ASSESSMENT OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND DEVELOPMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00171R000200220010-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 44
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 6, 2005
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: July 26, 1978
• Content Type: MF

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DD/SUT-3457-78
2 6 JUL 1978
MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Performance Evaluation
and Improvement
FROM: Deputy Director for Science and Technology
REFERENCE:
Assessment of Nuclear Proliferation Intelligeacc
Activities and Developments F I
Your memo dated 12 July 1978, same subject
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1. The following material responds to your
requests for data made in the reference. The reference requests
a three part response which corresponds to the three attachments
to the memo. That is, Attachment 1 addresses the series of
questions, Attachment 2 summarizes our resource allocations for
FY's 77, 78 and 79 and Attachment 3 lists external contracts
showing funding and contractors. Please note that the dollar
figures provided in Attachment 3 are RDFE and Processing contract
dollars only and include no.management support or Collection costs.
. 2. 1 We feel it is extremely important to point out
that the projects discussed in the Attachments contain collection
technology which is demonstrably applicable not only to nuclear
proliferation but also other nuclear issues such as nuclear weapons
movement and logistics. We perceive a disturbing tendency to try
to compartmentize our nuclear collection program activities into
one or the other category as a principal way in which to measure
their responsiveness to intelligence objectives. This is a mis-
leading practice for reasons expanded upon in Attachment I
Question #2. In order to deal with this issue, we have taken the
following approach: for those projects which result in hardware
or technology applicable to. both proliferation and other nuclear
issues, we reflect,fifty percent of the project cost in the
chart. For those cases where a system or technology was developed
or is planned for application exclusively to proliferation - type
targets, all costs associated with the project are shown.
3. If we can be of any further assistance in
this matter please contact us.
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QUESTION #1
Including what is achieved in the Interagency Intelligence
Working Group/Nuclear Proliferation (IIWWG/NP), is there more
effective coordination of the various collection and production)
components of the Intelligence Community (at least to the extelt
that various components know what the others are doing)? Suggest
changes that may be needed to improve coordination within the
Community.
ANSWER/COMMENT
A. We have not been directly involved in the IIWG/NP, so
we cannot comment on any contribution it may have made to improve-
ments in Community coordination on collection or production.
B. From our perspective, "coordination" between Community
members may have improved over the last few years--insofar as
this means we know more about each other's activities. If, however,
the goal of Community coordination is a well-focused nuclear
proliferation collection program with clearly defined roles for
each Agency and effective evaluation cf performance in response .o
those roles, the Community has a long way to go.
QUESTION #2
Are the analytical, collection, and other resources of tfe
Community now being effectively utilized and applied? Identify
possible misal,locations and provide suggestions for greater elf?.ciency.
ANSWER/COMMENT
A. General Comments
It is our perception that Community resources are not yet
being applied effectively to nuclear proliferation collection.
The causes for this shortfall may not lie in the proliferation
issue itself so much as in the overall inertia of Community
mechanisms by which resources are tied to intelligence issues
Whatever the intelligence topic, the Community in general and is
members in particular are usually slow to:
(1) Recognize long-range information needs and to
make specific arrangements to cover them effectively-;
(2) Agree upon and highlig'it those issues which de.seve
priority attention;
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QUESTION #2 ANSWER/COMMENT (Cont'd)
(3) Decide, among competing information needs,
how, where, and in what proportion, resources should be
allocated or redistributed to address these needs;
(4) Communicate effective guidance to multi-issue
resources managers in a way that will help them do
better at allocating resources among organizational
elements competing for them;
(5) Independently monitor resource allocation and
progress for important issues on a continuing basis,
implementing mechanisms for informed, constructive
review.
One of the fundamental problems which seems to underlie all
of the above areas is the basic difficulty in connecting
intelligence issues with the practical business of applying
resources to them. Resources, and the line managers who
apply them, are not "subject-specific"; that is, generally
speaking, funds and people can be applied to a wide range of
important problems. The mix is more or less at the discretion:.
of.the.line manager where it should undoubtedly remain.
