MONTHLY WARNING ASSESSMENT: LATIN AMERICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000300060037-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 11, 2007
• Sequence Number: 37
• Publication Date: January 28, 1981
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2007/04/12 : CIA-RDP83BO1027R000300060037-2
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
NFAC-390-81
28 January 1981
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH . Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
FROM . National Intelligence Officer for Latin America
SUBJECT . Monthly Warning Assessment: Latin America
1. Action Requested: none; for your information only.
2. El Salvador
The immediate military outcome of the insurgents' January
offensive appears to be a continuation of the stalemate. The military
and security forces contained the insurgents' widespread attacks and
inflicted heavy casualties (perhaps 1,000 killed and wounded). But
the insurgents remain intact as a potent fighting force. They
apparently have large stores of arms on hand and are able to recruit
in country. Moreover, arms supplies from abroad continue to arrive,
along with Salvadorans returning after guerrilla training in
Nicaragua and Cuba.
Despite government claims of victory, political tensions
between the military and the Christian Democratic members of the
government are likely to resurface. The military, smarting from its
own high casualties and inability to deliver a knock-out punch, and
egged on by rightist extremists, are likely to continue to employ
repressive measures against real and suspected leftists. This will
bring pressure on Junta President Duarte from Christian Democrats who
prefer a political rather than a military resolution of the rebellion.
The augmentation of US support of the government is likely to make
civilian and military hardline rightists less concerned about Christian
Democratic criticism of rightist violence, unless Duarte is seen as
essential for securing US assistance.
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3. Nicaragua
Despite stern private warnings from the US, the Sandinistas
continue their recent high level of activities in support of the
Salvadoran insurgents, especially the movement of arms and trained
guerrillas from Cuba through Nicaragua to El Salvador. If the
Sandinistas decide they have little chance of continued cordial
relations with the US under President Reagan, they are likely to use
the US as a scapegoat for excusing their economic failures and for
cracking down on domestic opponents.
In these circumstances, at the least, some harrassment of US
officials and private citizens in Nicaragua can be expected. The use
of force against US facilities and personnel, deliberate or "spontaneous",
is also possible.
4. Cuba
The increased US security engagement in support of the
Salvadoran government presents a major challenge to the Castro regime.
Some adivsors will probably counsel caution, so as to reduce the
chances for direct US action against Cuba. Other advisors will
probably counter that increased hostility from the US is inevitable
under President Reagan and recommend that the best defense for Cuba
is to confront the US with a Central American "Vietnam".
At a minimum, Castro will probably decide to bleed and
embarrass the US, by providing sufficient support to maintain the
current potency of both the Salvadoran and Guatemalan insurgents, He
will especially not want the revolutionary momentum in El Salvador to
be reversed for fear that this would endanger the Sandinista regime.
There is also an outside chance that Castro will decide to
test the will of the US before it can bring its new policy of greater
support to the Salvadoran government fully to bear. Cuba probably
could insert a large force of third-country "volunteer" combatants
into El Salvador, which could quickly transform the military situation
from stalemate to one of insurgent advantage.
5. Mexico
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Jack-Davis
SECRET
 Approved For Release 2007/04/12 : CIA-RDP83BO1027R000300060037-2
Approved For Release 2007/04/12 : CIA-RDP83BO1027R000300060037-2