear forces and
in forward-based US general purpose forces that can deliver a nuclear attack on
the USSR from their normal bases.
16. (S) The first approach to estimating the PRC share in the strategic nuclear
threat to the USSR related PRC forces to total US/NATO strategic and
forward-based nuclear air forces. As a check on this approach, a second approach
related PRC forces to US forward-based forces in the Far East. The results were
in general agreement -- that the strategic air attack threat to the USSR from the
PRC grew from about one percent of the total threat through 1969 to three percent
in 1971 and six percent in 1976.
17. (S) In 1968-1969 the Soviets started construction of six BMEWs radars
at two locations which could detect missiles launched from the PRC. These were
operational by 1973. In 1971, a second side -- facing toward the PRC -- was
started for the Chekhov radar near Moscow; it may become operational in 1977.
The major expenditures were for construction of these radars, and are estimated
to have required negligible percentages of the total Soviet effort.
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Ground Forces
18. (S) The major Soviet effort against the PRC was for building up the
ground forces along the PRC border, backed up by reinforcing elements in the
Siberian MD. Although there were forces in these areas prior to 1960, it is probable
that, since the mid-1960s, the Soviets have seen those forces as primarily for PRC
contingencies, and think of area force level requirements in terms of the PRC threat.
19. (S) In the calculations that follow, all Soviet divisions in the Siberian,
Central Asian, Transbaikal, and Far Eastern MDs and in Mongolia are counted as
opposed to the PRC, except for two divisions on Sakhalin and one division on
Kamchatka. These could, of course, be used to reinforce the border, as could
divisions in the western USSR, but this is unlikely. They received no augmentation
in the past ten years (as did the reinforcing divisions in the Siberian MD) and
are not considered to be oriented toward the PRC in Soviet force planning. The
buildup opposite the PRC is shown in Figure A-4. The assumption was made that
the numbers of divisions were an appropriate measure of ground force strength.
Troop strength in divisions forces along the PRC border is believed to average
about the same per division as in Soviet forces as a whole. It was assumed in
this study that the support slice was the same for forces opposite the PRC as
elsewhere. To the degree that this is not so, there is a slight bias in the results.*
FIGURE A-4. GROWTH OF SOVIET LINE DIVISIONS OPPOSITE PRC BORDER
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
Siberian MD
3
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
5
5
5
5
5
Central Asian MD a/
2
2
2
3
4
4
5
6
7
7
7
7
7
Transbaikal MD
5
5
5
7
9
8
8
9
10
10
10
10
10
b/
Mongolia
-
-
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
Far Eastern MD c/
6
7
8
8
9
13
15
16
16
16
16
16
16
Total
16
17
19
22
26
30
34
37
40
40
40
40
41
Added during year
-
1
2
3
4
4
4
3
3
-
-
-
1
Cumulative additions
1
3
6
10
14
18
21
24
24
24
24
25
a/Numbers 1964-1968 are divisions in that portion of the Turkestan MD that became the Central Asian MD in 1969.
b/Another division is in the process of formation.
'/Excludes 1 division on Kamchatka and 2 on Sakhalin
*POL and ammunition storage is in fact estimated to be less extensive along the
PRC border, in relation to ground forces, than in the west. Artillery support,
however, is greater.
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20. (S) CIA figures indicate that Soviet expenditures for ground forces per
man grew slightly from 1964 to 1975. This figure is derived by dividing the total
expenditures (in constant 1970 rubles) for ground forces by the number of men
in the ground forces, both before the buildup opposite the PRC (1964) and after
three years of no further divisional growth (1975). This factor, applied to the
growth in manpower, gives the "normal" expenditures for the ground forces. Over
and above these expenditures are (1) the cost of the buildup for Czechoslovakian
invasion and (2) the cost of expanding Soviet forces along the PRC border. These
relationships are shown in Figure A-5.
FIGURE A-5. REPRESENTATION OF THE EXPENDITURES FOR THE SOVIET GROUND FORCE BUILDUP
ALONG THE PRC BORDER SECRET
ADDITIONAL INVESTMENT NEEDED FOR
EXPANSION OF SOVIET GROUND FORCES
EXTRAORDINARY COST OF
INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA
ONGOING COST OFSOVIET
GROUND FORCE OP' RATIONS, .
