JUNE NIO WARNING MEETINGS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000300110015-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 5, 2007
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: June 29, 1979
• Content Type: MEMO

MEMORI NDUM R." AJ.1- NIOs, Di , D/OPA & D/OER
Herewith Harry Cochran's comments on this
month's warning meetings. I plan to distribute
these regularly for your use in any way that seems
appropriate. I'm making no dissemination except
to NIOs and Office Directors.
Richard Lehman
NIO for Warning
osk
Attachment
5075 FORM 101 USE PREVIOUS
Date 2 July 11079
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29 June 1979
MZORANDUM FOR: NIO for Warning
SUBJECT : June NIO Warning Meetings
With the exception of a brief discussion in the NESA session about
heightened chances of a Syrian-Israeli air clash (which promptly materialized)
the June meetings did not identify new possibilities that might call for
formal warning action. There are four items which, in my view, deserve
more detailed warning analysis than is usually possible in these rather
casual and unstructured meetings: Nicaragua, Afghanistan, Syria-Israel,
and Iraq-Iran. All four contain elements of potential surprise which have not
received adequate attention in current publications.
Nicaragua
The Latin American analysts were absorbed in current developments and
short-term possibilities. They briefly examined alternative outcomes,
reaching a kind of negative consensus that neither the National Guard nor
the Liberal Party will have a role in any conceivable succession arrangements.
They anticipated a sweeping demolition of the status quo but their examination
of the complexion of a successor regime was inconclusive.
As for foreign intervention, the meeting discussed possible actions on
Somoza's behalf by Guatemala, El Salvador, or Honduras. Only Honduras was
seen as a plausible candidate for intervention. The analysts reviewed current
reports of increased Cuban logistics and advisory support to the FSIN, but
curiously did not address the possibility of more direct and conspicuous
Cuban intervention on the Sandinistas' behalf.
None of the participants raised the hypothesis that Castro might perceive
strong incentives and promising opportunities to "be in on the kill." The key
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question of Cuban intentions was not addressed at all. A "detached" observer
could not help wondering if this prime candidate for warning judgment was
excluded from analysts' vision by the assessment of Cuba's policies in Central
and South America in the recently completed NIF, on Cuba (that the Cubans will
60tinuia their low profile posture and concentrate on long-term gains while
avoiding short-term provocations which might compromise their ambitions to
capture leadership of the nonaligned movement).
I am frankly puzzled by this seemingly complacent evaluation of Cuban
intentions and possible initiatives. The assumption seems to be that since
Castro's assistance to the FSLN in the past has been discreet and limited,
this state of affairs will continue into the final showdown phase. The
IIM on the "Military Situation in Nicaragua" (27 June) noted that the establish-
ment of an FSIN "liberated zone" in the Rivas area could be followed by "quick
foreign recognition of the provisional government and a massive influx of
materiel and even foreign troops," but tie memo did not offer even a guarded
conjecture that Cubans might be among those forei; troops.
It seems to me teat more careful consideration should be given to the
possible warning implications of repeated current intelligence judgments that
FSLN leaders are preoccupied with what they perceive to be a genuine danger
of US military intervention. For example, the NID of 26 June said the FSLN
"seems to be particularly anxious to begin a push in the southwest to preempt
any US intervention." Sandinista leaders, in discussing the situation last
weekend, expressed concern about the slow pace of their offensive toward Rivas
and noted the possibility of US intervention.
Humberto Ortega (Terciario faction) 2
expressed concern over possible US intervention or covert assistance to Somoza.
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Despite the "humiliating defeat" of the US resolution in the OAS, he said, the
US retained "great capacity for maneuver." Havana's unusual statement on
19 June charging that the US was plotting "direct intervention" suggests
FSLN apprehensions are 'hared by the Cubans.
We may be dealing here with the familiar problem of conflicting perspectives
and perceptions. Our analysts assume there is virtually no chance of direct
US military intervention, even if pro-Cuban elements in the FSLN seem to be
on the verge of seizing supreme power. But do the embattled FSLN leaders
and their Cuban backers share this assumption?
We now have a broad range of information--evehts, pronouncements, and
intelligence reports which could be interprdted to support a warning judgment
that the Cubans may be contemplating and/or preparing a military intervention
on behalf of, and at the request of, the FSLN provisional government. If such
a warning is not issued, and the Cubans do undertake more conspicuous actions
which could be described as "intervention," it would be awkward to explain
why this contingency was not foreseen in the information available before
the event.
Afghanistan
NESA analysts devoted over half of their meeting to this subject. Several
voiced uneasiness with what they felt was the Soviet specialists, overly
complacent view of the possibility of some form of Soviet military intervention
to prevent the collapse and defeat of tine Taraki regime. The NESA meeting
explored alternatives to the present Kabul government and concluded that, apart
from the present defense minister and a few Parcham exiles in Eastern Europe,
Soviet prospects for installing a more effective leadership are not promising.
The USSR/EE session seemed to discount the factor of Soviet commitments
to support the "popular revolution" in Afghanistan. Both the NIO and analysts
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saw the extent of Pakistani involvement on behalf of the insurgents as the
critical variable. They concluded that the Soviets would react only if there
is a significant increase in Pakistani intervention. An OPA analyst expressed
the view that in the absence of conspicuous Pakistani involvement, the Soviets
will allow the Taraki-Amin regime to collapse without major political or military
moves to save it.
