MONTHLY WARNING ASSESSMENT: USSR-EE (MEETING HELD ON 20 MAY 1980)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000300080013-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Sequence Number: 13
• Content Type: MEMO

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Approved For Release 2007/06/04: CIA-RDP83BO1027R000300080013-6
National Intelligence Officers
NFAC #3757-80
22 May 1980
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Int
Deputy Director of Cent
VIA . Bruce C. Clarke, Jr.
elligence
ral Intelligence
Deputy Director, Nation
Richard Lehman
National Intelligence O
al Foreign Assessment
fficer for Warning
SUBJECT :
Acting, National i
Monthly Warning As
ntell
sessm
igence Officer for USSR-EE
E
ent: S
(Meeting held on 20 May
1980)
M
25X1
25X1
1. Warsaw Pact PCC Results. No developments with warning
implications emerged from the rece ting of the Warsaw Pact's
Political Consultative Committee.
2. Afghanistan. A CIA analyst stated that another Soviet division
may be on its way into Afghanistan but agreed that the evidence for this
was only circumstantial. There was also general agreement that the
Soviets could expect no quick improvement in their posture in Afghanistan,
although they could keep the insurgents at bay while they attempted to 25X1
rebuild the Afghan army and police and to gain public support in the cities.
It was also agreed that there was no evidence that the Soviets
were seriously interested in negotiating the neutralization of Afghanistan.
It was noted that the Soviets have in fact been making increasingly
intransi ent demands in their statements dealing with the neutralization25X1
issue.
The question was posed of what the Soviet response would be to an
upsurge in the insurgency. There was general agreement that a substantial
improvement in the military effectiveness of the insurgents would lead to
greater Soviet efforts to seal the Afghan-Pakistani border and to subject
Islamabad to political-military pressure. Any serious attempt to seal
the Afghan-Pakistani border would, of course, require a large augmentation
of Soviet troops. At the same time, most analysts agreed that the insurgents
could not significantly increase their military effectiveness without a
much higher level of training. And it was felt that only a qualitatively
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N,IAC #3757-80
22 May 1980
higher level of damage inflicted by the insurgents woyl d be likely
to produce a shift in Soviet policy toward Pakistan. u 25X1
3. Iran. It was noted that Iran had approved a trade protocol
with the USSR this week, but that its terms were very general. The
Soviets were building a new rail transshipment facility and upgrading
another on their side of the border with Iran, but -- given problems
within Iran -- this was unlikely to have a larg act on the
transportation of goods to Iran via the USSR. " 25X1
The issue of trucks and tents observed in the Transcaucasus was
discussed at length. There was agreement that this activity was
harvest-related and normal. At the same time, it was agreed that
recent increases in military transport flights into the area were
probably related to an on-going, long-term effort to se the
preparedness of armed forces in the Transcaucasus. M 25X1
4. Yugoslavia. So far the transition from Tito's rule has gone
smoothly; the collective leadership arrangements set up before Tito's
death and calling for a rotation in the occupancy of top governmental
posts are being put into practice. Political struggles might arise
later in the year, however, that could strain these arrangements. The
Yugoslav leaders are making a concerted effort to get out into the various
republics and emphasize the unity of the different nationalities, and --
despite some potential unrest among Moslems in Bosnia-Hertegovina and
Albanians in Kosovo -- ethnic tensions in the country appear to be under
control. The Yugoslavs are procrastinating in the face of tough economic
choices (which have nationality dimensions), but for the time being the
economic situation is nevertheless tolera and is unlikely to deteriorate
sharply within the next several months. n 25X1
5. The Soviet Leadership. There was no dissent from the view that
Ustinov's absence would not make much difference in the operation of the
leadership. The Soviet leadership appears to be conducting business as
usual, and nobody in the leadership seems interested in shaking things up.
There are a few reports of second thoughts within the leadership about the
wisdom of the invasion of Afghanistan, but we see no signs of high-level
factional infighting. A Central Committee plenum is likely to be convened
in late May or in June to discuss the directives for the 1981-85 economic
five-year plan and possibly the agenda for the XXVI Party Congress. Political
activity will probably increase as the Congress approaches and decisions
have to be made on the Politburo membership -- perhaps including the
replacement of Ustinov. I 25X1
in any area.
6. Overall. No warnings of imminent serious problems were indicated
 Approved For Release 2007/06/04: CIA-RDP83BO1027R000300080013-6
Approved For Release 2007/06/04: CIA-RDP83BO1027R000300080013-6