4AINT NANCE, AND MODERNIZATION
A STEADILY GROWING COST PER MAX)
21. (S) The methodology utilized DIA estimates of divisions present on the
border; these estimates tend to count groups of men and equipment as active
divisions sooner than do CIA estimates. Moreover, the methodology considered
a division to have its complement of equipment and manpower the first year it
was carried in the order of battle; this was not usually true. On both counts,
the methodology used here tends to ascribe resources to support of ground forces
opposite the PRC more rapidly than might have taken place, by perhaps as much
as two years. On the other hand, CIA estimates that ground forces investment
grew much more rapidly than DIA divisional counts in the years 1964-1966, but
tended to grow at about the same pace thereafter, thereby indicating a possible
two-year investment lead over division activation. Given these two possible
indications of systematic error in the timing of the resource allocation, suggesting
adjustment in opposite directions, the calculations were not adjusted. These
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22. (S) Before 1965 the only Frontal Aviation in the area of the PRC was
an air army in the Far Eastern MD with less than 200 aircraft. By the end of
1969, there were three air armies with some 650 aircraft. By 1972 this number
had grown to 1130 aircraft, and has grown relatively little since then, although
the force has undergone considerable modernization with FITTER, FLOGGER,
and FENCER.
23. (S) As in the case of the ground forces, although there were forces in
being before the PRC became a threat to the USSR, the rapid augmentation of
the forces opposite the PRC indicated the high priority put on building a Frontal
Aviation capability opposite the PRC. In view of this priority, and the lack of
other land threats to the USSR in the Far East, the entire Frontal Aviation force
along the border was considered to be allocated to meeting the PRC threat.
24. (S) The early buildup in 1967-1969 was accomplished by bringing older
FRESCO and BEAGLE out of storage, and was thus relatively inexpensive. New
model aircraft started going to the border in 1970-1971, and resulted in a rapid
growth in costs.
25. (S) In the year from mid-1975 to mid-1976 Frontal Aviation forces
opposite the PRC received about 40 percent of the expensive new aircraft going
to Frontal Aviation. These had been procured in 1975; consequently expenditures
for Frontal Aviation opposite the PRC jumped in 1975. Since mid-1976, however,
new aircraft deployments to the area have dropped below a proportionate level.
26. (S) The effort is calculated as a percentage of the total Frontal Aviation
combat aircraft capability, as indicated in Figure A-6.
27. (S) Construction of facilities for Soviet Frontal Aviation opposite the PRC
is estimated by CIA to have cost about 22 percent of total FA construction over
the period 1964-75.
FIGURE A-6. CALCULATION OF THE SHARE OF FRONTAL AVIATION FIXED-WING
AIRCRAFT OPPOSITE THE PRC
Total
3230
3280
3230
3310
3540
3780
4040
4280
4540
4590
4660
4620
4600
Border
180
160
180
300
380
605
850
1065
1130
1130
1150
1230
1210
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Helicopter Aviation
28. (S) Most helicopters in Frontal Aviation are subordinate to tactical air
armies in the USSR. In 1965, there was one helicopter regiment and a smaller
unit near the PRC border out of a total of 16 units; the units near the border
had nine percent of the helicopters. Since 1968 there has been a steady growth
in the numbers of helicopters in Frontal Aviation opposite the PRC. The growth
was particularly rapid in the years following the border incidents of 1969. Since
1972, however, numbers of helicopters have been growing more rapidly opposite
NATO, with the result that the share opposite the PRC has declined, as shown
in Figure A-7.
