REFLECTIONS ON THE SPECIAL REPORT FOR THE PRESIDENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000300110001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 5, 2007
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 3, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2007/06/05: CIA-RDP83B01027R000300110001-5
3 Obber 1979
Reflections on the Special Report for the President
1. The essential purpose of a monthly warning report should be to
provide a succinct but comprehensive check list and assessment of the
current status of potential warning situations. We need a flexible vehicle
which would allow varying treatment, in terms of length and detail, of a
wide range of items. On the one hand, subjects which have been covered
in recent reports could be treated, for continuity purposes, in a sentence
or two if assessments and prognoses have not changed. On the other, items
being covered for the first time, or those being reassessed, would require
enough background and detail to clothe warning judgments with sufficient
impact and meaningfulness. New, unfamiliar, and still inchoate items-which
by the nature of things will be few and infrequent-should be elaborated
in brief annexes-one page if possible.
2. The Special Report should lead off with a highly compressed
check list which would provide a quick overview of the warning outl1ok.
This list would summarize all items discussed in the Report, as well as
note in a sentence or two the status of continuing "watch" items which do
not require more extensive treatment.
3. The proposed format would be composed of three sections:
a. A checklist or table of contents with summaries;
b. Brief discussion of the leading warning topics of the month, in
one or two paragraphs.
c. Annexes which would introduce new topics or present modified
assessments of continuing items.
Procedures:
4. A Special Report of this nature would require a more systematic and
uniform approach than we now have. The present NIO warning assessments,
which are essentially rapporteur reports of the monthly meetings, do not lend
themselves well to the kind of rigorous and distilled Report proposed here.
To be candid, most of the community analysts who attend NIO monthly meetings
are not well qualified by training or experience to deal with the demanding
requirements of serious warning analysis. Informal discussions of events and
exchanges of views and information rarely probe very deeply into the warning
dimensions of current developments. These meetings seldom perform the
indispensable task of weighing alternative interpretations and hypotheses in
a reasonably disciplined and objective manner.
5. Long experience gives little reason to be sanguine that'current
intelligence analysts-no matter how talented and well informed-will ever
accomplish adequately the difficult task of shifting intellectual gears into
the warning mode. Some improvements would be possible if office directors
and division chiefs would take special pains to underline the priority of the
warning function and follow up to ensure that it is receiving sufficient time
and attention.. But we should recognize that the pressures and preoccupations
of current intelligence are often the enemy of effective warning procedures
and assessments. In most cases, it is asking too much of current intelligence
officers to perform both tasks simultaneously. The preeminent warning
hazards --excessive concern with details, preconceptions, congealed and
unexamined assumptions, rigid mindsets, and deficient historical perspective
and memory-may be unavoidable adjucts of the insatiable demands of current
intelligence. A
 Approved For Release 2007/06/05: CIA-RDP83B01027R000300110001-5
2
6. The essential requirements of effective warning are a measure of
detachment from the rush of current events and a sense of the potential
implications of trends and specific developments. The dilemma for management
is how to make sure that the system is giving adequate attention to these
requirements. Line production officers are burdened with too many conflicting
demands on their time and resources. The experiment with the NIO monthly
meetings suggests that most of the participants lack the motivation, time,
experience, and understanding of the unique demands of warning to tackle this
task effectively. (An OPA analyst told me recently that he and his colleagues
regard the monthly round of preparing for the NIO meetings as a nuisance and
intrusion into their daily routines.)
7. If the Special Report is to be more than a summary of the results
of the rather casual and unstructured NIO meetings, requirements and
responsibilities will have to be defined with greater precision. There would
seem to be four alternative"solutions"-all directed toward liberating the
warning process from the chronic conservatism and inertia of the analyst corps:
a. With the approval and authority of the DCI, DDCI, D/NFAC, and NIO/,
procedural and substantive guidelines for the NIO meetings and monthly warning
assessments could be developed and applied.
b. The respective NIOs could be charged with drafting more rigorous and
detailed warning assessments. As agents of the DCI, they should be free to
express their own views even if these depart from the consensus, if any, among
community analysts.
c. NFAC office directors could be charged with preparing the assessments,
in consultation with the NIOs.
d. The NIO/W could assume this responsibility, drawing on the S14S and his
two assistants. The NIOs would review these drafts, but the NIO/W1 in consulta-
tion with the D/NFAC and with the approval of the DDCI and/or the DCI, would
reserve final authority over warning judgments presented in the Special Report.
