WARNING REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000300130001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2007
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 1, 1978
• Content Type: MEMO

A roved For Release 2007/ CIA-RDP 3B01 027R000300130001-3 25X1
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Officers
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH . Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
FROM . National Intelligence Officer for Africa
SUBJECT : Warning Report: Sub-Saharan Africa
1. Action Requested: None; the attached report is for your
information.
2. Background: Community representatives and specialists met on
29 November with the NIO/AF as chairman and rapporteur. The attached
report has not been coordinated with the other participants, but is being
circulated to them. If they feel their views have been misrepresented,
or if they have significant additional concerns, I will report further
to you.
3. I should add that the reaction of the Community people at a
working level to this exercise so far has been very good; the meetings
on Africa have been well attended and the discussions lively.
Attachment
25X1
SECRET
elease 2007/04/13 . 3B01 027R000300130001-3
 Approved For Release 2007/04/13: CIA-RDP83BO1027R000300130001-3
Distribution:
Oiiginal - Addressee {w/att)
1 - DDCI (w/att)
1 - DD/NFA (w/att)
1 - ER (w/att)
1 - NIO/Warning (w/att) t/
1 - NIO/AF (w/att)
1 - NIO/RI (w/att)
 Approved For Release 20071 M U177-RUPF B01027R000300130001-3
0
1 December 1978
SUMMARY
While Intelligence Community specialists see no new Soviet initiatives
toward Africa in the offing, they are concerned over developments, especially
in the Rhodesian situation, which they believe likely to open broader oppor-
tunities for Soviet/Cuban participation on a continuing basis. They also
foresee a potential re-emergence of Mozambique as an arena of significant
military action in coming months, as Soviet aid relationships with ZANU
strengthen. They also note the possibility that Rhodesian raids, which
are still having a serious impact in Zambia, may extend to Tanzania as the
Smith regime looks for demonstrative ways to support white morale. Re
Namibia, we note again that there is danger at any time of further South
African strikes into southern Angola in support of actions against SWAPO.
In the Horn, specialists look at the Sudan-Ethiopian border as a potentially
critical area. The defeat of the rebel forces in Eritrea moves that situa-
tion in the direction of Sudan, and the revival of dissident activity inside
Sudan, along the more southern portion of the border, is ominous. Also in
East Africa, a Tanzanian invasion of Uganda, while it would likely result
in the overthrow of Idi Amin, would have the effect of placing foreigners,
including the remaining Americans in Uganda, in jeopardy. Zaire remains
a very serious concern; a pullout of the Pan-African Moroccan force from
Shaba would, in the view of the specialists, lead to chaotic conditions
there almost immediately, with a good possibility of a revival, in some
form, of the FLNC (Katanga gendarme) problem.
USSR/Cuba
We have been impressed during the past month by the extent to which
the Soviets appear to be adjusting their strategy in southern Africa to cover
all of their bets and to support all of their relationships simultaneously --
with both ZAPU and ZANU and with both Zambia and Tanzania as elements of the
Patriotic Front and the leaders of the Front-Line States have tended to go
their separate ways. Last month we wrote of a shift in the emphasis in
Soviet support from guerrilla activity to "conventional" military operations;
we now think it would be better to characterize Soviet strategy as responding
to the situation that has developed among the African "liberationists."
Some of us, indeed, think that it is shifts in attitude by the Africans that
should be emphasized at this stage: Nyerere's more active backing of ZANU's
requests for Soviet assistance and Kaunda's greater openness, as compared
25X1
SECRE~
Approved For Release 2007/04/13: CIA-R?P83BO1027R000300130001-3
 Approved For Release 2007S CRE B01027R000300130001-3
19
to say six months ago, to a more significant military aid involvement
with the Soviets. These developments strongly imply a further expansion
of relationships with the Soviets in coming months, although analysts do
not see eye to eye on the speed with which this expansion will occur
RHODESIA -
Une consequence of the Soviet response we believe likely to show up
Salisbury suburbs -- be pulled. [CIA/OER is publishing a paper on this.]
"trigger" -- such as Smith's assassination or serious terrorism in the
prepared psychologically to leave on quite short notice, should some
that large numbers of whites who do not have a stake in real property are
factor is increasingly critical; the rate of white departures is still
rising, and analysts have a "gut feeling" arising out of the statistics
iorate, but might help support white morale. We believe that the morale
longer term military position of the Rhodesians, which continues to deter-
base). Such actions, we feel, would probably not basically affect the
(and within helicopter range if Malawi were used as a clandestine staging
reconnaissance flights over ZANU camps there which are within bombing range
with raids into Tanzania, hitherto immune; we note reports of Canberra
Mozambique front, as Soviet/Cuban aid to ZANU comes to be felt more strongly
and as the Rhodesians react to this.3The Rhodesians may well also react
during the next few months is an escalation of military action on the
We are skeptical, incidentally, that large numbers of Cubans will be
have had some months ago.