It seems to me there is some danger that Soviet specialists'are edging
toward a premature hardening of assumptions about Soviet interests and intentions
in Afghanistan. The familiar assumption that Moscow's equities in SALT II,
detente, trade and credits, etc. will deter audacious actions around the world,
including Afghanistan, seems to have been a major influence in shaping analysts'
views. They seem to have become more confident in this relaxed assessment
of Soviet intentions as a result of the decline in Soviet allegations of
foreign meddling which was apparent prior to and during the Vienna summit
meeting. TASS commentator Kornilov, however, returned to the charge on
27 June, claiming the Pakistanis, aided by the Chinese, CIA, and other unnamed
"reactionary regimes of the region" (Iran) are providing sanctuary and training
for the rebels.
Current publications, in my view, have gone too far in seeming to minimiae
the chances of Soviet military intervention.
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If our Soviet specialists remain reluctant to consider an Alert Memo
raising the possibility of Soviet military intervention, an alternative might
be to cast a memo in terms of Soviet contingency planning for various
forms of increased military assistance and presence, includ~ng an eventual
introduction of combat forces. I believe there is sufficient evidence
to support a judgment of contingency preparations, including the sensitive
material last month on Politburo-level discussions and preparation of a document
for Brezhnev.
To repeat: I sense some danger that Soviet analysts are becoming locked
into predispositions and preconceptions about Soviet intentions and views of the
stakes in Afghanistan--a mindset which may result in a jarring surprise unless
the tide now flowing against the Kabul regime is reversed in the near future.
I don't quarrel with the assumption that the Soviets ,,will be reluctant to
undertake a military intervention and.ww.ill search for alternatives to this
ccurse of action as long as possible. However, there are uncomfortable parallels
between the analysts' prcEent views about the constraints operating against
Soviet intervention and analytic judgments which preceded forceful Soviet actions
in the past. (Recall, for example, the reasons against a Soviet invasion of
Czechoslovakia that were adduced in summer 1968). Afghanistan certainly is
not another Czechoslovakia in terms of Soviet imperatives, but I would suggest
that the Soviets see their geopolitical interests in Afghanistan as quite
similar to their security requirements in non .'arsaw Pact contiguous states
such as Finland and Mongolia. Would the Soviets acquiesce in the takeover of
Finland or Mongolia by a political/military force perceived to be hostile to
Soviet security needs and under the control. or influence of Soviet adversaries?
In warning analysis, more attention should be given to a governrpent's
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perceptions of interests and stakes in any given situation and less to
constraints and inhibitions on assertive actions to defend these interests.
Preoccupation with factors and reasons that argued against action, rather than
a hard-eyed examination of a regime's perceptions (and/or misperceptions) of
its interests, led analysts last fall to underestimate Vietnam's intentions
in Cambodia and, later, China's reactions to Hanoi's offensive. This same
phenomenon also underlay the misjudgments of Egyptian and Syrian intentions
in October 1973.
S ria-Israel
Although NESA analysts correctly foresaw the growing danger of an air
clash, they did not take the next step by examining the clearly related question
of a change in Syrian policy and calculation of risks.
The potential warning significance of the air clash on 27 June obviously
requires close attention. The shootdown of at least five Syrian fighters will
take on heavy symbolic significance in Arab minds because it will conjure up
memories of the repercussions of the major air battle in April 1967--one of
the factors that impelled Nasir to take his fateful gamble in May-Uune '67.
t e now need a warning assessment that tackles the vital question of
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Positions in Lebanon? Or is he after much higher and broader objectives
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Syrian and Israeli motives and objectives in much greater depth and detail.
For example, is it plausible that Assad is willing to accept the high (and
Potentially catastrophic) risks of engaging Israeli aircraft simply to pursue
a dubious effort to oblige the Israelis to halt air attacks on Palestinian
(to discredit Sadat's policy, derail
Israeli-F,rptian negotiations, force a confrontation with the urpose of
alarming the US into applying unprecedented pressures on Israel to
negotiate a return of the Golan before Israeli annexation becomes irreversible).
In addition to these political objectives, a warning assessment should
address the motivating influence of the internal challenge to Alawite predominance.
Current publications are lag;;ing behind events.)
In sum, military escalation seems certain unless Assad backs down. Lill he
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or can he? Begin is determined to call Assad's bluff. If Syrian-Israeli
escalation occurs, how will Sadat react? Can he afford to proceed with
implementing the peace treaty and the autonomy talks as if nothing has
happened to affect his "peace process?" Or will he be obliged to adjust to
such an abrupt change in the Arab-Israeli equation by disengaging from the
talks and suspending the treaty scenario?
Iraq-Iran
NESA analysts agreed there are growing F'I~sks of military confrontation,
but they did not examine Iraqi or Iranian motives and policies in any detail.
The internal situation in Iran was touched on only tangentially.
The implications of volatile conditions on the border need no further
emphasis. A rapid and perhaps uncontrollable escalation could be triggered
by a seemingly trivial incident. The consequences in terms of US interests
(disruption of Khuzestan oil production and a display of aggressive Iraqi
irredentism in the Gulf) could be very serious. Perhaps it is time to begin
preliminary preparations for an Alert Memo.