MONTHLY WARNING ASSESSMENT: LATIN AMERICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000300080003-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Sequence Number: 3
• Content Type: MEMO

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
NFAC-4463-80/1
23 June 1980
MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution
FROM
: National Intelligenc
e Officer for Latin America
SUBJECT
: Monthly Warning Asse
ssment: Latin America
1. Attached is a copy of the Latin America Warning Assessment
based upon our discussion of 17 June 1980.
2. The next warning meeting will be held on 22 July 1980 at
1100 hours in room 5G00 CIA headquarters. Tentative agenda for the
meeting is as follows:
NIO/W
Cuba and Latin American revolutionaries
-- Jamaica
-- El Salvador
Nicaragua
-- Guatemala
Bolivia
-- Soviet intervention in. Latin America
Please calli by noon on 21 July to give her
the name o e individual participating from your office.
Jack Davis
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
NFAC-4463-80
23 June 1980
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
FROM . National Intelligence Officer for Latin America
SUBJECT : Monthly Warning Assessment: Latin America
1. Action Requested: None; for your information only.
2. Cuba
The Impact on domestic policy of the growing influence of
hard-line advisors to Castro is clear: greater repression; intensified
efforts to raise revolutionary fervor. The impact on foreign policy is
not as clear. The increasing stream of invective against governments
Castro's pragmatic advisors tried to cultivate (Venezuela and Costa
Rica in particular) can probably be attributed to the rise in hard-line
influence. Less concern about Cuban image in these countries would
support other evidence of stronger Cuban support for Latin American
revolutionaries--a long time hard-line position. Castro's frustration
over US unwillingness to negotiate bilaterally could strengthen his
incentives for stepping up support to revolutionaries. On the other
hand, if Castro really is concerned about a growing danger of a US attack
on Cuba (apparently one key reason for seeking US talks), stepped up
support to Latin American revolutionaries would seem a risky business.
3. Jamaica
The greater backbone shown by the Jamaican police force (in
attacking government political manipulation of the force) and the
increased public and special interest support of the opposition JLP
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would argue against the chances for success of an attempt by radicals in
Manley's entourage to cement themselves in power through illegal action.
However, in an increasingly tense and disorderly environment, a serious
attempt by the radicals cannot be ruled out (perhaps 20-25 percent likeli-
hood). Nor can its success, if attempted (perhaps 10-15 percent likelihood).
Under the circumstances, and considering the important US stakes in danger
should a successful strike for power take place; prompt attention to
contingency planning for US action in a possible crisis would seem prudent.
4. El Salvador
So far the military and security forces are holding their own
against the military forces of the extreme left. But there is no evidence
that the will or the power of the extreme left is diminishing. And there
are increasing signs of preparations for greater arms supplies from
abroad. Also, the government is not doing well at all on the political
front, where unbridled rightwing violence (with the complicity of govern-
ment forces) continues to undercut the Junta's legitimacy at home and
abroad. Also, the economic situation worsens steadily. We thus could
face over the next couple of months a stronger extreme left confronting
a weaker and possibly unravelling government.
6. Brazil
We still are not confident that the Brazilian government will
be able to pull itself out of its imposing economic difficulties and
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stick to its promised political liberalization program. Should the
government lose confidence in its pragmatic corrective policies, it might--
some months down the road--give vent to the considerable hypernationalism
in some sectors (e.g., attacks on multinationals, demands for debt relief
or selective default). This would likely make matters worse in Brazil and
create special difficulties for the US.
Jack Davis
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Distribution:
1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - DD/NFA
1 - C/NIC
1 - N I 0/W
1 - NI0/AF
1 - NI0/EA
1 - NI0/GPF
1 - NI0/NESA
1 - NI0/PE
1 - NI0/USSR-EE
1 - NI0/WE
1 - NIO/SP
1 - Senior Review Panel
1 - NSC Coordinator
1 - SA/NPI
1 - SA/CI
1 - D/OCO
1 - D/OCR
1 - D/OER
1 - D/OGCR
1 - D/OIA
1 - D/ O PA
1 - D/OSR
1 - D/OSWR
1 - NFAC Reg
1 - ER
1 - AS/NFAC
2 - NI0/LA