SECTION II: CURRENT GOALS/TRENDS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00171R001000190002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 3, 2009
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: REGULATION

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP83M00171 R001000190002-5
TOP SECRET ILLEGIB 3
SECTION II: CURRENT GOALS/TRENDS
NSC, NRO, NSA reviews
CURRENT GOALS completed.
The basic public policy on U.S. national space activities was ini-
tially set forth in the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958:
"The Congress hereby declares that it is the policy of the United'
States that activities in space should be devoted to peaceful purposes for
the benefit of all mankind.
"The Congress declares that the general welfare and security of
the United States require that adequate provision be made for aeronauti-
cal and space activities. The Congress further declares that such acti-
vities shall be the responsibility of, and shall be directed by, a civilian
agency exercising control over aeronautical and space activities sponsored
by the United States, except that activities peculiar to or primarily asso-
ciated with the development of weapons systems, military operations, or the
defense of the United States (including the research and development nec-
essary to make effective provision of the defense of the United States)
shall be the responsibility of, and shall be directed by, the Department
of Defense; and that determination as to which such agency has responsi-
bility for and direction of any such activity shall be made by the
President..."
Proceeding from this basic legislation, in the past 19 years the U.S.
has pursued many specific goals which provide the basis for the following
broad formulation of current national space goals.
- To develop civil applications of space and make space more
accessible so that the benefits of space activities and the
knowledge gained will be beneficial to the people of the U.S.
and to mankind and its institutions.
- To protect, maintain and enhance the utility, integrity and
viability of national space intelligence capabilities as an
essential element of national security.
- To develop military space systems to enhance national defense
through increased effectiveness of military forces, increased
strategic stability and deterrence of attack, protection of
U.S. assets in space, and defense against threats from space.
- To increase the body of scientific knowledge about the Earth,
the space environment and other celestial bodies.
- To use U.S. space activities as an instrument of foreign policy
to enhance national prestige, to maintain the free use of space
ILLEGIB
sn,m p,4- TOP SECRET
F. rc, SW V-. 2ssurs
s?cO .r DDg.I Fr -- ! . H 7
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP83M00171 R001000190002-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP83M00171 R001000190002-5
TOP SECRET 4
for peaceful purposes,. promote international stability through
increased international cooperation and understanding, and to
influence the policies and actions of other states.
- To encourage commercial exploitation of space for economic
benefit while protecting the technological advantages enjoyed
by U.S. industry in space activities.
- To preserve free and independent U.S. access to space.
TRENDS
While the above goals are not completely consistent, in 19 years
relatively few policy conflicts have arisen. There are, however, identi-
fiable trends, some of which form the underlying causes of current issues
and a source of concern for the future. They are:
- The increasing near-real-time capabilities of national intelli- "
_ gets to assist the managemen o crisis siu ons at
e na i ona eve with are Tt-in -increase in i xfo
su porgy tam operations at a tac cal eve 1.
interactive management of these activities.
- The increasin international acceptance of reconnaissance acti-
sibilities of civil, intelligence and military activities with
a resulting convergence of capabilities and a need for better
I
- The desire for better remote sensing data to meet the respon-
v1 ies_in space in support of stra eaic s a i ice! with. a re-
e aT s -curl ycon rols oincrease the u'tfit ty to those sec-
tors.
su 7-i~pressure from the U.S. civil and military sectors to
- Rapidly increasing dependence of U.S. and Soviet military forces
on support from space systems which cannot be satisfied as well
or at all by other means.
- A growing threat to military forces from space systems with a
resulting incentive for each side to negate the other's
satellites.
guard U.S. interests.
- The emergence of a significant threat by the USSR to the use
of space by the U.S. with a resulting need to develop a U.S.
response to this threat.
- The increasing international pressures to expand the legal
regime for the conduct of space activities with a resulting
need to retain U.S. leadership in these negotiations and safe-
TOP SECRET
X1
X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP83M00171 R001000190002-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP83M00171 R001000190002-5
#O1 SLUKL 1 5
The tendency toward consolidation of some aspects (e.g.,
launch systems) of the civil, military and intelligence acti-
vities prompted both by technology and by opportunities for
cost avoidance with a resulting coalescence of the sectors.
- The growth of opportunities for commercial remote sensing which
gives rise to the need to develop U.S. policy to govern that
activity.
