NATIONAL AND TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE RELATIONSHIP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00171R001000210001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 50
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 1, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: PAPER

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O I-_I EI
OFFICE OF POLICY AND PLANNING
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF
NATIONAL AND TACTICAL
INTELLIGENCE
RELATIONSHIP
Page
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
i
PURPOSE
1
INTRODUCTION
2
BACKGROUND
5
DISCUSSION
12
DEFINITIONS
12
THREE VIEWPOINTS
19
ORGANIZATIONAL POSITIONS
30
DCI PERSPECTIVE
38
CONCLUSIONS
45
NRO, JCS, OSD review(s) completed.
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This paper is the first of a series addressing policy
issues of interest to the Director of Central Intelligence.
It does not represent the coordinated views of the Intelligence
Community or the views of the DCI.
NRO, JCS, OSD review(s) completed.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The national-tactical intelligence relationship has
been a source of concern to the Intelligence Community for a
number of years. In 1971, the President directed the DCI
to assume a more dominant role in respect to tactical
intelligence but in 1976, E.O. 11905 stated that the DCI
shall have no responsibility for tactical intelligence.
The DCI has been uncomfortable with both these directives.
Much of the difficulty is inherent in the divergent
interests and perspectives of national and tactical
intelligence users, but confusion also stems from an
inadequate definitional framework. Exclusionary
definitions are inappropriate since intelligence can be
both national and tactical at the same time. Differen-
tiation between national and tactical intelligence, however,
can be made in terms of primary mission, primary purpose,
or primary user. Views on how to manage the so called
"interface" area vary widely. Some authorities espouse
complete separation of tactical from national systems
while others argue for a complete integration. As a result,
the major organizations concerned with the interface have
developed positions that conflict with each other to a large
degree. In general, OSD and the JCS have sought to limit
DCI involvement in tactical intelligence matters while OMB
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II
u
ment of management policy and programmatic review relative
to national intelligence collection and production. Hence,
he needs to adopt a perspective that embraces all U.S.
intelligence activity. In this manner he can functionally
relate national, departmental, and tactical intelligence
into a conceptual whole. The DCI policy on national-tactical
matters should be along the lines described below:
?? The DCI is not the appropriate official to pro-
vide resource recommendations pertaining to in-
telligence units and activities that exist for the
principal purpose of supporting combat commanders
in wartime, or to evaluate their efficiency and
effectiveness for wartime missions. He can,
however, take advantage of force support units
for intelligence in peacetime consistent with their
missions and the missions of supported forces.
?? The DCI will ensure that national assets are de-
and Congress have pushed for more extensive DCI participation
in the area. As a result the DCI has adopted a middle-of-the
road position, achieving progress through coordination and
negotiation. His concern with the resource allocation and
tasking process will continue to involve him in the develop-
signed and operated to optimize capabilities to
provide support, where needed, to tactical intelli-
gence users consistent with the primary national
mission purpose.
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we In the context of national-tactical interface,
the DCI shall concern himself with tactical
intelligence to the extent that: (a) tactical
intelligence assets can provide significant
national intelligence, (b) tactical intelligence
requirements interfere or conflict with national
requirements in the tasking of national assets,
and (c) tactical intelligence requirements impact
on resource allocation in the NFIP.
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TOP SECRET
NATIONAL AND TACTICAL
INTELLIGENCE RELATIONSHIP
PURPOSE
To examine the interface of "national" and "tactical"
intelligence with a view toward developing an effective
definitional framework and a statement of DCI policy which
ensures that intelligence programs of the several intelli-
gence departments and agencies avoid undesirable duplication
and uncoordinated overlap and provide adequate intelligence
to meet all national security needs.
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INTRODUCTION
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1. The national-tactical intelligence interface
has been a subject of continuing interest within the
Intelligence Community for the past few years. Concern has
been expressed over the possible duplicat'ibn of effort
between the several intelligence departments and agencies
and the military commands in both the collection and production
of intelligence. Categories of intelligence--tactical,
strategic, national, warning, etc.--are, for the most part,
determined by the intended use. In crisis situations
there have been cases where national authorities have
made national as well as tactical decisions based on
intelligence collected by military tactical assets.
Conversely, military commanders have made increasing use
in recent years of intelligence provided by national assets.
These things have occurred without benefit of an agreed-upon
Intelligence Community policy on the matter. Executive Order
11905, issued 19 February 1976, instructed the Committee
on Foreign Intelligence to provide guidance on the
relationship between tactical and national intelligence,
but no such guidance has been developed.
2. Issues which have arisen over the years concern:
of How tactical intelligence support derives from
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?? Who sets priorities and controls satellite systems
in peace, crisis and war.
?? What the future mix of satellite systems and
tactical intelligence collection capabilities will
be.
3. Problems associated with the interface of national
and tactical intelligence relate to resource allocation and
tasking of intelligence assets and dissemination/exploitation of
the product. Such problems can become extremely complex because
they involve consideration of the primary missions of these as-
sets, the overlapping nature of intelligence user interests, and the,
variety of interpretations used by various Community narticinants .1
as they attempt to resolve these issues. It should also be
recognized that the problem embraces more than the DCI and
DoD relationship. While the term "national-tactical interface"
tends to focus attention on Defense programs, we should be
aware that there is a similar dichotomy built into the
programs of other agencies, particularly those of the State
Department; i.e.; we have INR and field reporting agencies,
such as embassies, both contributing to national, departmental,
and field needs for intelligence.
