INTELLIGENCE USER SURVEY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00171R000300170003-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 11, 2006
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: May 20, 1982
• Content Type: MF

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DCl/ICS 82-3707
20 May 1982
Community Staff
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MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
Director, Intelligence
uirector, urrlue Ur MS
essment and Evaluation
13
Director, Uttice ot lanning
SUBJECT: Intelligence User Survey
1. Attached you will find revisions of (A) the Executive Summary and
(B) the Discussion of the Findings and Followup Interviews of the IC Staff
analysis of the data received from questionnaires and interviews in the
1981 Intelligence User Survey. We have ?ttpmntpd in these revisions, to
incorporate the suggestions made by You,' during our
recent discussions. We have appended to the Executive Summary tive
recommendations for action which the findings of the survey would appear
to warrant. Attachment C provides a brief summary of the responses to
each of the 26 questions contained in the questionnaire, and Attachment D,
the Statistical Annex, provides an abbreviated Audit Trail of the IC
Staff's assessment of the data.
2. We recommend that the entire set be forwarded to Evan Rifleman as
Chairman of the Intelligence Producer's Council for review and possible
inclusion in a Community report for the DCI on the User Survey.
Attachments:
As Stated
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WARNING NOTICE
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED
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Approved For Release 2006/08/14: CIA-RDP83M00171R000300170003-4 ATT. A.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In 1981, a Working Group composed of representatives of CIA, NSA, DIA and
the Intelligence Community Staff surveyed a broad range of policy makers whose
functions entailed the use of intelligence in an effort to ascertain their
degree of satisfaction with the intelligence support they received. Of the
155 officials queried, some 135 completed a four-page questionnaire; some 35
of those respondents in personal interviews with members of the Working Group
provided additional insights into their use of intelligence. The ICS analyzed
the data obtained from the questionnaires and interviews of all the
respondents, while an independent DIA study concentrated only on responses
from DoD officials. In both cases, the findings tended to confirm perceptions
already held by Intelligence Community officials. Since the survey was not
designed to assess the effectiveness of resource allocation in the Community,
its applicability in that area is limited.
Following are the salient conclusions from the IC Staff assessment:
? "Core" intelligence consumers defined as senior officials of the
Departments of State and Defense and of the National Security
Council, are more frequent users of, more dependent upon, more
influenced by, and significantly more satisfied with intelligence
than are their counterparts in "non-Core" organizations such as the
Departments of the Treasury, Energy, and Commerce.
? The most satisfied consumers of intelligence are those who deal
directly with intelligence analysts specializing in the individual
policy maker's field of interest. Those consumers relying primarily
upon their own staffs and upon intelligence liaison officers are less
likely to be satisfied with the intelligence support they receive.
? Intelligence consumers would welcome, early in their appointments, an
effective introduction into the Intelligence Community detailing the
services provided, and the best means of accessing the system, in
order to enhance their ability to incorporate intelligence into the
decision-making process. This is true of both policy makers who have
had considerable government experience as well as those new to
government.
UTILITY OF INTELLIGENCE
4, Consumers who used intelligence regularly generally rated the utility
of intelligence high.
INTELLIGENCE BY TYPE (Current, Basic, Raw, Predictive/Analytic, Intelligence
in Support of Policy Options).
? Respondents generally were satisfied with both the quantity and
quality of Current and Basic intelligence.
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? A significant proportion of those queried were dissatisfied with both
the quantity and quality of intelligence prepared in Support of
Policy Options and Predictive/Analytic intelligence.
INTELLIGENCE BY GEOGRAPHIC REGIONS
op About half of the respondents were dissatisfied with both the
quantity and quality of the intelligence they received on Latin
America, the Middle East and North Africa.
? A significant number of respondents praised the quality of
intelligence on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and West
Europe/NATO.
INTELLIGENCE BY TOPICS
? Military intelligenc
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policy makers as was
high by a significant number of
intelligence.