FIGURE A-7. HELICOPTERS IN FRONTAL AVIATION
1967a/
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
Total
720
770
860
920
981
1047
1302
2313
2584
3012
3079
Opposite PRC
67
67
173
270
371
409
439
674
794
934
977
Percent
9
9
20
30
38
39
34
29
30
31
32
Transport Aviation
29. (S) Of all the force components, Military Transport Aviation (VTA) is
best suited to rapid redeployment, and the long distances in Soviet Asia make
VTA useful in Asian operations. By the end of the buildup opposite the PRC
in 1973, there were some 60 medium-range transports (AN-12/CUB) of VTA in
the Transbaikal and Far East MDs and 45 in the Turkestan MD, out of a total
of 740 medium-range transports. In addition, there were some 20 long-range
transports (An-22/COCK) in the Western USSR. About 14 percent of the VTA
effort thus could be considered to be allocated to PRC defense in 1973; this portion
remained the same as in 1969 and in 1965. By 1976 the total number of VTA
transports had changed little. Long-range AN-22/COCK and IL-76/CANDID replaced
older and medium-range CUB in the west, but the composition of the force opposite
the PRC remained about the same as it had been in 1973.
General Purpose Naval Forces
30. (S) Of the four Soviet fleets, only the Pacific Fleet could, by reason
of geography, be concerned with the PRC; nevertheless, the US Pacific Fleet remains
its overwhelming concern. The PRC Navy is not an ocean-going force; it is primarily
for defense of its own coastal waters.
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31. (S) There has been no perceptible trend in the portion of general purpose
naval forces allocated to the Pacific Fleet since 1964. The Pacific Fleet has held
the following percentages of deployed Soviet naval forces.
1964
1966
1971
1973
1975
1976
Total
28
27
29
27
27
27
Submarines
25
27
34
30
31
32
Major Surface
28
27
24
25
25
25
Naval Air
32
27
29
28
28
30
Small Surface
-
-
-
25
25
23
If concern for the PRC were a major force behind the planning for naval
dispositions, the Pacific Fleet would have received some preference. Apparently
the Soviets think they can quite handily take care of any operations they are
charged with against China, and still maintain a viable capability against the US
7th Fleet with the same share of naval resources in the Pacific Fleet as in the
early 1960s. It is, of course, difficult to decide the share of effort the Soviet
Pacific Fleet devotes to meeting the PRC threat. For purposes of this paper, a
rather arbitrary figure of one-sixth of the effort of the Pacific Fleet has been used.
The Pacific Fleet has been considered to represent 27 percent of the Soviet naval
effort. Thus some 4 1/2 percent of the Soviet general purpose naval effort is
considered to be allocated against the PRC in this study.
32. (S) The growth of Soviet Naval expenditures in 1975 and 1976 is
attributable in large part to deployment of BACKFIRE and CHARLIE II and
VICTOR 11 submarines -- none of which were deployed to the Pacific Fleet.
Therefore, no significant increase in the effort against the PRC is estimated for
these years.
Border Troops
33. (S) While not Ministry of Defense forces, the border guards have long
contributed to the defense of the PRC border. Moreover the border guards opposite
the PRC were reorganized from 5 of 13 (38 percent) Districts in 1960, to 4 of
8 in 1967 (50 percent). This change largely took place 1962-1964. The number
of men in border guards (along with their signal support) has not changed
appreciably. The numbers of men in border units along the PRC border are
estimated to be about 60,000 out of a total of 130,000 in border units. But the
border units opposite the PRC are much better equipped than elsewhere. They
have, for example, about three-fourths of the border guard APCs. Nevertheless,
about 80 percent of border guards expenditures are manpower-related. Building
upon these general considerations, the share of the resources in support of border
guards opposite the PRC has been estimated as follows:
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1964
--
45 percent (manpower-related)
1968
--
50 percent
1970
--
55 percent (reflecting more APCs and combat
and later
teams after border incidents)
Research, Development, Test, And Evaluation
34. (S) The technological challenge to the Soviet armed forces is from NATO
and the US, not from the PRC. The entire effort of RDT&E would thus have
developed such as it has even without a PRC threat. In fact, without that threat,
RDT&E funds may have been larger in the years 1966-1970, when large amounts
of MOD resources were being devoted to building up defenses against the PRC.
In this paper, the RDT&E effort is allocated entirely against the US and NATO.
Command And Support, Reserve And Retired
35. (S) It is assumed that command and control, DOSAAF, general support,
military space operations, and reserve and retired expenditures support Soviet forces
across the board. Expenditures for these programs are therefore allocated in the
same proportion as the total of the expenditures enumerated above.
