WARNING REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000300110050-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 5, 2007
• Sequence Number: 50
• Publication Date: March 22, 1979
• Content Type: MEMO

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Officers
NFAC #1359-79/1
22 March 1979
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH : Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
FROM : National Intelligence Officer for Africa
SUBJECT : Warning Report: Sub-Saharan Africa
1. Action Requested: None; the attached report is for your
information.
2. Background: Community representatives and specialists met on
20 March with the NIO/AF as chairman and rapporteur. The attached
report has not been coordinated with the other participants, but is
being circulated to them. If they feel their views have been misrepre-
sented,or if they have significant additional concerns, I will report
further to you.
Attachment
NFAC #1359-79
26
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NFAC #1359-79/1
rItrlu rur . uUi
SUBJECT : Warning Report - Sub-Saharan Africa 20 March 1979
with attachment - NFAC #1359-79
Distribution:
Original - Addressee (w/att)
1 - DDCI (w/att)
1 - DD/NFA (w/att)
1 - ER (w/att)
1 - NIO/W (w/att)
1 - NIO/AF (w/att)
1 - NFAC/RI (w/att)
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SECRET
22 March 1979
NFAC #1359-79
WARNING REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA* No. 5
Analysts of Soviet affairs do not foresee any radical new departures
in Soviet policy toward Africa during the next two to three months. They
note, however, a continuing high level of activity of all kinds on the
part of the Soviets in this region, and, specifically, a continuing flow
of delegations between Angola and the USSR, Eastern Europe and Cuba.
This stream of contacts may account in part for what appears to be Soviet
complaisance toward Angola's efforts to broaden its contacts. At the
same time, the Soviets are observed to be somewhat more active in under-
cutting Western efforts to produce a Namibian agreement; we note that
Neto did not send a representative to the Namibian talks in New York.
The focus of analysts' interest in Cuban activities is on Cuba's
possible reactions to the South African strikes against SWAPO bases in
southern Angola, an area for which Cuba had assumed some responsibility
re air defense. The Cuban performance against the South Africans should
have been embarrassing to Havana; they have only one Canberra to show for
it, and that possibly the victim of a chance round. We do not believe
the Cubans would risk a retaliatory strike against the South Africans, al-
though this has been reported under consideration by the Angolans. We
could see, however, a further influx of Cuban air defense equipment (and
perhaps specialists) if the Namibian settlement breaks down. The Cuban
troop movements to and from Ethiopia now appear rotational rather than
withdrawal, but all the evidence is not in.
THE HORN
We are still concerned about the possibility of incidents along the
Ethiopian-Sudanese border, both in the northern sectors adjacent to Eritrea
and in the south. We think the war in Eritrea will go on for some time,
and that the-danger for Sudan will persist, perhaps even grow, as the
Ethiopian campaign is drawn out. Re Somalia, we doubt that the Ethiopians
will perceive any meaningful (for them) shift in Somali policy regardless
This memorandum is one of a series produced monthly by N10/AF. Its.purpose
is to review possible developments in the short-term future that would be
damaging to US interests. Obviously many of these developments will not
occur in the time-frame or in the manner suggested, or will not occur at all.
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of the level of ethnic Somali insurgent activity in the Ogaden or of the
degree of official Somali government involvement. Siad himself will
remain, we think, in jeopardy of overthrow whatever he does; we see no
basic improvement in his situation in the offing. Djibouti was not
discussed at the meeting, but analysts subsequently indicated their con-
cern that a pro-Ethiopian (Afar) guerrilla effort may be starting up,
even as the Issa (ethnically Somali) dominated government tries to tighten
its grip. The Ethiopians are not likely to give up on Djibouti until a
more acceptable regime is installed.