? The need for more and better Scientific and Technical (S&T)
intelligence was expressed by those consumers concerned with these
matters.
INTELLIGENCE PUBLICATIONS
? Of all the major intelligence publications, the CIA's National
Intelligence Daily (NID), the National Intelligence Council's
products, and the State Department's Morning Summary were read most
frequently by those who received them.
? The rest of the intelligence publications address a wide variety of
subjects and audiences, and tend to remain within departmental
channels; a significant number of these publications are not read by
those to whom they are addressed.
The above conclusions suggest consideration of actions to:
? brief intelligence consumers early in their incumbency and with
specific updates at the onset of a crisis on the precise range of
support available from the Intelligence Community, and how to access
the crisis system;
? encourage the establishment of closer working relationships between
intelligence analysts, and consumers and their staffs;
a revise periodically publications distribution lists in consultation
with consumers;
? determine the feasibility of increasing the quantity of intelligence
prepared in Support of Policy Options and Predictive/Analytic
intelligence;
? reappraise the needs of the S&T consumer community.
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Discussion of the Findings and Followup Interviews
ATT. B.
Patterns of Usage
The consumers who responded to this survey regularly used intelligence in
the discharge of their responsibilities, and were likely to be influenced by
it. Slightly more than 50% of the respondents spent at least one-half hour a
day reviewing intelligence, and almost 70% claimed that intelligence
frequently influenced their policy decisions. At the same time, however,
almost half the respondents believed that they frequently would have benefited
from better intelligence in formulating policy. Core users of intelligence --
State, DoD, NSC -- used intelligence more frequently than non-core users and
demonstrated a greater likelihood of being influenced by it than non-core
users, and were more likely to believe that it provided a unique input to the
decisionmaking process.
The IC Staff assessment also provided some insight into how intelligence
reached the consumer. Over 80% of the respondents reported that their
subordinates screened at least some if not all of the intelligence; the
implications of this filtering process are discussed later. Almost all
consumers received intelligence through the standard publications. Most
claimed that oral and written presentations prepared by intelligence officers
were a common means of receiving intelligence. However, a significant number
also reported receiving intelligence in either oral or written form from
subordinates other than intelligence officers. In these instances, the
consumer might have been unaware of the role that the intelligence played and,
to some extent, this might have influenced the Survey results.
Communications Between Producer anc Consumer
The Survey measured the frequency with which consumers used the primary
mechanisms the Community has established to facilitate communications: direct
contact with Agency Directors; direct contact with National Intelligence
Officers (NI0s) or Defense National Intelligence Officers (DNI0s); direct
contact with other intelligence officers; contact through a designated liaison
officer; or contact through the consumer's staff. Approximately 70% of the
respondents sought intelligence support through an intelligence liaison
officer on at least a weekly basis; 60% did so through their staffs and 50%
through direct contact with intelligence officers. Less than 30% frequently
sought support through the NIO system, a significant statistic given that this
was one of the NIO's major responsibilities at the time of the Survey.
In a comparison of the efficacy of the various tasking mechanisms, the
data show that those mechanisms most heavily relied upon were least likely to
serve consumer needs. The most productive relationships were those
established with individual intelligence officers. In fact, the highest
correlation between a descriptive and an evaluative question in the entire
questionnaire was between the frequency of influence and the frequency of
tasking intelligence officers. The next most influential relationships were
those with agency directors and NI0s, and the least significant were through
liaison officers. There was no statistically significant increase in the
degree to which consumers were influenced by intelligence between these who
tasked their liaison officers frequently and these who tasked them infrequently.
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The statistical data is supported by the narrative comments which are
highly laudatory of those analysts in the Community who had established close
working relationships with consumers. Sixteen of 35 officials interviewed
commented on the value of direct communications between policymaker and
analyst. On whatever level it took place, most agreed with a high Defense
Department official that, "There must be personal interface." Some felt that
it was the policymaker who should take the initiative in establishing this
contact, or at the very least convey to the analyst more of what is of current
concern. That this does not always occur naturally or easily was exemplified
by one consumer who prided himself in his ability to "reach into the
intelligence organization, bypassing the bureaucracy . . . to find out what
was going on."