4. This paper does not address such specific matters
as how requirements for improved tactical intelligence
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support by national assets are generated, how national
systems mesh with tactical command and control, the vulnera-
bility and survivability of potentially competing systems,
costs, the international political implications of using
national means of verification for tactical support, conflicts
in allocating space system resources, or the impact of security
compartmentation. These matters will be considered as part
of an interagency study to be conducted later this year.
This paper focuses on the broader policy aspects which will
serve as a framework within which the more specific issues
may be addressed.
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S. In late 1971, the President directed the DCI to
provide his judgments on the efficiency and effectiveness of
all intelligence programs and activities (including tactical
intelligence), and to recommend appropriate allocation of
intelligence resources. Early in 1972~a draft study was
circulated on "U.S. Tactical Intelligence -- A Survey of the
Current Situation," which noted the difficulty of defining
tactical intelligence activities in such a manner as to
reflect general agreement within the Intelligence Community,
among intelligence and operational personnel within the
Military Services, or among intelligence officials and
planning-program-budget review officials. The DCI tried to
reconcile the responsibility assigned to him in the Presi-
dential Directive with the statutory responsibilities assigned
to the Secretary of Defense and military departments for
sizing, organizing and equipping forces for combat readiness.
He found it to be impracticable--if not impossible--to make
resource recommendations on force support intelligence
assets within the limits of his authority and without violating
the authority of Defense. In 1973 he was able, however, to
forward to the President certain objectives for the Intelli-
gence Community, among which were proposals for rationalizing
interaction between national and tactical intelligence
activities. At the same time, the DCI proposed to the
Secretary of Defense that each appoint a representative to
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assess the scope of the work. The Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Intelligence) forwarded the DCI proposal to the
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and authorized him to appoint
a principal DoD representative for purposes of examining the
interface between national and tactical intelligence.
Subsequently, representatives of the DCI and DoD concluded a
Memorandum of Agreement, in which OJCS agreed to identify
those tactical intelligence assets to be included in the
national-tactical interface evaluation, including those
capable of contributing to national requirements.
6. As a follow-on, the DCI then proposed a pilot
study which would gauge the essential information needs of
the operating commands, would identify the national intelli-
gence assets that could contribute to their satisfaction,
and would identify the tactical assets that could contribute
to national intelligence. Representatives of the DCI and
DoD agreed upon Terms of Reference for an interagency Pilot
Study on National Intelligence Support to Field Commanders.
While this study was in progress, a National Security Council
ad hoc panel on "Tactical Use of National Reconnaissance
Assets" issued its preliminary report in mid-1975. It
concluded inter alia that national assets should not be
considered substitutes for "specialized theater assets now
existing or under development" but that the National
Reconnaissance Program can provide significant support to
theatre military operations. At approximately the same
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time, the Senate Select Committee, Military Intelligence and
Technology Task Force, issued a draft report which:
?? noted a "legitimate and extensive gray area--in
attempting to define military intelligence at the
tactical or field command level," and
?? recommended that intelligence activities at the
tactical/field command level be excluded from the
resources to be considered by Congress as an
"intelligence budget."
These views were countered later that year when the CIA
produced a study titled, "American Intelligence: A
Framework for the Future," which concluded that the DCI
must, unavoidably, become deeply involved in tactical
questions because these questions were thoroughly
entangled with national ones--that the field commander
could no longer be regarded as an independent entity who
must have his own self-contained intelligence apparatus.
7. The joint DCI/JCS Pilot Study on National Intelli-
gence Support to Field Commanders was published in early
1976 and included among its recommendations that:
?? Capabilities of certain national intelligence
assets be evaluated and tested in joint
exercises to determine the extent to which
they can support theater intelligence needs.
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is Numerous extant studies which address pieces of
national-tactical interface problems be integrated
and synthesized before any new or follow-on efforts
are undertaken.
JCS review of the pilot study resulted in two actions:
a. A study that will assess all previous and
current actions relative to the tactical-national
intelligence interface, with the objective of improving
intelligence support to operational commanders. This
action will be complete in June 1977.
b. Development of a concept for testing national
intelligence systems to support tactical requirements
in joint exercises and war games. The test plan was
approved by the JCS in early December 1976.
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Emphasis in these exercises was to
provide the national intelligence product to the commander,
in as realistic a fashion as possible and then assess its
utility vis-a-vis tactical assets by measuring its contribution.
These exercises did not address potential competition for the re-
source between the tactical commander at the division level and
other divisions, the corps, component or unified commanders, the JCS
DoD, and national users. After the
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DCI noted the problem of using the full capability of
national systems in tactical situations in light of the
needs of other consumers and priorities. As a result,
during the
a national tasking cell was
constituted but did not figure prominently ~n the exercise
due to the lack of a contextual scenario.
8. In February 1976, the President issued Executive
Order 11905, "United States Foreign Intelligence Activities,"
effectively rescinding the Memorandum of 5 November 1971 and,
excluding tactical intelligence from the responsibilities of
both the DCI and the new Committee on Foreign Intelligence.
The Order mentioned tactical intelligence in two places. In
Section 2, the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP)
was defined as follows (emphasis added):
National Foreign Intelligence Program means
the programs of the Central Intelligence Agency
and the special offices within the Department of
Defense for the collection of specialized intelli-
gence through reconnaissance programs, the Consoli-
dated Cryptologic Program, and those elements of
the General Defense Intelligence Program and other
programs of the departments and agencies, not
including tactical intelligence, designated by the
Committee on Foreign Intelligence as part of the
program.
