NIO WORRY LIST FOR JANUARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000300120026-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 13, 2008
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: February 2, 1979
• Content Type: MEMO

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25X1.
State Dept. review completed
2 February 1979
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH : Director, National Foreign Assessment Cente
FROM National Intelligence Officer for Warning._?'-
SUBJECT : NIO "Worry List" for January
Th,ia memoicandwn .ca dnAwn Jkom the memoranda pre-
pa,%ed bon you by the .indiv.Ldu&t NI0.a ajteA diacua.a.i.on
with other anatydta o6 the Community. I.t6 puApoa e .us .
to ateen t you in aucc i.nc t terms to otenti.ae deveQ.op-
menta that, in the N10'.6 view, couy-d .cn ? 1e next bew
months become matteA4 of .aetLLoua concern.. It .its not
an estimate that these deveLopments are tikeey to occur;
na.the,% it .c a an attempt to .s.ingte out the b!.achen c gouda
on the rote. gence ob6Lc.en's honi.zon.
The most urgent problem.
The Vietnam-Cambodia-China-USSR Imbroglio. The chain of
events since the last meeting of community analysts in late November
has moved to a point where the possibility of Sino-Soviet armed con-
flict growing out of these events is now one branch point closer than
it was. The Vietnam blitzkrieg overrunning Kampuchea has been followed
by both widespread Kampuchean guerrilla resistance and a large-scale
Chinese military buildup on the Vietnamese border. The manner of the
buildup, its timing and the mix of forces involved have increasingly . 25X1
suggested Chinese offensive intentions. The Soviets have not
committed themselves to any particular course of action in response,
but might in fact respond to a Chinese move against Vietnam with
pressure of some sort on the Sino-Soviet border.
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SUBJECT: NIO "Worry List" for January
25X1.
2. New Concerns I: The Fallout from Iran
Iranian Oil. Any consideration of the uncertainties sur-
rounding future trends in Iranian oil output clearly raises the specter
of global market strin
i
genc
es. It is even conceivable that later this
year.the world will face economic hardships and political tensions
reminiscent of the 1974 OAPEC/OPEC induced crisis
An
.
annex to this
memorandum describes possible trends in the global oil market this
and exami a problems th
t
-
a
would be created by an oil export short
fall.
25X1
The Soviet View. One specific contingency is the eventual emergence
of full-scale
prolonged Leba
t
l
,
non-s
y
e civil war in Iran which would
bring the question of Soviet military assistance to one side into play.
In the event of an open split in the Arm
d
y an
emergence of a struggle
involving armed civilians, it is conceivable that the Soviets would then
covertly funnel supplies and other assistance to some forces on the side
they favored
whil
f
,
e pro
essing nonintervention. It is also possible
that under these circumstances the Soviets w
ld
ou
move troops to the
adjacent frontier, and that they might caution the US against assistance
to one side under Dain of active intervention by Soviet forces to help
the other. . ~.. .
e
xico zs acquiring
new clients for its oil -- notably, France, Japan and Israel. While the
US will receive a lower percentage of Mexican oil than previously
antiFipated, the actual quantity.will be about the same because of
increased production. Diversification of Mexico's oil exports is likely
to make Mexico more independent in its forthcoming negotiations with the
t-~_
ore. ISO, the Nigerian leader-ship is
giving more serious consideration to using oil as a political weapon
than it has in the recent past. Developments re Iran will be the
central element here, in that a shortage of oil worldwide would open
opportunities for the Nigerians to press the US on southern Africa in a
way they have not previously sought to do. Nigeria now provides a
significant percentage of US crude imports, but also is heavily depen-
dent on continued sales to finance its own politically important
development program. E I 25X1
Mexico. As a direct result of events in Iran M
d
process of transition to civilian rule is now more likely ninothercominge
months than it has been heretof A g
Ni eria. Analysts believe that military interve-4r t
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SUBJECT: NIO "Worry List" for January
o
noting that there rtazn degree of contagion in the
overthrow of monarchies.
3. New Concerns II.
Morocco. A series of disturbing events have increased our
concern for the stability of the monarchy: more leftist activity
(students and labor); continued poor economic performance; its solitary
position on the Western Sahara; and deteriorating morale in the Army,
bogged down in the Western Sahara. In light of events in Iran, it is
w
th
Egypt. As in Morocco, there are some dist
rbi
i
u
ng s
gns about
internal stability: the rise in consumer prices; a resurgence of the
Muslim Brotherhood; clashes between Copts and Muslims; and the stalled
peace negotiations with Israel (which is causin some E
tia
9
gyp
ns to
question Sadat's policy, even though Sadat apparently feels the delay is
working to his advantage). In light of events in Iran, Sadat sees
himself as the new policeman in the region -- witness his decision to
send 200 tanks to Somalia. Sadat is good at balancing problems but he
may be getting close to the point when he has too many balls in the air.