- The growing competition from other nations in the development
of the capability to build and launch satellites with a re-
sulting reduction of U.S. influence on the kinds and types of
activities conducted in space.
- The growing international participation in and dependence on
satellite systems with a resulting decrease in the likelihood
of interference with such satellites.
These trends indicate that the world's se offss~ace is maturi_n4 and
with this maturity there is an erosion o the S. aili to control
LI-Ve ace a oug we ave never controlle the ovie program).
ccor ing y, t ere is an increasing need to keep up-to-date, the policy
framework that guides the implementation of U.S. programs to avoid undue
risk to any one sector from the actions of another sector. There is also
a need to minimize international constraints on U.S. freedom of action in
space.
TOP SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP83M00171 R001000190002-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP83M00l71 R001000190002-5
TOP-SECRET
SECTION III: ISSUES FOR DECISION
This section presents the essential underlying issues affecting the
U.S. space program. Decisions on these key issues will provide broad
guidance for resolving the many specific problems addressed in PRM-23.
The discussion which follows provides a statement of each key issue,
existing policy, current practice and potential solutions. A summary of
existing U.S. space policy is presented at Annex B. References in this
report are to the bibliography in that Annex.
The issues presented for decision are:
/- Can security restraints on intelli ence systems be relaxed and
s i provi eadequate pro ection of the program an ifs
--------------
rooducc s.
- What relationships and/or controls are appropriate to establish
a proper balance between civil requirements and national secu-
rity concerns in the remote sensing field?
`~- What policy should be applied to the use of intelligence and
C! Tl spacesys ems for national a ense nee
war.
- What should be U.S. policy on space system survivability?
- What should be the U.S. policy on antisatellite activity (ASAT)
and ASAT arms control?
The issues presented for reaffirmation of existing policy or endorse-
ment of new policy are:
- Are the current levels of control on the export of unclassified
space-related products and technologies serving the national
interest or do they require revision?
- Are additional guidelines needed for the Space Transportation
System (STS) utilization in the U.S. space program?
- What should be the U.S. position in discussions on the inter-
national legal regime for space?
TOP SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP83M00l71 R001000190002-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP83M00l71 R001000190002-5
TOP SECRET
ISSUE: Can security restraints on intelligence systems be relaxed
and still provide adequate protection of the program and
its products?
In 1960, after the U-2 incident and the first successful U.S. photo-
graphic satellite, the President directed that "the products of satellite
reconnaissance, and the information of the fact of such reconnaissance
revealed by the product, shall be given strict security handling under
provisions of a special security control system approved by me." The U.S.
was in urgent need of strategic intelligence, the Soviet Union was threat-
ening to treat reconnaissance satellites as they did the U-2, and the
world reaction to remote sensing from space was unknown. In 1962, NSAM
2454 established a goal and defined tactics for creating a favorable inter-
national environment for U.S. reconnaissance activities. By 1973 there
was much greater confidence in the acceptance of such operations; the
Soviet Union had an active program of its own, the UN Outer Space Treaty
endorsed the freedom of use of space for peaceful purposes and certain
reconnaissance activities were accepted by the USSR as a National Tech-
nical Means (NTM) of verification. To permit wider use of spa e derived
Current U.S. policy is:
- To protect the security and integrity of U.S. intelligence
activities in space, the nature, extent, and much of the
information collected is controlled in special, compart-
mented security channels. (24)
- "Economy dictates" the use by the Federal civil community
of "imagery and information derived from classified overhead
imagery systems that is in support of Congressionally approved
programs of the user agency and that is not in violation of
applicable laws, including the statutory authority of the
user agency, nor inconsistent with the Constitutional and
other legal rights of U.S. persons." (20, 21)
Current Practice
The current U.S. he "fact of" photographic recon-
naissance from_space is SECRET N 0 TORN. Access to some p o
p?~tiducl;'ana resu t1``g intelligence is allowed outside of the
special security control system. The fact of SIGINT pro r ms and their
products, however, are under compartmented controls defined for both
sa'Ctt(the 1'At - I-E system and T (the Special Inte i-
ce syy m) activities. A fraction o ie`in #elligence collection
capability of each pho ographic mission is normally released to satisfy
requirements of the civil community. A committee has been established
to coordinate these civil activities under security guidelines provided
by Director of Central Intelligence (DCI).
