MONTHLY WARNING ASSESSMENT: LATIN AMERICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000300050007-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 18, 2007
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: December 24, 1981
• Content Type: MEMO

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
NFAC-8429-81
24 December 1981
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH : National Intelligence Officer for Warning
FROM : National Intelligence Officer for Latin America
SUBJECT : Monthly Warning Assessment: Latin America
1. Central American Overview
Evidence continues to accumulate suggesting increased terrorism and
military operations by the guerrilla forces in El Salvador and Guatemala in
the coming weeks (with the likelihood of some pause during the Christmas-New
Year time period). The fiftieth anniversary of the communist-led peasant
uprising in El Salvador occurs on 22 January 1982, and some analysts feel the
next coordinated guerrilla actions might be keyed in some way to that date.
Purposes of the simultaneous violence--which may also include increased
terrorism in Honduras--remain as described in the last report. Some evidence
indicates that the Nicaraguan buildup has recently been augmented by large
numbers of additional soldiers and that jet fighters may arrive in January. f5X1
2. Honduras
Thus far, key military men appear satisfied with the handling and
outcome of the 29 November 1981 elections that produced a victory for the
Liberal Party. The fact that successful elections were held at all will improve
the international reputation of Honduras and be a setback for regional backers
of insurgency. ^
Nonetheless, a few officers are wary of Liberal Party members who, to
some extent, sympathize with the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. Such Liberal Party
figures are in a distinct minority, but the military establishment can be
expected to scrutinize their every word and deed. Were Liberals with pro-
Sandinista -ympathies to grow in power, the result could be serious tension
with the military establishment. This would certainly be the case if, for
example, pro-Sandinista Liberals sought to block the appointment of the tough.
General Alvarez, expected to become Army CINC.
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the US in Central America
Moreover, there is an outside chance that some within the new government
may be less willing than was the Paz administration to work quite as closet with
Analysts continue to believe that the extreme left--in and out of
Honduras--is working to build up its political and military capability and unity
but that the timetable for movement beyond the terrorist phase to full insurgency
is many months away.
up noticeably, and the extreme left does have some potential to hinder, if n
disrupt, the formal passage of power to the new government in January 1982.
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Estimates for hard-core membership in the extreme left organizations remain.at
600-800, but estimates of armed cadres are far lower--about 150 trained to date.
Even though there is no massive insurgent effort in the offing in the
near term, the pace of terrorist incidents--such as recent hijackings--has picked
3. El Salvador
Analysts expect violence from the revolutionary left and, perhaps, from
the extreme right as well to increase as the March 1982 elections draw near.
Each side, for its own reasons, hopes to intimidate voters and thus hamstring
or "invalidate" the balloting. Indeed, simultaneous guerrilla attacks on economic
and other targets have increased in recent weeks--though the expected massive,
coordinated, nationwide guerrilla offensive still appears to be some weeks away.
One report suggests that large numbers of guerrillas are being trained and
equipped in Nicaragua for the expected coordinated offensive in El Salvador.
The electoral process remains on track and in some ways has been
strengthened. The recent OAS vote (22-23) urgin-g Latin American support is one
factor. In El Salvador, itself, the Electoral Commission has gained a more non-
partisan image and greater international cred' y with the resignation of two
members of the co-governing Christian Party. I I 25X1
4. Nicaragua
There is no question that the Sandinistas remain fully committed to the
export of subversion to nearby states and their domestic arms buildup. Reports
indicate that Nicaragua may receive jet fighters in January andl 25X1
suggests the Army has mobilized a large number of additional people.
Concern was expressed about the possibility of Nicaraguan subversion in
newly independent Belize. As of now, no indications of Nicaraguan efforts to
work against the fledgling government have been seen. Analysts do believe, however,
that Nicaragua has or could easily assemble enough in-country intelligence assets
to mount a significant subversive effort, given the decision to do so. If nothing
else, Belize's location makes it a tempting, potentially significant route for
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arms to Guatemalan or other insurgents. There are reports of ongoing Sandinista
efforts to propagandize and even establish paramilitary training cam n the 25X1
Costa Rican province of Guanacaste--on Nicaragua's southern border.
5. Guatemala
Analysts expressed greatly heightened concern--based on recent but
tentative information--that the size and power of the guerrilla movement is
substantially greater than previous estimates. Recent major sweeps and,
interrogations by the Guatemala Army suggest that the four major guerrilla groups
7 pan
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tal on the order of 4,000-5,000, rather t
toward elections. The guerrillas may
ontinues to move
Guatemala, too, c well step up their disruptive activities to hinder the elections and,conceivably,
even score propaganda gains by "liberating" a given place for a time.
The elections could produce destabilizing tensions even without extreme
leftist disruption. Official candidate Guevara--though favored--could obtain
fewer votes than his most significant opponent, Mario Sandoval, leader of the far
right. Should Sandoval lose, he may well refuse to accept the outcome and attempt
to use his paramilitary group and what military support he has to oppose the result
with armed actions. Should Sandoval win, however, the bulk of the military officers
the ensuing tension
are likely to find this outcome unacceptable. In either case,
and potential violence between the military and the Sandoval _led elements of the
f the extreme left. Curren
the advantage o
far right would probably work to evidence suggests a major guerrilla offensive scheduled for January 1982. 2X1
6. Costa Rica
The country's economic situation continues to deteriorate--inflation
is at virtually unprecedented levels, and unemployment has tripled in only a few
months. The Carazo government has been unwilling to comply with, requirements
for IMF aid, and such aid almost certainly is impossible before Miay--when a new
president will be in office.
Leftist activity throughout the region and terrorist incidents inside
the country have led to an increasingly anti-communist public attitude in Costa
Rica. Despite this, the domestic Communist Party is said to expect to make gains
in the March elections. One analyst expressed the concern that, though such.
gains are most unlikely, the Communist Party may react to a disappointment by
ith the extreme left terrorists.
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becoming more militant and openly Join 0
7. Argentina
The advent of General Galtieri, who replaces the relatively conciliatory
General Viola as President, has potential effects on several fronts The Chileans
probably will see it as an indication the Argentines will take an even firmer line
in the longstanding Beagle Channel dispute. We do not, however, see any near-term
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prospects for hostilities. The ascendance of Galtieri could also signal a
further slowing of the already modest political normalization, with a consequent
sharpening of civil-military tensions. Finally, Galtieri may initially have the
power to make economic policy more coherent, but over time may have to devote
more and more time to political problems and watching potential military rivals
to the detriment of economic strategy.
Reports--still unconfirmed--of Argentine efforts to move toward
nuclear wean capability suggest the need for additional collection and
analysis.
Consta ne kMengMesj_~