The regional role heDerceives for himself may blind him to internal
develo ments
Pakistan. The Supreme Court may return a decision on the Bhutto
case this month.' Any decision will increase the likelihood of po-
litical instability and civil disorder. If Bhutto is exec t d h'
u
xpec o see hostilities being renewed as the Christians
again try to get rid of the Syrians. Sarkis' weakness during the
current lull in fichti g means another wasted opportunity for some sort
of solution.
Lebanon. Signs in the south are ominous again, and the north is
marked by procrastination. With the return of good weather in Marchand
April we e t t
e, ~s
followers may take to the streets; if he is spared, the Army leadership
will be reinforced in its unha ss with President Zia and more in-
clined to move against him.
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SUBJECT: NIO "Worry List" for January
. ?
4. Continuing concerns. 25X1
Poland. The economic dilemma and growing malaise cited in tt,A
Agt WAV ninn D.,.,...i. t_..._ ____ _ .
25X1 He suggested that one. 25X1
eventruai ou come could be wi
l
esca
e rioting posibl ldi
,syeang even to
Soviet i n tArvon+'i n.r 1.1i.47 ..
~ r~uuc5~y
aw, w e recognizing the seriousness of th
P
i
e
ol
sheconomi
position, has concluded that the outlook is far f
d
rom
esperate
.
Spain. In the face of escalating attacks by th B
1 b
y
asque and
--
appal rent
25X1
y -- other terrorists, the Suarez government has lost ground
this month in its str
l
ugg
e to retain the cfidfh
onence o te security
forces. Ranking military officers have participated in public demon-
strations of frustration that have delighted th
lt
i
e u
ra-r
ght poli
,ce
commanders have requested reintegration in the army, and tensions in the
ranks are high. We see no respite for the government -- either before
or after the !larch elections. . The Basque terrorists. reportedly have the
capability to carry out even more disruptive acts of violence. If the
victims were prominent enough and the timing right, we.believe the
government could find it very hard to control the reaction. Nor in such
circumstances do we exclude the possibility of some direc move against
the government by elements i
____._____ .._
h
e s
n t
Ital. It is increasingly likely that the Communists will dis-
sociate themselves from the Andreotti
over
t
d
g
nmen
an
thereby bri it
ng down within the next few weeks, throwing Italy into yet another serious
political crici
s
Syria-Iraq Rapprochement. In November 1978 we noted the radical-
ization of the Arab moderates as a result of th
i
k
e
r wea
performant
ce a the Baghdad Summit. We continue to be concerned by the additional steps
toward rapprochement between Syria and Iraq. There is a possi-bility of
effective and lasting Syrian-Iraqi cooperation -- military, economic,
and political. President Bakr's trip to Damascus next week should
produce something tangible in cooperation between the two countries;
additionally, the PLO and Jordan may well be brought in on the latter
party of the "summit." The implications of all this involve possible
future Israeli (military) reaction. The Israelis might not allow the
Iraqis to fill the currently unexplained, division-size a in Syrian
defensive
ositi
p
ons on the souther Gl Hiht
noanegs
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SUBJECT: NIO "Worry List" for January
5. Areas of lessened immediate concern.
Romania. The Soviets have not yet found an effective response
to Ceausescu's spectacular acts of public defiance. BY publicly airing
sensitive questions of Warsaw Pact expenditures and command and control,
Ceausescu had gone beyond previously established limits of his challenge
to Soviet authority and this time approached more closely the threshold
of Soviet tolerance. For the time being, he appears to have gotten away
with it, in the sense that we have no evidence that the Soviets have yet
decided to risk the costs associ
d
i
a e
w
th measures drastic enough to
bring Ceausescu to heel. 25X1
Nica_ r_ aqua. The present delicate state of the mediation effort led
by the United States is at the point that th
B
e
road Front (FAO) opposi-
tion is beginning to flake apart, while Somoza appears to- be at least as
strongly entrenched as
'
ever. Somoza
s ability to double the strength of
the National Guard seems to have demoralized the FSLN, which is limiting
its harrassment of the Somoza Government to localized attacks. A full-
scale FSLN assault on the government now appears unlikely.- Meanwhile,
other Central American governments are uneasily watching the threats to
Somoza
The Gov
.
ernment of El Salvador, already beset by terrorist'
Rhodesia. The more direct assistance relationship which we had.
anticipated owould develop between'-the Soviets and ZANU has not material-
ized as we PYRae+aA
to So
c
?.".
autiNIA, there have been
objections and counterarguments by the ZAPU leadership, who at least up
to now have been the focus of Sovi
t
tt
e
a
entions. The Soviet-ZANU
relation may yet develop; but the Soviets certainly show no signs of
being in a hurry, if in fact they intend to make this part of their
game.