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In Section 3, E.O. 11905 stated that the CFI shall:
Provide guidance on the relationship between
tactical and national intelligence; however,
neither the DCI nor the CFI shall have responsibility
for tactical intelligence.
9. Interpretation of the above revealed definitional
problems concerning the term "tactical intelligence." In
the Section 2 reference, tactical intelligence was defined
in terms of capabilities (assets or resources) as opposed to
information or use. This distinction was not made clear
however in Section 3. In fact, the more logical interpretation
of what tactical intelligence means in Section 3 was information
or use rather than capabilities, since it is treated separately
from the discussion of CFI responsibilities to the NFIP.
One interpretation suggested that while the DCI and CFI were
not responsible for providing intelligence for tactical
commanders or for ensuring that tactical commanders used
intelligence wisely or efficiently, they were not exempt
from some responsibility for tactical intelligence capabilities.
This interpretation seemed to be consistent with the section
on the NFIP, since tactical intelligence assets had not been
explicitly defined as part of any single departmental or
agency program. The CFI was considered the authority which
determined what specific assets fit the tactical category.
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11. Much of the difficulty in the national-tactical
interface problem stems from definitional ambiguity. The
following JCS definitions illustrate the problem:
a. "Tactical Intelligence --Intelligence which is
required or the planning and condyict of tactical
operations. Essentially, tactical intelligence
and strategic intelligence differ only in scope,
point of view, and level of employment."
b.0?erational Intelligence--Intelligence required
tor planning and executing all types of operations."
c. "Strategic Intelligence--Intelligence which is
required for the formation of policy and military
plans at national and international levels."
d. "National Intelligence- -Integrated departmental
intelligence that covers the broad aspects of
national policy and national security, is of
concern to more than one department or agency, and
transcends the exclusive competence of a single
department or agency."
Any attempt to fit various intelligence requirements or
activities under these separate headings--particularly in
periods of crisis--would reveal activities that are tactical,
operational, strategic and national all at the same time.
Intelligence is not the only area where this is happening.
In command and control, when the President can and often
does direct in detail what a "tactical" commander does with
his forces, it is both a tactical and a national matter.
12. The national-tactical distinction, while becoming
blurred in reality, is nonetheless useful for analysis.
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First, it is important to recognize that the national-
tactical division, while imprecise, still exists. An
examination of assets currently in the NFIP and the Defense
Department's intelligence-related category reveals a rough
structure where, for example, NRP satellites are clearly
national assets and force reconnaissance companies are
tactical assets and those in between lie on a continuum, and
are pegged on the basis of experience or convenience. In
the context of national-tactical intelligence, this spectrum
can be viewed from the standpoint of user or purpose and
program or control authority. The scope of the national
tactical spectrum is outlined in the figure below. Appli-
cations indicated in the left hand column are identified
with respect to the national-departmental-tactical continuum.
Each application has its own distinct spectrum which stretches
across the scale. The specific positions used in the figure
(e.g., GDIP under Departmental) must be viewed not as
discrete points but as generalized overlapping areas of
primary coincidence.
NATIONAL DEPARTMENTAL TACTICAL
PURPOSE/ Strategy, Force.Composition Maneuver,
Weapons
Employment.
USER Decision Maker, Military Planner, War Fighter
Policy Maker.
PROGRAM/ NRP - CCP GDIP Defense Program
SYSTEM 1 $ 2
TYPE Satellites Strategic A/C Theater Asset
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Using this matrix, it can be seen that attache reporting,
for example, is "national" from a purpose and user standpoint
but "departmental" from a programmatic and control perspective.
Similarly, the Defense Support Program is "national" from a
control and user view but "tactical" in terms of program and
purpose. The implications of the above are such that some-
have recommended the terms "national and tactical" be abandoned,
substituting, e.g., "Local and Global."
~,, f
U. this approach, definitive and useful delineation of
functions can be constructed. Local systems are defined as
?? Operate in the force profile of the supported
commander (i.e., organic).
of Exist to satisfy operational requirements as opposed
to intelligence.
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?? Produce combat information for immediate targeting
and/or maneuvering.
?? Are interfaced and interact with. other operational
sensor systems, rather than having their information
combined with the output of other systems in the fusion
approach used in intelligence analysis (i.e., inter-
action is real-time; fusion is after the fact).
of Operate under timeliness requirements for reporting
within seconds and minutes, as opposed to hours.
?? Need to be able to produce locational data which is
precise, rather than general.
?? Produce information that, in the terms of the intel-
ligence analyst, is unevaluated.
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The Global system, on the other hand, can be generally described
as the inverse of the above. It:
?? Operates in support of customers ranging from tactical
commander to national policy maker;
?? Functions primarily in satisfaction of intelligence
requirements;
?? Is logically managed on a global basis;
?? Directs its resources to the crisis or other high
priority areas;
of Is a system that must be designed to operate under stress
conditions.
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But since the major a4ors in t-he natNnal-tac-al interface area
tact tef l dic tomy, 'i.e seems'\necessary `:.o regain the existing
13. A significant requirement in defining the terms
involves specifying some kind of relationship of NFIP assets
to those currently in the Defense Department's Intelligence
Related Assets (IRA) category. IRA, which includes tactical
and departmental assets, is defined by the JCS as follows:
"Those activities outside the Consolidated Defense
Intelligence Program (CDIP) which:
?? Respond to operational commander's tasking for
time-sensitive information on foreign entities;
to Respond to national intelligence community tasking
of systems whose primary mission is support of
operating forces;
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?? Train personnel for intelligence duties;
of Provide an intelligence reserve; or
?? Are devoted to research and development of intelli-
gence or related capabilities.
