MONTHLY WARNING ASSESSMENT: LATIN AMERICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000300050018-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 18, 2007
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: November 2, 1981
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2007/04/19: CIA-RDP83B01027R000300050018-4
Approved For Release 2007/04/19: CIA-RDP83B01027R000300050018-4
 Approved For Release 2007694~tt ,P
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
25X1
ovem er 1981
Copy No.
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH . National Intelligence Officer for Warning
FROM . National Intelligence Officer for Latin America
SUBJECT . Monthly Warning Assessment: Latin America
1. Overall Trends in Central America
In the view of some--but not all analysts--there is a wide array
of information suggesting that Cuba, Nicaragua, and the Central American
guerrilla groups will move quickly and preemptively in the next months to:
(1) reinforce the Nicaraguan Government with Cuban or other
troops introduced in a deceptive way--such as the approximately
225 Cuban "special troops" who arrived in recent weeks on airplanes
along with teachers;
(2) provide jet aircraft and additional amounts of other
heavy weapons to Nicaragua which could permit it to intimidate or
threaten Honduras and Costa Rica if they permit a y "anti-Nicaraguan
activities" on their soil;
(3) strengthen guerrilla/terrorist groups in El Salvador (the
Sandinistas have called for volunteers to fight there), Honduras,
Guatemala, Costa Rica--for expanded military/terrorist assaults in
January-March 1982; this might well occur simultaneously at different
levels of violence in the various countries for both military and
political purposes--such as convincing Mexico and the Socialist
International (meeting in Caracas in February 1982) and the US Congress
that the guerrillas will win and further help to the threatened govern-
ment is hopeless or too costly. I 25X1
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TOP SECRET
2. Nicaragua
The various sources of intelligence information on possible Cuban
troop movement to Nicaragua--recent and future--were reviewed to the extent
possible in that context and specific questions from the Cuban deployments
to Angola (1975) and Ethiopia (1977) were raised for possible lessons. DIA
will make a presentation on this issue at the next meeting.
There was consensus that Nicaragua continues its movement toward a
Marxist-Leninist dictatorship and provides material help to the guerrillas
in Central America. I I 25X1
3. El Salvador
Compared with August/September 1981 there has been a 25% reduction
in the number of small unit attacks by the extreme left. Overall, the total
estimated politically-related deaths (from all sources) have declined from
about 120 per week during the first eight months of 1981 to about 70 per week
recently.
There is evidence that the various armed groups among the extreme
left have had serious disputes about tactics that this has included several
firefights. However, the destruction of the bridge over the Rio Lempa and
the subsequent large unit attack on the second and last bridge linking the
isolated eastern part of El Salvador to the rest of the country and the past
ability of the guerrilla organizations to overcome tactical disputes all
suggest the threat remains severe. Many analysts believe this is a period
of build-up before the expansion of violence in January-March 1982.
The government forces have good morale and have mounted several
large sweep operations but the guerrillas have escaped, though much of theiC
logistical support was captured or do-,trn\/Pd r- 1
25>11
The cohesion and stability of the Christian Democratic-military
coalition has been shaken by reports of Christian Democratic willingness to
negotiate with elements of the FDR, by the vehement opposition of Colonel
Garcia (scheduled to visit Washington on 5 November) and by reports of moder-
ate officers' discussions of the need to remove Colonel Garcia--the Minister
of Defense.
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Though the Christian Democrats have disavowed any negotiations with
the FOR, there are Salvadoran elements which want to remove them and which
tend to become more active if they perceive the guerrillas weaker or US indif-
ference on this issue. The differences within the government coaliti e
potentially far more serious than those within the guerrilla forces. 5X1
4. Guatemala
Trends described last month continue. However, the growing strength
of the guerrillas was made visible when 300 captured a provincial capital and
killed the governor, the police chief and about 10 others. This town, Solola,
is located about 70 miles from the Mexican border. 0 25X1
5. Honduras
Various extreme left groups including the Communist Party of Honduras
(PCH) went to Havana in mid-September for the now familiar Cuban insistence on
"revolutionary unity' as a prelude to its expanded support for violent destabili-
zation. This was followed by several dramatic terrorist incidents including the
attack on the US miltiary aid group and a mid-October unity meeting among the
extreme left to make plans for further violence and help to the guerrillas in
El Salvador and Guatemala--mainly as a conduit and storage mechanism for arms.
A recent CIA report estimated that about 400 Honduran guerrillas are
now being trained in Nicaragua for action in Honduras as early as January 1982.
Total estimated strength of the armed extreme left is now about 850 (including
the 400 in Nicaragua), a dramatic increase from two years ago when reports of
Cuban training for Honduran guerrillas first were seen.
Initially, Castro intended to leave Honduras in relative peace so that
it could be the "funnel" to El Salvador and Guatemala. However, there may be
three reasons for the clear step-up in the timetable for Honduras:
(1) to prevent military cooperation among the threatened govern-
ments in the area by tying down/distracting Honduras forces,
(2) to prevent or intimidate Honduras from permitting its terri-
tory to be used in operations against Nicaragua;
(3) to prevent elections in late November which would give
Honduras strong international legitimacy.
While analysts agree that the Honduran extreme left is still too weak
and divided to threaten takeover, it may well be strong enough to create a large
upsurge in violence within the next months. Though the election remains likely,
the heightened insecurity within the Honduran military already evident as result
of the increased violence and Nicaraguan covert activities with one political
party, have raised ever more serious concerns about the possibilit of a mili-
tary coup or other maneuver to prevent or nullify the elections. II 25X1
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6. Belize
This is a situation that should be watched very closely and that
requires far more intelligence information about possible Cuban/Nicaraguan
or Grenadian efforts at subversion--especially in the case of one political
faction. 25X1
7. Brazil
The mix of positive and troublesome trends described last month
continues with most analysts still judging that there will be elections in
1982. However, reports of activities by elements of the Brazilian intelli-
gence services to provoke violence and justify a crackdown on some leftist
elements continue and might portent serious problems for the political transi-
tion. ~ 25X1
Constantine C. Menges
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