REVIEW OF TRENDS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000300120007-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2007
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: February 13, 1978
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2007/08/09: CIA-RDP83B01027R000300120007-8
S .C:R ET
13 February 1978
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM Deputy Director, National Foreign Assessment
SUBJECT Review of Trends
The purpose of this memorandum is to alert you in
succinct terms to potential developments that could in the
next few months become matters of concern.. I should
caution, however, that it is not an estimate that these
developments are likely to occur; rather, it is an attempt
to single out clouds on the intelligence officer's horizon.
1. Italy. The outcome of the current political crisis
is likely to involve some increase in Communist influence.
None of the parties wants early elections, but the price
of avoiding them will be concessions to the Communists--
closer collaboration at the regional government level,
cabinet-level "technicians" acceptable to the Communists,
and/or firm programmatic commitments from a new government.
In the event of elections, the outcome will likely leave
the Christian Democrats and Communists still confronting
each other with no alternative to cooperation of some sort
in running the country.
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3. Poland. The economic dilemma and growing malaise
cited in the last Warning Report have now been strongly
underlined in rerPnt
lone eventual out-
come could be wi escale rioting, possibly leading even.to
Soviet intervention. While this pe tic outlook is
supported by it is not the
view of all observers;_____________ while recognizing
the seriousness of the Polish economic position, has con-
cluded that the outlook is far from desperate.
4. Morocco. A series of disturbing events has in-
creased our concern for the stability of the monarchy:
more leftist activity (students and labor); continued poor
economic performance; its solitary position on the Western
Sahara; and deteriorating morale in the army, which is
bogged down in the Western Sahara and is seeking revenge
for the recent Polisario attack on the southern Moroccan
town of Tan-Tan. In light of events in Iran:, it is worth
noting that there exists a certain tagion in
the overthrow of monarchies.
5. Egypt. As in Morocco, there are some disturbing
signs about nternal stability: the rise in consumer
prices; a resurgence of the Muslim Brotherhood; clashes
between Copts and Muslims; and the stalled peace negotia-
tions with Israel (which are causing some Egyptians to
question Sadat's policy, even though Sadat apparently feels
the delay is working to his advantage). In light of events
in Iran, Sadat sees himself as the new policeman in the re-
gion--witness his decision to send 200 tanks to Somalia and
his lengthy request for new military equipment from the US.
Sadat is good at balancing problems but he may. be getting
close to the point when he has too many balls in the air.
The regional role he perceives for i may blind him to
internal developments.
6. Lebanon. Signs in the south are ominous again,
and the north is marked by procrastination. With the re-
turn of good weather in March and April, we expect to see
hos ilities being renewed as the Christians again try to
get rid of the Syrians. Sarkis' inability to establish
himself as a leader and attract support during the current
lull in fighting means another wasted opportunity for some
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7. Nigeria. Analysts believe that the military are
now more likely to intervene to derail the process of
transition to civilian rule in the coming months. General
Obasanjo is trying to keep political agitation and violence
within bounds, but his chances are problematic. Nigerian
oil production is up, for financial reasons as well as Iran,
but the Nigerians may still be tempted at some point to try
to find in their oil political leverage over US policies re
southern Africa.
8. Rhodesia. We see no change in the pattern of the
armed guerrilla struggle, but possibly an increase in the
intensity, although we expect Smith will be able to conduct
elections in April as per his timetable. Absent some
further settlement, we still think that we will see some de-
gree of increased participation by Cubans in the Rhodesian
situation, especially in the defense of the Zimbabwe guer-
rilla base areas outside Rhodesia. An extension of the
warfare into Botswana, or even possibly Tanzania, is a con-
tinuing threat.
9. Zaire. The longer term threat to-Shaba remains
serious, despite the current disorganization of the ex-
Katangan grouping and the cooperation between Mobutu and
Neto in Angola. Danger in Shaba could be especially
acute after June, if the inter-African force withdraws.
The food, medical, and general economic situation in
Kinshasa itself is deteriorating, and we cannot predict
.when or if rioting might occur against Mobutu's security
forces there. Exile elements evidently are trying to
take advantage of these circumstances.
10. Romania. The Soviets have not yet found an ef-
fective response to Ceausescu's spectacular acts of public
defiance. By publicly airing sensitive questions of War-
saw Pact expenditures and command and control, Ceausescu
had gone beyond previously established limits of his chal-
lenge to Soviet authority and this time approached more
closely the threshold of Soviet tolerance. For the time
being, he appears to have gotten away with it, in the sense
that we have no evidence that the Soviets have yet decided
to risk the costs associated with measures drastic enough
to bring Ceausescu to heel. Moreover, the Romanians have
not repeated their rebuke of the Vietnamese over Kampuchea,
and 'Foreign Minister Andrei's visit to Moscow suggests an
agreement to disagree.
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