A SCENARIO FOR POSSIBLE SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTION IN ISRAELI/SYRIAN CONFLICT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000300150007-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 6, 2007
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: June 29, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

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RESEARCH REPORT
A Scenario For Possible Soviet Military
Intervention In Israeli/Syrian Conflict
29 JUNE 1981
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FORWARD
It is the function of the Strategic Warning Staff to provide
a thorough airing of serious alternative explanations to key
intelligence issues with strategic warning implications. Most
assessments of Soviet capabilities and intentions in the event of
another major conflict between Syria and Israel seem to focus on
a situation in which the Soviets would not be granted overflight
rights different from those which they have been granted in the
past. This Research Report examines an alternative hypothesis
which holds that potentially the Soviets might be able to win
unprecedented overflight rights in a new crisis because of
changed political circumstances in the region, especially because
of the assumption of power in Iran by a radical anti-Israel
regime.
This research report is the product of the Strategic Warning Staff and
has not been coordinated with the rest of the intelligence community.
Comments were solicited and incorporated at the discretion of the
Strategic Warning Staff. Questions or comments on this report should
be addressed to the Director, Strategic Warning Staff, Ext. 695-0031,
Pentagon.
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CONCLUSIONS
The Soviet response to an Israeli-Syrian conflict may no
longer be constrained by refusal of neighboring states to grant
needed overflight authorization. There is as yet no evidence
that the Soviets plan to do so, but the USSR could quickly deploy
a division of advanced fighter aircraft to Syria via Iran and
Iraq to support President Asad once overflight permission were
obtained. In this way, the Soviet Union would demonstrate its
willingness to stand by an embattled ally while bolstering its
claim to be an involved party in the Mideast conflict, whose
interests must be taken into account. Past presumptions of
Turkish and Iranian denial of the overflight permission necessary
to rapidly deploy a combat force to the Middle East may no longer
apply. Though Turkey remains unlikely to grant more than limited
overflight authorization, the Khomeini regime in Iran might now
be willing to support Syria in this regard. Iran and Iraq, along
with Saudi Arabia, would have serious misgivings about a Soviet
combat presence in Syria, but they would be reluctant to face
accusations of cowardice and betrayal in what could be called an
hour of supreme need in the struggle against Israel.
1. A new major conflict between Israel and Syria would put
the Soviets to a crucial test. While the USSR still appears
reluctant to become directly involved in a new round of fighting,
failure to aid the Syrians substantially--especially in the face
of dramatic Israeli success on the battlefield--would jeopardize
Soviet d lloomatic and strategic interests throughout the Middle
2. In past instances, the brevity and one-sidedness of
Arab-Israeli military engagements virtually rendered moot the
question of a Soviet decision to bring its own power to bear on
the conflict. In any case, neither Turkey nor Iran under the
Shah appeared likely to grant expanded overflight rights that
would enable the Soviets to insert their forces in a timely way.
Movement by sea, including loading and unloading times, would
have taken far too long to affect the conflict.
3. If a new round of fighting with Israel were to impel
Syrian President Asad to request direct Soviet military
assistance under the friendship treaty concluded late last year,
Moscow would face a hard choice. If the USSR failed to support
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Syria's needs adequately, Damascus and its supporters might begin
to view the Soviets as unreliable and might even conclude that
the time had come to join the US-backed negotiating process with
Israel. The Soviets would be aware that direct intervention, on
the other hand, would carry signi risks of a wider war and
greatly expanded US involvement.
4. Especially if the next Syrian military engagement
against Israel turned out disastrously, the Soviets might
contemplate the option of an actual projection of their own
military forces, with the aim of deterring further Israeli
actions and halting the conflict on terms less damaging to
Damascus. In reaching such a decision, Moscow might reckon that
Israel would be pursuing only limited goals in combat with Syria,
and might additionally expect the US to put strong unilateral
pressure on Tel Aviv to cease offensive operations at the
earliest possible time. A lull following a major Israeli
military move, accompanied by an intense round of diplomatic
activity, miiht well facilitate deployment of Soviet military
5. In specific terms, the USSR might consider the
deployment to Syria of a major tactical air combat presence, with
accompanying air defense, logistical, and security components.
At this point in a reignited Mideast conflict, the Soviets might
also conclude that a new approach to the Khomeini regime in Iran,
as well as to Iraq, might bring about the granting of the
expanded overflight rights vital to such an undertaking. Both
governments are on record as ready to join Syria in opposing any
new "US-Zionist" aggression. Moreover, Iranian-Syrian relations
have been exceptionally close since the start of the Iran-Iraq
war. With an actual Syrian invitation for such a move in hand,
Soviet diplomats could seek the cooperation of both Iran and Iraq
in granting liberal overflight rights, citing the emergency at
the front as a reason for unusual speed of decision.
6. This is not to suggest that major obstacles to such a
Soviet move would vanish once the fighting between Israel and
Syria escalated. Already at war, both Iran and Iraq would greet
such a Soviet initiative with deep misgivings. Saudi Arabia as
well could use its claim to be Syria's main source of outside
financial support to weigh in against a summoning of Soviet
combat forces into the region. If the new round of fighting were
to show any substantial sign of subsiding with Syria doing no
worse than a stalemate, the Saudis might prevail on Damascus to
restrict the Soviet military role to resupply. The Syrians
themselves would be extremely reluctant to sacrifice their
independence to an outside military presence, and no party to the
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conflict--including the Soviets--would be able to overlook the
possibility of further miscalculation leading to a superpower
confrontation or general war following the arrival of Soviet
forces. Yet the Arab-Israeli conflict continues to exert a
seemingly unique mobilizing power throughout the Middle East, and
no leader in the area now wants to join Egypt in facing bitter
accusations of cowardice and betrayal at an hour of supreme
need. If Syria and her neighbors conclude that only an
unprecedented resort to the "Soviet card" would deter further
Israeli adventures and lead to US pressure to curb Tel Aviv's
actions, they might decide not to block the passage of a "limited
contingent" of Soviet combat aircraft as well as the transport
aircraft necessary to move the supporting equipment and
personnel.
