THE YEMENS: THREATENING DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000300170026-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 29, 2007
• Sequence Number: 26
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2007/05/29: CIA 00300170026-2 25X1
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THE YEMENS: THREATENING DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ARABIAN
PENINSULA
SUMMARY
The movement toward unity between North and South
Yemen is continuing. North Yemen President Salih
reportedly is on the verge of agreeing to include
representatives of the insurcnt South Yemen-backed
National Democratic Front (Nt,,') in the government of
the North. Soviet military aid and influence in the
North continues to grow. Salih seems to be moving
toward a clear break with Saudi Arabia and the U.S.,
and there appears little prospect that he will reverse
the course that seems headed toward bringing North Yemen
under control of the Soviet-backed Marxist regime in Aden.
Indeed, SaZih may no longer hove the power to halt the
slide even if he were to become no inclined. Moreover,
there have been numerous reports of increased shipments
of Soviet military aid to South Yemen and -he presence
of Cuban combat troops there. Those repo rt.i have not as
yet been confirmed, but if they are true 4-hey suggest
youth Yemen may be preparing to attempt t. influence
North Yemeni political direction either through inti-
midation or small-scale military incursion along
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common border. F_ I
Salih's Slide Toward Moscow
Recent reports of impending governmental changes in
Sana indicate a further purge of pro-Saudi elements.
;alih apparently plans to reiy,ttO Prime Minister Abd Al
Chani, a relative moderate, to ti powerless vice presi-
cency. Last month Interior ?fiir: er, Khamis, another
moderate, was demoted, while z influence of Foreign
sinister Makki--a pro-Soviet--- -::iarently has increased
c late. The removal and of moderates has made
Ealih more responsive to the 3c ,ures from the left and
the USSR. Reportedly Salih !en seeing the Soviet
ambassador as often as twice w-_--k. If access implies
influence, Soviet influence i -i Sa;-ra is becoming considerable.
Moscow has encouraged Salih to include NDF officials in
his government and is reportedl y pleased with which has been made thus far. 25 1
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The growth of Soviet influence is further indicated
by Sana's failure to support the U.N. General Assembly
resolution condemning Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.
This is particularly significant because of North Yemen's
traditional tendency to go along with the mainstream of
Arab opinion. We do not know the position taken by 25X1
North Yemen at the Islamabad conference in late January.
The fact that a relatively low-level delegation was sent,
however, suggests an effort to avoid identification with
the anticipated resolution condemning the Soviets. Salih's
:silence on Afghanistan can only add to the deterioration
of relations with the Saudis.r~7_ 25X1
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scheduled rotation back to Co'~a, could wodl be connected
attributed to requirements of 'hp Ogaden situation and
Recent Cuban troop movemerts `:within Ethiopia, w e
incursion into North Yemen. In each casEjtae Cuba
mission was to bolster security in the Aden area.
0
If these reports about the flight activity 25X1
are true, the flights probably ,1ld not originate in the
Soviet Union. The distance involved, the necessity to
utilize overflight rights anc co:aily with international
flight rules would have resulted in detection by US
intelligence assets. The mon t r.,.'-obable point of origin
or this ivi.ty is :Fthir:ois. In the past, Cuban
forces have been airlifted fron+ there to South Yemen,
first in 1978 at the time of Iezru i1's take(?-er and sub-
sequently during the February/March 1979 S&''ath Yemen
with the numerous clandestine ar.+. press reports of in-
creased Cuban presence in So'-. th ",-men-
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Despite Salih's apparent willingness to
ive NDFr
g
a role in the Sana government- , '.' F is taking separate
measures to improve its position in the North including;
1) increasing its arms stockpiles, 2) upgrading its
capability for potential military operations, and 3) con-
solidating and expanding its political network in areas
previously distant to NDF influence but where currently
there is dissaffection with Salih's rorimn 2X1
Moscow's View
In the environment created by the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan, with its increaved potential for US-
Soviet military confrontation in the Persian Gulf area
the Soviets probably attach increased importance to
their enterprise in the Yecncr-s. They would be expected
to exploit Sana's leftward sift and in the process to
counter Us basing initiatives in the region by increasing
Soviet presence. Moscow's a_cision to step-up its acti-
vities is aimed at promoting t-.:? erosion of Western
influence on the Arabian Peninsul;i. The e odence--albeit
tenuous--of a covert step-up of rr litary a.ts_ivity at the
iden airfield, together with tY-? ndicat_*~5 n3 that the
:'outh Yemeni-backed National cratic P'. c>lt continues
r.i_litary preparations even they ma.;i gxai.n positions
in the North Yemen governmer-, :ggest that if the present
reunification negotiations f 1.. i_o achieve the results
fought by Aden and Moscow, (c.- L not move fast enough)
the latter would be prepared --o ...sort to a combination
of subversion and military F77 I 25X1
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