TOP SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP83M00l71 R001000190002-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP83M00l71 R001000190002-5
In a November 1976 memo to the President, the DCI requested authori-
nation o further reduce security restraints o a= ow, wi (I .,ers~ nee ? 1i- V/
no"M i-7nna
e o
a. Down radin the "fact of" satellite reconna
CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN an outside the specia urity contr 1 (with-
s1;ttion a ween Imaging and SIGINT
-.--
b. Usinq special product controls sparingly and exclusively for
materials revealing truly sensitive aspects of the program;
c. Not changing compartmented security for the operational
aspects of the program;
d. Classifying of all other aspects of satellite intelligence
and attributed products in accordance with criteria of E.O. 11652, "Classi-
fication and Declassification of National Security Information and Material,"
and no lower than CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN;
e. Develo inc Procedures to eliminate duplicative satellite (TK)
and signals nj t igence (S con ro systems; and
f. The DCI would have authority to establish security guide-
lines and control of information concerning satellite intelligence.
These recommendations define the subissues.
The sensitivity of the activity varies for the photographic, elec-
tronic (ELINT), telemetry (TELINT), and communications (COMINT) intelli-
gence missions. For example, COMINT is the most sensitive since the
'target nation could quickly cut off productive sources if knowledge of
U.S. capabilities and methods were known.
There is en al a ement that e of
the leve s needed to protec the intellic
t o a con r s res rict the use of the
and"Zlvt ommuni
TOP SECR,E} 8
current controls exceed
ro r adequateeT (
roducts by a mi iLai
n tFrert the fact
d be unclassified
Major factors bearing on the issue are:
- The fact of U.S. space reconnaissance activities has been
openly acknowledged by several Presidents.
- Relaxation of controls would permit wider application to
civil and military needs.
- Declassifying the fact that the U.S. is conducting recon-
naissance operations could permit the U.S, to take a more
TOP SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP83M00l71 R001000190002-5
 TOP SECRET
credible position in international arenas and could facilitate
exclusion of national security systems from UN legal restric-
tions.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP83M00171 R001000190002-5
- Any change in the security system could be irreversible.
- If the level of public knowledge is raised, nations could feel
that they should protect their sovereignty:
-- Raising the prospect of a restrictive international legal
regime for all forms of sensing
Possibly increasing the impact of Soviet activities aimed
at information denial
- Possibly impacting U.S. overseas space facilities
- Declassifying the fact of reconnaissance is likely to create
requests for sensitive details which the U.S. is not prepared
to release.
- PRM-29 directed a review of the security classification sys-
tem and preparation of a new Executive Order to replace
E.O. 11652. The 22 July SCC meeting on PRM-29 agreed unani-
mously that special security controls (i.e., compartments)
should be permitted only subject to (1) meeting criteria of
demonstrable need, limits on access, and balance between
protection and utility; (2) personal approval by heads of
departments, or, for intelligence sources and methods, by the
DCI; and (3) review and revalidation as necessary at three-
year intervals. The decisions arrived at in both PRMs should
be consistent.
Four potential solutions exist:
a. Maintain the Current Situation.
b. Allow for Selective Relaxation of Security Restrictions.
This solution would make non-real-time imagery and operational ELINT
available to the military forces and civil users at a useable security
level. More sensitive missions would retain the current level of protec-
tion. The President would retain control over satellite security policy.
Duplicative space (TK) and COMINT control channels would be
eliminated. The fact of ELINT and non-real-time photographic reconnais-
sance would be CONFIDENTIAL and the operational products not compartmented.
Compartmented controls for the fact of and product of real-time imagery
and other SIGINT missions and for operational details would continue.
TOP SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP83M00l71 R001000190002-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP83M00l71 R001000190002-5
TOP SECRET 10
c, Adopt the November 1976'DCI Recommendation as Described
Above. This solution would enlarge the potential for broad use of satel-
tedata by both military and civil users, Authority would be delegated
to the DCI to change security policy for space programs as needed to
adopt to changing circumstances (e.g., controls for real-time imagery,
TELINT and COMINT could either be kept compartmented, or not, as the
Intelligence Community needs dictate). Some agencies are concerned that
the DCI's security recommendations are not specific enough concerning
SIGINT operations.
d. Allow for Broad Relaxation of Security Restrictions. This
is an extension which could be applied to options b. and c. above. It
is consistent with recent Presidential statements and would make non-real-
time imagery and ELINT products available to the military forces and
civil users at a more useable security lever. This solution represents
a major change in existing policy. The "fact of"' non-real-time photo-
graphic and operational ELINT missions would be unclassified. The product
of photographic missions would be classified if the resolution is better
than the threshold established for control of civil imagery. The ELINT
product would not be compartmented.