Regarding Cuban activities, we do not see any specific indications
that more Cubans are about to arrive in Africa or that those already
there will be shifted about in a major way. The "logic of the situ-
ation" in regard to Rhodesia still calls, in our view, for additional
Cuban participation in the defense of Zimbabwe guerrilla and host
government base areas, but, again, we do not see any fundamentally new
development with regard to Cubans in he next three months in either
southern Afri
a
t.L_
c
or
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SUBJECT: NIB "Worry List" for January
The Beagle Channel. The danger of Argentine-Chilean hostilities
has markedly decreased with the beginning of Papal mediation.
South Africa. Concern over the possibility of rene.ved ac4ivit at
the Kalahari test faciiit Ile has abated in the last month
RICHARD LEI-L%.MAN
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f1FAC f-lo. 0397-79
23 January 1979
Coss of Iranian Oil: So?ra
_ Global Im lication- for 1979
-Potential Oil i~lar?ket Problems in 1979
While the glob
al
- -
'
an Iranian oil
_
of l market. will Probably b shortfall in the first- quarter a able to co
arise soon
e thereafter, of 1979, problew
Frorn
could
spri
usually rebuilt i
u e
oil stk
n contt
,ras t the drawdwns thatocs are
o
place during the-first quarter. In addition, by sprin -a1Iy t
production facilities, especially those in Saudi
strained ake
fr
a
l
om monthsfgi1
Arabi
,l o runnin at near full rana-44-.. W1. have been
Although the c - -- / - --' -. .
urgent uncertainties in Iran make it imp
to predict oil market t
b
rends w ossi
l
,e can at least examine thee
range Possibilities. Three plausible scenarios can be envisaged of
here in order of increasing risk that serious market stri 'ranked
will appear between April and the end of thi
~gencfes
s
production is substantially r
spring. Ai though fear
f
e
s o
st
er-ea
it suplh
py sortage would ease
necessity to rebuild stocks to normal levels would leave the the
susceptible to any renewed curtai lme rkefi
Saudi) output, nt of Iranian
(or deep cuts in
(This case assumes that a new government in Teheran
believes it needs maximum oil revenues to restore economic activity
in Iran and/or desires to continue the modernization effort albeit
at a.-somewhat reduced rate.) , albeit
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aode_>at
Zsk -
Under this scenario marketiconditions would ar some three million production remained at current high 1, b/d.
?v tight even if non-
prolonged sharp drop in output of velets s. Thus almost any
produce a supply crisis. p the other major producers
ment abandons much of the (This case assumes that the successoCoud
Shah's
enough oil to sustai
r lgovern-
7Pro
n
gram btl
rodeststardu sels
Populace.) and Of living for the
for most- 'o- - Iranian oil output remains b?
the Period, {This case would stem from oeitherlpon b/d
Civil disturbances reflecting continued governmental the installation -of a hit, prolonged
deliberately to isolate tae gunt ffundamentalist regime wh cht seks
foreign influenc
tY as completel
es)
y as posiblm
.se fro under The above depj ction of a range of
the most optimistic citthe s
gges~
- faces a substanti
l rcumstances that,
o
a
, this year. With tight markettCORdi.tionstrsoaencies appearing arket
later
Slater
any important Producer for any reason would cause a
Price sharp production cuts by
run up..
It m
c
timing
ust be strongly emphasized,- however, that of a market crunch, if there is one, will depend more the
behavior of oil consumers and marketers than on
on the
supply trends O
nce th
.ese
Pleczed
to replenish stocks
groups believe that they Jwi l?
th
e
,
be
ey W-111 b
ubl
nae
e more inclined to h
worse, build inventorie
old
s
onto or
consumption rather than draw them down.