19
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COST DIFFERENTIALS OF SOVIET FORCES AGAINST THE PRC
1. (U) The approach used so far in this estimate attributes average cost to
the Soviet forces opposite the PRC. But the border regions are higher cost areas,
and the average may have to be adjusted in order to get a truer picture of the
relative burden of the Soviet buildup against the PRC. This calculation involves
several steps:
-- Calculation of the cost differential of forces in Siberia and the Soviet
Far East, relative to central USSR (Moscow area) and other areas.
-- From this, a calculation of the average cost for all Soviet forces
and the relationship of average costs to eastern area costs opposite the PRC.
-- Adjustment of these eastern area cost differentials to take account
of the fact that, in some force elements, forces against the PRC have lower factor
costs, relative to the average, due to peculiarities of basing.
-- Adjustment to account for the fact that forces opposite the PRC
are not necessarily average forces in terms of makeup and quality, and hence of
cost.
2. (U) The calculation of costs in the eastern regions relative to the central
USSR was based on cost differentials for various components of military costs
for these regions reported in Soviet sources, adjusted for qualitative differences,
and weighted by the share of those components in total Soviet military costs.
These calculations are presented in Table B-1, following.
3. (C) As these differentials relate to costs for the central USSR (Moscow
area) they then have to be adjusted to arrive at their relationship to average Soviet
costs. Regional construction costs, weighted by regional distribution of military
manpower, indicate average national military construction costs are 15 percent
above central region costs. As construction costs opposite the PRC are 24 percent
above central region costs, they are thus eight percent above the national average.
(1.24 =1.15 = 1.08). It has been assumed in this study that total military costs,
for comparable goods and services, would be no more than eight percent above
the national average, as construction costs cause the greatest upward bias (Table
B-1).
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TABLE B-1
MILITARY EXPENDITURES IN THE
SOVIET EASTERN AREAS IN RELATION TO CENTRAL USSR
Factor Cost
Differential Over Resulting
Central USSRbi Contribution
Equipment, spares
_
.50
1.10
.550
Food
.05
1.20
.060
Construction
.10
1.24 _~i
.124
Fuel
.05
1.23A/
.062
Clothing and Other Supplies
.15
1.08 bi
.162
Military Pay
.05
1.15?/
.058
Other (administration overhead)
.10
1.23 fi
.123
TOTAL
1.00
1.1399-/
b/
Rand WN-9239-NA Cost-Planning Factors for Soviet East Asia, November
1975, (FOUO) unless otherwise indicated.
s1 See Table B-2.
J
Average of gasoline (1.14), fuel oil (1.56) and coal (0.98). Heating fuel factors
include factors for the temperature differentials. Calculations are based on
data in JJ/ above.
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f/ General cost of living factor in West Siberia, East Siberia, Far East, weighted
by military manpower, for single worker, as in above. _bj
By comparison, the US Alaskan Air Command found that for planning
purposes a differential of 1.24 using AAC cost weights and 1.35 using DoD
cost weights is applicable to Alaskan operations. As PCS adds 13 percent to
the DoD-weighted cost, and PCS is a negligible added cost in the USSR, 1.22
is a more appropriate DoD-weighted factor for comparison purposes. The
average Soviet base is much further north, in much harsher conditions, so
the differential should be much less in the USSR. See Air University Review
Mar-Apr 1976, pp 61-73.
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TABLE B-2
CONSTRUCTION COST DIFFERENTIALS IN SOVIET EASTERN REGIONS
(Central European USSR Equals 1.00)
Central
Asia
Siberia
Transbaikal
Far
East
Weighted
Total
Construction Materials a/
-
1.01
1.23
1.43
Construction Costa/ -
-
1.3-1.5 bi
One M2 Living Space /
-
-
1.03-1.30
1.50b/
Apartment Construction ~~
-
-
-
1.30 bi
Construction Costs in
General d/
a. Remote Area
1.08
1.04
1.20
1.27-b/
b. Severe Climate
0.95
1.07
1.07
1.07b/
Total (a x b)
1.03
1.11
1.28
1.36
Weights e/
.23
.12
.27
.38
1.00
Contribution
.24
.13
.35
.52
1.24
a/
Oleg Hoeffding, The Economy of the Soviet Far East as a Base for Military
Deployment, Rand WN-9199-NA, September 1975 (U). Factors are for total
region.
b/ Amur and Khabarovsk oblasts and Primorskiy Kray.
