WARNING REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000300080031-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Sequence Number: 31
• Content Type: MEMO

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NFAC #1271-80/1
21 February 1980
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
VIA . Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
FROM . National Intelligence Officer for Africa
SUBJECT . Warning Report: Sub-Saharan Africa
1. Action Requested: None; the attached report is for your
information.
2. Background: Community representatives and specialists met on
19 February with the NIO/AF as chairman. The attached report has not
been coordinated with the other participants, but is being circulated
to them. If they feel their views have been misrepresented, or if they
have significant additional concerns,I'll report further to you.
Attachment
NFAC #1271-80
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NFAC #1271-80
20 February 1980
WARNING REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA* No. 16
USSR, CUBA, ET AL
area. was pointed out tMat an iopian air s ri e nas een carri-
on as far into Somalia as Iscia Baidoa and somewhat increased activities
by the Somali Salvation Front along with the air strike might indicate
increased Ethiopian and thereby Soviet pressure on Siad. It was agreed,
however, that the Ethiopians/Soviets could, if they wished, step up
pressure on Siad through military means as well as by meddling in Somali
tribal rivalries.
2. It was agreed that there was no evidence of a drawdown of Cuban
troops in Ethiopia. The question of Cuban presence in the Western Sahara
was raised; concomitant was the point whether or not the Algerians really
want Cubans in the Western Sahara at all. They may be contented only
with advisers but are not interested in troop support for the Polarisio
which would reduce Algerian influence.
3. The Cubans are improving their entree into Uganda, although not
to an alarming degree. There is continued evidence of a drift toward
a more anti-Western non-aligned position within the government of the
Seychelles which may place the continued use of the US tracking station
there in jeopardy. It was reported that the Seychelles is preparing to
send eight officers to Cuba for military training and last week received
over 100 tons of small arms from the Soviet Union.
ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA
4. The increased level of violence in the pre-election period was a
matter of concern; possible developments in the post-election period were
a matter of very substantial concern given the extent of uncertain variables.
It was agreed that there was some risk that the elections might not be held
at all but that if they were, Soames might well ask Nkomo to form a govern-
ment. If the British follow their present determination to pull out
immediately after the election there will be a strong possibility of chaos.
* This memorandum is one of a series produced monthly by NI0/AF. Its purpose
is to review possible developments in the short-term future that would be
damaging to US interests. Obviously many of these developments will not
occur in the time-frame or in the manner suggested, or will not occur at all.
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There have been reports that the Rhodesian forces might attack the
Mugabe forces at the collection points but no firm evidence to this
effect has been seen. There is, however, undoubtedly contingency plan-
ning. General Walls is the key actor in the scene since if he were to
pull out of the Lancaster House agreement, violence would become wide-
spread. It was agreed that the South African reaction to any electoral
result could not be evaluated yet but that the South Africans were opera-
ting on a hair trigger basis. The South Africans were very concerned
over maintaining the integrity of the Rhodesian security forces and
there was some risk that South Africa might participate in a preemptive
move against ZANU.
5. It was felt by most analysts that the Frontline continues to
be deeply interested in a "successful" settlement. It is unlikely that
a resumption of the war by ZANU would take place without the approval of
Machel.
6. The Soviets would probably beX.with an Nkomo-Muzorewa deal,
but the Soviets would probably follow everyone else's lead as a way of
playing to the other African countries.
NAMIBIA
7. It was agreed that there would be no substantial change in the
Namibian situation until after the South African Government had developed
a feel for the situation in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia after the elections. As a
result, diplomatic tensions are likely to rise as a consequence of the slow
pace of UN negotiations. South Africa feels comfortable with the Thatcher
government and we would expect Pretoria to work toward establishing the UK
as first-among-equals in the Contact Group. There has been some stepped
up fighting in Namibia but not of a serious nature.
ANGOLA
8. Further information was being developed regarding the Catete
group but little was known regarding the potential strengths and weaknesses
of this key actor in the ongoing power struggle. It was felt that there
was a real potential that the power struggle would result in some changes
in the regime during the course of this year. It was noted that UNITA has
apparently weathered the latest government/Cuban sweep operation and the
view was expressed that increased UNITA activity in central and north
Angola could be expected.
9. The Cubans and Soviets seem nervous about developments in Angola.
Their understanding of the process of Angolan internal politi-cs should not
be overstated.
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SOUTH AFRICA
10. There was some question as to whether the Silverton Bank raid
marked the beginning of increased organized activity by the ANC. There
is not sufficient evidence to warrant this conclusion at the moment,
but further evidence of this nature should be expected and watch should
be kept to see if a pattern is emerging.
HORN OF AFRICA
11. The meeting recorded the apparent presence of Somali regular
units inside the Ogaden. Siad is attempting to bolster up his internal
position by dividing up official appointments among tribal groups. The
question of collusion between the Soviet and Libyan interests in Djibouti
was raised. The Libyans are clearly pursuing the French at every point
possible and make no secret of the fact that their recent support in arms
for Djibouti was an attempt to reduce French influence there.
CHAD
12. The situation in Chad remains as complicated as it was in the
past month but it was agreed that the Chadian government is going to have
to choose between the Libyans and the French. If the French leave, the
ramifications of their departure would go far beyond Chad. Chad is not
only the scene of a civil war but also the scene of conflict between the
Libyans and the French. Other African leaders in surrounding countries
are seriously worried about the possibility of a French departure as a
reflection of French resolve. It was agreed that a French departure is
unlikely but in that event the African peacekeeping force would be in no
position whatever to maintain the peace and Libya would have a free hand.
WEST AFRICA
13. Attention was drawn to the continuing bickering among the
political parties in Nigeria and the use of strong arm tactics by the
Shagari supporters. This is symptomatic of the earlier problems of
civilian governments in Nigeria, but it was not felt that this was of an
immediately serious nature.
14. The Nigerian government is insisting upon immediate US agreement
on future purchases of liquid natural gas. The development of LNG
facilities in Nigeria has a high priority for the Nigerian government and
the US decision on LNG probably would affect continued US access to Nigerian
oil.
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15. In Ghana the threat of strikes is ever present as a disrupting
factor and the government continues to be worried about the future
activities of Rawlings.
WEATHER AND CROPS
16. It was agreed that the food situation in Africa is becoming more
serious and it was suggested that a representative of OGCR's Food and
Population Branch be asked to come to next month's warning meeting to
discuss the situation in greater detail.
SECRET
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