MONTHLY WARNING ASSESSMENT: LATIN AMERICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000300060011-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 9, 2007
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: May 28, 1981
• Content Type: MEMO

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NFAC-3214-81
28 May 1981
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH : Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
FROM : National Intelligence Officer for Latin America
SUBJECT : Monthly Warning Assessment: Latin America
1. Action Requested: none, for your information only. (U)
2. El Salvador -- Political
Internal strains within the military-civilian government are
likely to intensify.
-- As battlefield casualties rise, the military will increasingly
blame Duarte and other civilians for undercutting the war effort and
failing to win broader popular support.
-- Civilian rightists are winning greater receptivity within the
officer corps to the argument that the Christian Democrats have
ruined the economy, are personally corrupt, and will go to any length
to cement themselves in office--even alliances with "communists".
-- The officers blame Duarte for the heat put on them by the
US to punish those responsible for use of indiscriminate violence
against civilians, especially US citizens.
The junta is held together more by US pressure than by common trust and
goals, and the US will have to keep getting the message across to the
military about US support of Duarte. (S)
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3. El Salvador -- Diplomatic
The Mitterand election is likely to swing France from quiet
support to open opposition to US Salvadoran policy. This will increase
European, Mexican--and domestic US pressures--to give the leftist
extremists through negotiations the shot at'Victory" that they have not
been able to get through insurgency or domestic political support. (S)
4. Nicaragua
The Sandinistas probably have concluded that it is just a matter
of time before the US moves more decisively to unseat them from power.
While they need and want the time to strengthen their defenses, heightened
paranoia could lead to anti-US incidents in Nicaragua as well as to a
more vigorous diplomatic campaign against the US. The Mitterand victory
is likely to increase their intransigence to US pressures, as will recent
economic support from Libya, Mexico, and Canada. (S)
It is difficult to read Castro's attitude toward US pressures.
He probably has concluded that key elements of the Reagan Administration
are serious about "going to the source". But he also sees Congressional
and public opposition to a tougher Caribbean basin policy. Thus he will
continue his mixed signals of readiness either to fight or to talk with the
US. He would expect this to slow US momentum to get tough with him. (S)
6. Mexico
President Lopez Portillo for a variety of reasons--including con-
viction that he knows better than President Reagan what is best for Mexico
and Central America--is probably prepared to resist strongly, during the
early dune visit, pressures to back US policy in Central America. He may
be ready, however, to trade off support for US economic initiatives for a
reduction of pressures against Nicaragua. (S)
7. Bolivia
Presidential change in Bolivia now seems imminent as well as
inevitable. In effect, the only US option, in the wake of a rotation of
generals, is to resume engagement, in order to help the country inch away
from its inherent rendezvous with disaster. (S)
8. Saint Lucia
Former Deputy Prime Minister George Odlum, whose driving ambition
to become Prime Minister contributed to the collapse of the previous
government, has staged frequent demonstrations recently aimed at unseating
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the shaky Cenac Administration. ,Odium, a pro-Cuban leftist, has almost no
chance of winning office on his own ticket. Although Havana reportedly
offered unspecified assistance a year ago, we doubt that he is planning to
take over by force. He probably fears the reaction of US and regional
governments to an illegal power grab. If radical elements--emboldened by
public disorders--succeeded in overwhelming Saint Lucia's 300-man police
force, they might decide to take power, however, and turn to Cuba and
Grenada for help. (S)
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