WARNING REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000300090001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 18, 2007
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 20, 1979
• Content Type: MEMO

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
NFAC #6887-79/1
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH : Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
Chairman, National Intelligence Council
FROM : National Intelligence Officer for Africa ~L,
SUBJECT : Warning Report: Sub-Saharan Africa
1. Action Requested: None; the attached report is for your
information.
2. Background: Community representatives and specialists met on
18 December with the NIO/AF as chairman. The attached report has not been
coordinated with the other participants, but is being circulated to them.
If they feel their views have been misrepresented, or if they have
significant additional concerns, I'll report further to you.
Attachment
NFAC #6887-79
-This memorandum is UNCLASSIFIED
when separated from attachment.
William Parmenter
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NIO/AF:WmParmenterci 20Dec79:
Original - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - DD/NFA
1 - Chairman, NIC
1 - NIO/AF
1 - NFAC/RI
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WARNING REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA* No. 14
USSR, CUBA, ET AL.
In contrast to last month, there have been few reports or indications
of Soviet policy thinking on Africa during November/December. Analysts
believe, however, that we are still in a period where Moscow is keeping
its options open, especially in southern Africa, where a breakdown of the
Lancaster House settlement arrangements would, if it occurs, both confirm
Soviet warnings to the Patriotic Front and offer a fresh opportunity for
Soviet meddling. Again, the attitudes of the Frontline States would be
crucial to whatever new line the Soviets might take, and analysts are
unable to foresee circumstances in the next two to three months that would
lead the Frontline to appeal for Soviet/Cuban help on a new, larger scale.
There has been some revival of interest in a Soviet/Zambian arms
deal; it is not clear that this represents a new departure -- it may only
be a reflex to the punishing Rhodesian raids into Zambia earlier this fall.
Cuban attitudes toward southern Africa appear to analysts to be a
little more positive than Soviet attitudes toward a Rhodesian settlement.
Analysts believe Havana has been so disappointed by the ineptitude of the
Patriotic Front guerrillas that the Cubans now hope the settlement process
can work out so that Cuba's assets for future influence can be better
preserved than they would be by further fighting.
There are also signs that both Soviets and Cubans are uneasy over
developments in Angola. As we indicated last month, there appears to be
a fair possibility that an open power struggle will take place in Luanda
between now and next spring. The new president, Dos Santos, was to be in
Moscow this week on a visit that has already been postponed once.
RHODESIA, ZAMBIA, ETC.
Despite analsyts' ready admission that "a thousand things" can go
wrong in the transition process, the general opinion is that the parties
will somehow muddle through to elections. After that event, tentatively
scheduled for February at the earliest, the balloon may well go up again.
*This memorandum is one of a series produced monthly by NI0/AF. Its purpose
is to review possible developments in the short-term future that would be
--damaging to US interests. Obviously many of these developments will not
occur in the time-frame or in the manner suggested, or will not occur--zit all.
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There is a potential for coups, withdrawals into the bush by parties who
feel they have suffered intolerable setbacks, new foreign interventions
(more or less covert) to help one or another of the parties, and so on.
A fresh exodus of whites is possible in the post-election period; a South
African intervention, open and in force, seems less likely as time goes on
but remains a threat.
Analysts also point out that both Zambia and Mozambique are in such
basically bad shape that a renewal of the struggles and troubles in
Rhodesia could have very serious consequences in either or both countries,
primarily economic but possibly spilling over into politics. The potential
for a food crisis in Zambia late this winter remains very serious. This
could also affect Shaba.
NAMIBIA AND ANGOLA
We believe South Africa will continue to string out the Namibian
negotiations with the West and the internal parties for some time yet,
encouraged by the disarray they and we sense in Angola and watching events
in Rhodesia.
In addition to the problems inside the Angolan regime, UNITA may
become an increasing factor as the contending parties in Luanda cast about
for support. UNITA's position has been improved as a result of the now
apparent decision of the Cubans to pull back from direct participation in
major operations against UNITA in the far south. This also, of course,
leaves SWAPO even less protected in this region from the South Africans.
EAST AFRICA
Analysts are concerned about the impact of more intensive US use of
port facilities along the East African coast, Djibouti and Mombasa (Kenya)
being the points in question. They note that some 75% of Kenya's oil comes
from Iran.
There is a possibility of further Ethiopian air attacks on Somalia
in coming weeks, as it does not appear that the Ethiopians have really
"gotten the attention" of the Somalis yet. In Eritrea, the "sixth offensive"
by the Ethiopians is still to come, but possibly not for some time yet.
WEST AFRICA
In Ghana, another coup remains a real possibility, but analysts feel
they cannot say when. Mild optimism prevails about Liberia; circumstances
are compelling the governing elite to get its act together more effectively.
Chad remains a state of suspended disintegration; it is clear that the French
_-presence is ever more necessary to keep the body alive. Sierra Leone has
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a hard period ahead; it must prepare the potlatch for the OAU conference
in 1980, and resources are scarce as usual.
King Hassan is making no friends in the rest of Africa, and to the
extent that the US is identified with Morocco through arms supply, some of
the distaste for his attitudes on the Polisario and Mauritania is rubbing
off on us.
INDIAN OCEAN
No new developments, but the Seychelles government, hypersensitive
to foreign conspiracies and sympathetic to the socialist left, is reported
working out a program to allot foreign naval port calls on an annual basis;
this could have an effect on some US operations in the area.
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