Community panels, committees, and councils convened on a
particular collection issue, such as proliferation, may
suggest initiatives, plan strategies, and exhort managers on
the importance of the subject. This guidance, however, has
little credibility unless it can either provide the line
manager with funds and people or can he linked in some
practical way with the other issues among which he must re-
apportion his resources. Of course, these other issues have
their own advocates within and without the line manager's
organization. While line managers are beginning to hear "the
.word" on proliferation, they are still in the process of
juggling their personnel and budgets to effectively accommodate
the subject, and it is not likely to be before 1980 that the
inertia in the system will have been overcome.
B. Connecting Resources with Intelligence Issues
In numerous requests for information about our nuclear
development program we perceive a disturbing tendency to ask
line-item by line-item whether a particular technique or
system under development supports proliferation collection
or some other form of nuc-lear collection, such as weapons
movement. While we appreciate the need for linkage between
intelligence issues and the resource expenditures, we think
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that this particular approach could be very misleading. [Example
#1 - Each of the projects in the charts accompanying these
comments contains technology which could be applied either
to proliferation or weapons movement targets.
In reviewing the current (77/78) programs and their
responsiveness to proliferation issues, it should be remembered
that some of our current systems have first been deployed
against weapons movement targets only because these targets
already exist and, in most cases, proliferation targets for
these approaches do not. A better way to look at the technolcg;
would be to determine what specific questions a system can
answer about a particular aspect of the proliferation issue
(along'with the other issues it may also address), how
widely is it likely to be used, and what is the likely value
to the Community of the resulting information in comparison
with the system cost.
QUESTION #3
Is the collection, research, and production program of
the Community commensurate with the priorities for nuclear
proliferation intelligence, and is it responsive to the
needs of key policymakers? Describe tiny shortcomings and
propose appropriate means of improvement.
ANSWER/COMMENT
See Question #2, Answer/Comment
QUESTION #4
What progress has been made toward design and implementa-_i,,n
of common nuclear proliferation data bases? What problems
have been encountered? What are the milestones for the next
year?
ANSWER/COMMENT
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QUESTION #5
Based on the past year's experience, what, if any,
administrative actions or structural changes would be recommenced
to speed progress and improve the prospects of the nuclear
proliferation intelligence program?
ANSWER/COH\IENT
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a'5 JUl
MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Performance Evaluation
and Improvement, IC Staff
ATTENTION:
SUBJECT:
REFERENCE:
Eloise R. Page
Acting Associate Deputy Director for
Operations
Assessment of Nuclear Proliferation
Intelligence Activities and Developments
Your memorandum (IC 2361-78) dated
1 June 1978, same subject
1. As a result of the initiatives of the Interagency
Intelligence Working Group/Nuclear Proliferation (IIWG/NP),
the CIA/Directorate of Operations has received guidance on
the priorities for collection against specific nuclear
pro1.iferating countries.. This guidance has assisted us in
the allocation of resources and in directing collection
resources in target countries toward those areas that appear
to have the greatest intelligence potential. For example,
the greater emphasis by the IIWG/NP on non-technical collec-
tion in target countries is now reflected in specific
guidance to field stations.
2. We see some possibility for improvement in the
development of Collection Strategies. We have already
observed one instance where a Collection Strategy was con-
strued as a tasking document. This led to initiatives being
taken by individual components that could have jeopardized
ongoing collection operations, or confused planning efforts.
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Furthermore, it recommended a itiona
co ec ion tasks w lc , if these had been carried out, could
have conflicted with the DIA effort. While sensitive opera-
tions must be protected, particularly against wide Community
dissemination of specific operational tasks, we recommend
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that some steps be undertaken to avoid Collection Strategies
from being used as a basis for new ititiatives that might
affect ongoing or planned operations.
