MONTHLY WARNING ASSESSMENT: NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000300080017-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Sequence Number: 17
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For_Rele.ase 2007/06104.: CIA-RDP83B01027R000300080017-2
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NFAC 3124-80
29 April 1980
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
FROM: Robert C. Ames
National Intelligence Officer for Near East and South Asia
SUBJECT: Monthly Warning Assessment: Near East and South Asia
1. Lebanon. With the approach of UNIFIL renewal on 19 June and the
current tough Israeli/Haddad attitude toward UNIFIL 25X1
analysts wondered what might happen in southern Lebanon if UNIFIL 25X1
pulls out. Haddad would probably expand his area of operations and thereby
come into direct conflict with the Palestinians -- who have received increased
quantities of equipment recently (e.g. longer range rockets) and might
again begin using southern Lebanon as a base for terrorist attacks into
Israel. The Israelis, who show signs of returning to a more pre-emptive
policy, could declare a free-fire zone all the way up to the Litani. Having
learned from the success of their August 1979 shelling of southern Lebanon
(compared to the failure of their March 1978 ground incursion), the
Israelis might decide to eliminate the Tyre pocket by firepower rather than
with ground forces. A Syrian reaction to this could mean Syrian-Israeli
confrontations (artillery and air battles) north of the Red Line. One
result of all this would be a major set back for, if not a fatal blow to,
the slowly improving Lebanese Army -- and perhaps even the fall of the Sarkis
government,
2. South Yemen. Although Abd al-Fatah Ismail was a very sick man,
leaders in Middle East countries just don't "resign." His nominal replace-
ment, Hasani, is a South Yemeni nationalist, not the Soviets' man. He is
not an advocate of union with North Yemen (as Ismail was). Hasani, then,
seems "better" for US and Saudi interests in the region. However, if the
Defense Minister, Ali Antar, should rise to the top, US and Saudi interests
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would be set back. Ali Antar is totally a creature of the Soviets. Some
debate among analysts occurred over the possibility of a Soviet hand in
engineering this change of leadership in South Yemen. If, indeed, All
becomes the real power in South Yemen, it could be because the Soviets
wanted to counter US moves in the region by. firmly establishing in power
the PDRY leader with wham they were most comfortable. One analyst, however,
stated that the Soviets would never install a military leader in an LDC
because of their own ideological distaste for military leadership - i.e.
the Soviets favor military subordination to civilian leadership. The
counter argument was that the military - not the socialist party - is the
strongest institution in South Yemen. The Soviets, being pragmatic,
recognize this and will deal with whomever they must. Finally, the
impact of the South Yemen leadership change on the National Democratic
Front was briefly discussed: Although losing some momentum, the nationalist
appeal of the NDF will continue (i.e. nationalist opposition in North
Yemen to its becoming a Saudi puppet state).
3. Morocco. The much-heralded operation to relieve the garrison at
Zaag in southern Morocco is imminent. The Moroccans have, in effect,
ceded the Western Sahara to the Polisario during this operation. If this
(third) task force fails -- which would demonstrate a Polisario capability
to seize and hold terrain in Morocco proper -- there will be increased
domestic pressure on Hassan. There is already increased foreign pressure
on his Western Sahara position: the SDAR is being recognized by an increasing
number of countries. A major diplomatic set back could occur at the next
OAU vote,
4. International Oil Situation. Iran has squandered its clout on the
oil market, and oil seems to have become a somewhat less important issue in
the. short term. One analyst wondered, however, whether there would still
he a "glut" of oil and reduced pressure on prices after 26 May. He asked
how long Saudi production at 9.5m b/d could be expected to continue.
(On this last point there seemed to be general agreement that the Saudis
tend to use their oil policy as a carrot rather than a stick -- i,.e.
the Saudis would probably not cut back substantially unless they determined
the international market could bear it in an orderly fashion.) Finally,
Iraq's capability to make up some of the difference if Iran suddenly drops
out was mentioned: Iraq, currently at 3.3m b/d has the capacity to increase
to 3.7m b/d.
5. Agenda Item for May Warning Meeting. The likely consequences of
the passing of the 26 May deadline for the conclusion of the autonomy
talks -- discussed briefly last month -- was not addressed again this
month. NIO/NESA asked that participants in next month's warning meeting
come prepared to discuss this issue in detail.
Robert C. Ames. -
Aaaroved For Release 2007/06/04: CIA-RDP83B01027R000300080017-2
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NFAC 3124-80
29 April 1980
SUBJECT: Monthly Warning Assessment: Near East and South Asia
A/NIO/NESA
Distribution:
(25 Apr.
80)
I
Orig - Addee
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - DD/NFA
1 - DD/NFAC
1 - C/NIC
2 - NI0/NESA
-Each NIO
1 - Each Office Director
1 - Senior Review Panel
1 - NSC Coordinator
1 - OPA/NESA
1 - OPA/USSR
1 - OER/D/NE
1 - OER/D/SA
1 - NFAC Reg
1 - DDO/NE
1 - DDO/EPDS
1 - NITO/Near East
1 - NFAC/RES
1 - State/INR/RNA
1 - DIO/Near East
1 - DIA/DN2E1
1 - NSA/C-6
1 - ONI/Estimates Br
1 - AF/INER
1 - HQ USMC Code INTP
1 - OSI/LSD
1 - ACSI DAMI FII
SECRE