WARNING REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000300050030-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 19, 2007
• Sequence Number: 30
• Publication Date: September 24, 1981
• Content Type: MEMO

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? SECRET is
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
NFAC #5979-81/1
24 September 1981
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH : National Intelligence Officer for Warning
FROM : National Intelligence Officer for Africa
SUBJECT : Warning Report: Sub-Saharan Africa
1. Action Requested: None; the attached report is for your
information. 25X1
2. Back round: Community representatives and specialists met on
22 September 1981 with the NIO/AF as chairman. The attached report has not
been coordinated with the other participants, but is being circulated to
them. If they feel their views have been misinterpreted, orhave
significant additional concerns, I'll report further to you. I~~f 25X1
L. Gray Cowan
Attachment
NFAC #5979-81
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0 SECRET .
NFAC #5979-81
24 September 1981
ETHIOPIAN/LIBYAN/PDRY COOPERATION TREATY (ADEN TREATY)
While there is no hard evidence that the Soviets instigated the pact,
analysts felt that the Soviets actively encouraged the negotiations and expect
to benefit directly from the treaty. Analysts questioned the point made in a
paper by the Strategic Warning Staff that the treaty marked the appearance of
a new and more active direction of Soviet foreign policy in the Middle East,
maintaining that it was too soon to reach this conclusion. They were doubtful
of the chances of implementation of the aid provisions of the treaty in the
face of substantial evidence that Qadhafi has not lived up to his previous
pledges.
The existence of the treaty may, however, lead to an increased threat by
the Ethiopians in view of what they may regard as a provocative action in the
landing of American troops in Somalia in mid-November in connection with
Operation Bright Star. This action may take the form of increased terrorist
activities in Somalia and even against American personnel.
The question of whether Nimeiri perceived the treaty to be aimed at him
was raised, but the analysts had no firm conclusions as to Nimeiri's view.
(Since the meeting I have been informed by Ambassador Kontos that Nimeiri
feels that he has been assured by Mengistu that the treaty is not aimed at
Sudan. In any case, Nimeiri has always the trump card of the encouraging
activity by the Eritreans to play against Mengistu.)
SOMALIA
Continuing concern was expressed regarding internal threats to the Siad
regime. The main threat does not seem to be the question of subversion by
Omar Haji, the acting defense minister, but rather that there may be other
centers of opposition to Siad which have not yet surfaced.
SUDAN
While Nimeiri is disturbed by recent overflights and air attacks by the
Libyans into Sudan from Chad, analysts felt that this was not sufficiently
serious to induce him to call upon the Egyptians for assistance.
*This memorandum is one of a series produced monthly by NIO/AF. Its purpose
is to review possible developments in the short-term future that would be
damaging to US interests. Obviously, many of these developments will not
occur in the time frame or in the manner suggested, or will not occur at all.
SECRET
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The prospect of an OAU force in Chad constitutes a possible complication
for American interests in the next three months in that, if we are asked for
financial support of such a force, Goukouni may very well argue that the force
would be unacceptable because the U.S. is in effect siding with Habre, in that
Habre is supported by Sadat who is supported by the U.S.
BENIN
Analysts indicated growing concern with recent unconfirmed reports that
Libyan pilots have been assigned to Benin and that Libyans are training more
guerrillas to undertake an attack on Niger. Libyan activities constitute a
continuing threat to Niger which will undoubtedly be brought up by President
Kountche in his forthcoming visit to the U.S.
ZAIRE
The visit of Nguza to the U.S. has heightened Mobutu's nervousness. He
appears more worried now than he has in some time, and he will be looking to
the U.S. for greater reassurance, particularly security aid.
SOUTHERN AFRICA
In view of the growing strength of the NRM in Mozambique, analysts raised
the question as to whether South Africa may now consider the NRM as a
successor regime to Machel and not just as a check on him. Some analysts
believe that the risk of NRM attacks on Zimbabwe may be higher in view of NRM
suspicions that Zimbabweans are assisting Mozambican forces in defense against
the NRM. It is possible, moreover, that South Africa may participate with the
NRM in joint actions against the Beira-Umtali pipeline in Mozambique as a way
of getting at Zimbabwe. The NRM leadership appears increasingly confident and
is searching for additional supporters. The situation requires close watching
over the next three months.
ANGOLA
Analysts felt that a close watch should be kept on the resupply situation
in Angola both in terms of Soviet resupply of Cuban and Angolan forces and
possible South African transfers to UNITA and NRM of captured Angolan
equipment.
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