TOP SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP83M00l71 R001000190002-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP83M00l71 R001000190002-5
TOP SECRET
3. ISSUE: What policy should be applied to the use of intelligence and
civil space systems for National Defense needs in peace and
war?
A need is emerging to insure that the mission architectures which
involve space systems are founded on a realistic assessment of operational
military support requirements, particularly in wartime. The basic policy
question is whether systems should be configured to exploit fully the peace-
time environment with wartime capabilities secondary, or whether realistic
wartime operatin modes should be assured. There are two basic considera-
a. Should national reconnaissance support of operational mili-
tary requirements be increased?
b. Should critical civil systems be configured to support
National Defense needs in times of emergency?
National Reconnaissance Support
Technological advances have allowed and have resulted in intelli-
gence systems with significant and growing capabilities to provide near-
real-time data that can be used to support operational military requirements.
The growth in een accom anied by efforts to
improve tasking responsiveness, product dissemination an communica ions
and operational capabilities for product utilization. To optimize use-
fulness at a reasonable investment, increased support for operational
military requirements has been supported by the Intelligence Community
(IC), with the caveat that increased tactical dependence on space satel-
lites should be approached cautiously because of vulnerability and per-
formance limitations compared to some organic military field assets. The
decision to increase operational militar porrtt~could_have effects on
t e pa i o e program to meet other national s e c u r i t re quire-
Y
in b o t peace an `w
Current U.S. Policy is:
- The provision on intelligence and its utilization must enhance
the formation of the foreign, military, and economic policies
of the USG and the planning for and conduct of military opera-
tions by U.S. forces. (26)
- [within House Armed Services Committee oversight requirements]...
the Committee would have no objection to continued experimen-
tation in this area, and would, in fact, encourage such experi-
mentation since other means of obtaining tactical intelligence
may become less tenable if the political sensitivity of other
governments to U.S. intelligence activities in foreign coun-
TOP SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP83M00l71 R001000190002-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP83M00l71 R001000190002-5
TOP SECRET
Current Practice
Under t practice the national intell* 'des
limits su ort for oi military eratio d endin u on a s m
an other nationa requirements. Requirements, tasking, and evaluation
or tactical intelligence rom space systems are transmitted to the NRO
via military channels and then through appropriate DCI collection commit-
tees. In developing and configuring the satellite collection systems,
the NRO responds to NSC Policy Review Committee (Intelligence) program
guidance. Processing and dissemination is performed by the NRO based
on guidance from the DCI collection committees., The operational mili-
tary community feels it has a limited input to'this process. Questions
to be resolved include:
- Should the role of the operational military community in this
process be strengthened?
- Should the Services be permitted to develop (and operate)
dedicated tactical reconnaissance satellites?
Major factors bearing on the problem are:
Requirements; The bulk of operational intelligence needs (e.g.,
missile, ground, naval and air order of battle) are also required to
produce national intelligence studies and estimates on foreign military
capabilities. However, the tactical intelligence needs call for more
i
selective and discrete levels o informat
on potentia a greater
re
n
uenc
In general, intelligence space systems provide support o these require-
ments in areas where wartime attrition of organic assets would be high
or where covert collection is desired,
Satellite Capabilities: Most intelligence satellite collection capa-
bilities lack the full flexibility required to support the rapidly changing
elements of tactical situations. Some spare recnnnaissance products re
not now being used because we-have-been unable to satisfactorily effect
either rapid dissemination of data to military elements, or to conduct
the desired levels of exploitation and operational use when the data is
disseminated or to identify capabilities to field commanders due to
security restrictions.
Product Dissemination/Communications: During past crises and war
the United States had experienced communications overload in supporting
the needs of military commanders. Alternatives such as downlinking and
processing intelligence data in-theater may be feasible. However, satel-
lite modifications may be required. Tests are being conducted with un-
modified satellites.
TOP SECRET
g
y a
d I Ime 1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP83M00l71 R001000190002-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP83M00l71 R001000190002-5
TOP SECRET
Security: Current security controls inhibit effective tactical use
of satellite-collected information, The decision on security controls
(Issue 1) will impact this issue.