A comparison of the efficacy of the various production agencies suggests
that consumers who frequently consulted the intelligence arms of the military
services and DIA were more influenced by intelligence and more likely to have
received unique information from them than those who tasked other agencies
frequently. The clustering of organizations around military and all others is
revealing of what it says about military intelligence. According to the
Survey data, military intelligence in general is perceived as being of higher
quality and greater utility than other types of intelligence. It can be
inferred that those production offices that specialize in military
intelligence are most likely to satisfy consumer demands.
Although the point was not addressed directly in the questionnaire, a
major theme that ran through the narrative comments was the need early in the
administration for a detailed introduction to intelligence by each
policymaker. Many of the consumers surveyed came to office from outside
government, and were not aware of what support they could receive from the IC
nor how to access the system. Indeed, several career government officials
suffered from the same lack of knowledge. Eight of the nine policymakers who
commented on this subject in the interviews felt that too little time had been
spent on their education as intelligence consumers. One expressed the opinion
that becoming comfortable with intelligence was a long process that had a
"significant learning curve." Another felt that his later policy decisions
were far better than his earlier ones for having gained experience in the use
of foreign intelligence. All agreed that a thorough introduction to the
Community would have enhanced their ability to incorporate intelligence into
the decisionmaking process at an earlier point in office.
A policymaker's staff plays a critical role in the communications between
producer and consumer, although the statistical data suggests that this is not
necessarily an effective one. Staffs may serve as both a conduit for and a
filter of intelligence support to the consumer. The Survey data reveals that
over 80% of the respondents relied on subordinates to screen some or all of
the intelligence information they received. According to the interviews,
staffs also provide analytical support to their principals in which case they
may also be considered to be an intelligence consumer. Many consumers polled
in this Survey may not have been aware of the level of intelligence support
actually provided either because it was filtered out before reaching them, or
because it was incorporated in analyses performed by their staffs. Finally,
the staff may task the Community for intelligence support on behalf of its
principal, a mechanism that the data suggests is not particularly effective.
Several consumers who were interviewed suggested that the ideal relationship
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between producers and consumers occurred when the intelligence officers and
staffs of consumers had gained one another's confidence through personal
contact.
A number of consumers interviewed praised the efforts of liaison
officers, in spite of the generally low level of influence associated with
liaison channels in the survey data. A number of intelligence liaison
officers from DIA, for example, received high marks for their sincere attempts
to satisfy consumer needs. These efforts appeared to be a function of
individual officers as satisfaction varied depending on the officer
assigned. A second group of liaison officers that was cited by the State
Department for its utility was from CIA's DDO. When State Department officials
referred to Agency representatives, they frequently meant DDO officers. The
DDO frequently is included in weekly strategy meetings at State to discuss
operational matters, but in many instances they also provide analytic support
to the policymaking process.
Types of Intelligence
Three questions in the Survey measured consumers opinions of six basic
types of published intelligence. The types selected (open source, current
raw, basic, predictive/analytic, and policy responsive) covered all of the
published intelligence sources used by the consumer in the policymaking
process.
Consumers rated the types of intelligence they received at three general
levels of value with current and basic intelligence ranked at the high end of
the scale, open source information in the middle, and predictive/analytic and
policy responsive analysis at the low end. Predictive/analytic intelligence
and intelligence in direct support of policymakers are more easily challenged
by consumers than the more descriptive forms of intelligence. However, a
significant number of consumers felt they had received insufficient quantities
of both.