SUDAN
A DIA representative expressed concern that, while there are no new
elements of danger for Nimeiry, a fresh combination of these elements --
Ethiopian problems, Ugandan refugees, defeat of the pro-Western government
in Chad, calls for support of Sadat and his peace treaty, continuing
economic problems -- could put Nimeiry under unusually serious pressures
during the next three months. We note that Nimeiry's fortunes are tied to
some degree to Sadat's, and that Saudi attitudes (the Saudis being Sudan's
financial angels) are affected by the Nimeiry-Sadat relationship as well.
WEST AFRICA
The "northern tier" of West Africa has yet to feel the full reper-
cussions of developments in Chad. The NIO would point again to what he
perceives to be the beginning of some shift in the French protective role
in this area. He and other analysts note that Morocco plays a key part
here, too; the overthrow of King Hassan could have an impact we would find
hard to measure in advance in this part of the world, even aside from its
effect on the maintenance of the inter-African force in Zaire. Mauritania
appears closer to internal strife along ethnic/racial lines than we thought
last month, not to mention a garden variety coup. Re Nigeria, on the other
hand, we are moderately encouraged given the tensions and strains of the
transition to civilian rule.
ZAI RE
Mobutu's situation and problems have exhausted the analytical imagina-
tion for the time being.
UGANDA/TANZANIA
There is ground for worry that Nyerere's problems could be just
beginning. If the Ugandans do not themselves act to set up and support a
new government after Amin goes (assuming that-he does), the Tanzanians will
be faced with the problem and, if they tackle it, are likely to get in
over their heads and beyond their staying power. We also note that Amin
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is making more noise about US and UK involvement on Tanzania's side; if,
by chance, he should come out on top, US citizens could again be placed
in greater jeopardy.
MOZAMBIQUE
The representative of DIA/Estimates is concerned that training
activities by the South African ANC might arouse the South Africans to
do more than protest to Machel; other specialists do not yet see grounds
for concern -- they point to other valuable relationships between South
Africa and the Mozambique regime, and believe that these will tend to keep
Machel within bounds in his support for liberation activities aimed against
Pretoria.
NAMIBIA
Pessimism rules among analysts regarding the prospects for any early
agreement. They note that South Africa's internal political problems
(the Information Ministry scandals) impact negatively on the government's
flexibility, such as'it is in any case, on Namibia. They also point out
that a breakdown will again raise the question of sanctions against South
Africa, with the divisive effects this issue has in Africa, Western Europe
and the US. Another potential danger is that tensions along the Namibia-,
Angola border will increase in the absence of a settlement, especially if
the South Africans feel even freer to come to the defense of an independent
government allied with, them.
RHODESIA
Analysts are tending, perhaps more than previously, to see the April
elections as a critical point in the development of the psychological climate
around the internal settlement. The important developments may not be so
much the elections themselves, which we still believe can be carried off
despite the guerrilla effort against them, but in the maneuvering which will
follow and which will bring black vs. black problems to the fore as serious
questions for the US, even though the Europeans' willingness to make more
than cosmetic adjustments still appears central, at least to the NIO. More-
over, we cannot emphasize too strongly that the trend toward increased Cuban/
Soviet/Ethiopian military involvement on the side of the "externals" --
which we have pointed to repeatedly as likely in the absence of inter
nationally acceptable arrangements -- will be exacerbated and hastened by
the lifting of sanctions against Rhodesia on the part of the UK and/or the
US. The "externals" inability to throw the internal settlement off track
with the assets now available to them can hardly fail to send them in search
of additional help, even if only to improve their bargaining positions
against Salisbury and against each other. We see no political reason why
the Soviets/Cubans/Ethiopians should be inhibited from providing such help
as they deem appropriate to the task.
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ZAMBIA
While it was not discussed, for lack of time, at our meeting, the
DIO wished to call attention to the continuing basic precariousness of
Kaunda's situation in the light of drought (and scarcer food supplies,
with South Africa the potential supplier), ZAPU's apparent intention to
step up greatly the intensity of its military operations using conven-
tional formations, and the likelihood of yet further Rhodesian (or
South Africa, against SWAPO) incursions and raids into Zambian territory.
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