3. In this context, we should also like to suggest
that the possibility be explored of evaluating various
collection means that could be employed against a given
target. Since the employment of clandestine resources is
expensive in terms of risks, they should obviously be used
only when other resources are unable to collect the required
information. Therefore, we should appreciate some evaluation
of the potential of other collection means (COMINT, Foreign
Service, attaches, etc.) to gain the intelligence objectives
for each target country. Such an assessment might identify
more clearly those areas that require a clandestine' human
collection effort for lack of reasonable alternatives.
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Eloise age
1 Attachment
FY 77/78/79
Estimate
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
Notional Intelligence Officers
NFAC-2748-78
3 July 1978
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Resource Management
FROM : National Intelligence Officer for Nuclear Proliferation
SUBJECT : Assessment of Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence
Activities and Developments
REFERENCE : IC-2361-78, 1 June 78, Subject (same as above), Secret
1. The following paragraphs provide preliminary answers to the
questions you posed on the management of nuclear proliferation intelli-
gence activities. While it mainly represents my office's views, it
partly also reflects views solicited from the Nuclear Energy Division
of the Office of Scientific Intelligence. In the next few weeks, I will
be soliciting additional views from other offices in the National Foreign
Assessment Center and will be considering the answers to your questions
provided by other components of the community. So, I would like to
reserve further comments and suggestions for an early review of your
draft report.
2. The coordination of nuclear proliferation intelligence activities
has already improved substantially. Still, I am considering additional
changes in the division of labor, assignment of responsibility, and in the
conduct of studies by various agencies to optimize the quality, coverage,
and efficiency of intelligence analysis. U on discovering a suspect
.military test facility in the I established an inter-
age ncy watch team to insure adequately competitive analyses of information
on intentions and capabilities to conduct a nuclear
explosion. the same time, some mutually duplicative efforts were
undertaken on the initiative of individual agencies without informing my
office. Subsequent to these highly urgent but somewhat redundant efforts,
the Interagency Intelligence Working Group on Nuclear Proliferation
(IIWG/NP), which I chair, began to develop a comprehensive community
production program. I initiated, in addition, an interagency study of
I nuclear program and policies in cooperation with the
National Intelligence Officerl In response to a special
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request of the DCI from the Interagency Committee on Internal Security,
I also had the IIWG/NP undertake a community study of prospects for foreign.
threats of nuclear terrorism. The IIWG/NP has further served as a. forum:
for guiding the development of a community data base on nuclear proliferation;
reviewing the production plans, roles, and missions of various intelligfnc-
components; insuring community participation in the drafting of country-
specific collection strategies; and conveying new intelligence needs anc.
priorities that derive from the NSC Ad Hoc Group on Non-Proliferation as
well as other policy-making bodies. Most of these efforts are continuirg,
and they will lead to the issuance of successive interagency studies, tt-e
complete coordination of a community production program, and the drafting
of additional collection strategies by the end of Fiscal Year 1.978.
3. The increasingly effective coordination of the community
production and collection efforts on nuclear proliferation intelligence
has entailed more efficient as well as more abundant utilization of
resources. Not only has there been a disproportionate increase in the
quantity of intelligence produced by a limited number of analysts, but the
quality of their finished contributions to the policy-making process ha!.
improved even more markedly. However, strategic, political, and economic
analysis of nuclear proliferation has only begun to match the quality and
quantity of scientific-technical intelligence. New provisions have been
made for political and economic analysts dedicated to nuclear prolifera,icrr
intelligence, and regionally or functionally specialized analysts have
begun to acquire new skills in elucidating nuclear issues. For instance,
country-specialized economic analysts have completed a comparative
appraisal of developing countries' nuclear energy programs; country-
specialized political analysts have undertaken more comprehensive
assessments of the nuclear energy, technology, and weapons-related pro grarfs
such key countries as 25X1
I I and strategic analysts have participated in sc;m? of
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under DCID 1/2. Ho.wrever, the total size and immediate productivity o
these efforts have been deliberately limited by the long-term need to
improve both the quality of analysis and the efficiency of resource
utilization at the same time. So, initial efforts were intended to
produce finished studies on the most policy-urgent countries
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countries, and to prepare specialized studies, data-bases, and collection
strategies for all countries of concern. In addition, the community nas
responded to a wide variety of ad hoc requests from policy-makers for
timely assessments of foreign nuclear policy developments, e_g.