Current intelligence receives the highest marks in terms of quantity,
quality and utility of all the types of intelligence measured. Current
intelligence includes such publications as the National Intelligence Daily
(NID), the State Morning Summary, and the Defense Intelligence Summary (DIS),
which are produced on a daily basis and are intended to keep a broad range of
policymakers informed of current developments. The data suggests that they
fulfill this function in a very sattsfactory manner as measured by all three
criteria. (A more detailed discussion of qualitative difference between
specific publications can be found in a following section entitled
Intelligence Publications.) A second type of current reporting that received
favorable comments in the interviews was that produced by crisis monitoring
task forces when the major purpose of the product was to keep the consumer
informed of fast-breaking events.
Basic intelligence, the compilation of factual data, and biographic
information also received favorable ratings for their quality and utility,
although a significant number of respondents believed they could have used
more. This observation was reflected in the follow-up interviews by several
consumers who expressed a need for more factual data, particularly on Third
World countries.
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The categories of predictive/analytic intelligence and policy responsive
analysis both ranked below open source analyses in terms of quantity and
quality. Thirty-four percent of the respondents felt they received an
insufficient amount of predictive/analytic intelligence, and fully 42 percent
felt the same about policy responsive analysis in spite of the fact that, by
definition, this is precisely the type of intelligence the Community stands
ready to provide on demand. In addition, these two categories receive the
lowest ratings in terms of quality, well below the rating of open source
analysis.
The narrative comments stress the need for analysis to discern the terms
of reference in which issues of concern to consumers are being shaped. One
consumer from State preferred INR reporting because it was more pointed, and
focused on the relevant issues more than the NID while someone from Treasury
preferred in-house analyses to all others because its analysts knew more about
the issues of importance to Treasury. An earlier preliminary survey revealed
that consumers did not make this distinction when discussing general
intelligence support, although those who were interviewed were well aware of
the differences and were very precise when addressing one or the other.
Consumer perception of the value of raw intelligence tends to polarize
about the two extremes--liking and using it frequently and disliking and not
using it. SIGINT in particular generated this reaction from those
interviewed. Some consumers apprently generated their own analysis directly
from intercepts and did not use Community analysis at all.1
HUMINT reports that are immediately relevant to topics under discussion are
considered very useful, although they are not received in the same numbers as
SIGINT intercepts. PHOTINT is used least frequently of any form of raw
reporting, but when used it can be a valuable supplement to published or oral
briefings.
More consumers believed they received an excessive amount of raw
intelligence than any other type of Community product, but this was balanced
by an equal number who felt the quantity was inadequate. Several consumers
noted in their narrative comments that they had to sift through too many raw
intelligence reports in order to find the few relevant ones, an inherent
problem with raw intelligence. The quality of raw intelligence was judged to
be somewhere between current/basic and predictive/analytic. The utility of
raw intelligence received the lowest of all ratings probably reflecting the
frustration many consumers experienced in extracting useful information from
the volumes received.
Finally, those interviewed agreed that the intelligence product is sorely
lacking information from clandestine human source collection. Every consumer
who elected to comment on the need for more HUMINT also displayed a thorough
appreciation for how it would be best used and why it was lacking. The need
for more HUMINT was expressed by those involved in every topic and region.
Those interested in the USSR, for instance, were looking for revelations of
plans and intentions, but understood the difficulties involved in acquiring
such data despite the substantial investment of HUMINT resources against this
target. Some officials involved in Third World issues believed that HUMINT
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collection was the most appropriate means of acquiring information on those
areas, but also recognized the debilitating effects of past budgetary
constraints. Several consumers ascribed the perceived poor quality of some
analysis to insufficient numbers of good clandestine human sources.
Intelligence Publications
Intelligence publications represent the most visible and quantifiable
form of intelligence support to policymakers, and as such were considered to
be an important factor in the analysis of Community support to consumers. The
Survey, however, did not permit the opinions of consumers to be tied to
specific publications. The most informative characteristic that was measured
in the survey was the frequency with which consumers read the publications.