Specifically excluded are programs which are so closely
integrated with a weapon system that their primary
function is to provide immediate-use targeting data."
14. Definition of terms is thereforblboth necessary
and appropriate in order to discuss differing perceptions
and the development of a policy statement on relationships
in national-tactical intelligence. The definitions which
follow will be useful for purposes of the ensuing discussion.
a. National Intelligence -
(1) National intelligence is that intelligence
required by the President, the National Security Council,
and other officials of the United States Government who
are involved in formulating and directing the implementation
of national security and foreign policy.
(2) National intelligence assets are those which
have the primary mission of supporting national policy.
A secondary purpose of national assets is to provide
support to departmental and/or tactical intelligence
needs as capabilities and priorities permit. National
intelligence assets transcend the exclusive purview of
a single department or agency and are included in the
National Foreign Intelligence Program and identified as
such.
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b. Departmental Intelligence -
(1) Departmental intelligence is that intelli-
gence any department or agency requires to execute its
own mission.
(2) Departmental intelligence assets are those
which have the primary mission of supporting the specific
mission of a department or agency, e.g.",'in DoD organizing,
equipping, and training military forces. A secondary
purpose of departmental assets is to provide support to
national and tactical intelligence needs as capabilities
and priorities permit. Certain Departmental intelligence
assets are included in the National Foreign Intelligence
Program and identified as such. Those assets not in
the NFIP are identified as departmental intelligence
related assets (IRA).
c. Tactical Intelligence -
(1) Tactical intelligence is that intelligence
required for the planning and conduct of tactical
operations.
(2) Tactical intelligence assets are those which
have the primary mission of providing tactical intelli-
gence to a military or field commander. They are
integral to the combat organization and directly responsive
to the military commander. A secondary purpose of
tactical intelligence assets is to provide support to
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departmental and national intelligence needs as capa-
bilities and priorities permit. Because of their unique
peacetime training and wartime combat missions, tactical
intelligence assets are not included in the National
Foreign Intelligence Program.
15. The key to operational use of these definitions is
the authoritative assignment of primary and/br secondary and
tertiary missions to each intelligence asset. Assignment of
mission primacy, although highly dependent upon scenarios
should remain permanently vested in the authority who has the
more probable or more important mission. The above definitions
take into account two aspects of reality: one deals with
current collection and production of intelligence in the
functional sense, the other with the allocation of resources
to develop or sustain intelligence collection and production
capabilities. The terms tasking and resource allocation will
be used to distinguish these two facets of the problem in
the discussion which follows.
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THREE V I EIVPOI NTS
16. At least three points of view exist relative to
providing guidance based on the relationship between
national and tactical intelligence. These range from
total separation to complete integration.
?? Viewpoint A would see a unified intelligence
structure and resource allocation process as a DCI
responsibility.
of Viewpoint B would see an interacting relation-
ship between national and tactical assets in both the
tasking and resource allocation process but would
divide responsibility for the two.
?? Viewpoint C would see the total separation of
tactical resources from the DCI's responsibility and
would exclude tactical assets and capabilities from the
NFIP.
17. Viewpoint A was clearly articulated in the
November 1971 Presidential directive, "Organization and
Management of the US Foreign Intelligence Community,"
in which the DCI was assigned the following three
responsibilities with respect to tactical intelligence
(emphasis added):
a. "I shall look to him (the DCI) to improve the
performance of the Community, to provide his
judgments on the efficiency and effectiveness
of all intelligence programs and activities
(including tactical intelligence), and to
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recommend the appropriate allocation of resources
to be devoted to intelligence."
b. "I am directing the Director of Central Intelli-
gence to prepare and submit each year, through
OMB, a consolidated intelligence program budget,
including tactical intelligence."
c. "The need to make some savings is so urgent that I
have directed the Office of Management and Budget,
jointly with the DCI and Secretary of Defense, to
review the FY 1973 budget for intelligence and to
submit specific reductions from cli1rent programs,
with particular attention to tactical intelligence."
This view, which by and large represented an OMB position,
was the de jure but not de facto mode for addressing national/
tactical matters during 1971-1976.
18. Problems developed in this viewpoint stemmed from
the basic authorities establishing the responsibility for
intelligence within the Executive Branch, i.e., the National
Security Act of 1947, as amended, and National Security
Council Intelligence Directives. The National Security Act
of 1947, as amended:
a. "established under the National Security Council a
Central Intelligence Agency with a Director of
Central Intelligence..." "For the purpose of
coordinating the intelligence activities of the
several Government departments and agencies in
the interest of national security..."
b. "established a Secretary of Defense as "the
principal assistant to the President in all
matters relating to the Department of Defense..."
"he has direction, authority, and control over
the Department of Defense," and
c. authorized that "with the advice and assistance of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff the President, through
the Secretary of Defense, shall establish unified
or specified combatant commands for the performance
of military missions, and shall determine the force
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structure of such combatant commands to be com-
posed of forces...,' which shall then be assigned
to such combatant commands by the departments
concerned for the performance of such military
missions.
