MONTHLY WARNING ASSESSMENT: WESTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000300040045-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 24, 2007
• Sequence Number: 45
• Publication Date: February 19, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2007/04/24: CIA-RDP83B01027R000300040045-5 --
SECRET .
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intel igence Council
DDI-1423-82
19 February 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH: National Intelligence Officer for Warning
Acting National Intelligence Officer for
Western Europe
SUBJECT: Monthly Warning Assessment: Western Europe
NIO/W
West Germany
1. Stress and strain between Bonn's coalition partners, the SPD and FDP,
are increasing despite the recent parliamentary vote of confidence handily won
by Chancellor Schmidt. The immediate problem results from compromises each
party had to make in order to agree on a job-creation program. In attacking
SPDers who hold that the stimulation package does not go far enough, FDP
leader Genscher is trying to assure passage of the legislation, but also to
safeguard his own party's identity with its electorate. Even if the employ-
ment stimulation program can be safely steered through Bonn's upper and lower
houses, as Schmidt believes likely, tension between the coalition partners on
economic questions will re-emerge later this year when serious discussion gets
under way on the 1983 budget. In effect, the campaign for West Germany's 1984
elections has already begun, and as the CDU/CSU opposition sharpens its
attacks on Schmidt, the FDP will be increasingly hard pressed to show where it
stands.
2. There are signs that Genscher may be preparing for a breakup of the
coalition, but we have no firm indication of such an intention. The chances
at the moment are that he still sees more losses than gains in provoking an
early fall of the Schmidt government. But the growing disarray within the SPD
over security policy--the showdown over INF that Schmidt had hoped to avoid at
the SPD convention in April now appears inevitable--will add stress to the
coalition and possibly narrow Genscher's room to maneuver.
 ? Approved For Release 2007/04/24: CIA-RDP83BO1027R000300040045-5
?
SECRET
Spain
3. While none of the major political forces have an interest in the
political instability that might attend early elections (they are still
scheduled for spring 1983), there is increasing exploration of coalition
options should Premier Calvo Sotelo's government fall a victim to unresolvable
legislative battles--especially over university autonomy, public financing of
private schools, or budgetary questions. On current form, the Spanish
Socialist party would do well in elections, a prospect which some--Kind Juan
Carlos among them--believe could trigger a coup attempt by the military.
Hence the efforts to promote an electoral alliance between the UCD and
moderate rightist groups. The Socialists themselves would prefer a center-
left coalition in order to reduce their exposure. Calvo Sotelo's strategy
during the coming months--which will coincide with the trial of the February
23 coup plotters--will be to try to finesse political confrontation as best he
can. Apart from the legislative issues themselves, the principal threat to
governmental stability will be further defections from the UCD.
4. .The Allies now agree with the US that there should be a break in the
Madrid CSCE session. But the West wants the neutrals to take the initiative
on orchestrating a recess and they remain divided over tactics. Unless agree-
ment is reached within the next week or so on how to achieve a recess,
Alliance unity may break down, with a consequent resurgence of US-European
disputes over the extent to which CSCE should be held hostage to the Polish
situation.
Turkey-Greece
5. Tension between the two countries has leveled off, but some Turkish
forces in the Aegean apparently are on a low level of alert. Ankara has so
far reacted skeptically t "informal" suggestion by Greek 25X1
President Karamanlis for a gentleman's agreement to avoid strong public
statements. The Turks are apprehensive that Greece may extend its territorial
limits to twelve miles, but we have no evidence that Prime Minister Papandreou
is currently planning such a step.
Italy-Nuclear Terrorism
6. In light of the persistent questioning by the Red Brigades of General
Dozier on nuclear weapons storage depots, and other indications of terrorist
 . Approved For Release 2007/04/24: CIA-RDP83B01027R000300040045-5
SECRET
capabilities, INR expressed strong interest not only in a new examination of
the threat to nuclear storage sites but also of possible scenarios any
counterefforts would have to cope with. An inter-agency project is now under
way.
3
SECRET
e 2007/04/24: CIA-RDP83BOl
 Approved For Release 2007/04124: CIA-RDP83BO1027R000300040045-5
MEMORANDUM FOR: DCI
SUBJECT: Monthly Warning Assessment: Western Europe
Distribution:
DCI
DDCI
Executive Director
ER
DDI
A. / DD I
SA/DDI
SA/ DDI/CI
Chairman, NIC
Vice Chairman, NIC
Associate Chairman, NIC
d1'IO/W
NIO/WE
NIO/AF
NIO/EA
NIO/GPF
NI0/LA
NI0/NESA
NIO at Large
NIO/SP
NIO/USSR
Senior Review Panel
SA/NPI
DD/OCO , 7F17
D/0/EURA, 6G42
D/0/SOVA, GS21,
D/OGI, 6F20
D/OCR , 2E60
D/OIA, Rm 3N-109
DDI Registry
Approved For Release 2007/04/24: CIA-RDP83BO1027R0003000400q