Nevertheless, the data tends to lend support to the hypothesis that those who
spend more time consuming the intelligence product are more likely to be
influenced by intelligence than those who spend less time with them. Of
perhaps greater interest are the readership patterns that emerged by
organization. Institutional loyalties between consumers and their
departmental intelligence arms are strong, and the flow of information across
organizational lines is relatively restricted.
Those who are likely to consult intelligence products regularly stand a
greater chance of being influenced by intelligence. It is difficult to
determine if there is a causal relationship between influence and frequent
readership and if so, its direction. Whether the pattern of regularity is the
result of good intelligence or vice versa is not as important as the fact that
one class of consumers (active/657i)?TTITore influenced by the intelligence
they receive. Those who read the NIC products, DoD publications, and the NID
were more likely to be influenced by intelligence than those who read any
other intelligence material.
The products that were selected for the Survey represent a combination of
periodical publications (those that are published on a scheduled basis) and
topical publications (those that address a particular topic on an exhaustive
basis). The frequency of publication affects the rate at which they are read,
and this might given an unfair advantage to the periodicals simply because
they are seen more often. Some, such as the NID, the DIS, and the Morning
Summary, are read quite frequently by those who receive them. Those products
that are published less frequently are read even less frequently by those who
claim to receive them. A significant number of these two categories of
publications are read occasionally or not at all. It was not possible to
determine from the data or the interviews why this was so. The most
conspicuous exception to this generalization about topical publications are
those produced by the NIC. The NIE's, SNIE's, and IIM's claim a large
circulation and high readership rates.
Consumers tend to read the products prepared by their dedicated
intelligence components. As a result, consumers may not benefit to the
fullest extent possible from contrasting analysis on a given issue; that
debate is confined to either the analytic level or the policy level. Only the
NSC appears to receive and read a broad range of Community products, and only
the NIC products and CIA's NID, both Community coordinated documents, receive
broad circulation across departmental lines. This pattern of readership
suggests that a significant number of policymakers did not benefit from as
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broad a range of analytical perspective as was available in the Community.
Few respondents outside the DoD, State, and the NSC claim to receive many
publications on a regular basis. Only NIC products, the IEEW, and CIA
memoranda and assessments received a high level of recognition by these
consumers. Only the IEEW was read by those outside State/NSC/Defense with any
regularity, perhaps reflecting the high percentage of consumers of economic
intelligence found in this group of respondents.
Regional and Topical Assessments
The Survey attempted to measured directly the level of consumer
satisfaction with the substantive support provided by the Community by region
and by topic. Very few of those consumers who rated specific geotopic areas
to be very important to their work believed they had received an excessive
amount of intelligence support. Intelligence on Latin America was considered
most deficient by a wide margin. This came as no surprise to those
interviewed. Time and again they attributed the dearth of intelligence on
Latin America in large measure to lack of clandestine HUMINT sources. This
same problem was cited again in discussions on the quality of intelligence on
Latin America. Intelligence on Sub-Sahara Africa was not rated equally
deficient perhaps because this part of the world in fact was considered of
lesser priority by the previous administration. Only a small number surveyed
considered it to be very important, and their memory of the issues addressed
may not have been as vivid at the time of the Survey.
The data on the quantity of reporting by topic suggests that a major
disconnect between producer and consumer exists in some categories. A
significant core of consumers of scientific and technical intelligence claimed
not to have received a sufficient quantity of intelligence support. This may
be as much a matter of distribution as production, however. According to the
data, DIA S&T reports were received by 44% of State respondents and read
frequently by none of them, received by 68% of NSC respondents and read
frequently by 38% of them, received by 70% of DoD consumers and read
frequently by 19% of them, and received by 35% of all others and read by 21%
of them. Economic/energy reporting is something of an anomaly and was
considered insufficient by a significant number of respondents, although the
IEEW was frequently read by half of those who received it.