Anatoli Kuprianov, Cost-Planning Factors for Soviet East Asia, Rand
WN-9239-NA, November 1975 (FOUO).
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e/ Based on share of construction in each region.
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4. (S) The differential factor inputs, tending to make forces opposite the PRC
higher in cost, also make forces arrayed against the United States and its allies
higher in cost as well, as suggested below. Thus the differential may, in fact, be
in favor of forces deployed against the United States and its allies.
Against the US and Allies
ICBMs against the US are in higher
cost eastern regions.
Higher cost LRA Arctic basing
is for use against the US.
Against the PRC
ICBMs against the PRC are in
lower cost western regions.
Lower cost LRA basing against
the PRC, well south of Arctic.
The higher cost fleet areas are
the Northern Fleet and the Kamchatka
flotilla of the Pacific Fleet, which
are against the US and NATO.
Ground and tactical air
forces opposite NATO get
foreign area bonuses equating
to 100 percent of position pay.
Air Defenses in the Far North are
against the US.
Naval forces against the PRC
in the southern-based Pacific
Fleet are closer to average in
cost.
Ground and tactical air forces
opposite the PRC get border area
bonuses equating to 15 percent
of base pay.
Air defenses against the PRC
are in Southern Siberian regions.
5. (S) It is not generally remembered that the composition and quality of
Soviet forces against the United States and NATO are such that unit costs are
higher than against the PRC, as suggested below:
Against the US and NATO
Newer ICBMs with MIRVs.
High cost MRBMs and IRBMs.
BACKFIRE.
LRA staged and refueled.
Against the PRC
No BACKFIRE; older BADGER
No staging and refueling
required.
Long-range bombers are
oriented against the US.
Tank divisions make up 50
percent of forward force and
have newer tanks. Priority
deployment of new equipment
to West.
Bombers against PRC are less
expensive intermediate-range.
Tank divisions make up 5
percent of forward forces and
have older tanks.
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Forward force all combat Forward force only one-third
ready. combat ready.
All heavy transports are Lighter transports in the east.
positioned in the west.
SSNs, carriers, and Older ships.
missile cruisers.
6. (U) The following table attempts to take these differentials into account,
using lower factor input and composition and quality differentials for forces against
the PRC, as appropriate (see Table B-3).
7. (U) As can be seen, when the' average costs are adjusted in the ways
indicated above, Soviet forces directed against the PRC threat are on the average,
not appreciably more expensive per unit. This conclusion rests in large part on
the higher quality of forces against the United States and NATO and the fact
that operation in high cost areas applies to many forces against the United States
and NATO, as well. While the individual figures used to arrive at these conclusions
are open to debate and refinement, the general conclusion appears to be an
appropriate reflection of reality.*
*These conclusions are at some variance with a differential of 50 percent used
in Rand WN-9178-NA, Extraordinary Costs of the Soviet Buildup Against China,
19 March 1976 (U).
The differences largely lie in the facts that:
Rand did not allow for differences of basing and quality as indicated
above.
Rand's 50 percent differential was derived from construction costs in
the Siberian North, not along the Transsiberian RR, where most of the buildup
took place.
Rand attributed to Soviet forces opposite the PRC greater inventories
and subsidies, and lower cost effectiveness than can be supported by available
analysis.
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COST DIFFERENTIALS BETWEEN SOVIET FORCES OPPOSITE
THE PRC AND THE NATIONAL AVERAGE
Cost Differential as a result of
Contribution to Total
Cost 1964-1976
Force Element Quality
Composition a/
Factor b!