Vulnerability: Survivability measures to make the systems less vul-
nerable have been proposed (Issue 4), but little action has been taken.
Costs: Substantial amounts of money could be involved in configuring
and adding surviva i 'xis-ting Support the needs
of military commanders, and in transmitting, processing and exploiting
va1t ` The potential over ap o sa e a and
data of potential military
11
_
c __ teems in coil ecti ng e same ~i kin v i n e i ence ~ n or-
Potential solutions of this issue are:
va. Maintain the Current Philosophy with Minor Improvements in
Implementation. This solution would endorse the concept of support for
operational requirements as one of the primary NRP missions. It would
call for the configuration of NRP assets, at this time, to improve sup-
port to deployed operational forces, as long as the primary mission capa-
bility of the NRP asset is not impaired, so as to provide maximum satisfac-
tion of both peacetime and wartime requirements. The need for increased
military involvement in tasking national intelligence satellites to support
military needs will be established pending evaluation of current and
future operational exercises. After review with the NRO, space reconnais-
sance systems which are considered by the military as essential to their
tactical needs, but which are not planned under the NRP, would be concep-
tually studied by the Services under appropriate security constraints.
The concepts would be reviewed by an equitably represented military/
intelligence group and a decision made on whether development and opera-
tion should occur under the aegis of the military or fall under the NRP.
In either case, the system would be funded and justified by the military.
Cost increases over the current program could be incurred.
/b, Endorse the Concept of Increased Support of Operational
Military Requirements. This solution would accept some degree of impair-
ment of NRP assets primary capability as an acceptable trade-off to
achieve significant improvement in military support. It also directs a
program for systematic evaluation of the potential utility of candidate
systems compared with the impact of implementing the necessary prepara-
tion, capabilities, and interfaces. Consideration is given to a program
of increased operational involvement in tasking national intelligence
satellites at levels of increasing conflict. Substantial costs could be
incurred. Military development and operation of reconnaissance systems
would be permitted as described in solution a.
TOP SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP83M00l71 R001000190002-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP83M00l71 R001000190002-5
TOP SECRET
Civil System Support
The civil space program is oriented toward peacetime activities,
available in a jamming environment, yet the U.S. might have considerable
additional capability available if there were plans to use civil systems.
Effective augmentation of military capabilities by civil systems requires
a program to identify appropriate systems, establish desired operating
modes and necessary interface capabilities, and integrate the systems into
military operational plans and exercises,
and only limited policies, capabilities and procedures exist for wartime.
In times of emergency, there is a potential need for mobilizing certain
civil systems, particularly communications systems, while denying their
use to adversaries. For example, only limited communications may be
Current U.S. Policy is:
- To prevent a hostile nation from gaining control of civil
weather satellites and to deny a hostile nation direct access
to data transmitted from the satellites when such actions are
determined to be in the interests of national security. (18)
- The U.S, has agreed that INTELSAT satellites shall not be
used directly for military communications purposes. (28)
However, indirect military use through common carriers is
substantial.
Current Practice
Under current practice, plans for civil sector support to national
defense have been generally limited. Currently, if a national emergency
should arise, the military has no way to deny the enemy the use of civil
satellites except through destruction of the satellite (by spin-up).
Alternate means of denial while retaining exclusive U.S. use could be
established. Many domestic commercial satellites are used by the mili-
tary; however, no agreements have been developed for emergency control
of these assets.
Major Factors Bearing on the Problem
The major argument in favor of increased civil sector utilization is
that this could provide a cost effective, back-up military capability.
The major arguments against such usage is the limited survivability of
these systems and potential adverse foreign reaction if the potential mili-
tary use of these systems becomes known.
The involved agencies agree that increased military use of civil
systems can be implemented. Provisions must be made to protect the civil
sector's peaceful international activities by classifying information about
the military use of these systems and the military funding for incremental
costs,
TOP SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP83M00l71 R001000190002-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP83M00171 R001000190002-5
TOP SECRET
Therefore, the U.S. should endorse a policy of military use of civil
space systems in emergencies. United States space systems would, as appro-
priate, be designed to permit denial of their capabilities to enemies in
time of national emergency while still providing these capabilities to the
United States, appropriate-federal civil systems and domestic commercial
systems will be developed and operated to the extent practicable to meet
emergency military requirements as well as those of the civil sector.
lop SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/03: CIA-RDP83M00171 R001000190002-5