MONTHLY WARNING ASSESSMENT: LATIN AMERICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000300080010-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Sequence Number: 10
• Content Type: MEMO

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Officers
NFAC-3795-80/1
23 May 1980
MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution
FROM : National Intelligence Officer for Latin America
SUBJECT : Monthly Warning Assessment: Latin America
1. Attached is a copy of the Latin America Warning Assessment
based upon our discussion of 20 May 1980.
2. The next warning meeting will be held on 17 June 1980 at
1100 hours in room 5G00 CIA headquarters. Tentative agenda for the
meeting is as follows:
-- Cuba
Jamaica
-- El Salvador
-- Nicaragua
-- Bolivia
-- Brazil
Please calli by noon on 16 June to give her
the name of the individual participating from your office.
Att: (1)
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NFAC-3795-80
23 May 1980
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
National Intelligence Officers
THROUGH . Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
FROM . National Intelligence Officer for Latin America
SUBJECT : Monthly Warning Assessment: Latin America
1. Action Requested: None; for your information only,
2. Cuba
The Castro government has turned off the political tumult it
previously had provoked to counter the embarrassment of the refugee
situation and to divert attention from underlying political and
economic problems. But these problems still seem more serious than
any Castro has faced for at least a decade. The ever-growing numbers
of Cubans who strongly desire to leave the island and the intense
resentment of them by regime stalwarts could spark a renewal of street
violence at a time inconvenient to Castro.
without the usual precondition of dropping the US embargo--probably
indicate an unusual degree of concern about US intentions and Cuba's
prospects on the part of Castro and some of his advisors. Hard line
advisors, in contrast, might see a return to anti-US tirades as
essential for maintaining revolutionary fervor at home and may work
on Castro toward this end if the US response can be depicted as
unsatisfactory from Cuba's point of view.
Recent signals of a willingness to discuss bilateral problems--
RVW MAY 86
DRV 3d3
BY SIGNER
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
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The action's-of Cuban aircraft first against a Bahamian Coast
Guard vessel and then against a US Coast Guard helicopter appear to
have been blunders by local commanders or individual pilots. Inadequate
command controls of Cuban aircraft from Havana might again lead to
nasty incidents during a period of heightened domestic or international
tensions.
3. Jamaica
The escalating political violence and worsening economic
conditions in Jamaica remain matters for concern. A high level of
partisan violence is a characteristic of Jamaican elections--both to
intimidate the other party and stimulate the spirits of supporters.
Either Manley or his radical supporters may see violence as a means of
avoiding the elections altogether, to avoid near certain defeat. Seaga
and his Jamaica Labor Party may be hard pressed to avoid escalation
in the face of PNP provokations. The best bet is that mass disturbances
will be avoided and that elections will take place, but it is not a
sure bet.
4. El Salvador
After one says "where there is life there's hope", there is
little room for optimism for US objectives in El Salvador. The
escalation of rural violence, the dangerous economic situation, and
the increased influence of military hard liners make it increasingly
difficult for the Christian Democrats to stay in the government and
extremely unlikely that other centrist civilians will lend support.
While the extreme leftist can probably be held at bay for some time,
the government may become even more characterized as a repressive one,
and less defendable as a reformist one over the next month or so.
5. Nicaragua
The Sandinistas are still maintaining a facade of pluralism,
but they probably have undercut the will and the ability of the
private sector and moderate political forces to resist further movement
toward one-party Marxist. rule. The reports of anti-Sandinista armed
resistance within Nicaragua (including the participation of the exiled
former supporters of Somoza) add to the complexity of the situation.
The resistance probably is not strong enough to do real damage, and
its activities may give the Sandinistas added motivation to crack down
on the non-violent opposition.
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5. Suriname
The influence of leftists on the government continues to
increase, and the effectiveness of moderates in maintaining constitutional
forms and conservative policies is eroding.
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Distribution:
1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - DD/NFA
1 - C/NIC
1 - NIO/W
1 - NI0/AF
1 - NI0/CH-EA
1 - NI0/GPF
1 - NI0/NESA
1 - NI0/PE
1 - NI0/USSR-EE
1 - NI0/WE
1 - NIO/SP
1 - Senior Review Panel
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1 - D/OCO
1 - D/OCR
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1 - D/OGCR
1 - D/OIA
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1 - D/OSWR
1 - NFAC Reg
1 - ER
1 - AS/NFAC
2 - N I0/ LA