19. The President, by his 1971 letter, created an
apparent conflict between the command authority of the
Secretary of Defense, exercised by the.commanders of the
unified and specified commands, and the responsibility of
the DCI to coordinate the intelligence activities of the
several Government departments and agencies in the interest
of national security. In terms of the budget review process,
the DCI makes recommendations to the President and defends
before Congress the National Foreign Intelligence Program
(NFIP), which is essentially a compilation of the CIA Program,
the State Intelligence Program and the Consolidated Defense
Intelligence Program (CDIP), the latter being a part of
Program 3 of the Defense budget. Viewpoint A would have the
DCI review and justify all intelligence-related assets, to
include combatant force intelligence units. The DCI, to
meet his obligations, would thus provide judgments on the
efficiency and effectiveness of all intelligence, and would
be the authority to include or remove intelligence and
intelligence-related assets from the NFIP and recommend the
relative priority for funding.
20. The draft study on "U.S. Tactical Intelligence--A
Survey of the Current Situation" previously mentioned addressed
the problem of defining and isolating tactical intelligence
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activities in a manner which has general agreement.
This study concluded that:
a. The problem of identifying what resources are
involved in tactical intelligence cannot be
resolved outside of the Department of Defense and
should be a responsibility of the Secretary of
Defense. Participation by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff is called for because of the 'intimate
relationship between tactical intelligence re-
sources and the combat readiness of the armed
forces.
b. The role of the Director of Central Intelligence
should be to consult with the Secretary of Defense
to insure close correlation between national and
tactical intelligence activities in the interest
of economy in the use of intelligence resources,
elimination of any unneeded redundancy and optimum
overall utilization of information acquired by
either national or tactical intelligence efforts.
c. Examination of tactical intelligence activities on
the part of the Intelligence Community should
focus on specific identified issues which can be
analyzed in depth. Identification of such issues
and initiation of the necessary studies should be
a function both of the Director of Central Intelli-
gence and of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Intelligence. Participation in such studies
should include representatives, as appropriate, of
the DCI, ASD/I, DIA, NSA and the military services.
d. Whether or in what format a tactical intelligence
budget should be identified as part of the Consoli-
dated Defense Intelligence Budget (CDIP) should be
determined within the Department of Defense after
further study of the issues involved. Until such
time as tactical U.S. combat forces actually are
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committed, however, any budget separately identi-
fied as pertaining to peacetime tactical intelli-
gence activities should be limited to programs
which have or can be assigned an active peacetime
role in the acquisition, processing, production or
dissemination of?intelligence -- either tactical
or national.
ILLEGIB
As a result of the study ar.d unresolved definitional
problems, such actions as might have been necessary to
effectively implement viewpoint A were never undertaken.
21. Viewpoint B recognizes the state of affairs which
militates against viewpoint A and tries to make divisions of
responsibility and authority as explicit as possible. In
developing an understanding of Viewpoint B the following
questions represent major concerns:
a. How and under what authority does the DCI task
tactical intelligence assets to collect/produce
national intelligence?
b. How and under what authority do tactical com-
manders task national intelligence assets to
collect/produce tactical intelligence?
c. How does the DCI evaluate and justify tactical
intelligence collection and production capabilities
proposed as part of the NFIP?
d. How does the DCI evaluate the extent of overlap
and duplication between national and tactical
assets which have similar capabilities?
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22. In order to focus on these concerns, four examples
of current tasking or resource allocation problems have been
chosen to illustrate the national-tactical interface issue
and the difficulties involved in making distinctions in
terms of authority and responsibility.
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c. CROSS PROGRAM - CROSS DISCIPLINE. All four programs
require an integrated analysis. For example, a
Warsaw Pact attack scenario would have all four
resources involved in activities ranging from
warning of attack to weapons employment. Each
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would contribute a portion of the total infor-
mation collected or produced; therefore, each
system should be reviewed on its own merits
regardless of program or discipline.
24. Viewpoint B looks at the possible resolution of
these problems as a practical and beneficial goal. The Pilot
Study on National Intelligence Support to Field Commanders,
the Electromagnetic Intercept and Position Fixing (IPF)
report, the NSC Panel Report on Tactical Use of National
Reconnaissance Satellite Assets, and the proposed interagency
study to address the matter in a comprehensive manner are
manifestations of concern in this area.
25. Viewpoint C would provide a means to more easily
define boundaries. Much of the argument against viewpoint
A supports viewpoint C. The military establishment views
the DCI as serving in a staff capacity as the intelligence
advisor to the President and to the NSC. They consider
that the Secretary of Defense, as a member of the NSC and
a part of the national command authority (DoD definition),
is in a line relationship between the President and
operational forces in the field. So, too, the Secretary
of Defense's subordinates, the CINC's, are in a line
relationship. The CINC's functions of command include:
?? the composition of subordinate forces
?? the assignment of tasks
?? the designation of objectives, and
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so the authoritative direction necessary to accom-
plish the mission.
The view that there must be a compelling need for tactical
capabilities to be included in a national program is a mani-
festation of that point of view. Viewpoint C essentially
looks at the national-tactical interface,ip programmatic
terms. The determination of primary mission would categorize
the assets under review and result in all tactical intell-
igence assets being removed from consideration as part of
the NFIP review. Viewpoint C, however, does not adequately
address the tasking problem or its relationship to the
effective allocation of resources. Viewpoint C recognizes
the bureaucratic factors which make viewpoint A impractical.