cutbacks necessary this would make even
dicate. earlier than stockpile levels would in-
Da
n er Points.and Some Possible 0 ortuni
ties
t
her
Prices Combi
rted Lzth Steer
resumptp
i
on of Iranian oilc'at~ - Without nearly full
that d OPEC oil Prices will rise beyosdbtheseidecided odds are hi h
meeting of the or9amZati
id d at la
e
st man
on The
,se 'Probabilitiess
even with Iranian output
under the one million b/d scenario- averaging 3 Million b dclimb from near
ario. Any OPEC n ' to almost-certai rty
the way by unilaterall price ha
k
!y
y raisin could
Those countries Producing mainlyplight crudestcouldfachie la glerd
unofficial Prices by hiking the quality differential betwee higher
and heavy. crude. Higher prices could also be set officia n light
OPEC meeting, and Saudi Arabia -- bece l ly at an
at near-capacity -- would have littleauower s already aperaiong
to gold the line. p moral suasion,
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A substantial increase in oil prices wouldf urse. de
expected economic growth. As Was the case in 19'703 , the United pStates
is now attempting a so called "soft landing",
would slow somewhat in order to relieve inflationary pressures omy
much higher energy prices, the landing could again be hard", With
inflation rates remaining uncomfortably high. The economies of~th
Western Europe are in the best position since the 1975 recession to
accelerate economic expansion. Sharp hikes in oil
this opportunity. Japan, already beleaguered by the prices woul
difficultidesjp
of turning its economy inward and the most dependent on oil imports,
may find its economic growth particularly hard hit. In all developed
economies, the economic cushion provided b
y exports to OPECl
woud
certainly be less than in 1974
and 3975 Althh OP
.ougEC states would
once again have vastly -increased
spending Powerl f
.. ony aew would
greatly expand foreign purchases.
The troubles among devel
d
ope
countriesld i
wounevitably spread
to the LDCs. The payments positions of many LOCs, especially pupper
tier' ones, are expected t
o weaken subttillh
sanay tis year and
higher oil prices combined with lower exports to the developed world
would unquestionably make conditions worse. The poorest countries
would be asking for more aid at the very time the developed countries
could least afford such outla
s If
y
the oil pri hik
.cees come- this -
spring, they would affect the tone of both the UNTAD V conference in.
May and the Tokyo Summit in Ju
ne
.
The Saudi Arrzbico
F
t
-
ac
or
- The pressures facing the Saudi
lead
leadership have intensi led
th
'
as
e Kingdom
s oil export level has
increasingly become the critical
This has arbiter of global. economic health.
happened at a time
he
i
w
n
ts latentsi
succeson problems are
beginning to emerge, its faith in the value of its alliance with the
United States is being questio
d
ne
near and its misgivings about sustaining
capacity oil production are sharpening. The Saudis will face
the dilemma of having to exert
more influencehil fli
, weeeng more
vulnerable. They will be urged, and may be tempted, to use
their
oil supply leverage to achiev
b
e o
jectives
in the Arab-Israeli arena.
At the same time, their perceived dependence on their long-time ally,
the-United States, will deepen, as the uncertainties in Iran add to
their anxieties (felt by the Saudi establishr nt) over the growing
Soviet involvement in the region Gi
ven these cirt
.cumsances, the
possibility exists -- at least in principle -- for some trade-off
between the future level of Saudi oil output and US security guarantees.
If the US extends, and the Saudis agree to, such an arrangement, it
might be Possible to convince the Persian Gulf sheikdoms, and
the UAE, to participate in such an accord. The accord might ~1incl ude
a provision for temporarily lifting self-imposed production ceilings,
a move which would add more than one million b/d to global oil supplies.
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Non-Price Reactions bq M E ortirq States - Some oil
producing states may aiso try to advance their perceived political
and economic interests other than through higher oil prices. These
could range from efforts by a single state (e.g., 1''exico) to link
increased oil exports to US trade concessions or US treatment of
migrant labor, to efforts by a group of states (e.g., Arab oil
pro-
ducers) seeking to influence the course of development of a settlement
with Israel. The sco
f
pe o
action could range from the most subtle
verbal hints to open threats of concrete action, such as a limitation
on production.* In most cases, however, their actual leverage will
be limited. Oil producers will have to cope with weaknesses such
as OPEC members' unwillingness to halt the flow of oil for fear of
losing needed foreign exchange. Also, each producer will have to
weigh any such action in the context of its. overall foreign relations-
Competition Among Inroorting Counl_ es - Competition for oil
on the world market coullead to tensions between consumers,
especially the United States and its OECD
partners. These i ntra-
OECD strains, however, may be si
nifi
a
tl
l
g
c
n
y
ess than in 7973-1974.
Governments have learned from the earli
er experience that a scramble
for oil supplies is self-defeating, in that it needlessly drives up
prices and leaves the bu
er
t
k
i
y
s
uc
w
th high-priced oil contracts
once supply conditions return to normal. In addition,- the Inter-
national Energy Agreement, adopted by 18 member countries,' provides
at least a framework for allocating availabl
l
e supp
ies of imported
oil. It has never been tested under actual condi tions, however and it. is
questionable wh
th
i
e
er
I. could function effectively in the context
of severe oil
tri
s
ngencies.
