MONTHLY WARNING ASSESSMENT: WESTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000300060027-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 9, 2007
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: March 26, 1981
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2007/04/12 CIA-RDP83BO1027R000300060027-3
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
26 March 1981
NFAC 1742-81
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
VIA Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
Assistant National Intelligence Officer for
Western Europe
SUBJECT Monthly Warning Assessment: Western Europe
SPAIN
1. At first the attempted coup in Spain last month seemed to
allow an optimistic assessment of the vigor of Spanish democracy in face
of a threat to its survival. But accumulating evidence suggests that
the event may portend more serious obstacles to the consolidation of
Spain's new political order.
-- Military complicity in the coup planning was more widespread
than originally apparent.
-- Many more key military leaders would apparently have supported
the coup attempt had it not been crushed so quickly.
-- The "Turkish model" will continue to attract the military in
Spain, especially if partisan political infighting becomes more severe.
-- Juan Carlos' clear rejection of the military's move has under-
mined his position among some of the officers, and he may alienate more of
them if he fails to restrain either terrorism or the autonomy process in
Spain.
-- The king has apparently promised the military that he will
institute martial law in the Basque provinces if terrorism gets out of hand,
and he may also have promised he will work to limit regional autonomy, which
the military fears as destructive to the Spanish state.
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2. The likelihood of another coup attempt this year seems slim: the
military are probably prepared to give the new government a period of grace
in which to establish itself and demonstrate its effectiveness. But critical
uncertainties remain.
-- Some military officers, due to retire this year, may decide to
make another move against the government while they are still on active duty.
-- The government's ability to prove its effectiveness and to meet
the concerns of the military is uncertain.
-- If martial law were instituted in the Basque provinces, new polit-
ical tensions there could be severe.
-- Merely delaying the autonomy process might not satisfy the military,
but attempting to reverse it would provoke widespread political turmoil.
3. The Calvo-Sotelo government has certain assets in the coming months,
however. The move toward autonomy for the Basque provinces has met many of the
grievances of the Basque moderates, who may now be willing to work with Madrid
against the terrorists as long as Madrid's security forces are not expanded
dramatically. The military in Spain may become more reconciled to regional
autonomy as over time it proves compatible with Spanish national unity. In
future, moreover, the military will not be able to take advantage of uncertainty
about whether or not the king will support a move against the government, now
thathe has demonstrated his commitment to the constitution. Finally, Calvo-Sotelo
intends to govern by majority in parliament, rather than by consensus with the
opposition parties as well; prospects for his effectiveness are fairly good.
4. In this setting, the form of challenges to the Spanish government may
change: rather than "coup plotting", assassination attempts may become more
frequent, perhaps directed against the king himself or against high-level govern-
ment officials as the military wing of ETA becomes more active; this could cause
the military to apply increasing pressure on the king to take action against the
government with the threat that they will otherwise make their own move.
Approved For Release 2007/04/12 : CIA-RDP83B010 78000300060027-3