MONTHLY WARNING ASSESSMENT: LATIN AMERICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000300070032-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 16, 2007
• Sequence Number: 32
• Publication Date: August 20, 1980
• Content Type: MEMO

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
NFAC-5803-80
20 August 1980
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH . Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
FROM : Assistant NIO for Latin America
SUBJECT : Monthly Warning Assessment: Latin America
1. Action Requested: none; for your information only,
2. Jamaica
The preelectoral scene remains largely unchanged: Manley and
his PNP party are expected to lose the approaching elections, giving
way to the moderate Labor Party. Election-related violence, a Jamaica
tradition, is virtually certain to continue, but we doubt that it will
reach levels that could derail the election process. Even so, we
believe that PNP radicals will continue to probe for an opening to lock
on to power and we anticipate disruptive actions such as attacks on US
property or personnel, or on prominent Jamaicans.
3. El Salvador
There has been no fundamental change, but there are some mildly
encouraging signs. Last week's leftist-led general strike was largely
unsuccessful, and this is apt to bolster the junta's confidence. More-
over, the government has shown some modest signs of growing adroitness:
of late it has made more effective use of the media to take its case to
the public, and skillfully handled a ticklish diplomatic problem with
Mexico. The regime until now has largely failed to project a favorable
image, crucial to gaining international support, and may be starting to
make progress in that front. But the junta is being tested by greatly 25X1
stepped-up guerrilla military operations. If sustained, this leftist
offensive could strain the military's fragile unity, as conservative
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officers push for all-out retaliation, undermining the efforts of moderates
to rein in indiscriminate violence. Further rightist excesses, of course,
would wipe out whatever small public relations gains the junta may have
begun to make.
4. Cuba-Latin America
El Salvador remains the most likely candidate for stepped-up
Cuban support. Havana probably still believes a leftist victory is
inevitable, though the junta's staying power has undoubtedly caused
Castro and his advisers to revise the timing of their expectations. If
the Salvadoran guerrillas' current offensive continues, the Cubans may be
tempted to step up their support significantly, lest they be criticized
for braking revolutionary momentum.
5. Cuba-US
Castro would have to balance that goal against his stated desire
to avoid provoking the US as it approaches elections. We continue to
believe that Castro wants to establish a basis for talks--albeit on his own
terms--with Washington. To this end he has adopted a relatively con-
ciliatory line. He is facilitating the departure of asylum seekers in
the US Interests Section (admittedly a problem he himself contrived);
he has allowed boat departures to regain pre-hurricane Allen levels
(500-700 a week), but not the massive numbers recorded months ago ('up to
several thousand a day). We do not expect revival of last months
aborted effort to send us a "mother ship"loaded with thousands of
"undesirables".
6. Suriname
We view the recent bloodless coup by the ostensibly moderate
army commander with mixed feelings. On the one hand, it was a blow to
civilians and military men with leftist views--several of whom lost
positions of influence. On the other hand, the constitutional president
was obliged to resign and parliament suspended. The country has
experienced several abrupt--and still largely unexplained--political
changes in recent months. Further sudden changes of direction could
prove more inimical to US interests.
7. Bolivia
The Garcia Meza regime appears to have strengthened its hold on
power, but its extraordinarily brutal tactics could in time provoke
serious civilian resistance or dissension within the military. At least
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some of the nation's miners are still off the job and the economy is
suffering. We see no imminent threat to Garcia Meza, but he could be
supplanted at some point by a more sophisticated, if not necessarily more
moderate, general. We see little likelihood that Argentina will reverse its
policy of strong backing for the Bolivian military regime.
8. Brazil
There has been an upsurge in acts of rightwing violence, many
apparently committed by elements of the security services. This type of
activity, which has occurred intermittently before, again raises the
question of the regime's ability--or willingness--to rein in local security
officials, who often operate with virtual impunity. The rightwing acts
may be the work of freewheeling officials opposed to the government's
modest political liberalization program. But the acts may also be dis-
creetly sponsored, or at least tolerated by Brasilia, and intended as a
warning to the left and politicians in general, lest they make undue
political demands. The government probably remains committed to gradually
opening the political system, but is concerned that rising popular
expectations and serious economic problems--inflation has topped 100%--
may produce heavy pressures for rapid changes.
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