MONTHLY WARNING ASSESSMENT: LATIN AMERICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000300040043-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 23, 2007
• Sequence Number: 43
• Publication Date: February 24, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Council
DDI-1578-82
24 February 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH National Intelligence Officer for Warning
FROM National Intelligence Officer for Latin America
SUBJECT Monthly Warning Assessment: Latin America
1. Central America -- The Next Dangerous Weeks*
It is my personal view that the violence and political action
planned by the extreme left in the next weeks could significantly shift
the ~ercei~ved balance of forces in E1 Salvador and Guatemala toward the
extreme left. While not necessarily irreversible, this could mean that
after the March 28 elections (whatever their outcome) -- though low turnout
or a significant vote for the far right party would make matters worse --
there would be substantially greater international and domestic political
pressures a ag inst any more military help for the Salvadoran government and
for "negotiations" which could break the unity of the current civil-military
coalition there.
Our information shows that the violence planned for E1 Salvador
in March is intended to be dramatic and to simultaneously portray the
guerrillas as strong and the government as too weak to win. The "annihilation
strikes" planned for mid-March and the urban military attacks** soon after
could be and probably will be carried out (unless the government moves pre-
emptively) with potentially "Tet-like" effects on perceptions. At the same
time, additional terrorism in Guatemala before and after their March 7
presidential election is intended to be very dramatic. And we have highly
This section of the warning report reflects the objective but individual
judgment of the NIO/LA. Although there is no dispute among my colleagues
about the coming increase in guerrilla violence in E1 Salvador and Guatemala,
only a minority might join me in depth of concern or the speculative comments
on possible terrorist targets.
**As an example, note the surprise attack on military facilities by 365 well-
armed commandos in the capital of Uganda reported in the Washington Post,
24 February 1982.
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disturbing but still unconfirmed reports that the extreme left intends to
use a forei n terrorist group (perhaps the Spanish Marxist/Leninist ETA
separatists for some type of dramatic commando action the region. A
foreign intelligence service has confirmed that Spanish ETA terrorists have
left France en route to Costa Rica with Nicaragua as the next stop, and that
their operation might take place toward the end of this month or in early
March. Though this is speculative on my part, possible targets could include
the US Embassy in Nicaragua (with anti-NATO symbols complementing "anti-
imperialist" ones), the US Embassy in Guatemala, Spanish diplomatic or
business targets or some other high visibility group of individuals whose
killing or capture would attract wide media interest.
Other potential targets for left terrorist attack in the next weeks
might be one or more of the pro-constitutional, moderate and anti-Castro
senior officers of the Honduras military and/or Honduran military equipment
or facilities. Also, the social democratic and anti-communist President-elect
of Costa Rica, his family or close associates might 6e another potential target
for extreme left terrorists -- as a way of neutralizing and intimidating Costa
Rica. My sense is that the extreme left intends to use these four to six weeks
to bring about a surge of violence and propaganda which will make the defeat
of the guerrillas seem hopeless or much too expensive while encouraging the
mirage of negotiations as the "decent interval" and "way out" for the US.
2. E1 Salvador
Despite some reports of isolated military successes against the
guerrilla forces, the army appears basically to be fighting a holding action
and avoiding contact with the guerrillas. Arms are still flowing to the
guerrillas, and they probably have what they need to sustain increased attacks.
The guerrillas have laid ambitious plans to sabotage the elections, and even if
they are only partly successful, military morale could be hurt severely and the
momentum shift to the side of the guerrillas.
Thirteen mostly Latin American countries have indicated their
intention to send observers to the 28 March election, but most Europeans have
refrained. Recent political soundings in E1 Salvador suggest that support for the
right is mounting and that the Duarte government -- which has been plagued
increasingly by internal squabbling, graft, and finger-pointing -- may be
replaced by a conservative alliance. Under a new conservative government,
repression would be increased, agrarian reform curtailed, and US leverage could
be seriously diminished.
3. Guatemala
The guerrillas appear to be making some progress toward increasing
tactical military cooperation following their unity announcement earlier this
month. Analysts do not anticipate a major military offensive against the army
per se prior to the 7 March elections, but do expect increased terrorist acts
and further efforts to wear the military down and stretch out its forces.
Reporting also suggests that a large foreign terrorist action is
being planned in Central America in the next few weeks. The operation could
be related to guerrilla plans to disrupt elections in Guatemala or E1 Salvador;
US facilities and individuals would be prime targets.
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4. Nicaragua
The Nicaraguan military buildup continues. Anew airborne unit has
been established at Montelimar, and six AN-2 small transport aircraft were
recently acquired. Managua reportedly is planning to acquire two to four -~
Boeing 707-class transport and passenger planes, more helicopters and two to
four short takeoff and landing aircraft. Such acquisitions will significantly
increase Managua's ability to airlift military personnel and equipment.
Guerrilla exfiltration from Nicaragua had tapered off over the past
few months, but recent reports suggests that it now may be picking upo Several
unconfirmed reports suggest that large numbers of guerrillas are receiving
training at several camps in northwestern Nicaragua and possibly Costa Rica.
Further collection and analysis will be necessary before a meaningful estimate
can be made of how many guerrillas are being trained, the extent of Cuban or
other external involvement, when they might be exfiltrated, and into which
countries. Analysts are especially concerned, however, that the introduction
of a large body of newly trained guerrillas into ET Salvador could deal a
major, if not catastrophic, blow to the government.