A Change in US-Ismali Relations - Israel's sense of insecurity
-and isolation has already been heightened by the loss of Iran as an
ally and oil supplier. This may stiffen its determination to be
self-reliant, making a peace settlement more difficult. At the same
time, possible oil market stringencies later this year may-force
Tel Aviv to invoke its oil supply agreement with Washington. -A flow
of US oil to Israel would come just at the moment when the United
States may have to impose domestic restrictions to conserve oil.
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Reaffirm tiio f the PZutoni:~r Ecororm~ - The Iranian oil cut-
back will strengthen the convictions of those who favor additional
R&D on plutonium-based reactor systems predicated on reprocessing.
Rapidly rising oil prices would certainly reinforce their position,
further complicating US efforts to stall the development of these
Pl utoni urn-based systems.
---
i -s- _d_,._.. ; ~,tczcc~ E'zzszs' d finis is a large and camp
issue thathould be discussed separately. 'So far the international
financial
consequences of. Iranian instability have been minimal
largely because Teheran has'such a large cushion in the form of
foreign. exchange reserves outside of Iran. More serious problems
could emerge in the next few months, however. While these could
hurt individual banks, the international financi
l
t
i
a
sys
en
s able
to cope. We do. see one remote possibility with wid
ifi
er ram
cations_ :..
A fundamentalist regime in Iran might decide to abrogate its foreign
debts
on grounds th
,
ey were the product of the Shah's "illegalities".
Some Western banks with a large Iranian exposure and a weak financial
structure could go under. A chain reaction is then -possible if the
banks concern
d
d
e
are
eeply involved in the unregulated euro-dollar
market. ._
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9 ?
NIO "Worry List" Items
Nigeria. Analysts believe that military intervention to
derail the process of transition to civilian rule is now more likely
in the coming months than it was last year. General Obasanjo is
trying to keep political agitation and violence within bounds, but
his chances are problematic. Nigerian oil production is up, for
financial reasons as well as Iran, but the Nigerians may still be
tempted at some point to try to find in their oil political leverage
over US policies re southern Africa.
Rhodesia. We see no change in the pattern of the armed guerrilla
struggle, but possibly an increase in the intensity, although we
expect Smith will be able to conduct elections in April as per his
timetable. Absent some further settlement, we still think that we
will see some degree of increased participation by Cubans in the
Rhodesian situation, especially in the defense of the Zimbabwe
guerrilla base areas outside Rhodesia. An extension of the warfare
into Botswana, or even possibly Tanzania, is a continuing threat.
Zaire. The longer term threat to Shaba remains serious, despite
the current disorganization of the ex-Katangan grouping and the co-
operation between Mobutu and Neto in Angola. Danger in Shaba could
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. .
be especially acute after June, if the inter-African force with-
draws. The food, medical, and general economic situation in
Kinshasa itself is deteriorating, and we cannot predict when or if
rioting might occur against Mobutu's security forces there. Exile
elements evidently are trying to take advantage of these circumstances.
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The Communist Party's break with the Andreotti government
shifts the emphasis in Italian politics back toward confrontation,
breaking a long trend that saw the Communists inching steadily
toward a fuller and more overt role in the governing process. The
Communists feel they must take a tougher line toward Andreotti
and his fellow Christian Democrats, yet they will not want to
jeopardize their hard-won reputation as a responsible and construc-
tive political force. The Christian Democrats, troubled as always
by their own internal factional problems, seem more willing now
than in the past couple of years to confront the Communists.
Because no party's options are clear--and also because decisions
in each case will be heavily contingent on the actions of others--
all the participants are likely to move very cautiously, and it is
unlikely that we will predict in any detail how the crisis will
develop. Certain broad trends can be discerned, however. First,
it seems likely that relations between the Christian Democrats and
Communists will grow more tense in the next few weeks, with increased
possibilities for miscalculation by both parties. Second, if this
is so, a round of parliamentary elections will be very difficult to
avoid. Third, whether or not elections are held, the central fact
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in Italian political life is unlikely to change: that it is all but
impossible to set up a stable government, much less an effective
one, unless Italy's two biggest parties can find a way to cooperate.
And fourth, events of the last year have made the Communists much
more reluctant to cooperate without some guarantee of an expanded
role in the governing process. 25X1
Approved For Release 2008/08/13: CIA-RDP83B01027R000300120026-7