MONTHLY WARNING MEETING - OCTOBER 1981

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000300050022-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 19, 2007
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: October 23, 1981
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Rse 2007/04/19: CIA-RDP83B01027R000300050022-9
e SE .
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Council
NFAC 6757-81
23 October 1981
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: National Intelligence Officer for Warning
Assistant National Intelligence Officer for NESA
SUBJECT: Monthly Warning Meeting - October 1981
1. Egypt. Community representatives conclude that Moubarek has firmly
grasped the reins of power and is well along the road to consolidating his
position as Sadat's successor. Despite some longer term concerns about
the new president's lack of charisma and his ability to deal with the economy,
little apprehension was expressed for stability in the immediate future.
The Egyptian military remains the single most powerful engine for political
change and Moubarek appears to have its present loyalty. 5X1
5X1
2. Exercise BRIGHT STAR was discussed at some length. The DIA and
RDJTF attendees indicated that while the outline of the exercises is firm,
many specifics remain to be worked out. The overall risk assessment for
BRIGHT STAR is "low," but there is some concern for the potential terrorist
threat to the small component scheduled to deploy to Berbera. Similarly,
the Air Force representative noted that the international flight corridor
which passes through the Bab el Mandeb airspace is very near South Yemen's
Perim Island. French reconnaissance aircraft have reportedly been fired
on from Perim in the past. Hostile military reactions to BRIGHT STAR from
Libya, Ethiopia, or Iran are possible-but unlikely. Qadhafi may seek to
conduct a concurrent "defensive" exercise possibly in concert with Syria.
Soviet naval reconnaissance aircraft deployed to Libya will probably con
intelligence collection against US units participating in BRIGHT STAR.
3. There is no persuasive evidence of an increased external threat to
Sudan from Libyan forces in Chad. Analysts continue to believe that Libyan
 ?
meddling with both Cairo and Khartoum will take the form of deniable terro 2561
operations.
4. In the Western Sahara there is a growing body of reports which lend
credence to Moroccan claims that Polisario forces may have received and
employed the Soviet-built SA-6 mobile SAM system. Although Moroccan claims
that the introduction of the SA-6 robs them of air superiority in the area
are overstated, the development
25X1
We would expect the Moroccans to make this a policy issue
the USG, probably seeking to link th
Cuba, East Germany or the Soviets.
e Polis
I
ario more closely with Qadhafi,
25X1
5. Speculation concerning an Army instigated coup in Bangladesh continues.
In the event, such an action by the milita leadership is unlikely to
have much immediate effect in the region. 25X1
6. Iran's recent airstrike against a Kuwaiti petroleum facility is subject
to repetition at any time. The Kuwaitis are manifestly incapable of defending
against any future Iranian attack and their position as a funnel for Iraq-
bound Soviet military equipm provides Tehran with ample reason to attack
again whenever it wishes. I 25X1
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Approved For Release 2007/04/19: CIA-RDP83BO1027R000300050022-9
 Approved For Release 2007/04/19: CIA-RDP83BO1027R000300050022-9
Approved For Release 2007/04/19: CIA-RDP83BO1027R000300050022-9