We continue to receive reports of increased violence along Nicaragua's
border with Honduras. Nicaraguan forces are creating a well-fortified "cordon
sanitare", possibly 100 kilometers wide. At least eight villages -- and
possibly 20 to 30 -- have been burned to the ground, and the government has.
admitted to relocating 8,500 Miskito Indians away from the borders Such
relocation efforts are likely to continue, depopulating large portions of
northeastern Nicaragua. .At the same time, the Sandinistas are likely to launch.
a more vigorous anti-insurgent campaign and increase their support to terrorists
operating inside Honduras.
5. Costa Rica
Last month's election was a setback for the Communists. Although they
won four seats in the Assembly (up from three), the party polled fewer votes
in an election where 100,000 more people voted. This loss of support is likely
to strengthen the position of hardliners who want to foment unresto Meanwhile,
after the new government takes office in May, it can be expected to downgrade
its relations with Nicaragua and to reduce the Soviet presence in San Jose.
President-elect Monge recognizes Costa Rica's economic situation-and appears
committed to implementing IMF-mandated austerity measures. Nevertheless, such
action will lose him some popular support as well as some support within hiss
own party.
Soviet arms deliveries to Cuba continue at a high rate, with some
4,000 tons received in January. Assembly has begun on one of about 12 HI-24
(HIND) helicopters that were delivered last month. One additional MIG-2 3
fuselage crate has been observed raising the total known deliveries this year
to nine. Since last fall, the number of OSA naval patrol crafts also has
risen from 7 to 13. There is no evidence as yet that any of this equipment
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is earmarked for Nicaragua or that preparations are under way in Cuba to
transfer it to Nicaragua. Most analysts believe that Cuba would transfer
such sophisticated equipment to Nicaragua only if the Managua regime was
seriously threatened and Cuban forces were deployed as well. Under such
conditions, Havana probably could dispatch 20 or 30 MIG fighters without
seriously impending effectiveness of its own forces. Any helicopters would
have to be.shipped to Nicaragua; they cannot be flown. Moreover, Cuban
pilots probably need several more months training in the MI-24 helicopters
before they reach proficiency. The Cubans would be more likely to send naval
patrol boats to Nicaragua. Nicaragua needs more patrol boats, and Nicaraguans
receiving patrol boat training in Cuba should be returning to Nicaragua next
month.
Initial analysis of recent Soviet brigade exercise activity suggests
some trends that could be troubling: the activity began a couple of weeks
early, involved more locations (three) and extended for a longer period of
time. Moreover, Cuban bivouacs were observed close to two of the training
areas.
Cuban plans to counter Radio Marti with their own broadcast/jamming
network also were noted as likely to create serious problems for the US.
7. Suriname
The ouster of President Chin A Sen in Suriname has removed a very
important moderating influence from the leadership. Although some forces
for moderation remain, the events of the past few weeks have opened the door to a
more rapid (and possible irreversible) radicalization of the ru1i'ng clique. The
new government will certainly 6e more leftist in its orientation, and we expect
that much greater emphasis will be placed on indoctrinating the people in
radical left principles. Cuban influence is likely to grow, and there is some
real potential that Suriname will become another Cuban partner like Grenada.
However, some pro-Cuban leaders there may be wary of becoming too dependent
on the Cubans, and the country has more resources and a significantly higher
standard of living than Grenada.
8. Counting Procedures
Beginning this month, two tables will be attached to every warning
report summarizing guerrilla and government security force levels in selected
Central American countries. The numbers reflect coordinated intelligence
community estimates and will be revised at each monthly warning meeting.
Constantine C. Menges
Atts: (2)
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 CFIVTRAT. AMF.RTC`A- (;TTF.RRTT.T.A Ff1RC'F.S _ 1 AR7
Country
Category February March
April
M~
Attachment A 25X1
Unclasai-
Confidence Classi- fied
.Level* fication Number
Nicaragua**
Full-time
less than
D
2
"less thar.
guerrilla
1,000
1,000
Militia/
part-time
uerrilla
El Salvador
Full-time
4,500-
D
5,000
guerrilla
5,000
idiilitia/
5,000-
D
5,000-
part-time
10,000
10,000
uerrilla
Guatemala
Full-time
4,000-
D
4,500
guerrillas
5,000
Militia/
part-time
guerrillas
Honduras
Full-time
100
C
some
guerrillas
Militia/
M
?part-time
guerrillas
.-
i
* The confidence level ranges from A (highest level of confidence) to D (lo6-est level of confidence)
as follows:
.
A =
Uncertainty
is
less
than
20
percent.
B =
Uncertainty
is
less
than
35
percent.
C =
Uncertainty
is
less
than
50
percent.
D =
Uncertainty
is
greater than 50 percent. '
*+~ Anti-Sandinista forces operating mostly from Honduras.
cr.~nr_m
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Distribution:
1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - C/NIC
1 - NI.O/W
1 - DDI
1 - DDO
1 - NIO/AF
1 - NIO/EA
1 - NIO/GPF
1 - NIO/NESA
1 - NIO/AL
1 - NIO/USSR-EE
1 - NIO/WE
1 - NIO/SP
1 - NIO/E
1 - Senior Review Panel
1 - SA/NPI
1 - SA/CI
1 - D/OCO
1 - D/OCR
1 - D/SOVA
1 - D/ALA
1 - D/OIA
1 - D/NESA
1 - D/OEA
1 - D/OGI
1 - 0/OSWR
1 - D/NPIC
1 - C/CA/IAD
1 - D/OHC/ICS
1 - ER
1 - NFAC Reg
3 - NIO/LA
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