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5. Substantial progress has been made in the development of a
comprehensive, community data base on special nuclear materials. (An
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should summarize the results of a works op I conducted there under the
auspices of the IIWG/NP, June 27-28. The 0 project Teader promised
to send me a report on this workshop by mid-July.) Elements of a
comprehensive, community data base on nuclear scientists and technicians.
sensitive fuel-cycle facilities,. weapons research and development
activities, strategic doctrines, and other items critical to nuclear
proliferation-intelligence have also been identified. However, there
are no current plans to institutionalize a mechanism for integrating these
elements into a formally established data base on nuclear proliferation
intelligence. Instead, under the auspices of the IIWG/NP, I plan to
review periodically the progress made in improving the scope, content,
and accessibility of specialized data bases. As deficiencies are.
identified, new needs emerge, and priorities change, I will propose
appropriate measures to responsible offices and agencies.
6. 1 can not now identify specific administrative actions or
structural changes needed to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of
nuclear proliferation intelligence activities. In'due course, I intend
to make some specific recommendations on the basis of future proposals. by
individual components of the intelligence community. In general, though,
the structural changes that were instituted last year have been working,
producing results, and promising further progress. Given the established
priorities for nuclear proliferation intelligence, my office is still
needed to lead national production of nuclear proliferation intelligence.
7. New and Unfinished Business. Unless the diplomacy of nuclear ron-
.proliferation and international conflict resolution actually halt the
spread of nuclear explosive materials and new national interests in
nuclear arms, policy needs for nuclear proliferation intelligence will
continue to grow. They are likely to expand in several ways -- in the
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number of countries concerned, in the complexity and detail of issues
raised, and in the strategic importance of answers provided. Nuclear
proliferation intelligence already needs not only to support diplomatic
efforts aimed at stemming proliferation and limiting conflict, but it
must also anticipate the possible failure of diplomacy and the exigencies
of'future crisis management. Consequently, nuclear proliferation intelli-
gence is likely to merge, country by country. with strategic intelligence
on medium and lesser powers such as
Moreover, the most serious shortcomings of nuclear proliferation in elligerce
to date are attirbutable to inadequate assessments of proliferating
countries' political-military interests in and approaches toward.the
development of nuclear explosives. These deficiencies could eventually
result in the unexpected deployment (and unforeseen plans for employment)
of nuclear weapons unless the long-term strategies of medium and lesser
powers are more thoroughly researched, carefully analyzed, and correctly
understood. Insofar as nuclear proliferation intelligence may elucidate
those countries' nuclear strategies, plans, and intentions, it should also
contribute to better intelligence on their associated conventional research
and development strategies, arms production and deployment plans, and
political-military intentions. So, among the more important items of new
and unfinished business for nuclear proliferation intelligence are the
long-term threat perceptions, force development programs, contingency plans.
and political security needs of incipient nuclear powers.
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NFAC-2748-78
SUBJECT: Assessment of Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence Activities
and Developments
Distribution:
1 - DD/RM
1 - DD/NFAC
1 - D/ORPA
1 - D/OSI
1 - D/OER
1 - D./OSR
1 - NFAC Reg
2 - NIO/NP
7" "T
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1The IIWG/NP has provided a mechanis.m for listing produc tD on
of nuclear proliferation projects by several of the int.elli g(rce
agencies. To date, however, no attempt has been made to
coordinate these production programs. This will probably to
a difficult exercise as some agencies will want to produce pects of when OER may ma tie
a contribution.
2. Not applicable.
3. Not applicable.
4, We have recently completed a detailed 1)o