It recognizes the functional problems that characterize
viewpoint B and attempts to make sharp distinctions where
possible. It compromises the "big picture" in order to
obtain tangible, "real world" gains.
ORGANIZATIONAL POSITIONS
26. Because the solution to the national-tactical
interface problem is viewed from these various perspectives,
each of the major participants has developed a position
which conflicts to some extent with the others. These
positions are summarized below.
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27. The Defense View: Many in Defense look at the
problem essentially as stated by then Deputy Secretary of
Defense Ellsworth in a letter to the House Appropriations
Committee.
... we must not try to exert too much control
over operational intelligence and intelligence-
related programs in ways that could interfere
with the needs and priorities of military
commanders. Quite frankly, we in intelligence
do not understand enough aboutithe tactical
needs of military forces to try to second guess
our commanders in too much detail. We lack the
planning and analytic capability to try to tie
every major system together in Washington, or
to say to a given field command that his
priorities do not seem cost effective.
28. As intelligence buying power has decreased
and management interest in the relationship between
NFIP and non-NFIP programs and activities has increased,
attempts to achieve savings by eliminating needless
redundancy and by improving mutual support tend to
reinforce strongly held JCS and Service views.
Military commanders are skeptical of national
intelligence support from national systems in wartime because:
?? national needs may take priority over
legitimate combat intelligence needs,
?? many NFIP systems might not report fast enough
for combat support, and
?? communications may be inadequate..
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They are also concerned about the identity of intelligence
assets which might directly support combat forces. They
believe that such assets:
?? might be diverted from high priority
military missions to respond to national
intelligence tasks;
?? might be subject to centralized funding,
taking from the Services responsibility
for resource decisions for them;
?? might be traded for national systems
incapable of supporting the forces in
a timely and usable way, and unrespon-
sive to the combat commanders in the
field.
29. On resource matters, some in Defense believe
in an approach that would address national-tactical
interface issues on an ad hoc basis and would negotiate
on what will and what will not be addressed in the
Policy Review Committee arena. For example, with regard
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DoD supported the Defense Dissemination Program as
separate and distinct from the NRP program (but still
in the NFIP).
DoD declined to separate tactical
from national requirements,
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30. The CIA View: Concerned primarily with maintaining
the integrity of the NFIB, CIA generally wants tactical re-
quirements and objectives as clearly identified as are national
requirements and objectives.
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In summary, CIA looks at tactical needs as competitors
for funds in the NFIP. Since NFIP collection systems
provide mostly national intelligence, they look at
proposed add-ons as threatening to other NFIP
capabilities.*
31. Congressional View:
a. Congressional concern with national-
tactical interface is historic. Major interest
was shown this past year as part of both the
Senate Select Committee and Joint Congressional
Study of the FY 77 budget. The SSC on
Intelligence stated:
The SecDef and military services should
retain direct control over the operation
of tactical military intelligence. None-
theless, the DCI needs the right to review
tactical military operations in order to
make budget choices between tactical and
national intelligence activities.
Moreover, to carry out his coordina-
ting role, the DCI needs to retain
control over major technical intel-
ligence collection systems which
service both tactical and national
intelligence requirements.
In order to carry out his national
intelligence responsibilities, the
DCI should have the authority to
review al.i foreign and military
activities and intelligence resource
allocations, including tactical
military intelligence which is the
responsibility of the Armed Forces.
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b. The Joint Congressional Conference Report
on the 1977 budget contained the following:
... just as the local commander
is given maximum flexibility in the
use of tanks, artillery, and other
weapons at his disposal while de-
cisions as to the characteristics of
those various weapons are frequently
made at higher levels, so also must
higher level authorities make de-
cisions about the intelligence-
related assets which will be made
available to the local commander.
As these intelligence-related assets
become ever more expensive, complex,
and interrelated with strategic
intelligence assets, including sat-
ellites, it becomes even more crucial
that some central control be exercised
to prevent overlap and duplication.
The conferees do not object to the
Deputy Secretary of Defense (Intel-
ligence) and the Director of Central
Intelligence sharing this responsi-
bility for review of intelligence-
related programs with the Joint Chiefs
of Staff and other competent military
authorities, but the conferees reaffirm
that the intelligence-related programs
must be subjected to the strong direc-
tion which the House Classified Letter
on intelligence directed and with which
the Senate Classified Letter concurred
by implication."
c. The House Appropriations Committee report stated
...the Director of Central
Intelligence must continue to review
these (intelligence-related) programs
to prevent duplication between stra-
tegic and tactical intelligence assets
and to assure that all relevant infor-
mation gathered at the tactical level
is available to national level
decision makers.
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For the first time, the Committee also included a section
on intelligence-related programs in its classified letter
stating that this is to establish the Committee's firm
intention to control intelligence related programs to
the same degree that it controls intelligence programs.
d. In summarizing the Congressional view, the
key points are that:
(1) DoD should retain operational control
over tactical assets.
(2) Tactical assets should respond to
national tasking.
(3) Some central control should be
exercised to prevent overlap and
unnecessary duplication.
32. The 0MB View: 0MB has much the same outlook
as Congress. In reviewing the entire budget for the
Executive Branch, 0MB must compile and relate data from
the separate departments and agencies which must be
integrated and treated as one budget. For this reason,
OMB's concern is somewhat similar to that of the
Congress, albeit for a different reason. Congress
desires a total budget package that can be attacked
as such; 0MB requires budget submissions that can be
readily integrated into a defensible whole.