7. Should the Soviets decide to provide a military force
and the problem of overflight permission were solved, a FLOGGER-
equipped Frontal Aviation fighter division from the nearby
Transcaucasus Military District could be flown directly to
Syria. With no Israeli air opposition, Soviet fighter aircraft
could fly into Syrian airfields (if allowed through Iranian or
Turkish airspace) that support similar type aircraft, refuel, and
be ready to conduct a combat sortie on the same day. With two
external tanks and armed with 2 APEX and 4 APHID air-to-air
missiles, the FLOGGER has an estimated optimum low altitude
intercept range of more than 1100 nautical miles, a range well
beyond the 500 to 800 miles to various Syrian airbases. u
8. Aside from the political advantage of establishing a
Soviet presence, the deployment of a FLOGGER-equipped division
could accomplish several objectives. If current Syrian and
Israeli inventories remained intact the added Soviet aircraft
would change the balance of air superiority type of aircraft from
the current Syrian advantage of 1.5:1 to a ratio better than 2:1
in the Syrian-Soviet favor. Historically, the Syrian
numerical advantage has consistently been overcome both by
superior Israeli pilots and by superior technical capability of
the Israelis' Western-produced aircraft and missile systems. In
the past the Soviets basically provided only the short range
ATOLL series of air-to-air missiles and only very recently has
there been evidence the Syrian Air Force has begun receiving more
advanced missile systems. These systems likely will be gradually
introduced; therefore, thev will not immediately erode Israeli
technical superiority.
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9. Rapid movement and positioning of a Soviet fighter 1-11
division in Syria would present the Israelis with a qualitatively
new threat environment. They would be facing air intercept
radars with increased acquisition ranges and aircraft capable of
all-aspect attack. The Israelis would be facing a new tactical
environment with significantly increased probability of
sustaining losses should they attempt to conduct operations in
Syrian airspace. Arrival and purpose of Soviet air forces could
be announced publicly as soon as their initial operational
capability had been established. The Soviet fighters could
establish barrier patrols which would force any Israeli air
action against Syria to become a direct attack against Soviet
10. Although the net political advantages of a Soviet
military presence in Syria might justify that course of action,
in a military sense there may be as many drawbacks as there are
advantages. As discussed above, Soviet fighter aviation forces
would offer a greater capability than the Syrian. The Soviets
might face considerable difficulty if they had to engage in
prolonged operations. It is not possible for those units to
deploy without the majority of their maintenance and combat
support activities. The Syrians would be unable to support a
large influx of Soviet fighter units, because of the scale and
type of support necessary. The export versions of FLOGGER which
the Syrians have received do not have the same advanced avionics
as the Soviet domestic versions. Therefore maintenance personnel
and automated test vans of regimental maintenance establishment
are a must. The armament and munitions maintenance personnel are
also necessary since Syria may only now be receiving the APEX and
APHID missiles with which the Soviet FLOGGER's are armed.
Evidence of initial export of these advanced LOGGER-B)
to Syria has E been detected.
11. There do not appear to be sufficient facilities at
either Syrian FLOGGER base to support a large Soviet
deployment. Sayqal, the main FLOGGER base, already supports over
sixty-five aircraft with little ramp space. An Nasiriyah
presently has less than thirty FLOGGER's but even fewer
facilities than Sayqal. Both airfields are in southwest Syria
within 85 nautical miles of Israeli airspace and vulnerable to
Israeli air strikes. Because the Soviets would have to move
extensive supporting personnel and material anyway, it appears
that it would be to their advantage to deploy their FLOGGER's to
other Syrian operational airfields more removed from the Israeli
airspace. Deployment to an operational Syrian military airbase
would provide the obvious advantage of not having to move such
outsized cargo as POL trucks. Deploying to a base other than one
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of the FLOGGER bases would likely make it necessary to move
nearly the entire strength of each of the three regiments of a
fighter aviation division. The exact number of personnel to be
moved under these conditions is uncertain, but it would probably
be about 4000. This would probably include:
--Regimental and division staffs
--Squadron maintenance
--Regimental planning and control elements
--Maintenance specialists
--Missile maintenance facility personnel
--Some portion of the supporting air technical
and signal battalions.
12. It is likely that Soviet planning would include
provisions for an increase in airfield defenses at the receiving
bases, probably the deployment of an airfield security force
equipped with additional air defense weapons. These could be
provided by the movement of some airborne troops with augmenting
SAM units from locations in the Transcaucasus Military
District. Since Israeli aircraft with tanker support can operate
anywhere within Syrian airspace, the Soviets might find it
advantageous to create their airhead at one of the northern or
northeastern Syrian bases. Introduction of the' own defense
would be consistent with past Soviet practice.
13. Based on US calculations, transportation of some 5000
men, support vehicles and initial supplies probably would
require about 65 IL-76 CANDID sorties. Another 10 to 15 AN-22
COCK flights would be needed to move large pieces of radar
equipment if the Soviets chose to establish their own ground
controlled intercept capability.
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16. The deployment of a Soviet fighter division to Syria
would be a risky and potentially costly venture. The
possibilities of a confrontation with the US or excessive combat
losses to the Israelis would be serious considerations for the
Kremlin. The Soviets, however, might view the opportunity to
influence developments in the Middle East as worth the risk and
the price.
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