8. If the years since Pearl Harbor afford one preeminent lesson, it is
that if warning is to be timely and useful to senior decision-makers, it
should not be trammeled or stultified by being subjected to the normal process
of institutional compromise and accommodation. "Coordination" inevitably is
the enemy of both timeliness and clarity. Of all the diverse functions of
intelligence, warning is preeminently the one that demands a clear focus of
responsibility and a capacity to speak "loud and clear", free of the hedges
and qualifications that are both unavoidable and justified in other forms of
national intelligence.
9. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that warning at the national
level-especially as defined by the present DCI-is uniquely the province of
the DCI, and that he must retain the freedom to issue timely and unambiguous
warning, in some cases well in advance of the ponderous process of reaching
agreed community judgments-^a process that will almost always lag well behind
the flow of events and information. The distinction between warning and
estimative procedures and judgments is vital, and the indispensable requirement
for strengthening the national warning performance is to recognize the
institutional and substantive implications of this distinction.
Cochran
 Approved For Release 2007/06/05: CIA-FpP83B011027R000300110001-5
TOP SECRET 0
September
The Warning Outlook in Brief
1. USSR. Brezhnev's growing senility and intensified maneuvering in the
leadership over succession may make Soviet foreign policy behavior more
erratic and unpredictable in the next few months.
2. USSR Afghanistan. Amin's coup against Taraki has not resulted in any
change in Soviet policy, although it appears to have surprised and embarrassed
Moscow. The alerting of Soviet airborne forces in mid-September strongly
suggests that the Soviets were prepared to introduce sizable forces into
Afghanistan if this had been judged necessary to defend Soviet persoiu-,e7
and interests. In view of the fragile position of Amin's regime, the
chances of greater Soviet military involvement probably will increase in
the next 60 days.
3. USSR-China-Vietnam. Both Moscow and Beijing view the new round of talks
as an arena for political warfare, with the Chinese. striving to discredit
Soviet support for Vietnam and inhibit the latter's dry season offensive in
Kampuchea.
4. USSR-Iran. Moscow is downgrading Khomeini's prospects and positioning
itself to capitalize on an expected decline in his authority and control.
5. Syria-Israel. Syrian attempts to challenge Israel's control of Lebanon's
airspace may trigger an escalation which could shake President Assad's
already precarious domestic position.
6. Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. Failure of the London Conference, combined with
more aggressive Rhodesian and South African military operations against
ZANU forces in Mozambique, may oblige the Patriotic Front and the Frontline
States to make decisions which will open unprecedented opportunities for
an expansion of Soviet and Cuban presence and influence.
7. Central America. The Romero regime's precarious position in El Salvador
could be shattered suddenly by large-scale violence precipitated by leftist
provocations. A showdown in Salvador would trigger a sizable increase in
Nicaraguan and Cuban support for the leftists.
8. Morocco. King Hassan's position is becoming more precarious as the
Western Sahara dispute is attracting greater meddling by outside forces.
Egypt perceives an opportunity to draw Morocco away from the Arab rejectionist
coalition by offering political and military support to Hassan. In addition
to Libyan meddling, the Cubans reportdly plan to increase their support to
the Polisario Front. These trends will reinforce Polisario intransigence
in demanding independence for the Western Sahara and increase pressure on
Hassan to negotiate directly with the Polisario as the only avenue to a
settlement. Hassan, however, has little freedom of maneuver because he fears
a popular backlash if he appears to be weakening his claim to Western Sahara.
Annrnved For Release 2007/06/05: CIA-R?P83B01027R000300110001-5 A
 Approved For Release 2007/06/05: CIA-RDP83B01027R000300110001-5
Approved For Release 2007/06/05: CIA-RDP83B01027R000300110001-5