significant guerrilla success could have greater impact than it might
scale indicated by reports of the planning. At this stage, however, any
with Soviet encouragement, will take the forms or turn out to be on the
skeptical that the ZAPU offensive, reported to be scheduled for December
tional Cubans could of course appear from other directions. We are also
moving to the Rhodesian theatre from Ethiopia anytime soon, although addi-
ETHIOPIA
The Ethiopians' capture of Keren is likely to lead them to pay more
treans and other opponents of the Mengistu regime, nor, given his limited
tions with Ethiopia and reduce to a minimum his involvement with the Eri-
or of cutting bait, will feel able neither to move promptly to repair rela-
to be that President Nimeiry, faced with a question of continuing to fish
probability of border incidents in the weeks ahead. The danger would seem
produce a flow of Eritrean refugees toward Sudan. There is thus an increased
attention to the Eritreans' supply lines; it is also virtually certain to
 Approved For Release 2007/04/13 1 CIA RDI 83BO1027R000300130001-3
? SECREII I 10
military means, to develop a coherent alternative strategy. If the
situation then drifts, border security could disintegrate and Nimeiry
be led to appeal more strongly for US help.
We are more concerned than previously that the Ogaden will heat up
again, now that the Eritrean towns have been regained and Ethiopian forces
may be available for transfer back south. At the same time, some analysts
see hints that the Somalis may be looking toward improving relations with
the Soviets -- but slowly and cautiously. If so, the Soviets, in the view
of these analysts, might well be receptive. Most analysts see this as
unlikely, and although we all agree that the Soviet-Ethiopian treaty --
a document of considerable symbolic value to the Soviets -- implies some
change in the quality of Soviet-Ethiopian relations, we can't yet be very
specific.
UGANDA/TANZANIA
While the Tanzanians' delay in launching a counter-attack against
Uganda does not appear to us to be procrastination but rather the result
of real logistic difficulties, specialists think the longer the delay the
less the likelihood of a Tanzanian offensive in strength. Nyerere likes to
keep his options open, and could always find a face-saving way of calling
off the operation. If the Tanzanians do mount an offensive, however,
specialists agree that they could move to Kampala, but not so quickly as
to preclude a collapse of public order (such as it has been in Uganda) or
a period of savage infighting among Ugandan factions taking retribution
for past injuries. Foreigners, including Americans especially, could well
become hostages and victims in these situations. [CIA/ORPA has produced
a memorandum on this subject.]
ZAIRE
We are concerned that a phase-out of the Pan-African force under
Moroccan leadership is a real possibility. If this occurs, we foresee
chaos reappearing in Shaba and a good chance that FLNC activity, led by
dissidents already in place but likely also supported in some degree by
sympathetic elements in Angola and Zambia, will revive.. This could easily
spook the remaining European population in Shaba, and an interruption of
cobalt production would become more likely. The "cobalt mystery" of last
month has not been completely resolved, but the specialists now think that
much of Zaire's production is being delayed in transit and will ultimately
reach world markets. The heat behind Mobutu's suspicions of the US has
diminished, but more trouble in Shaba could obviously affect the rapproche-
ment with Angola which we have urged him to pursue.
25X1
SECRE~
For Release 2007/04/13: CIA-RDP83BO1 027R000300130001-3
 Approved For Release 2007 fi fib
$31301027ROO0300130001-3 25X1
?
KENYA
Specialists sense that the Moi honeymoon is ending, and that the basic
problems of Kenyan political society are reasserting themselves. Moi's
anti-corruption campaign, while no doubt popular with those who are not on
the take, is embittering significant people, and the ease with which Kenya
and Moi passed through the post-Kenyatta transition should not blind us
to the possibility of trouble ahead.
WEST AFRICA
In addition to the political/ethnic problems of Nigeria, of which you
are aware, economic specialists point out that a number of specific
economic problems that afflict the country will become more noticeable by
next spring, when a round of elections is scheduled to take place as part
of the transition from military to civilian rule. This could contribute to
exacerbating the difficulty the Nigerians are having in finding some
political formulae other than those which failed in the past. There are
signs in Togo and Ghana that their endemic problems may again come to a
head in the not too distant future, and the regimes there be replaced. How
much this should matter to the US is doubtful, but there always is a chance
that "radical" leadership could emerge. We are still seeking confirmation
of Cuban/Soviet withdrawals from Guinea. There does not appear to us to
have been any real improvement in the situation in Chad, but we have little
new information.
ANGOLA
We have seen no good evidence of large numbers of East Germans acting
as an Afrika Korps, as alleged by the South Africans, among others. There
are, and have been, East German security advisers with the Luanda regime.
SECRE