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`` ~tjj
A DCI PERSPECTIVE
33. In formulating his position on
national-tactical interface matters, the DCI must take
into account the key interests of all members of the
Intelligence Community. There is probably no perfect
system which he might establish as the final solution
to the various problems facing all the interested
parties. In the Community, the DCI acts as the first'
among equals and is responsible for maintaining an
efficient forum for providing policy decisions on
U.S. intelligence programs. Thus, his perspective
must transcend the component programs of the National
Foreign Intelligence Program. He must respond to
Congressional and OMB demands for a central focus
for resource review while, at the same time, permitting
control of operational intelligence systems to remain
in the hands of the program manager. Recognizing that
legitimate differences of opinion exist which are not
always easily reconciled, he must, in the end,
strive to rise above such obstacles and propose a
policy that is in the best interests of the entire
Intelligence Community.
34. In developing a DCI policy two major
factors need to be considered. One involves better
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definition of the means whereby the DCI can carry out
his specific NSC assigned responsibilities. These
are:
a. The DCI shall supervise the production
and dissemination of national intelligence
and shall develop national intell~gence
requirements and priorities.
b. The DCI shall ensure that planning for the
utilization of the collection and reporting
capabilities for intelligence purposes of
each of the several departments and agencies
avoids undesirable duplication and un-
coordinated overlap and provides adequate
coverage for national security purposes.
Concerning the above, it has been pointed out that
DCI cognizance must extend to cross-program, cross-
discipline matters if he is to be an effective
manager. Therefore, he must be able to assess
collection, production, and support capabilities
individually and in combination in a total U.S.
intelligence perspective. In the figure shown on the
next page, this view is described (with selected
examples included) to demonstrate the scope and
totality of the necessary DCI cognizance.
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33. A conceptual framework of this nature for
U.S. intelligence permits the DCI to look at cross-program,
cross-discipline and cross-mission issues without
artificial boundaries. It is important to recognize
in this integrated view of U.S. intelligence that
the footnote represents a significant caveat. The
DCI must ensure that explicit operational control
and initial resource commitments remain the sole
responsibility of the appropriate commander or manager.
Implicit in this vestiture, however, is the existence
of a chain of command or authority whereby superiors can
approve, modify, or countermand subordinates' directives.
This logic leads to a fundamental point in theory -- the
NSC is the tasking and resource allocation authority for
the U.S. intelligence effort. In this context the DCI
could, as appropriate, bring certain matters up for
Policy Review Committee (PRC) deliberation, refer other
matters to the departments or agencies, or bring
certain other issues before 0MB or the Pr-esident.
The development of a policy for national-tactical
interface should also consider the diversity of the
organizational views noted above. In order to compare
policy choices and key viewpoints, the following tables
depict expected organizational reactions to various
alternatives. While the basis for the development of
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n gsinle "best" policy for the Community may be
elusive, it may be assumed that those options
acceptable to most interested parties will prove
most viable.
TASKING-NATIONAL TO
TACTICAL
DEFENSE
CIA
CONGRESS/OMB
DCI has authoritative
Anathema to JCS-
Difficult to
Responds to expecta-
tasking control over
violates command
effect viable
tions for central
all assets
chain principle
procedures
control
DCI has limited task-
Might be OK ie
Improves pres-
Recognizes concern to
ing authority over
properly caveated
ent situation
some 'extent
tactical assets
DCI does not task
Impacts on justi-
National Intel-
Flies in face of wish
tactical assets at all
fication for cer-
ligence produc-
for integrated structure
tain assets
t' would
it
su
e r
TASKING-TACTICAL TO
NATIONAL
Authoritative military
Meets goal but
Major setback
Clean in theory.
control is exercised
procedural imple-
to national
Looks good on paper
by system or event
mentation prob-
intelligence
precipitated, e.g.,
lems involved
primacy
crisis
Consolidated, negoti-
Does not reduce
Continues to
Appears to be cumber-
ated tasking meeting
concern over lack
avoid decision
some but probably
combined needs
of speed in near
on who resolves
acceptable
(present system)
real time problem
conflicts
Military tactical
Reverses direct-
Potential
Bifurcates rather than
needs excluded from
ion. Would be
threats & poli-
centralizes national
national tasking
strongly fought
tical problems
focus
disappear
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P.FSOURCE ALLOCATION
NATIONAL ASSETS
DEFENSE
CIA
CONGRESS/OMB
Tactical capabilities
Does violence to
Saves $ for
Makes dividing line
not included in NFIP
current concept
national capa-
clear but maybe too
assets
bilities
fine
Tactical capabilities
Could be sup-
Meets major
Appears pretty much
included in NFIP
ported if
objective
on target
assets but separately
impetus is to
identified
emphasize utility
Tactical capabilities
More or less pre-
Considered
Rejects Appropriations
included in NFIP but
ferred as long as
unacceptable
Committee direction
not identified as
drive for tacti-
such
cal use is sup-
ported
RESOURCE ALLOCATION
TACTICAL ASSETS
Include Tactical
Totally at odds
Complicates
Total solution
assets in NFIP
with Defense view
identification
but unwieldy
of national
.assets
,,Exclude Tactical
Objected to by
Major concern
Addresses essential
assets from NFIP but
some quarters
is satisfied
concern
DCI review for
overlap/duplication
Exclude Tactical
JCS position
Further reduces
Not responsive to
assets from DCI
throughout the
influence
Appropriation
review
years
Committee guidance
1
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36. Considering only those acceptable alternatives,
a national-tactical interface policy should ensure that:
of the DCI has advisory tasking* authority
over tactical intelligence assets.