An analysis of the data on the quality of intelligence support by region
and topic yielded few surprises, although it appeared to contain a number of
contradictions. The rankings by geographic area conform to popular
perceptions. Intelligence on the Third World countries ranked at the low end,
and USSR/EE and Western Europe/NATO at the high end. Similarly, the
statistical data and the narrative comments both indicate that the Community
provides excellent coverage of military subjects. Because this is the primary
component of Soviet/East European intelligence, it stands to reason that the
quality of intelligence on the USSR/EE is rated highly. The higher quality
ratings of Western Europe/NATO is somewhat difficult to explain given its high
content of political and economic reporting, both of which are rated
significantly lower in quality than military intelligence. However, a good
deal of current reporting is devoted to WE/NATO and, given the high ratings
accorded current reporting, may account for the high marks coverage of this
area received from consumers.
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Consumer assessment of the utility of intelligence support by region and
topic provides some additional insights which, together with the narratives,
help to explain what consumers are saying. It should be noted from the outset
that the utility of intelligence in general was judged to be relatively high,
and that any further analysis must be based on the differences between those
who considered it to be "fairly" useful and those who judged it "very
useful." The utility of intelligence on Sub-Sahara Africa is rated the
lowest, perhaps reflecting the priority attached to the region. Intelligence
on WE/NATO is rated only slightly more useful, perhaps reflecting the wealth
of open source information available on the region and reduced consumer
dependence on the Community. Open sources of information on Latin America,
ME/NA, and Asia may be considered by consumers to be of questionable
reliability, resulting in consumer dependence on intelligence. Intelligence
on the USSR rated high in utility, probably reflecting the large content of
military reporting, the dearth of open source information, and the priority
that the Intelligence Community attaches to it.
The analysis of utility by topic also relies on the difference between
responses of "fairly" and "very" useful. A higher percentage of consumers of
military and biographic reporting found intelligence on their topics to be
very useful than consumers of political and economic reporting found theirs to
be. S&T consumers rated this intelligence support somewhere between the other
two. Military reporting consistently received higher marks than all other
topical areas in the statistical and narrative portions of this Survey. One
possible explanation lies in the fact that military reporting emphasizes
descriptive over analytical content and technical over human sources to
generate a product that is more definitive than reporting on other subject
areas. Not enough is known about the consumers of S&T reporting to posit any
reasons for the results on quantity, quality, or utility.
The narrative comments give some clue to why political and economic
reporting fall where they do in the various assessment categories, and why
they have a smaller percentage of consumers who regard them as being very
useful. Statistics and descriptive reporting aside, political and economic
reporting require the Community to deal with subjects containing a higher
level of ambiguity than any other topical category, and consumers are more
willing to challenge any but their own analyses. In addition to calling for
greater sensitivity to the current relevancy of intelligence production, those
consumers surveyed are asking analysts to be more adventuresome in their
analysis. Consumers appear to be asking the Community to go beyond a
recitation of the data, and permit uncertainties, disagreements and
speculation to be reflected in the intelligence product.
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STATISTICAL ANNEX
ATT. D.
The statistical annex provides an audit trail for the Intelligence
Community Staff's assessment of the Consumer Survey. It records the
statistical techniques and tests that were tried and the data tables from
which the salient conclusions were drawn.
By the time the IC Staff received the raw data, the completed
questionnaires were in, and the data had been coded, entered into a computer
data base and checked for errors. Data summaries were generated by several
computerized statistical packages, primarily Statistical Packages for the
Social Sciences (SPSS) and Statistical Analysis System (SAS), and by several
inhouse analytical tools as well.
Since the survey contained multiple-choice questions, the most useful
data summaries, especially in the preliminary assessment, were simple
tabulations of the proportions of consumers responding to each choice. The
estimation of the precision of these proportions is straightforward. Multiple
choice categories form a well-defined statistical population known as the
multinominal population. The precision of the proportion of consumers falling
into any category depends upon both the sample size and the value of the
proportion itself. Figure 1 plots the 95% confidence interval for five
different sample sizes. For the most part, question-by-question summary
proportions are precise to better than + 10%.
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