Composite
Share Contribution
Inputs
of Total
Ground Forces
0.90
1.08
0.97
.46
.45
Helicopter Aviation
1.00
1.08
1.08
.07
.08
Frontal Aviation
1.00
1.08
1.08
.20
.22
Security Troops
1.00
1.08
1.08
.06
.07
Transport Aviation
0.90
1.08
0.97
.05
.05
Air Defense
1.00
1.08
1.08
.03
.03
Navy
0.90
1.00
.90
.06
.05
ICBMs
0.80
1.00
0.80
.03
.02
Ballistic Missile Defense
1.00
1.00
1.00
Negl
Negl
1 Quality adjustments have been made for forces opposite the PRC in those
cases in which those forces are clearly of lower quality than average.
Ground forces have fewer tanks and new equipment.
Transport aviation has no heavy transports.
More expensive nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines and aircraft
carriers are deployed against the US.
More expensive SS-17, 18, 19 ICBMs are deployed against the US; less
expensive SS-11 are deployed against the PRC.
J Factor inputs opposite the PRC are estimated to be 8 percent above the
national average, in general. The differential has been adjusted downward for:
ICBMs, because units targeted against the PRC are in low cost western
USSR, while many of those targeted against the US are in high cost
eastern areas.
Naval forces, because many of those against US are based in more
expensive Northern Fleet and Petropavlovsk areas.
LRA, in which more expensive Arctic basing and refueling are against
the US.
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B615
DIA/DN-2C
B633
DIA/DB-4G3
A010
AFS COL
B634
DIA/DB-4G4
A015
DARPA
B680
DIA/DB-4
A024
DEF NUCLEAR AGCY
B681
DIA/DB-4B
A034
DEP SEC DEF
B737
DIA/RDS-3B3 LIB
A045
DCA
B793
DIA/DB-2B2
A085
NAT DEF UNIVERSITY
B794
DIA/DB-2B3
A097
DIA GRP ANMCC
B854
USDAO AUSTRALIA
A100
OSD
B855
USDAO AUSTRIA
A104
OASDCCC&I
B859
USDAO BULGARIA
A115
OASD ISA
B862
USDAO CANADA
A116
OATSD AE
B872
USDAO DENMARK
A117
OSD ODP&E
B876
USDAO ENGLAND
A124
OSD NET ASSESSMENT
B878
USDAO FINLAND
A125
OSD DD R & E
B879
USDAO FRANCE
A127
OSD SALT SUP GRP
B880
USDAO GERMANY
A301
JCS/J-5 STRATNEGBR
B882
USDAO GREECE
A302
JCS/CHAIRMAN
B888
USDAO INDONESIA
A315
JCS/SAGA
B893
USDAOITALY
A325
JCS/J3
B896
USDAO JAPAN
A340
JCS/J-5 MIL SEC
B902
USDAO MALAYSIA
A363
USNMR SHAPE
B908
USDAO NETHERLANDS
A365
US DEL UN MSC
B909
USDAO NEW ZEALAND
A368
USRMC/NATO
B912
USDAO NORWAY
B032
DIA/JS
B913
USDAO PAKISTAN
B033
DIA/CS-3
B917
USDAO POLAND
B037
DIA/CS-4
B927
USDAO SWEDEN
B040
DIA/DIO
B928
USDAO SWITZERLAND
B060
DIA/RDS-3A5 PENT
B930
USDAO TAIWAN
B080
DIA/SWS
B931
USDAO THAILAND
B131
DIA/DE
B933
USDAO TURKEY
B136
