MONTHLY WARNING ASSESSMENT: LATIN AMERICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000300070010-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 16, 2007
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: November 25, 1980
• Content Type: MEMO

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NIO/W
NFAC-7709-80
25 November 1980
MEMORANDUM FUR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH . Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
FROM . National Intelligence Officer for Latin America
SUBJECT : Monthly Warning Assessment: Latin America
1. Action Requested: none; for your information only.
2. Jamaica
The JLP's strong electoral victory will present Prime Minister
Seaga with some problems as well as benefits. Clear public repudiation
of Manley's PNP has probably undercut any plans Jamaican radicals had
for sustaining the pre-electoral violence. And the JLP's control of
over 80 percent of the seats in the House of Representatives means little
energy need be wasted in parliamentary maneuver against the opposition
in devising a long-term recovery program for the bankrupt economy.
However, the extent of JLP domination of the political scene also
increases the impatience of its supporters for the "deliverance" promised
by Seaga. Yet there is little that Seaga can do in the "bread and butter"
area without prompt and largescale foreign assistance. Inertia in the
launching of foreign aid programs will cause strains in the JLP between
technocrats and labor leaders and lengthens the odds against effective
political and economic reconstruction
3. Nicaragua
The short-term political course remains highly clouded. In
response to mounting economic pressures, erosion of popular support, and
real and imagined organized dissidence and plotting, the Sandinista
Directorate is likely to turn increasingly dictatorial. At least some
members apparently have concluded that the game plan of toleration of a
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measured degree of political freedom is not working, and that opposition
groups will have to be cowed or eliminated lest they gain support from
an increasingly dissatisfied population, including disaffected mid-and
lower-level Sandinistas. While many among the disgruntled will keep a
low profile, and some will flee, the number engaged in plotting and
organized resistance will increase. In other words, a more dictatorial
government may become more vulnerable. The Sandinista leaders very
likely will retain control of the situation. But their sense of
beleaguerment will cause them to seek more assistance from the Cubans and
the USSR, in the security and political action as well as in the technical
and economic areas.
4. El Salvador
The process of slow improvements in the security and political
performance of the government and declining political and (to a less
clear extent) military potency on the part of the leftist extremists
continues. Nonetheless, the vulnerabilities of the centrist junta remain
large. A lowered sense of danger from the extreme left and dismal
short-term economic prospects (as well as the results of the US election)
are increasing pressures by the political right for more conservative
governmental leadership. Middle grade officers, weary of growing
casualties and an inability to dramatically reduce the military power
of the guerrillas, are also pressuring for a "stronger" government.
Centrist political groups in and out of the government are concerned
about t emitting and perhaps increasing) terrorism of the extreme
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The odds still favor the junta hanging on to power for some
time (though a shift in its political standards to the right of center
seems increasingly likely). The prospects for the junta to gain the
degree of domestic and foreign support needed for consolidating its power
and fostering a much greater measure of political peace and improved
economic performance still seem dim.
5. Brazil
Despite some recent belt-tightening measures to shore up its
increasingly beleaguered credit rating, negative momentum seems likely
to suck the government into a politically-costly financial crisis.
Brazil apparently needs $1.5 billion in fresh foreign funds per month
to meet its debt commitments, and to pay for oil and other essential
imports. Foreign lenders, more and more concerned about short and
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? .
medium term prospects, are willing to extend only about one-third of
that amount. They are convinced that Brazil must sharply cut its growth
rate and reschedule its massive ($60 billion) external debt, and strongly
prefer that it be done in conjunction with an IMF stabilization program.
Brazilian leaders increasingly recognize the need for a serious austerity
program, but fear the domestic political costs and international
embarrassment of having lost control of the situation--which is what
IMF participation will be seen to mean.
If it seeks IMF help, the government will try to shift the
blame to external forces beyond its control (e.g., unreasonable inter-
national bankers, disruption of oil imports as a consequence of the
Iran-Iraq war). With or without the IMF, the costs of the delay in
shifting from growth-as-usual to austerity will probably shake the govern-
ment's self-confidence as well as its popularity.
Paragraphs 2 through 5
are SECRET.
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? SECRET ?
Distribution:
1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - DD/NFA
1 - C/NIC
1 - NIO/W
1 - NI0/AF
1 - NI0/EA
1 - NI0/GPF
1 - NIp/NESA
1 - NI0/PE
1 - NI0/USSR-EE
1 - NI0/WE
1 - NIO/SP
1 - Senior Review Panel
1 - NSC Coordinator
1 - SA/NPI
1 - SA/CI
1 - D/OCO
1 - D/OCR
1 - D/OER
1 - D/OGCR
1 - D/OIA
1 - D/OPA
1 - D/OSR
1 - D/OSWR
1 - NFAC Reg
1 - ER
1 - AS/NFAC
2 - NI0/LA