SOVIET ACTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000300170019-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 29, 2007
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: December 13, 1979
• Content Type: MEMO

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? _ . . ._ -?
Strategic Warning muff
"hiniba, D.C. 15-38
S-0C86/StIS 13 December 1979
MEMO ANDUM FOR: NIO/W
FROM ~irectur, SWS
SUBJECT : Sc?iet Actions in Afghanistan
1. I left the meeting on Afghanistan yesterday with the feeling that we
had not accomplished much in the way of sharpening the Communip.i perception
of what the Soviets may be about in Afghanistan. Other than myself, most;
of these present seemed to continue to hold th?_= view that the Soviets are
mc.;-ing tentatively with reg=.-d to their options in Afghanistan. E.g.,
-- They are setting up an enclave at Bagram to ensure that they have
a base through which to either evacuate their advisors or insert more
troops and material, whichever move.. is dictated by the evolution of a
situation which is now uncertain.
-- They have decided to bolst:-r the defens~?s of Bagram in response to
increased insurgent probes.
-- They need =;e troops to protect their people again:' a massacre if
the situation suddenly deterorltes.
2. None of these actions, however, is likely to change the course of events
in Afghanistan that is causing the Soviets grief.. Yet there seemed to :'e a
glimmer of -::.oncensus among those at the meeting that the act of siding
their own combat units =-to another country in the midst of an insurgency
reflects a significant political decision on the part of the Soviets. Why
then should we shrink from believing that the Soviets -- having crossed this
threshold -- will employ these troops in some way to tangibly impact on the
situation that caused the threshold to be crossed.
3. The decision in this case was made with the benefit of a thorough (60
plus days) on-the-scene study of all aspects of the situation .sy a mission
of high level authorities. (The Pavlovskiy mission.) We know from, the
compos-.-ion of the study group and the activities in which they were engaged
while in Afghanistan that their review went into the logistics of the
situation, the effectiveness of such orgc:-ss as t:he police, intelligence,
the ministerial level offices, a .-d communica-tiores security. A main feature
of this study certainly must have been an assessment of t?h;-, course of the
insurgency and the ability of the DRA forces -- military and political --
to deal with it.
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4. Our own assessment shows an Afghan army which is having great difficulty
in maintaining its manpower strength, experiencing erosian :,f morale ead:-g
to desertions, mutinies, and outright defections. The wRA forces hair.
produced no lasting gains against the insurgents. 4'=iey have been able to
win most pitched ba tt.l es -- when the insurgents permit a pitched ba.ztl a to
occur-- bu` annat consolidate gains. Among the reasons for this inability
are (a) the shrinking strength of the armed forces, which forces them to
be constantly shifty forces to meet the various outbreaks and thus allow'ng
rebel forces to seep back into areas from which they had bee'l driven, and
(b) the deterioration of morale in DRA forces left too hold' the positions
gained by military action. At the heart of the problem is a regime rent
by factionalism, for which mutiny is a constant problem, and which is
demonstrably unable to promote the kind of cohesior. and. efficiency in its
own military and political machinery that }-ould be needed to deal effectively
with the insurgency. What all this adds up to is a situation that could fly
apart at any time, with a revolt of the armed forces being the most serious
potential problem.
5. Mora-.over, `he pr:',.gnosis is that things will con;inue to go downhill.
During last winter,.a mild one, the insurgency gained strength. This.
summer, ar:_lysts both in Embassy Kabul and here in Wasi 'ngton foreec;rrt
that if the regime cool-= survive until winter the insur-oents would have
to pull back and the DR.A forces could pull themselves together. he reverse
appears to be happening. It is the DRA forces that sr to be pulling
and the insurgents who are gainira. T:- ?roec =1 rfft _1vC' of t
a ci d t=:. rebels seG ... _ s y _
b ti. ay - _s nom w ch they h
dr iv;.o by the offensive. The action Rst clearly be seen as prc
advisors and technicians, logi,tidal s, :port, and twcticai guidar, a is
not going to turn the situation around.
6. The Pavlovskiy mis:.ion had ample opportunity to stud, the situation
first hand, and in all likelihood came to the same conclusion. The
decision which led to the actions we are beginning to see would have
been made on the basis of a dismal assessmc}it of the present situation and
of its likely course ifi something were not done about it, together with
an evaluation i.y a teary of high level authorities as to what would have
to be done if the USSR 4antt:l to solidify i politico-strategic
objectives in Afghanistan.
7. We believe that the Soviet actions since Pavlovskiy's de-?-?rture indicate
that Moscow decided to .cct U, save its position. Steps such as securing
an enclave against future contingencies for evacuation :v._:sd providing pro-
tection to Soviet citize..s could not be perceived by the Soviets as "doing"
anything at~c:.t the situation. Indeed, such actions are more consistent
with a lack decision. In view of the prognosis. they amount to con-
ceding to the probability of losing out and merely covering the exit.
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Evan if the enclav. were for the purpose of ensuring an entrance point fe r
troop,:, merely holding an enclave would not change the deteriorating situation
which created the potential need for troops. In effect, doing nothing more
than holding an enclave against the potential need to land troops would make
it likely that sooner or later the enclave w.dhave to be used for just that
purpose. "W'_:=it and see" does not appear to be the objective :ff the course
indicated by the recent: Soviet actions.
8. "Doing something" about the situation means, in effect, ensuring that the
next time the DRA forces,with Soviet help,undertake a large offensive against
the insuic..nts they will not be forced to give back their winnings. f?is
requires more military forces than the DRS'- can muster at present. Someone
must hold the cities, main centers, air-fields, and keep the roads open.
Military forces are required to ensure the security of Kabul, both from
revolts from within and from attacks by the insurgents. One of the reasons
for the military failure and eroding morale of the Afghan arme forces to
date is that they canr-)t accomplish all these things and to the Afghan troops
there must appear little prospect that they ever will.
9. Another step toward rectifying th; situation would be to proA-..ce a
more effective, cohe=sive regime in Kabul. If nothing else, the would
alleviate sorr:.,what the drain on Af han military strength in t' countryside
caused by the need to keep a large "Praetorean Guard" in Kabi- . lhi : sr.,gcests
that ultimately Amin will have to go. His replacement, however, is urcli'4t;y
to be chosen on the basis of hip accept ?hiflt tc: the ir. r_;Art: .
stE.x b^ :,.~s7 ~lie:?. ;t ,. 'e ikE
K is *%r Pone
who can pull together the Marxist factions L various groups g=ong t
political and military leaders zip. This w e d enable the Afghan Marx.asts
and their Soviet allies to concentrate on ?.A it=.r en;.}?.
10. For undertakrr:g these objec=ives, the irrmediate need is efficient
military forces. By their actions, the Soviets have indicated they are
willing to take the large political step of putting heir own combat units
into a foreign country. Why should we shrink from esti sting the:-,-t they
would be willing, once having taken this step, to use their troops in a
way and in an amount that co-,Ad benefit their long rant Dosition?
DOUGLAS J. acEACHIK
3
~,.3 -_ANM
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