?? Consolidated, negotiated tasking of
national assets continue toy meet
combined national-departmental-
tactical needs.
?? Tactical capabilities included in NFIP
assets are separately identified.
of Tactical capabilities or assets
excluded from NFIP receive DCI
review for overlap/duplication.
isory tasking -- tasking accepted by an operational
commander or controlling authority of an intelligence
asset so long as it does not interfere with the
primary mission for which that asset was assigned.
The effectiveness of the advisory tasking is a matter of
concern to many interested in developing a strong
DCI position. Advisory tasking will ensure that a
mechanism exists to get collection or production
requirements to the proper level of Government and
will lay the burden of not responding on the shoulders
of the appropriate controlling authority. JCS
experience indicates that advisory tasking maintains
the integrity of the command structure while at the
same time providing an effective means of rapid
direct tasking to the tactical level. The national
tasking nexus (DCI Committees and the NIOs) would
have to operationalize this authority through
consultation with the appropriate departments and
agencies to identify proper addressees and the scope
of communications under various scenarios.
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CONCLUSIONS
37. Based on the above analysis, a statement of
national-tactical interface policy should assign
responsibilities based on DCI views and acceptable
alternatives. In general, tasking methods currently
in use would remain much the same as present but with the
underpinning of Community-agreed-upon DCII kuidance as to
relative priorities and DCI advisory tasking authority.
In the resource allocation area, the DCI would direct
NFIP managers to separately identify as appropriate tactical,
departmental, and national capabilities for program review and,
at the same time, the DCI after consulting with the heads of
the appropriate departments and agencies would identify those
non-NFIP resources he considered to be subject to comprehensive
review. Specific provisions should be as follows:
Policy
(1) The DCI is not the appropriate official
to provide resource recommendations pertaining to
intelligence units and activities that exist for the
principal purpose of supporting combat commanders in
wartime, or to evaluate their efficiency and
effectiveness for wartime missions. He can, however
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take advantage of force support units for intelligence
in peacetime consistent with their missions and the
missions of supported forces.
(2) The DCI will ensure that national assets
are designed and operated to optimize capabilities to
provide support, where needed, to tactical intelligence
users consistent with the primary nationalsriission
purpose.
(3) In the context of national-tactical
interface, the DCI shall concern himself with tactical
intelligence to the extent that: a) tactical intelli-
gence assets can provide significant national intelli-
gence, b) tactical intelligence requirements interfere
or conflict with national requirements in the tasking
of national assets, and c) tactical intelligence
requirements impact on resource allocation in the NFIP.
Responsibilities
In consonance with this policy, the following
responsibilities are assigned:
(1) The DCI, in developing national intelligence
collection requirements, may task tactical intelligence
assets on an advisory basis* through the appropriate
* Advisory tasking can be accepted by the operational
commander or controlling authority of a tactical
asset so long as it does not interfere with the
primary mission for which that asset was assigned.
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department or agency, to provide national intelligence.
The DCI shall participate in national-tactical testing
and exercises to ensure realistic national tasking is
part of the scenario.
(2) The DCI will justify national collection
resources in the NFIP to the extent that they satisfy
national intelligence collection requirements.
Justification for additional capabilities in support
of tactical requirements will be provided by the
departments/agencies concerned.
(3) The DCI will identify those non-NFIP
departmental intelligence-related and tactical assets
he considers necessary to be reviewed in context of
the NFIP because of their tasking and resource
allocation relationship to national intelligence
requirements and priorities for the collection,
production, and dissemination of national intelligence.
(4) The DCI shall review and comment as
appropriate on those NFIP resources he identifies as
duplicative or overlapping capabilities with
departmental and tactical assets, and where national
assets can be expected to be tasked to meet
departmental and tactical needs. The DCI will identify
to the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of
Staff those non-NFIP intelligence programs which appear
T 0 P c'LVIjC.I
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to be ineffective, inefficient, or unnecessary due to
duplication or overlap with NFIP assets.
Procedures
(1) The DCI shall identify those tactical
(non-NFIP) resources which he considers to be
potentially significant collectors of intelligence
useful to the national effort. The controlling
authority of these resources will ensure t'h'at these
assets can and will respond to national advisory tasking
on a timely but not to interfere with their primary mission
basis. The DCI shall in turn ensure that national assets
respond to the needs of tactical users as capabilities and
priorities permit.
(2) During the formulation stage of
the NFIP budget, the DCI shall identify appropriate
systems requirements or capabilities of NFIP assets
which he considers to be necessary for national
intelligence purposes. At the same time, tactical
intelligence systems requirements or capabilities
for these NFIP assets shall be identified by the
appropriate agency or department.
(3) During the formulation stage of the NFIP
budget, the DCI after consulting with the heads of the
appropriate departments and agencies, shall identify those
departmental, intelligence-related, and tactical
assets where possible overlap and unnecessary
duplication might exist between or among systems.
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(4) The National Security Council Policy Review
Committee will determine the appropriate mix of requirements
and capabilities necessary to best meet the combined
national, departmental, and tactical needs of the NFIP assets
involved.
(5) The Intelligence Community Staff will ensure
that the arrangements necessary to accomplish the above are
adequate and routinely tested where applicable.
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/09/08 : CIA-RDP183M00171R001000210001-3