WARNING REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000300080040-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2007
• Sequence Number: 40
• Publication Date: January 29, 1980
• Content Type: MEMO

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE Nlolio
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
NFAC #0653-80/2
29 January 1980
MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution
SUBJECT : Warning Report: Sub-Saharan Africa
1. Attached is my report to the DCI based on our meeting on
22 January. If there are any significant amendments or additions to
your views as I have reported them, please get in touch as soon as
possible.
2. We would like to take this opportunity to invite you to next
month's
i
warn
ng meeting on Tuesday, 19 February at 1:30 p.m. in
by COB Friday, 15 February with the names and clearances of your
representatives.
3. In order to make our monthly warning meetings more efficient
we request that you notify by telephone or memo the week prior to the
meeting of specific concerns. What we have in mind are concerns which do
not fall within our normal order of march at these meetings. Much of
our warning meetings is devoted to southern Africa and the Horn, and by
notifying us of your other concerns we will be able to pace the meeting
accordingly and ensure that appropriate specialists are present.
L. Gr owan
National Intelligence Officer
for Africa
Attachment
NFAC #0653-80
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NFAC #0653-80
25 January 1980
Warning Report: Sub-Saharan Africa No. 15
USSR, CUBA, ET AL
1. A concern expressed by the analysts this month is a possible Soviet
response to US initiatives resulting from the Afghanistan invasion, i.e.
stepped up Soviet activity in the Horn and Indian Ocean areas. In the Indian
Ocean it is anticipated that there will be increased Soviet effort to expand
relations with the islands in the area over the next number of months. It was
pointed out theat African countries with friendship treaties with the Soviet
Union are all somewhat nervous over Soviet action in Afghanistan and in the
case of Angola it may heighten their long-held suspicion of the Soviets.
Otherwise, there are no reports of substantial change in the level of Soviet
activity throughout Sub-Saharan Africa. The formation of a political party
in Ethiopia under Soviet guidance offers an opportunity for further consolida-
tilon of the Soviet position there.
2. The Soviets are providing. options in Rhodesia by training ZAPU
guerrillas for possible action in Rhodesia whould the settlement process
break down, and continue to support the ZAPU election campaign, but again
their actions continue to be influenced strongly by Frontline positions.
3. There continues to be substantial interest in the development of a
Soviet/Zambian arms deal and it is reported that arms are being imported
from Iraq. Analysts:are still unsure whether there is any connection between
these two arms deals.
4. It appears that the Soviets are fairly comfortable with the new
leadership in Angola and the Dos Santos visit to Moscow was treated with
consdierable importance by the Soviets. Some analysts felt, however, that
the Soviet feeling toward Dos Santos was not necessarily permanent and that
if' he proved to be a weak leader and was replaced Moscow would have close
relations with whoever succeeded him.
RHODESIA
5. The analysts expressed optimism that the Rhodesian elections would
proceed as planned at the end of February, but the critical period would come
after the elections. The coalition building process would take some time since
his memorandum is one of a series produced monthly by NI0/AF. Its purpose
-is
is to review possible developments in the short-term future that would be
to US interests. Obviously, many of these developments will not
occur in the time-frame or in the manner suggested, or will not occur at all.
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there appears to be no clear cut winner in the elections. The powerbrokering
that will go on during the post-election period may lead to a fragmentation
of parties. The role of the whites in any post-election Zimbabwe is by no
means clear. The hope is that the government will be born in such a way
that a rapid exodus can be prevented.
6. The key question in the post-election period will be who controls
the guns and what should be done with those who are already armed. The
potential for a South African military intervention remains but the genera
feeling was that South Africa would make every effort to get along with any
government resulting from the elections. The overall feeling was that
"a thousand things" could go wrong after the elections.
7. The analysts felt that the Frontline States would make every effort
to accept the results of the elections since neither Zambia nor Mozambique
were anxious to see the fighting continue. Potential for a food crisis in
Zambia continues but relief could be gained from resumption of transportation
of food from South Africa. The analysts were somewhat divided on how
serious Kaunda's foreign policy "tilt to the East" should be viewed. Some
felt that it may be to some degree posturing in order to attract greater
attention from the West. Other analysts believe that this "tilt" reflects
Kaunda's deep concern for Zambian security in the face of possible increased
instability in southern Africa. All seem to agree that the West will not
get the automatic support of Zambia in the short run; at least not until
the Rhodesia situation settles down.
NAMIBIA AND ANGOLA
8. The situation in Namibia has not changed and it is expected that
South Africa will take no further action until after the Rhodesian elections.
9. The recent changes in the Angolan government were nbt thought to be
an indication of serious change in the MPLA front, but we still do not have
sufficient sources of information on Angola to evaluate this fully.
EAST AFRICA
10. Some concern was expressed regarding the continuing tensions in
Zanzibar but it was not felt that these would constitute a serious problem
for the Nyerere government.
11. In the Horn, the Ethiopian military forces continue to be pressed
by the Eritrean insurgents with heavy casualties on the Ethiopian side.
12. New efforts are being made by both the Soviets and the Sudanese to
encourage Mengistu to seek a negotiated settlement but he continues to resist.
Some analysts look for increasing Saudi support for the Eritreans as a result
--of Soviet moves in Afghanistan.
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13. If the US gains increased access to naval and air facilities in
the Horn and region a shrill reaction from Ethiopia and the Indian Ocean
Islands is to be expected. Specific reactions might include termination
of the US tracking station in the Seychelles and perhaps more Soviet involve-
ment with the anti-Siad Somali Salvation Front.
WEST AFRICA
14. In Ghana the analysts felt that the maneuvering by Rawlings was
more a matter of desperation than a serious threat to the present government.
The political climate of Liberia appears to be improving. An opposition
party has been legally registered for the first time since 1955. No
immediate crisis is foreseen in Senegal but there appears to be a very
difficult road ahead in terms of economic improvement. The question is
whether Diouf can succeed in restraining his opposition in view of the
severe economic constraints which may have to be imposed over the next
few months. The situation in Chad remains as it was last month -- in a
state of suspension. The Libyans and Nigerians would like to have French
troops leave to be replaced with an African peace-keeping force but the
chances for a successful use of a peace-keeping force appear to be sub-
stantially less than before.
15. In the Western Sahara a recognition of a Polisario government
by the OAU would affect US interests, particularly our relations with
Morocco. It was felt, however, that there was little likelihood of enhanced
Cuban military assistance for the Polisario. There was some feeling that
the Cubans desire to decrease their military presence abroad and this might
result in a drawdown of Cuban forces in Angola and Ethiopia.
CENTRAL AFRICA
16. There is mild optimism regarding the situation in Zaire. Mobutu
appears to be responding to pressure to get his act together and to be
more responsive to critics. The recent reshuffling of the cabinet combined
with other internal reforms and the return of political refugees gives
some hope of easing internal tensions but there is still a very long road
to go.
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