DIA/DE-3
B934
USDAO USSR
B150
DIA/DT
B940
DLO HONG KONG
B155
DIA/RDS-3A4 PP
B942
USDAO SINGAPORE
B264
DIA/DP-1
B267
DIA/DP-3
B318
DIA/DN-1A
B329
DIA/DN-2F1
C020
DCS-MIL OPS
B351
DIA/RDS-3D2
C030
CH RD&A
B352
DIA/RDS-3A2C STOCK
C043
USAMIIA
B485
DIA/IS
C231
2ND ARM DIV
B515
DIA/DC
C242
FORSCOM
B520
DIA/DC-3
C303
4TH PSYOP GROUP
B550
DIA/DP-2
C348
453D MID
B551
DIA/DM-3
C398
698TH MID
B563
DIA/DB-1E2
C459
COMD-GEN STF COL
B569
DIA/DN-2A
C463
INTEL CTR&SCH
B571
DIA/DB-4G1
C470
ARMY WAR COL
B573
DIA/DB-4E1
C500
TRADOC
B575
DIA/DB-1
C513
ARRADCOM
B578
DIA/DB-4A
C523
HARRY DIAMOND LAB
B579
DIA/DN-2B2
C539
TRASANA
B583
DIA/DB-ID
C591
FSTC
B584
DIA/DB-1B4
C605
JFK CTR MIL ASSIST
B586
DIA/DB-4D1
C617
CONCEPT ANLYS AGCY
B593
DIA/DB-1G2
C619
MIA REDSTONE
B594
DIA/DB-1F
C620
SRD/ITAD
B596
DIA/DB-1E1
C635
AIR DEF AGCY
B597
DIA/DB-1G1
C750
OACSI-MAIL ROOM
B598
DIA/DB-2
C763
OACSI-S & T DIV
B604
DIA/DB-4E2
C766
OACSI-INT SUP DET
B606
DIA/DB-2B
C768
OACSI-USAITAD
B607
DIA/DB-2B1
C787
OACSI-EASTERN BR
B608
DIA/DB-2B4
C788
OACSI-SOV/EEUR BR
Approved For Release 2004/06/29 : CIA-RDP83MOOl71 R001100010003-2
 Approved For Release 2004/06/29 : CIA-RDP83MOO171 R001 100010003-2
D008 NISC
D011 OP-09B24 MLRM
D150 CMC INT
D159 NAVAIRDEVCEN
D202 NAVWARCOL
D204 NAVWARCOL/IO
D263 NOSC RES LIB
D496 DIR SSPO
D507 COMINEWARCOM
D511 NAVAIRSYSCOM
D700 CGMCDEC
D902 NFOIO DET NPT
D947 NAVINTCOM-03E
DO10 OP-OOK
E010 AFIS/INDOC
E016 AFIS/INC
E018 AF/RDQA-C
E020 AFIS/INZA
E050 7602 AINTELG/INUA
E053 AF/INAKA
E054 AF/INAKB
E200 AAC
E252 AF/RDRE
E303 AF/INAP
E317 AF/SAMI
E403 AFSC/INA
E408 AFWL
E409 AMD
E410 ADTC
E411 ASD/FTD/ETID
E420 FTD/NICD
E429 SAMSOIND
E436 AFEWC SUR
E437 AFIS/INI
E450 AIR UNIV
G005 CINCAD
G120 AIR DEF WPNS CEN
H005 USCINCEUR
H101 USAFE 497RTG IRC
H300 USAICEUSAREUR
H350 SFDET ABN EUR
H351 10TH SFGABNISTSF
H500 CINCUSNAVEUR
J015 COMICEDEFOR
J037 FAISCEN OCEANA
J500 CINCLANTFLT
J502 COMSECONDFLT
J505 COMNAVAIRLANT
J515 FICEURLANT
J517 COMNAVSURFLANT
J532 COMSUBLANT
J575 FMFLANT/FMFEUR
J959 RECONATKWNGONE
K007 COMUSJAPAN
KO10 UNC/USFK/EA
K100 PACAF 548 RTG
K115 5TH AF
K203 314 AD/IN
K300 IPAC CODE IC-L
K302 USACSG MOCG-IN
K313 IPAC CODE 1-22
K315 IPAC CODE 1-24
K320 USARJAPAN
K500 CINCPACFLT
K505 FICPAC
K515 COMSEVENTHFLT
L040 SAC 544TH ARTW
N005 USREDCOM
rVV')
P055 25X1
P085 STATE
P090 NSA
P091 NSA REP DEFENSE
P100 NAT SEC COUNCIL
Pill WH SIT ROOM
R010 OMB
R145 ACDA
DIA Dist.
DIA Stock
TOTAL PRINT
369
26
395
Approved For Release 2004/06/29 : CIA-RDP83MOOl71 ROO1100010003-2